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preface
To visit the Palace of the Captain General on Havana’s Plaza de Armas today 
is to witness the most prominent stone- and mortar monument to the endur-
ing history of Spanish colonial rule in Cuba. Built in the eigh teenth century, 
the palace has served many purposes: as the home of the captain general, the 
highest- ranking Spanish offi  cial on the island; with Cuban in de pen dence, the 
home of the U.S. military governor aft er 1899; the home of the Cuban president 
until 1920; as the city hall, municipal archive, and fi nally a museum.1 Long 
since national in de pen dence in 1898, Cubans have resisted the infl uence of 
foreign powers, but the empire that built the palace as its nerve center has be-
come, with each successive transition, a less commanding symbol of imperial 
domination. Cubans have confronted problems that had their origins in 
slavery— economic de pen den cy and racial inequalities among them. Th e 
palace itself, though, is now associated with the trea sures of a bygone era. 
Walking through the palace today, it’s easy to underestimate the heft  of an 
empire that for almost four centuries variously inspired fear, resentment, and 
aff ection from its subjects.2
Fernando Ortiz, the foremost scholar of Cuba’s African dimension, knew 
this palace well. It was  here that the lawyer and anthropologist learned lasting 
lessons about the meaning of colonial rule to Cuba’s multiracial population. 
Ortiz spent his formative years in the Canary Islands before returning to Cuba 
when he was fourteen, just months before the fi nal war for in de pen dence 
erupted in February 1895. Within days of his arrival in Havana, his grandfather 
took him to the palace to catch a glimpse of Arsenio Martínez Campos, the 
once and future reform- minded captain general known for negotiating with 
rebels over the course of a three- decade insurgency. Such conciliation pro-
voked nothing but contempt in the grandfather, a staunchly conservative sup-
porter of Spain. When Martínez Campos entered the room, the grandfather 
whispered into young Fernando’s ear, “Look well at his face; he is a mulatto 
from Guanabacoa” (see fi gure P.1).3
Figure P.1 • Arsenio Martínez Campos, ca. 1870. Courtesy of Prints and 
Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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Never say never, but it would be surprising if Martínez Campos— who was 
born in Segovia, Spain, and whose well- documented rise through the ranks 
of a mostly segregated military led him to high offi  ce— was either of African 
descent or from a marginal Havana suburb.4 But this was how the elder Ortiz 
made sense of the openness toward those who fought for national in de pen-
dence, all of whom he assumed to be black or mulatto—“as if being a rebel 
was proof that one was colored,” his grandson later noted. Th is episode also 
illustrates the central topic of this book: the relationships imagined between 
po liti cal allegiance and racial identity.
Fernando Ortiz would eventually dismiss the far- fetched theory as an old 
man’s prejudices, although he still observed that the captain general “looked 
and he seemed to me somewhat like a light- skinned mulatto.” In the same 
chamber aft er Cuban in de pen dence, Ortiz recounted this anecdote to Tomás 
Estrada Palma, the fi rst president of the Cuban Republic (see fi gure P.2). Es-
trada Palma dismissed with “unforgettable amiability” the story about his co-
lonial pre de ces sor: “Now all that has fi nished; in Free Cuba we are now all of 
the same color.”5 And this was the idea that Ortiz reiterated in a speech deliv-
ered in that very same space (in what was now the Municipal Palace) in 1943. 
Figure P.2 • Palace of the Captain General, Havana, ca. 1895. Courtesy of Cuban 
Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries.
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He located the writings of in de pen dence leader José Martí at the heart of a 
vision of the Cuban nation that transcended the racial divisions created un-
der colonial rule. He also acknowledged that many Cubans of color in the 
nineteenth century found it logical to support a national project that placed 
being Cuban above blackness or whiteness. Th is was an idea developed in 
writing by Martí and others and in practice within a diverse liberation army, 
and it is a national racial ideology that still today stands as one of the most 
remarked- upon features of the island— one with analogs in many other areas 
of Latin America.
Although this book began as a social history of those ideas, early discoveries 
in Cuban archives shift ed attention to another intriguing intersection of race 
and politics: how ordinary Cubans expressed support not for national in de-
pen dence but for the Spanish colonial government, how that government un-
evenly cultivated and reciprocated that support, and how African- descended 
Cubans fi gured prominently among its adherents.  Here was a story of po liti-
cal allegiance running parallel to the narrative of raceless nationalism cham-
pioned by Martí, Ortiz, and many other people who wove it into the fabric of 
Cuban history. Once I started to tug at the thread of argument about pro- 
colonial loyalty, that fabric began to unravel. Basic understandings about the 
nature of Spanish imperialism, African slavery, colonial racial hierarchies, 
liberalism, and national citizenship all begged for revision.
How, then, are we to reconcile such divergent forms of po liti cal allegiance, 
or to account for a phenomenon that confounds the anti- imperialist orienta-
tions of so many struggles against racial in e qual ity? Scholars have acknowl-
edged that the Spanish government had cultivated that support and extended 
limited rights and privileges, but they have generally understood it either as 
exclusive to Cubans of full Spanish ancestry or as false consciousness: a 
“ divide and rule” policy, as Ortiz called it, an “im mense social lottery” designed 
to keep most Cubans of color “distracted and diverted from fundamental 
grievances.” Ortiz did not dwell on the question of why Cubans of color 
might have affi  rmed colonial rule. In his speech of 1943, he briefl y explained 
it as an elite aff air. “Doubtless there existed in Cuba that select group of 
colored people whose personal interests  were selfi shly interlocked in the high 
wheels of the colonial government,” he argued, insisting that most of those 
individuals “were mulattoes with hidden or unconcealed family connections, 
favored by privileges; mulattoes of blood tinged with blue by amorous rela-
tions that placed ebony patches on the noble Castilian heraldry; and mulat-
toes of blood turned yellow by the embrace of the dark- colored girl with the 
man who was the color of his gold coins.”6 Like his grandfather, Ortiz associ-
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ated po liti cal allegiance to one cause or another as being linked to blood, 
ancestry, and color: the key concepts that gave meaning to the idea of race 
in Cuba.
Certainly, Ortiz was on to something when he linked mixed ancestry to 
the consolidation of empire. Since the earliest years of the Spanish presence 
in the Americas, strategic marriages to native elites and the Hispanization of 
mixed peoples helped make Spanish legal and social norms hegemonic.7 Yet 
it is no more persuasive to assume that support for Spanish rule was limited 
to Spanish ancestry than to assume that Arsenio Martínez Campos’s conces-
sions to rebels meant that he was a mulatto passing for white. Nor was loyalty 
to Spain limited to those who derived economic privileges from colonial rule. 
Indeed, many wealthy Cubans preferred the stability of Spanish rule to the 
uncertainties of in de pen dence, but so did many other Cubans, and for a wide 
variety of reasons. Neither economic opportunity nor Spanish descent fully 
explains pop u lar support for a colonial government that survived mainland 
Spanish American in de pen dence by many de cades.
Th is book argues that alongside per sis tent associations of pro- colonial sen-
timent with Cuba’s white population lay a conception of race and loyalty that 
allowed Cubans of African descent— slave and free— to be included in colonial 
politics as faithful, if unequal, subjects. Reconstructing this history requires 
looking beyond the dramas that unfolded in the captain general’s palace and 
the imposing mansions of Cubans whose wealth derived from the island’s 
sugar economy, which was built on slave labor. Th e history of race and loyalty 
is also to be found in bustling meeting halls and public squares across the 
island, on plantations transformed into battlefi elds, and in the barracks of mi-
litia soldiers and war time recruits. Th ese spaces became the staging grounds 
for mutual and reciprocal interests articulated by the Spanish government and 
its subjects. Although the focus of the book is primarily on people of African 
descent, it is more than a social history of those black and mulatto Cubans who 
explicitly supported the continuation of Spanish rule; it asks broader questions 
about the centrality of race to the maintenance of the Spanish empire in its 
fi nal de cades in the Americas. In doing so, it questions the neat divide com-
monly drawn between colonial and national racial ideologies in Cuba and, 
by extension, po liti cal strategies of African- descended Cubans based on 
identifi cations as subjects of an empire or as citizens of a liberal nation- state. 
Chronicling individuals caught between competing racial identities, colonial 
identity as subjects of the Spanish empire, and race- transcendent national 
identity, this book explains how Cubans of many diff erent backgrounds 
shaped the politics of Spain’s “ever- faithful isle.”
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I follow the history of race and loyalty along two principal axes. Military 
ser vice represented one of the most conspicuous opportunities to demonstrate 
loyalty in colonial Cuba. Free men of African descent had served the Spanish 
empire in militias since the sixteenth century, and membership conferred so-
cial status and legal privileges recognized by colonials of all backgrounds. 
Yet militias encountered patchy support by Spanish offi  cials and free people 
of color alike in the early nineteenth century. Aft er the Haitian Revolution 
(1791– 1804) and in de pen dence wars in mainland Latin America, for example, 
colonial offi  cials doubted more than ever the wisdom of arming potentially 
rebellious groups. It was not until the outbreak of the fi rst major anticolonial 
insurrection, the Ten Years’ War (1868– 1878), that military ser vice regained its 
earlier importance to defi ning loyalty, and some free men mobilized to defend 
Spain against the rebels. Th e Spanish government also off ered slaves an incen-
tive to support the empire as it initiated the gradual pro cess of slave emancipa-
tion: those who fought for the Spanish in the insurrection could receive their 
freedom. Field interrogations of slave- soldiers juxtaposed pop u lar and offi  cial 
understandings of loyalty that determined whether or not a slave would be 
freed, uncovering, in the pro cess, assumptions about the will and ability of 
slaves to be loyal subjects.
As a result of the po liti cal reforms that followed the Ten Years’ War, many 
more African- descended Cubans asserted their allegiance to Spanish rule, in 
part because they encountered new opportunities for doing so. Th e second 
axis on which I plot race and loyalty tracks the spaces of their public articula-
tion, which expanded signifi cantly in the late nineteenth century. Th e Span-
ish state sanctioned the formation of po liti cal parties, and it loosened 
restrictions on press and association. Cubans of color quickly asserted their 
presence in this burgeoning public sphere by invoking their loyalty to the 
government that made it possible. Since 1812, when a constitution draft ed by 
the besieged Spanish government radically expanded the citizenship rights 
of select Spanish American men, colonial and metropolitan liberals had 
struggled to contain the demands of African- descended and indigenous 
 people within the Spanish system— notably through censorship and control of 
public spaces. Reforms aft er the Ten Years’ War represented a turning point. 
Th us, the book moves from the hot, crowded theaters in small towns that 
hosted po liti cal party meetings to the ceremonious patriotic clubs in Havana 
where Cubans of color delivered fl orid speeches, attended by colonial offi  -
cials, that called for slave emancipation and clearer voting rights. In the late 
1880s, the slow steps toward an integrated postemancipation society pro-
voked frustration among many African- descended Cubans who had deferred 
Preface • xiii
protest in good faith. Spanish po liti cal concessions buckled under social pres-
sure for wider inclusion, and by the War of In de pen dence between 1895 and 
1898, the separatist movement’s explicit commitment to antiracism had done 
much to displace pop u lar loyalty to Spain, particularly among Cubans of 
color.
Th is is a book about the ideological foundations of empire, about reexam-
ining the central themes of Cuban history, and about a prominent but under-
explored phenomenon in the po liti cal history of the African diaspora. At the 
heart of the history of race and imperial loyalty is the interplay between an 
early iteration of Spanish national citizenship and an older form of subjectiv-
ity as a loyal vassal of the monarch. Th is is a story of their confl ict, but also of 
their interdependence.
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Introduction
A Faithful Account of Colonial Racial Politics
At the top of most pieces of offi  cial correspondence in nineteenth- century 
Cuba, from statistics on sugar harvests to investigations of slave unrest, was a 
seal or letterhead hailing “La siempre fi el isla,” the ever- faithful isle. Cuba’s 
loyalty to the Spanish empire became one of its defi ning attributes during the 
Age of Revolutions. Travel accounts repeated and reproduced the “ever faith-
ful” motto, as did leading writers throughout the century. By the time that 
Fernando VII of Spain formally bestowed Cuba with the siempre fi el title in 
1824, people had described the island with the phrase for de cades.
Perhaps the title protested too much. In the wake of successful in de pen-
dence movements in mainland Spanish America from Mexico to Argentina, 
Cuba, along with Puerto Rico and the Philippines, stood as the remnants of 
what at the beginning of the nineteenth century had been second only to Rus-
sia as the world’s largest empire. As Cuban sugar production grew to global 
dominance during that century— enabled by the vast expansion of African 
slavery— Spain was as eager for the island to remain in its imperial orbit as 
Cubans themselves  were sharply divided about their po liti cal future. Anxiety 
about maintaining the colonial relationship explained, in part, the spread of the 
“ever- faithful” motto, adapted to designate cities that  were fi delísimas (super- 
faithful) and printed atop the lottery tickets that optimistic Cubans tucked 
away in their pockets. Its ubiquity guaranteed nothing in terms of people’s po-
liti cal allegiance, but neither did it lack symbolic value. In 1899, one year aft er 
the conclusion of the thirty- year struggle for Cuba’s national in de pen dence, 
court documents still written on the Spanish government’s letterhead had the 
coat of arms punched out of them, leaving a gaping hole at the top of the page.1
So much talk of loyalty does not entirely square with common historical 
associations pertaining to Cuba, namely, the rebellions and revolutions that 
have given shape to its unique po liti cal culture. Today, at the Museo de la Revo-
lución in Havana, the narrative of the Cuban Revolution begins with the re sis-
tance of African slaves in the nineteenth century. But at a time in the Atlantic 
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world when anticolonial movements in Eu rope’s American colonies gave rise 
to new national states and the promise (if not the uniform practice) of liberal 
citizenship, Cuba did not experience revolutionary upheaval and, in fact, pros-
pered greatly as a colony. Cuba’s loyalty to Spain was not the outcome of the 
wishful thinking of the Spanish government, no matter how per sis tent ly it 
affi  rmed the ever- faithful island. Nor was repressive violence the lone expla-
nation. Th at allegiance depended on the support of Cubans and on the perva-
sive ideas about race that shaped Cuban society.
Th is book attempts to understand that support from the inside out: not as 
an aberration of Cuban history, nor as a pothole in the road to national in de-
pen dence and citizenship— the benchmarks of po liti cal modernity— but as a 
meaningful po liti cal relationship that expressed mutual and reinforcing inter-
ests between the Spanish state and Cuban society. Moreover, loyalty to colonial 
rule did not slowly fi zzle throughout the nineteenth century, paving the way for 
the empire’s demise. In fact, at the end of the nineteenth century, pop u lar ex-
pressions of allegiance found new means of expression that had been stifl ed 
earlier, when colonial authorities more strictly policed spaces for public delib-
eration and limited citizenship based on race as well as colonial status (and on 
gender, age, and many other criteria). Th e fact that these spaces allowed, and 
sometimes encouraged, the participation of Cubans of African descent helped 
bind together ideas about po liti cal inclusion and social subordination.
figure I.1 • Cuban lottery ticket, 1840. Private collection.
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Scholars of Spanish and Portuguese American in de pen dence have gone to 
great lengths in recent years to explain the multiple contingencies that con-
verged to eff ect the end of Iberian rule.2 With a few exceptions, colonial Latin 
America at the beginning of the nineteenth century was no powder keg, no 
combustible mess of tensions and contradictions caused by the worst aspects 
of colonial rule. Still, the general absence of anticolonial fervor in the Spanish 
Ca rib be an perplexed the great liberator of Spanish America, Simón Bolívar: 
“But aren’t the people of those islands Americans? Are they not oppressed? Do 
they not desire their own happiness?” he wrote from Jamaica in 1815.3 Pop u lar 
support for the Spanish empire in Cuba, even if it appeared counterintuitive 
to Bolívar and still does to many people today, is a topic that pushes us to re-
consider much of what recent scholarship has made visible: the agency of 
African- descended people, the relationship of racial ideology to empire and 
nationalism, and the ascendancy of the nation- state as the outcome of po liti-
cal struggles in the nineteenth- century Americas.
Loyalty, Race, and Slavery
In many ways, histories of race and loyalty in Cuba are nothing new. Race has 
long fi gured prominently as an explanation of Cuba’s “ever faithful” po liti cal 
culture during the nineteenth century. By far the most common argument 
has cited white Cubans’ fears of racial reprisal as the African slave population 
increased to accommodate the explosive growth of the sugarcane industry. 
John Lynch, for example, writes that “slave revolt was so fearful a prospect 
that creoles  were loathe to leave the shelter of imperial government and break 
ranks with the dominant whites unless there was a viable alternative.” 4 Other 
scholars, too, have put the decision- making power in the hands of the island’s 
economic elite. Th is focus makes sense, given the considerable power that the 
elite held both locally and in their negotiations with the crown for the con-
cessions that enabled the expansion of the slave trade and sugar cultivation. 
Capital oft en superseded, controlled, and coincided with the interests of state, 
and not surprisingly the Spanish empire functioned in ways that distributed 
power to those who profi ted from the island’s agricultural enterprises. In 
other words, the choice (to the extent that it could be chosen) between colo-
nial rule and national in de pen dence was one made by a small segment of the 
island’s white population, one with deep investments in the stability of 
the  growing slave society.5 A thin echelon of privileged Cubans benefi ted 
both from the coercive and violent powers of the Spanish state and by the 
state’s delegation of coercive and violent powers to slaveowners. Th e loyalty of 
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the white elite postponed national in de pen dence, as common arguments go, 
and other Cubans endured the mechanisms of social control imposed by the 
Spanish government, especially those designed to regulate slavery, capture 
runaway slaves, suppress rebellions, and limit po liti cal discourse.
Th is interpretation is persuasive. But by widening the frame of Cuban his-
tory to examine race and loyalty in the context of Spanish America and the 
African diaspora, more expansive arguments become visible. Instead of lo-
cating support for Spain primarily in the Spanish and creole population, and 
linking them to a par tic u lar class experience, historians of the Americas have 
found the support of ordinary colonials, including those of indigenous and 
African ancestry, critical in explaining the trajectories of colonial and repub-
lican rule. Jorge Domínguez notes “the enormous variety of reasons why a 
great many people in Spanish America across the economic hierarchies and 
the color spectrum resisted those who clamored for in de pen dence and oft en 
fought with their blood and guts” against it.6 Attention to pop u lar politics 
has not simply made visible a wider cast of actors; it has also revealed how 
racial ideology shaped projects of in de pen dence, royalism, and many other 
imagined po liti cal communities whose possibilities have been rendered in-
visible by a near single- minded focus on the formation of national states.
Th us the title phrase “ends of empire.” Rather than identifying the genera-
tion of wealth for planters and the Spanish state as the sole end, or goal, of the 
imperial project, this book emphasizes the multiple reasons that empire lasted 
so long in Cuba, namely because so many individuals looked to colonial rule 
to attain a wide variety of ends. Among those aims fi gured formal member-
ship in a po liti cal community that was sometimes inclusive of (but never ex-
hausted by) the idea of liberal citizenship. We can also understand the ends 
of empire to refer to its limits or extremities. Indeed, the history of loyalty in 
Cuba cannot be told as one of unqualifi ed success. One of the reasons that 
the concept held so much value throughout the nineteenth century was be-
cause at some point just about everyone expressed discontent with Spanish 
rule on the island. Th ey discovered and tested the limits of empire— where 
their loyalty began and ended— including the question of whether Cubans of 
African descent could be considered, and know themselves to be, loyal sub-
jects. Finally, the ends of empire are obviously chronological. No single year 
marked the end of the Spanish empire, as various areas of Spanish territory 
declared in de pen dence at diff erent times. Moreover, the many new nations 
that emerged during the nineteenth century felt the eff ects of colonial rule 
long aft er its formal conclusion. And of course, empire in Cuba did not end in 
1898 with victory against Spain in the in de pen dence war; the intervention of 
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the United States at the end of the confl ict signaled a new imperial presence that 
operated on new terms. Th us, the goals and limits of Spanish imperialism in 
Cuba intersect with the chronological questions of why empire didn’t end 
earlier and how it eventually did.
Looking to beginnings, in contrast, the importance of pop u lar support for 
Eu ro pe an rule in the colonial Americas had almost always been necessary for 
the establishment of empire, and for much of the colonial period that support 
coalesced around the fi gure of the benevolent and protective monarch.7 De-
pending on their legal and social status as slaves, free people, Indians, or 
women and children, individuals assumed to be inferior could lay claim to 
royal benefaction by occupying a subject position as humble and loyal sub-
jects with aff ective ties to empire. For example, Eric Van Young has argued about 
New Spain that “in the Spanish colony as one descended the social pyramid 
and found one’s self in a countryside still predominantly indigenous in 
makeup, the sign of the tyrannous monarch reversed itself into that of the 
defender of his most humble subjects, who became the object of messianic fer-
vor.”8 At the same time, assumptions (and inventions) of indigenous alle-
giance to the Spanish system allowed in de pen dence supporters to cast Indians 
as backward and unfi t for the Mexican nation.9 Th e protective ethos could be 
extended as well to the multiple holders of sovereignty in the colonial world: 
colonial offi  cials in Spain and in the colonies at the level of vice- royalties, 
captaincies general, provinces and towns, and even slaveowners. Native elites 
whose claims to nobility  were backed by Spanish authority found strategic 
reasons to support colonialism: Andean peasants in the Ayacucho region ar-
ticulated alternatives to the nascent Peruvian state in the language of loyalty 
to the Spanish crown.10 Slaves in New Granada identifi ed themselves “his 
Majesty’s slaves” in a petition at the end of the eigh teenth century, and racial 
hierarchies there relaxed as the Bourbon state recognized the po liti cal bene-
fi ts of affi  rming slaves’ claims to honor and respect.11 With the arrival of the 
Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, Brazilian slaves used royal courts 
to advance petitions for freedom, which, though they  were rarely successful, 
affi  rmed the authority of the monarch over that of slave own ers.12 And Spanish 
offi  cials actively sought the military support of African- descended subjects, 
both free and enslaved, during the South American wars for in de pen dence. 
For some free men, this extended their ser vice in free- colored militias and, 
for some slaves, it represented an opportunity for freedom.13
Th e cumulative impact of these histories encourages a reexamination of 
the racial politics of Cuban loyalty to Spanish rule. Th is need not negate the 
signifi cance of Cuba’s Spanish and creole leaders, whose class interests and 
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racial anxieties informed their own allegiance. Rather, it opens up new possi-
bilities for understanding the role of race in nineteenth- century Cuban soci-
ety, and it broadens a fi eld of politics typically divided into discrete colonial 
and national units. Indisputably, most Cubans of African descent regularly 
confronted discrimination, violence, and legal subordination under colonial 
rule. Many (oft en those who  were legally free) also found opportunities for 
membership and mobility in Spanish institutions. Separate militia units com-
posed of free black and mulatto men, for example, had existed in some Cuban 
towns since the sixteenth century. Th e mass arrivals of African slaves in the 
late eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries dwarfed but never extinguished 
the communities of relatively prosperous free people of color, particularly in 
urban areas. Cabildos and cofradías, lay brotherhoods and mutual aid orga-
nizations, gave sanctioned institutional structure to organizations of free 
and enslaved Cubans of color that sometimes preserved African ethnic des-
ignations.14 No wonder, then, that the slaves living in the copper- mining 
community of El Cobre, in eastern Cuba, experienced a highly conditional 
freedom once the crown confi scated derelict mines. A direct line to royal 
authority allowed the “royal slaves” to make claims based on their professed 
loyalty to their king and master. Slaves in the early nineteenth century acted 
on rumors of emancipation by royal authority, a phenomenon that Matt Childs 
terms “rebellious royalism.”15 None of these aspects of Cuban society guaran-
teed loyalty to Spanish rule, but they off ered status linked to, and not in defi -
ance of, putatively subordinating racial identifi cations. Th e principal contrast 
between pro- colonial allegiance in nineteenth- century Cuba and the earlier 
examples in Iberian America is that the fi gure of the monarch held much 
less purchase as the embodiment of Spanish justice. Dramatic transforma-
tions in Spanish politics throughout the century made forms of republican 
government— the Cortes (the parliament), various constitutions, and even 
po liti cal parties— a more visible signifi er of Spanish sovereignty and the pos-
sibility of rights, citizenship, and inclusion.
Running throughout these developments, the po liti cal question of whether 
Cubans of color could express loyalty to Spanish rule was inextricably bound 
up with the social realm, particularly the quotidian experience of slavery. 
“Humility, obedience, loyalty,” wrote Brazilian historian Katia Mattoso; “these 
 were the cornerstones of the slave’s new life.” Indexing the terms by which the 
“good slave” could “acquire the know- how” to improve her or his situation, 
Mattoso makes clear the paternalistic values common to many slave societies 
in the Americas, Cuba included.16 Th is idealized relationship has played a 
complicated role in depictions of slavery in the Americas, and it conditioned 
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thinking about obedience and loyalty in its po liti cal forms. Countless fi ctional 
accounts contain stock characters of docile and loyal slaves who accept their 
conditions uncritically and sometimes continue to work for their masters 
aft er their freedom.17 In the United States, the fi gure of Uncle Tom in Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) has been transposed, inaccu-
rately, as a condescending ste reo type for African Americans’ passive ac cep-
tance of discrimination. Narratives about faithful slaves content with slavery 
and loathe to challenge their legal status, much less po liti cal rule, proliferated 
when slavery was in full swing. Th ey lived on in subsequent histories to be 
memorialized in ways that reproduced and mollifi ed the inequalities wrought 
by slavery.18 Th us, historians in their wake faced an uphill historiographic 
battle in documenting the re sis tance of the enslaved and free to the inequali-
ties they faced.19
Th e fi gure of the loyal slave captured the attention of Cubans as well dur-
ing the nineteenth century. At their most idealistic, Cuban planters linked 
the hierarchy between colony and metropole to the hierarchy between mas-
ters and slaves, even using the risky rhetorical strategy of decrying unfair 
conditions under colonial rule as enslavement. Assurances of colonial stabil-
ity could link royal and private authority through evidence of slaves’ sup-
posed loyalty. Writing to the king in 1790, a group of planters recalled the 
widespread fl ight of slaves during the occupation of Havana by the British in 
1762– 63. But “once Your Majesty’s august father was restored,” they argued, 
“the slaves themselves sought us out on their own, under no undue infl uence 
or persuasion (fugitives, criminals, and the wicked excepted).” Spanish benev-
olence also explained to them why freed slaves oft en continued working on 
the same sugar estates, which they would never have done “if those very same 
own ers had been such tyrants.”20 Th e fantasy of the submissive slave, as Sib-
ylle Fischer has noted of Cuban literature, gained par tic u lar resonance in the 
aft ermath of the Haitian Revolution and, in that fantasy’s sublimation of black 
agency, could have shaped the po liti cal imagination of the creole elite. “Th e 
possibility of Cuban autonomy and in de pen dence,” she argues, “depends on 
the suppression of black insurrection and the substitution of aff ective, vol-
untary submission through brute force.”21 A main goal of this book is to re-
visit questions of race and loyalty without assuming aff ective and voluntary 
submission as fact but seeing its fi guration as central to Cuban racial poli-
tics. Th at Cubans of all backgrounds could express support for colonial 
rule does not imply that they did so based exclusively on their whiteness, 
blackness, wealth, poverty, and so on. Th ey did, however, express that sup-
port frequently through language that drew on deeply entrenched ideas 
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about social status, hierarchy, and belonging— including the idea of the 
loyal slave.
Th e signifi cance of this story to the history of the African diaspora cannot 
be understated, even if it can be diffi  cult to document. Enslaved Africans and 
their descendants constituted one of the populations that felt the in e qual ity, 
violence, and exclusion of imperialism most severely in the Americas. But 
they also, against the odds, formed bonds of community, po liti cal in nature 
and sometimes drawing on iconographic vocabularies of monarchical rule 
and empire. Anthropologist Lorand Matory acknowledges that “the people 
of the black Atlantic never simply embraced nation- states as suffi  cient indices 
of their collective identities.” His insights into Afro- Brazilian religious prac-
tices confi rm that the transnational pro cesses that defi ne the African diaspora 
perhaps best demonstrate that “territorial jurisdictions have never monopo-
lized the loyalty of the citizens and subjects that they claim, and they are 
never the sole founts of authority or agents of constraint in such people’s 
lives.”22 Alternative conceptions of community in the diaspora have oft en been 
expressed in idioms of culture and religion, and to great eff ect.23 But what 
about politics? To the extent that these frames can be discrete, scholarship 
about the African diaspora has focused on culture more than politics. To 
take seriously, as historian Steven Hahn describes them, “the po liti cal tenden-
cies of self- determination and self- defense” in the history of African Ameri-
cans (imagined hemispherically) is to allow the possibility of imperial affi  liations 
in their multifaceted struggles for freedom.24 It is also an invitation to move 
past plotting royalist or monarchist ideologies along a spectrum that renders 
them archaic and retrograde in relation to liberal and national forms, and to 
consider instead a hidden history of modern politics based on earlier tradi-
tions of community and belonging.25
Empires, Nations, and Liberal Subjects
What does it mean to be loyal to an empire? From the vantage point of the 
twenty- fi rst century, questions of patriotism and po liti cal allegiance usually 
target nation- states, while dismissing pro- colonial affi  nities as the misfi res of 
historical subjects acting against their interests: dupes, victims, collabora-
tors.26 On closer inspection, answers for the two po liti cal forms can be strik-
ingly similar when placed side by side. Asking how loyalty to an empire diff ers 
from loyalty to a nation- state implies, at least in part, that the two po liti cal 
forms are mutually exclusive; this was not the case in nineteenth- century Cuba. 
In the context of the Americas, singling out imperial loyalty as a historical 
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“problem” reinforces an assumed evolutionary progression from colonial 
rule to national in de pen dence, or at least to po liti cal affi  liations that are 
non- or postimperial. Th ose assumptions do not originate with contempo-
rary scholars. Cuban intellectual Father Félix Varela, for example, wrote in 
1824 that what ever support existed for King Ferdinand VII of Spain would 
never survive the march of progress: “Whether Fernando wants it or not, and 
regardless of the opinion of his vassals on the island of Cuba, the country’s 
revolution is inevitable.”27 Th e unavoidability of national in de pen dence rou-
tinely implies that “bad” po liti cal traditions originated with colonial rule and 
that the “good” ones emerged with nation- states, even when their ideals of 
national rights and citizenship are not fully realized.
Th e point  here is not that colonial rule was good or bad for the Cubans 
who lived under it, or better or worse than a national government. One pur-
pose of this book is to broadly explore what po liti cal practices colonial rule 
enabled and suppressed, who could practice them, and the criteria for deter-
mining that “who.” My approach stands in contrast to histories of late Span-
ish colonialism that adopt the frame of nation- states (and their anachronistic 
postcolonial names such as Mexico, the Dominican Republic, or Bolivia) and 
work backward to trace the historical events that led to the successful realiza-
tion of nations. Instead, I take up Frederick Cooper’s challenge to consider 
“what it meant for a polity to think like an empire, to conjugate incorporation 
and diff erentiation, to confront problems of long- distance extension and rec-
ognize limits of control over large and diverse populations.”28 Th inking like 
an empire was not limited to its po liti cal and economic elites, and it helps 
explain why the Spanish might have cultivated and received the support of 
ordinary Cubans.
Th is approach to empire also restores some contingency to Cuban his-
tory by avoiding easy assumptions that the island’s trajectory was delayed 
or out of step, that opposition to Spanish rule was the default position of most 
Cubans, or that Cuban nationalism was the sole engine of pop u lar politics 
in the nineteenth century. Ada Ferrer, Jorge Ibarra, and Francisco Pérez 
Guzmán, among others, have thoroughly demonstrated that the path to 
Cuban in de pen dence was by no means preordained; nor was the race- 
transcendent vision that developed within it and became central to its pur-
pose.29 Th e dramatic transformations that accompanied the in de pen dence 
movement occurred alongside, in reaction to, and sometimes in the shad-
ows of changes happening within a Spanish polity by no means slowly fi z-
zling out over the course of the century. Seeing the dynamism of Spanish 
rule brings even the struggle for Cuban in de pen dence into sharper view as 
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one of multiple and overlapping po liti cal projects that attracted pop u lar 
support.
Extending to Cubans public rights already enjoyed by citizens in Spain, for 
example, marked a change in the late nineteenth century from earlier poli-
cies that excluded Cubans from the promises of Spanish liberalism. Th inking 
like an empire, it turns out, was complicated when Spaniards thought simul-
taneously like a nation.30 Cubans experienced the tensions between nation 
and empire acutely as their status shift ed with the winds of Spanish constitu-
tional politics. Th e Constitution of 1812 embraced liberal principles earlier 
than most other Eu ro pe an constitutions, and its defi nition of citizenship in the 
Spanish nation— which included the indigenous inhabitants of Spanish Amer-
ica but not those of African descent— drew on liberalism as well as early 
modern Castilian notions of citizenship and belonging.31 Th e promise of those 
rights in Cuba was unevenly fulfi lled in the years when the constitution was 
in eff ect (1812– 14, 1820– 23), and even when a new constitution in 1836 explic-
itly excluded the colonies, aspirations toward Spanish citizenship— by the 
end of the century, particularly among Cuban men of color— contrasted 
sharply with the imagined citizenship of an in de pen dent Cuba. It also con-
trasted with the privileges and incentives extended to imperial subjects, 
which had a long history in Spanish America. It required Cubans to imagine 
the reciprocities of pro- colonial loyalty in Cuba in terms of both citizenship 
and rights, on one hand, and privileges and protections, on the other.
If Cuban in de pen dence was not the universal aspiration of the island’s 
inhabitants, and if slavery and racial hierarchies (to say nothing of gender 
distinctions) shut out many inhabitants from claiming Spanish citizenship, 
there was still another path to po liti cal personhood and belonging: the forms 
of public expression predicated on the in e qual ity, subordination, and vulnera-
bility of being a colonial subject. Th roughout the book, I refer to this path, and 
the kinds of subjects idealized by the Spanish state and Cubans themselves, as 
loyal subjectivity.32 Cubans of color, slave and free, could inhabit loyal subjec-
tivity because of, and not despite, the so- called “defects” of their status.
Th at this mode of po liti cal expression infused discussions of citizenship 
and rights invites a dialogue with scholars of mainland Iberian in de pen dence 
who have recognized the colonial moorings of putatively “national” forms of 
repre sen ta tion, sovereignty, legitimacy, and inclusion. Excessive attention to 
the burden of the Spanish past on Latin American nation- states compounded 
the region’s problem of per sis tence, as Jeremy Adelman has called it, and histo-
rians of Latin America have balanced attention between the infl uences of 
Spanish structures and ideas and the innovativeness of experiments with 
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liberal citizenship following in de pen dence.33 Cuba can thus be seen as cen-
tral, rather than peripheral, to the po liti cal history of Latin America in the 
nineteenth century if we understand, following Adelman, that “the ambigui-
ties of sovereignty could not be easily dissimulated in visions of nationhood 
or po liti cal power without the existence of previous deep- seated ideologies to 
justify them.”34 Loyalty to Spanish rule was always about more than strategic 
calculations and anxiety about radical change. It was imbued with long- 
standing principles of po liti cal membership expressed aff ectively and whose 
traces remained long aft er in de pen dence.
Th ose principles  were by no means unique to Cuba or to the Spanish em-
pire. Given my interest in a diasporic population and a form of politics ex-
ceeding a national frame (whether Cuban or Spanish), Ever Faithful should not 
be read as a story of Cuban exceptionalism. Th e major themes of the book also 
fi nd parallels in Anglophone, Lusophone, and Francophone colonial histo-
ries. And, as Rebecca Scott notes, Cuba was among many slave societies that 
experienced “pervasive uncertainty over whether persons held as property 
could, in practice, also be colonial subjects deserving of protection.”35 If colo-
nial loyalty might appear anachronistic within the history of Cuban national-
ism, it should appear downright typical in the context of the Ca rib be an, where 
the British empire held on until the 1980s, Martinique and Guadeloupe are still 
departments of France, and the historical presence of the United States chal-
lenges easy declarations of the end of empire. Spanish attempts to merge lib-
eral principles with imperial practices exposed the limits of Cuban po liti cal 
inclusion, particularly around questions of race and slavery. Th ose attempts 
also resemble other forms of imperial citizenship more closely associated with 
French and British rule during the period.36 Loyal subjects  were ubiquitous in 
Eu rope’s African, Asian, and Ca rib be an colonies, and they  were more than 
understudies in the per for mance of liberal politics; they shared the stage, 
and sometimes even roles, with national citizens.
Writing a History of Loyalty
Histories of the people, politics, and culture of Cuba and the African diaspora 
have for de cades circled around the theme of re sis tance. Given the weighty 
legacies of slavery, imperialism, capitalism, and their attendant violence, it is of 
little surprise that attention has focused on challenges to those deep struc-
tures. Historians have read sources “against the grain” to emphasize the visi-
bility of people who openly contested their exclusion from power. But what 
about when those people didn’t? Rebellion, revolt, and revolution have been 
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privileged modes of identifying subaltern agency— including African Ameri-
can politics— with the eff ect that disloyalty is far better understood than loy-
alty. If the latter may hold less appeal for its associations with conservative or 
accommodationist politics, attending to it may loosen the tight connection 
drawn between re sis tance and agency.37 Yet attempts to historicize loyalty 
run afoul of formidable methodological hurdles.
Perhaps the most signifi cant problem lies in the sources themselves. To 
the extent that pro- Spanish loyalty represented a normative po liti cal position 
against which others  were contrasted, it oft en went unmarked in the his-
torical record— no head counts, no lengthy theorizing, and no generous doc-
umentation produced within a fully formed social movement. At the same 
time, there is the ever- present “Ever Faithful” emblem marked on offi  cial cor-
respondence. Its pervasiveness does not prove its sincerity any more than 
signing “sincerely” at the end of correspondence today. But fi ltering it out as 
an irrelevant formality glosses the power relations that shape the material 
production and reception of documents. Recipients of royal decrees in Span-
ish America ritually kissed the royal seal on the document and then held it 
above their heads to acknowledge the monarch’s authority.38 As Kathryn Burns 
writes of colonial notarial templates, “knowing something about the formulae 
one encounters in the archive is as useful as having some insight into the re-
lations between the parties involved.”39 Th e struggles of colonial offi  cials 
charged with maintaining Cuba’s fi delity come into sharp relief when they 
entertained the possibility of extending privileges to African- descended Cu-
bans per sis tent ly characterized as rebellious and unfi t for po liti cal participa-
tion. How well can an offi  cial report, then, index po liti cal subjectivity when 
both the language of loyalty and the language of re sis tance may be so com-
monplace as to overdetermine even basic description?
Drawing on periodicals, literary sources, and proceedings of associations, 
po liti cal parties, military units, and municipal, island- wide, and Spanish “na-
tional” governing bodies, this book draws on a wide range of sources to exam-
ine loyalty as something neither merely rhetorical nor a verifi able belief. One 
case in point bears attention. Scholars who have searched for evidence of re-
sis tance and rebellion in Cuba’s colonial past have been intrigued by the sub-
versive behavior or African- derived cultural practices that might have been 
taking place in various urban clubs and associations. Th ey have productively 
interpreted such documents against the grain of colonial discourse, reading 
past the language of loyalty and subordination that characterizes the public 
statements of those institutions.40 My reading of nineteenth- century docu-
ments places this language front and center: as evidence of a mode of engage-
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ment with the colonial state that may fi t uneasily with the language of liberal 
citizenship or revolutionary rhetoric but that nevertheless off ered African- 
descended Cubans a public voice for inhabiting loyal subjectivity. For histori-
ans conditioned to examine sources for perspectives silenced or forgotten by 
the archival record, however, there might be good reason to suspect that 
statements of pop u lar support for empire served as “respectable per for-
mances” and little  else.41 But to write them off  them entirely as elite fantasies 
or false consciousness is to miss the chance to glimpse what Ann Stoler calls 
“the febrile movements of persons off  balance— of thoughts and feelings in 
and out of place.” “In tone and temper,” she continues, “[archives] convey 
the rough interior edges of governance and disruptions to the deceptive 
clarity of its mandates.” 42 In other words, summary dismissal prevents us 
from imagining that the point of contact between subjects and representa-
tives of the colonial state might sometimes identify— uneasily and messily— 
common ground or a shared ideology of rule, as opposed to exclusively 
adversarial relationships.
Another problem of grasping loyalty revolves around identifying who sup-
ported Spanish rule in the nineteenth century. Attempts to provide a demo-
graphic profi le of pro- Spanish loyalty in Cuba miss an always shift ing target. 
No matter how hard they tried, Spanish offi  cials could never mea sure or 
predict, or document, the demographic dimensions of pop u lar loyalty. Num-
bers of soldiers, even,  were diffi  cult to aggregate, and concealed the deser-
tions and defections common on all sides of the island’s military confl icts. 
Po liti cal affi  liations never mapped neatly onto geo graph i cal regions or census 
categories, and certainly not racial identifi cations, in a way that allows for neat 
conclusions about who might predictably have affi  rmed colonial rule. Given 
the nature of the evidence, it is tempting to characterize the Cubans of Afri-
can descent most likely to support colonial rule as urban, free, island born (as 
opposed to African born), and overwhelmingly male. Indeed, much of the 
evidence for this study points to such individuals. But there are plenty of ex-
amples of rural, enslaved, African- born men and women who found them-
selves fi ghting alongside the Spanish army, traveling to see a politician passing 
through town, or phrasing a petition in the language of humility and obedi-
ence. Despite the exciting evidence of women of color participating in public 
life and the surprising evidence of slave women engaged in Spanish military 
campaigns, one defi nitive demographic conclusion about loyalty is that 
women faced serious challenges to inhabiting loyal subjectivity, which means 
that examples of their success might better be understood as exceptions rather 
than the rule— or, in contrast, that Spanish authorities and other observers 
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had reasons for erasing or understating the presence of women in a public 
world that operated on paternalistic terms and that posed challenges for sub-
altern men to make their voices heard.
No matter who claimed it, loyalty was, and is, a slippery concept. It at once 
occupies an old- fangled and modern place in po liti cal imaginaries: on one 
hand, the feudal pacts between lord and vassal; ancient confl icts between fam-
ily and community; the thick ties of blood, faith, and status evoke primordial 
bonds that resist the spaces of modern, secular politics. On the other hand, 
po liti cal allegiance appears in some po liti cal theory as a product of the indi-
vidual will or choice that is constitutive of the modern liberal subject. In fact, 
thinking about patriotism or affi  nity is so closely linked to liberal po liti cal 
theory— or to the nation- state—that there seems little room to consider indi-
vidual choices aff ecting empires, dictatorships, or other systems refl exively 
deemed undemo cratic or illiberal.43 In part, this association appears so perva-
sive because claims about loyalty rest more on theory than on the function of 
the concept in specifi c historical circumstances. Historicizing key po liti cal 
concepts has yielded great insights into Latin American society when ap-
plied, for example, to the idea of honor.44 In methodological terms, histori-
cizing loyal subjectivity draws on many of the approaches that historicize 
re sis tance; rather than delineating the repertoires of rebellion and revolution 
so central to Cuban, Latin American, and African American history, this 
book off ers instead a genealogy of consent.
One useful approach to understanding loyalty can be found in Albert 
Hirschman’s classic study of how individuals respond to a qualitative decline 
in fi rms. Hirschman postulated three basic possibilities. Th e fi rst, exit— or 
leaving— stands in contrast to the second, voice— an attempt to change “an 
objectionable state of aff airs.” A third option is loyalty, a “feeling of attach-
ment” and the “reluctance to exit in spite of disagreement.” Loyalty benefi ts 
institutions (such as states), Hirschman argues, when the costs of exit are low 
and when alternatives are less than desirable. Th e “consumer,” or, for our pur-
poses, the po liti cal subject, fi nds loyalty benefi cial because it opens up possi-
bilities for dialogue and critique.45 Within the problem- space of colonial and 
national politics, Hirschman off ers a path forward from national histories 
centered on exits from colonial rule, and he also foregrounds loyalty as an 
aff ective posture that allows for the potential to express voice within the world 
of empire. Jeremy Adelman, for example, has fruitfully brought Hirschman’s 
concept to bear on the South American in de pen dence movements, taking 
care to note the loyalty expressed by most of colonial Spanish America when 
crisis erupted in Spain.46
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Bringing Cuba into the picture only amplifi es the importance of looking 
at colonial politics on its own terms, rather than from the outside space 
of the modern nation. It revives loyalty to colonial rule as an active histori-
cal pro cess and a crucial element in cementing Spanish hegemony, rather 
than an inertial default position obstructing radical change. As useful as 
Hirschman’s framework may be, I try not to remain bound to a single sche-
matic throughout the book. Instead, I try to understand the historical actors 
I encounter to be theorists of loyalty in their own right: when slave- soldiers 
explained why they enlisted in the Spanish army; when a colonial offi  cial re-
instated the militias of color aft er their abolition; when the editor of a black 
newspaper explained how racial affi  liations could complement, rather than 
compete with, ties to Spanish rule; or the myriad instances in which Cubans 
themselves defi ned loyalty in counterpoint to the disloyalty they believed 
was always around the corner. Within par tic u lar contexts, I also analyze be-
haviors and actions not named as loyalty front and center but that conform 
to patterns that people elsewhere commonly acknowledged as loyalty. If we 
can understand that invocations of loyalty may sometimes have been disin-
genuous, we should also acknowledge other instances when Cubans grappled 
with questions of loyalty without actually naming it as such.47
Because attention to the issue of Cuba’s continued colonial status became 
acute during the early nineteenth century, or the tail end of the Age of Revolu-
tions, I begin the book with two chapters that survey those de cades from two 
angles. In chapter 1, I consider the implications of the tectonic po liti cal shift s in 
the Spanish empire for Cubans’ status as subjects and citizens. Th e Napoleonic 
invasion of Spain, the in de pen dence movements, and most important, the lib-
eral Spanish Constitution of 1812 redefi ned the relationship between Spain and 
its colonies and the categories of po liti cal belonging available to colonial sub-
jects. Colonial offi  cials wavered on how these changes would aff ect po liti cal 
defi nitions of being Spanish or white, the freedoms of free men of color, and 
even the status of the inhabitants of Cuba’s last two Indian pueblos. With for-
mal citizenship and repre sen ta tion off  the table more oft en than not, chapter 2 
explores how Cubans attemped to express loyalty to Spain rule as a historical 
strategy for gaining privileges, access, and mobility. Colonial policies aimed at 
stifl ing seditious activity and slave rebellions restricted opportunities for pop-
u lar politics in general, but a coherent picture of what a loyal subject was sup-
posed to be still came into focus. Restrictive mea sures left  Cubans at midcentury 
with an ambivalent sense of belonging to the Spanish empire, especially people 
of African descent, who saw the militias abolished and reinstituted and who 
found their desires to be loyal subjects checked by other Cubans.
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Th e initiation of the Ten Years’ War (1868– 78) reactivated the military di-
mension of pop u lar allegiance to colonial rule at the same time at which 
Spain began the gradual pro cess of slave emancipation. Chapter 3 plunges 
into the war time drama to reveal a resurgence of active support for Spanish 
rule, even as the incorporation of slaves and free people of color into counter-
insurgent ranks operated on more limited terms than in the multiracial rebel 
army. Th e military adjustment to the presence of Cubans of color overlapped 
with one crucial component of the abolition law, which off ered freedom to 
slaves who fought against insurgents. Th e interrogations of slave- soldiers pro-
vide a rich source for the construction of loyal subjectivity as soldiers and 
offi  cers oft en disagreed on its defi nition.
Th e last three chapters of the book address the fl ourishing of public life in 
Cuba following the war. Cubans of African descent took great advantage of 
the extension of Spanish constitutional protections in the forms of press and 
associational freedoms and sanctioned po liti cal parties. Chapter 4 examines 
the amplifi ed meaning of loyalty in the burgeoning public sphere as black 
newspapers and organizations attempted to prove their readiness for free-
dom and citizenship. Chapter 5 zooms in on an incident that took place in 
the southern port city of Cienfuegos just weeks aft er the formal abolition of 
slavery in 1886. Th e racial politics of traveling representatives of the Liberal 
Autonomist Party blurred the boundaries between robust pop u lar loyalty and 
violent public disturbance. Finally, chapter 6 looks at the fi nal years of Span-
ish rule in terms of how the proliferation of po liti cal affi  liations merged with 
frustrations about the slow pace of postemancipation improvements to mar-
ginalize the role of the loyal subject. Th e war for in de pen dence that began 
in 1895 only increased the fragmentation on the island, and by 1898 new rela-
tionships between race and loyalty emerged as Spain was defeated, the United 
States intervened, and a race- transcendent vision of Cuban in de pen dence 
faced an uncertain future in a new republic.
Th roughout the book, cities and towns frequently provide the setting for 
the main developments and patterns that I trace. Clearly, Havana, the capital, 
and Santiago, the second- largest city and main anchor of eastern Cuba, fea-
ture prominently. I give par tic u lar attention as well to the southern port city 
of Cienfuegos. Th is focus emerged at fi rst from encountering the rich docu-
mentation in its provincial archive and the eff ervescent community of schol-
ars who gravitated toward it. Eventually, Cienfuegos developed a purpose 
inherent to my argument about race, loyalty, and empire. It was founded in 
1819 through a Spanish initiative for white immigration to Cuba but quickly 
developed an economy that, like most other parts of the island, employed 
African slave labor. As a large slave population, a smaller free population, and 
a multiracial society took shape, residents of Cienfuegos— and those govern-
ing it— did not miss the transformation from what was supposed to be a 
white colony. Its role in the in de pen dence wars and its extensive public life 
shed light on some islandwide trends; of more signifi cance, it off ers a glimpse 
into the workings of race and loyalty not conditioned by competing connota-
tions ascribed to Santiago and Havana: a center of potential and actualized 
anticolonial re sis tance, for the former, and the center of imperial power and 
intellectual life, for the latter.48
Finally, a note about terminology. Most books about race in Latin America 
clarify classifi cations that might seem most confusing to contemporary 
English- speaking readers.49 Th is is necessary and standard practice: readers 
should understand the synonymy between designations of pardo and mulato 
(usually translated as “mulatto” throughout the book)—both referring to 
mixed African and Spanish ancestry— and between moreno and negro (trans-
lated as “black” or kept as “negro”— references to blackness and sometimes to 
“pure” African descent. In many cases, ambiguity in the sources prevents dis-
tinguishing these groups, so I use the term “Cubans of color” or “Cubans of 
African descent” when necessary. An increase in references to gente de color 
(people of color) and the raza de color took place in the second half of the 
century, which fused mulato and negro nomenclature. Casta, another am-
biguous term, denoted any person of mixed ancestry. Th ere was a dual use of 
criollo (creole) to describe Cuban- born Spaniards (in contrast to peninsula-
res, from Spain) and Cuban- born people of African descent (in contrast to 
bozales, who  were born in Africa). We should approach the anachronistic 
term afrocubano with caution, as it speaks more to twentieth- century reck-
onings of race and nation than to the era of Spanish rule. And above all, read-
ers should realize how slippery each of these concepts could be, as categories 
overlapped to collapse and diff erentiate groups and individuals with frequent 
inconsistency.
For the purposes of this book, equal attention is due to the presumed nor-
mative categories against which these racial “diff erences” became meaning-
ful. A relatively unexplored area of historical research concerns the meaning 
of whiteness in the colonial world. Being white was by no means inevitably 
interchangeable with being Spanish. Both categorizations depended on situ-
ational and relational criteria that could encompass parentage and place of 
origin (sometimes verifi able with baptismal rec ords) as much as color.50 Th e 
well- known casta paintings of eighteenth- century Spanish America, which 
visually charted the dizzying number of categories of mixture, placed an español, 
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not a blanco, at the top of the hierarchy. Th e conceptual links between race, 
blood, and place of birth made references to Spanish blood more common 
than white blood, although in the system’s originary trinity of Spanish, In-
dian, and black, black blood could also be referred to as African blood.51 
Informal estimations of color oft en identifi ed individuals as white— or some-
times trigueño, “wheaty” or olive- skinned—and as the century progressed, 
more standardized censuses and references to Cubans “of color” elevated the 
category of whiteness above Spanishness. When the Spanish government es-
tablished a Comisión Blanca in the 1810s to encourage “white” immigration to 
Cuba, it initially had peninsular Spaniards in mind, but low interest on the 
peninsula forced the commission to broaden out to include French and Brit-
ish migrants. Even as Cubans increasingly spoke of “whites”— oft en in rela-
tion to anxieties about “black” (read as slave and free, negro and mulato) 
rebellion— they stayed focused on the category of “Spaniard” in light of the 
Constitution of 1812’s provision that anyone residing in Spanish territory 
could be considered as such. (“Citizen” was a diff erent story.) Th e shift ing 
uses and defi nitions of white and Spaniard should encourage readers to avoid 
easy linkages between the two.
An equally relevant clarifi cation at the outset concerns my references 
to loyalty. Scholarship that considers pro- colonial sentiment in the Franco-
phone, Anglophone, Lusophone, and Hispanophone imperial worlds regu-
larly deploys the term “royalism” to shorthand various forms of allegiance 
during the eras of colonialism and in de pen dence, and “loyalists” to refer to 
the people who pledged it. Th ese terms rarely appear in nineteenth- century 
Cuban and Spanish documents. Th e meaning of royal authority changed as 
Spain became a constitutional monarchy, and the monarch, as the source of 
authority and paternal rule, lost some of the symbolic prominence it had in 
earlier centuries,52 Th e confl icted and interrupted reigns of specifi c mon-
archs (such as Fernando VII and Isabel II), moreover, dimmed the luster of 
things “royal.” I tend to avoid the term “loyalists” as well. Reading across the 
diff erent imperial case studies, supporters of Eu ro pe an empires throughout 
the Atlantic world in the Age of Revolutions oft en embraced the term. And 
indeed, one of the richest fi elds of comparison for this book is that which 
considers African- descended British loyalists in the Atlantic World aft er the 
American Revolution.53
On closer inspection, a pattern emerges in these studies: individuals and 
governments identifi ed loyalists primarily aft er colonial rule or during the 
military confl icts that ended it, when the ability to win favors and collect 
reparations or pensions depended on the guise of permanent allegiance to 
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the metropole. Th is created “strong identity” (to borrow Frederick Cooper and 
Rogers Brubaker’s term) intended to remain fi xed and durable over time.54 In-
stead, pop u lar allegiance might better be understood in more fl exible terms, 
as a mode of po liti cal belonging strategically invoked by states and subjects 
alike and, in the case of nineteenth- century Cuba, a concept joined to racial 
ideology in order to cement Spanish hegemony in Cuba. Th is is the idea be-
hind my discussion of loyal subjectivity. Th e decision to avoid cementing 
allegiance as an “- ism” should not imply that Cubans, particularly those of 
African descent,  were incapable of maintaining durable po liti cal ideas. Th ey 
lived during a period when ideologies and social movements changed radi-
cally and rapidly— even, and perhaps especially, liberalism, a practice whose 
contingency was evident to almost everyone.
One
Belonging to an Empire
Race and Rights
Th e blood of colored men is red, and so is that of warriors, of healthy men: pure 
and noble blood. Th e juntas established in America have won this class over, 
granting them the equality for which they yearn. We must win them back with a 
similar declaration. “Come, pardo,” I would say: “Do not stray in search of the 
sweet food you desire. Do not fl ee your home to seek it, poor wretch (for they are 
very humble and like to be treated like this).  Here at home you can have it.”
—José Mejía Lequerica, addressing the Cortes of Cádiz, 1810
Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Spain in 1808 prompted a remarkably uni-
form response from the Spanish American colonies: demonstrations of 
loyalty to the exiled monarch Fernando VII and the establishment of juntas 
(councils) that would rule in the king’s name as Joseph Bonaparte assumed 
the Spanish throne. Few calls for in de pen dence could be heard in the Ameri-
cas. Th e Junta Central in Spain called for an assembly to redefi ne the rela-
tionships between the king, his government, and his subjects, and in so doing 
it began to imagine what it meant for Spain to exist as both an empire and a 
nation. With French troops advancing south from Madrid, the Junta Central 
retreated in 1810 to the Isla de León at the southern port of Cádiz, and dis-
solved to form a Regency Council that called for an assembly to draft  Spain’s 
fi rst constitution. It included deputies from across the Atlantic but stopped 
short of asserting the po liti cal equality of the American territories; the depu-
ties instead insisted that they  were not from “colonies or outposts ( factorías) 
like those of other nations, but an essential and integral part of the Spanish 
monarchy.”1 So many interested parties from across the empire descended on 
the city to observe and participate in the proceedings that one onlooker wrote 
that “Spain had almost entirely been reduced to the walls of Cádiz.”2
Th at microcosm bustled with people maintaining an empire entering 
its fourth century. Among the offi  cial delegates to the constitutional Cortes 
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(Parliament) fi gured titled nobles, priests, lawyers, and merchants, and they 
mingled in the city with the sailors, slaves, and artisans who had done their 
part, too, for the prosperity and defense of Spain. By 1812, sixty- three of the 
delegates— about a fi ft h of the total— represented the American colonies.3 As 
the port in Spain through which most trade and communication with the 
Americas took place, Cádiz was no stranger to transatlantic arrivals or to the 
presence of slaves, who  were bought and sold there as they  were in other im-
perial ports. But during the constitutional debates, the presence of Ameri-
cans and people of African descent— both of them subjected to a subordinate 
po liti cal status— served as a powerful reminder of the limits of the liberal 
principles being fi ercely debated. Th at some of the American juntas began to 
favor in de pen dence and seek supporters of native and African origins exposed 
the contradictions in the Cádiz debates even further.
In the midst of the commotion was a free Cuban man of African descent 
experiencing fi rsthand how the Spanish state gave po liti cal signifi cance to 
racial diff erence. José María Rodríguez, identifi ed in documents as a free mu-
latto and vecino (resident) of Havana, spent the early months of 1812 stuck in 
Cádiz with no apparent role in the constitutional drama. Instead, he was strug-
gling to acquire a passport— in this era, permission to make a single voyage— 
that would let him travel back to Cuba to take care of urgent fi nancial matters 
and then return to Cádiz with the money that he needed to conduct business. 
He was one of several Cubans whose requests to travel stalled as the imperial 
bureaucracy struggled to stay afl oat. Unlike applicants of full Spanish descent, 
however, Rodríguez had to wait for the Real Audiencia (high court) in Havana 
to send documentation of his free status back to Spain before he could receive 
permission to travel.4 Moving within the empire as well as beyond it irregu-
larly required state documentation for most people, and a passport— a basic 
document that identifi ed membership in a sovereign po liti cal community— 
presented par tic u lar challenges to free people of African descent, whose full 
legal personhood was not recognized by Spanish law. In contrast, thousands 
of enslaved Africans continued to travel the Atlantic against their will each 
year with no such passports; as far as customs  houses and offi  cials  were con-
cerned they  were cargo, property, but rarely individual people with fi xed legal 
identities who required documentation. Rodríguez’s hassles occurred as the 
Cortes of Cádiz was determining the legal status of free people of African 
descent: whether they could be Spanish citizens or remain Spanish subjects.
Th e crisis in Spain precipitated an empire- wide crisis of coherence, and 
people from Cortes delegates to frustrated Cubans routinely used the lan-
guage of race to formulate their responses. Drawing on old languages of 
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citizenship and inclusion, the Cortes of Cádiz initiated new conversations 
about the po liti cal subjectivity of African- descended people in the Iberian 
world that became particularly resonant in Cuba as it remained part of the 
empire. Although the Constitution of 1812 was in eff ect only briefl y (from 
1812 to 1814 and 1820 to 1823), it established the terms of debates about who 
did and could belong to the newly imagined Spanish national empire, despite 
its long-term inability to reconcile liberalism with an ongoing imperial proj-
ect.5 In the context of a French invasion of the mother country, restructuring 
the Spanish nation had immediate implications for Cubans. In the wake of 
the Haitian Revolution, French refugees arrived from Hispaniola. Now that 
the French had seized Spain, did those immigrants obey the same king? Did 
support for France equate to sedition or solidarity?
In de pen dence movements in mainland Spanish America found their ori-
gins less in long- simmering nationalisms than in the chaos produced from 
competing attempts to reformulate Spanish sovereignty aft er 1808.6 In this 
light, the politics of empire in Cuba merit close attention. Th e historical de-
velopments that postponed violent in de pen dence confl icts in Cuba do not 
necessarily attest to an inherently conservative, backward- looking, or risk- 
averse po liti cal culture. As is well known many well- to- do Cubans preferred 
Spanish stability to the risks of a violent confl ict when both sugar production 
and slavery  were expanding precipitously— in other words, loyalty to Spain 
represented “the price of prosperity.”7 Th at explanation leans heavily on the 
racial anxieties of white Cubans.8 As the Cortes of Cádiz and other imperial 
projects reconsidered the privileges and meanings of whiteness in the early 
nineteenth century, the diverse Cubans who shaped the island’s po liti cal 
trajectory did not stop at trying to stifl e in de pen dence; they sought to rei-
magine the goals and limitations of loyalty to the Spanish empire and the 
po liti cal languages through which they expressed that support.
Race, Rights, and the Constitution of 1812
Spain’s po liti cal identity as an empire had long been supported by legal struc-
tures and governing institutions that generated interrelated hierarchical dis-
tinctions between its diverse subjects. Representative advisory councils called 
cortes dated back to medieval Iberian kingdoms, but throughout the colonial 
period, the colonies had not fi gured in what had become a fulsome legislative 
system. All of the monarch’s subjects enjoyed the right of appeal, but the 
extension of royal justice to social subordinates functioned unevenly and 
according to paternalistic ideologies that attributed an inherent weakness to 
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women, children, inhabitants of the colonies, and people of indigenous and 
African ancestry, who required the king’s benevolent protection. Mea sures 
to ameliorate the conditions of these weaker people made no presumption 
of their equality or capacity for membership in a polity.9 Th e crisis of 1808 
eff ected dramatic reimaginings of these relationships. In the pro cess of draft -
ing a constitution in Cádiz, the question of who could belong to Spain 
overlapped with the question of how Spain would unite its territories around 
the world. Th e answer off ered by the Cortes of Cádiz was to envision Spain 
much more explicitly as a nation, even as it sought to preserve its older impe-
rial confi guration and regain territorial control from France. As Henry Ka-
men explains it, “Spain existed as a nation because absence made it real.”10
Th is is not to say that concepts of nationalism and citizenship did not exist 
before the Constitution of 1812. Among the earliest references to the Spanish 
nation, even in the absence of a po liti cal unit,  were contrasts between Span-
ish naturales (natives) and extranjeros (foreigners), and indeed, the select few 
who would claim to be vecinos (residents or citizens) enjoyed limited formal 
rights off ered by the crown. Early modern notions of vecindad and natura-
leza  were primarily local categories of belonging from which broader concepts 
of a national community later derived, although the monarch could naturalize 
foreigners by issuing a carta de naturaleza (naturalization letter). Inhabiting 
those categories involved negotiations and affi  rmations within towns and 
cities, and although the boundaries  were rigid enough to prevent women from 
claiming vecindad, early cases of indigenous, mestizo, mulatto, and non- 
Spanish Eu ro pe an vecinos and naturales attest to the fl uidity, and perhaps 
informality, of these designations. What Tamar Herzog notes as a “growing 
identifi cation between ‘Spanishness’ and citizenship” in the seventeenth and 
eigh teenth centuries was oft en checked by individuals who proved their love 
of community or “a suffi  cient sense of loyalty,” according to one eighteenth- 
century writer.11 Th us test cases in the colonies oft en delineated citizenship’s 
boundaries, as individuals not from Iberia attempted to claim membership 
and as migrants to the colonies longed for their homeland.
Th e Constitution of 1812 was a radical document that placed Spain far 
ahead of other Eu ro pe an polities in its embrace of liberalism and its exten-
sion of citizenship rights guaranteed by a constitution. It limited the power of 
the crown and traced its authority to pop u lar sovereignty; it established civil 
rights and free trade; and it announced the elimination of entail and seigneur-
ial jurisdiction. Beyond the concrete outcomes, the proceedings of the con-
stitutional Cortes in 1810 and 1811 devoted signifi cant time to discussing basic 
po liti cal questions and how they might be applied to Spain and its empire. 
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What is sovereignty? What is a nation? Who are the people of a nation? What 
is a citizen? Th ese questions led delegates to test the limits of vague common-
places; especially vexing  were the ideas that the nation was the collectivity of 
all Spaniards in both hemi spheres and that the “voice of the people” resided 
in the majority. As in earlier negotiations of the meaning of vecindad and 
naturaleza, delegates routinely sought evidence in the details of colonialism 
and racial diff erence.12
From the outset, the deliberations in Cádiz had to address the question 
of the po liti cal repre sen ta tion for the Americas. By 1810 the provisional jun-
tas that had been established in many Spanish American cities  were no lon-
ger reliably supportive of Fernando VII and the Cádiz Cortes, sometimes out 
of calculated strategy, sometimes out of genuine confusion. Indeed, minor 
confusion about legitimate po liti cal authority punctuated early deliberations 
in Cuba. When news of the French invasion reached Havana in July 1808, the 
Marqués de Someruelos, the captain general, authorized the formation of a 
junta subordinate to the Junta Suprema Central in Spain, but two members of 
Havana’s ayuntamiento, or city council, opposed the decision, claiming that 
there was no pre ce dent or right to do so. Francisco Arango y Parreño, the 
modernizing po liti cal force behind Cuba’s expansion of slavery and sugar 
cultivation, led a short- lived movement to form a Junta Suprema. With equal 
authority to those in Spain and presumably with the intent of reor ga niz ing 
the government, the movement nominally claimed a state of exception that 
justifi ed extraordinary power during crisis.13 Ultimately, the ayuntamiento 
requested permission to form a junta on 26 July and in 1810 received a royal 
order thanking Cubans for “the demonstrations of loyalty and the common 
feelings in all American provinces of love for the King.”14 Th e Consejo de 
Regencia, which replaced the Junta Suprema Central, formed a Cortes in Cádiz 
and gave Cubans the right to repre sen ta tion in the Cortes in February 1810. 
When the Cortes fi rst met at the end of September, twenty- seven delegates 
out of the ninety- nine represented the Americas. Cuba had two delegates: the 
Marqués de San Felipe y Santiago and Joaquín Santa Cruz.15 Repre sen ta tion 
surfaced frequently as the principal problem of including the colonies in the 
pro cess and nation. Many Spanish deputies understood that guaranteeing 
repre sen ta tion across the ocean was necessary to maintain the loyalty of the 
colonies but a threat, in numerical terms, to the dominance of peninsular 
Spaniards in a representative system.16 Delegates from the Americas faced the 
dilemma of advocating for broad categories of citizenship that would include 
non-European populations in order to increase their proportional numbers, 
while remaining concerned about the social repercussions of extending rights 
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so broadly at home. In contrast to fi nding colonies expressing increased frus-
tration with Spanish rule, members of the Cortes worried that Spain had too 
many loyal subjects— namely the dark ones who threatened to outnumber 
them.
Despite the low-key presence of the Cuban deputies in the Cortes Consti-
tuyentes, the debates that took place had a profound impact on the island and 
on the way that ideas about race intersected with po liti cal rule and po liti cal 
allegiance. Certainly some concerns about who counted as a Spaniard mini-
mized racial distinctions. Pedro Inguanzo, a delegate who consistently ar-
gued against the adoption of liberal principles, explained that the majority of 
the population included women, artisans, menial laborers, rústicos (bump-
kins), and ignorant people who  were too “docile and submissive” even to ex-
pect to have a voice, much less know how to represent “the people.”17 And the 
question of who could become a Spaniard was sometimes less about who lived 
within Spanish territory than who came from beyond it. Th e French inter-
vention weighed heavily on the minds of delegates, and Francisco Javier Bor-
rul, a delegate from Valencia, thought it appropriate to require a foreigner to 
live in Spanish territory for at least ten years before seeking naturaleza, “in 
order to ascertain his love of the nation and fi rm desires to follow our laws.”18 
Belonging to the empire, in other words, depended on aff ective ties and avowed 
subordination— fundamental components of pro- colonial loyalty as its adher-
ents frequently articulated it.
Several delegates recognized the incongruity between the embrace of lib-
eral ideas and the continued existence of slavery, and proposals in July 1811 
to abolish slavery and the slave trade  were one of the fi rst debates into which 
Cuban delegates actively entered. José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer and Agustín 
de Argüelles, who did the most to introduce the principles of liberalism into 
the constitutional debates, submitted proposals to abolish slavery in July 
1811. Concerned, too, with property rights, Guridi y Alcocer proposed to re-
quire current slaves to “remain in servile condition” so as not to “defraud 
their own ers of the money they cost them.”19 Argüelles, however paired his 
proposal to abolish the transatlantic slave trade with a call to abolish torture 
“tan bárbara y cruel [so barbaric and cruel]” and to live up to “the liberality 
and religiosity of the principles of Spain’s criminal code.”20 Andrés de Jáure-
gui, a Cuban deputy, spoke against the proposal, promising that Cuba “to-
day enjoys profound tranquility,” and he worried about the po liti cal eff ects 
of altering “domestic peace” by abolishing slavery in “one of the most pre-
cious parts of overseas Spain.” Domestic peace was a constant concern of 
Jáuregui to the extent that he requested that all discussions of slavery be 
Belonging to an Empire • 27
conducted in secret sessions so that news of the proceedings did not reach 
Cuba and generate rumors of emancipation.21
Francisco Arango y Parreño, Cuba’s great enlightened reformer and voice 
of the planter elite, regularly expressed concern that Cuba’s place in the Span-
ish empire would be in jeopardy if slavery  were abolished. No enemy of liber-
alism, Arango y Parreño was perhaps the greatest ideological exponent of 
free trade in Cuba, which he had been advocating for since he joined Havana’s 
ayuntamiento in the 1780s, when he was still a legal minor. He epitomized 
the reconciliation of free market economics and slave labor that, as Dale 
Tomich has noted, was “at once a defi ning feature and a central paradox of 
the nineteenth- century Cuban slave regime.”22 Th e proposals by Guridi y Al-
cocer and Argüelles led Arango to author one of the great defenses of Cuban 
slavery and persuade the captain general and Havana ayuntamiento that the 
question of slavery would be the one issue that might determine Cuba’s loy-
alty to Spain.23 In this case, Arango’s fear was less that a slave insurrection 
would cause the demise of colonial rule than that the Cuban elite would re-
volt if slavery fell victim to the Cortes’s commitment to liberal principles.
It should come as little surprise that the Cuban deputies felt so strongly 
about maintaining slavery. In the preceding two de cades, the island had 
experienced a degree of economic growth unpre ce dented in its three- hundred- 
year history under Spanish rule. Coff ee and sugar production had reached a 
level of profi tability previously unheard of within the Spanish empire.24 Th e 
boom coincided with the decision by Spain in 1789 to allow free trade in 
slaves for Cuba; that is, in contrast to a closed system in which the Spanish 
government gave asientos (contracts) to specifi c slave traders to sell a limited 
number of slaves in specifi c locales, foreigners and Spaniards alike could now 
sell any number of slaves to multiple ports. Th e Cortes of Cádiz took place in 
the midst of massive importations of Africans: between 1774 and 1827, the 
slave population of Cuba grew from around 39,000 to 287,000, from compos-
ing 23 percent of the island’s residents to composing 41 percent.25 In 1811, 
Cuba’s wealth resided in slaves and the agricultural endeavors that employed 
them. Abolishing slavery, in the minds of Cuba’s po liti cal and economic elite, 
would transform the island’s economy and society beyond recognition.
Th e Cuban deputies appeared less interested in questions of race and 
citizenship than in the slavery debates, despite the consequences that the 
former would have for the island. When the Cortes debates turned to the po-
liti cal status of indigenous- and African- descended subjects, slavery rarely 
emerged as a topic. On its most basic level, citizenship was a status pre-
mised on freedom. Th us discussions of the legal equality of indigenous 
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people merited little discussion. Th eir juridical freedom had been acknowl-
edged since 1542 with the qualifi cation that they remain legally separated 
from Spaniards: a republic of Indians complemented the republic of Span-
iards for the purposes of guaranteeing Indians’ ac cep tance of Catholicism 
and paying tribute in exchange for designating them Christian vassals. On 7 
January 1812, both indigenous tribute and forced labor  were abolished, and 
the end of the system of separate republics signifi ed the formal end of Spain’s 
tutelary evangelical project. Cuban delegates had little at stake due to Cuba’s 
scarce indigenous population. Despite anxieties about their social conse-
quences, most proposals affi  rmed the citizenship of Indians more out of prin-
ciple than by practice.
Debates over the summer of 1811 yielded a defi nition of Spaniards as “free 
men born and domiciled in the Spanish domains,” naturalized foreigners, 
and “freedmen from the time they acquire liberty in the Spains,” and a defi -
nition of vecinos as “Spaniards who on both sides trace their ancestry to the 
Spanish dominions of both hemi spheres,” including indigenous Americans, 
who  were considered native to what was now Spanish territory. As fall ap-
proached, discussion of Article 22, about the status of free men of African 
descent, began with the following draft :
For those Spaniards who on either side derive their origin from Africa, the 
door of virtue and merit is open. In consequence the Cortes may grant 
letters of citizenship to those who have rendered eminent ser vices to the 
fatherland, or to those who distinguish themselves by their talent, appli-
cation, and conduct, provided . . .  that they be the off spring of legitimate 
marriages, the children of free parents, themselves married to free women, 
and resident in Spanish dominions, and that they exercise some useful 
profession, offi  ce, or industry and have capital of their own suffi  cient to 
maintain their homes and educate their children honorably.26
Th e debate set off  by this proposed article far exceeded the simple question 
of adding to the numbers of Americans who qualifi ed for repre sen ta tion and 
augmenting the American presence in the Cortes. Spanish delegates  were 
predictably wary of American delegates who infl ated the number of citizens 
they would represent. Th ey decried the hypocrisy of creole, or American- 
born, representatives from the colonies who had not spoken up for the 
rights of people of African descent when they  were carefully claiming their 
equality with peninsular (Spanish- born) Spaniards as well as indigenous 
people and mestizos (people of mixed Spanish and indigenous ancestry).27 
But for most deputies involved, at issue was the nature of the colonial 
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 project and the loyalty of the African- descended men whose legal status 
was on the line.
Opposition to the proposed article came as swift ly from those who felt that 
it went too far as from those who felt that it didn’t go far enough. Some dele-
gates criticized the inconsistency of Article 21, which granted citizenship to the 
sons of foreigners in Spanish territory for a single generation, while denying 
the same rights to men whose “foreign” ancestors from Africa “had established 
themselves in the Spanish monarchy for the long period of two hundred years.” 
If indeed the love for and ser vice to Spain was learned over generations, there 
was no reason to give primary emphasis to “the quality or accident” of dark 
skin, one of “the variety of colors in the human species” over “the infl uence of 
parents on their children.”28 A Peruvian deputy, Francisco Salazar, explained 
in detail the demonstrated loyalty of African descendants: the free- colored 
militias had been the fi rst military units to pacify Peru in 1780 as the Túpac 
Amaru Indian revolt ignited; at that very moment, black troops  were defending 
Buenos Aires, Guayaquil, and Callao, near Lima, from anticolonial attacks. 
Was it wise, he asked, to question their moral capacity and deny them rights 
when their loyalty to Spain was most crucial?29 As with the earlier debates 
about American repre sen ta tion, citizenship and inclusion, then, also fell within 
an aff ective register that acknowledged the affi  nity for Spanish rule that had 
moved so many African- descended men to defend the empire from attack.
Agustín de Argüelles, who had fought to preserve slavery, gave the pre-
liminary speech establishing the terms of Article 22, but admitted during 
its formal debate that he lacked fi rsthand experience of the situation in the 
Americas. Th ose who did— except for the Cubans— painted a picture of the 
colonies that brought into relief the instability of racial categories. Antonio 
Larrazábal, from Guatemala, drew parallels between castas and indigenous 
people, emphasizing the smooth integration of Indians and even mulattoes 
into po liti cal aff airs, with long- functioning Indian cabildos (municipal coun-
cils) capable of producing administrators and offi  cials in their communities.30 
José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros, a Mexican delegate, insisted that some mea sure 
was needed to ratify the existing prominence of some African- descended men 
in Mexican society. He explained that he had “known mulattoes who had 
been counts, marquis, oidores [magistrates], canons, coronels, and knights, 
surrounded by intrigue, bribery, extortion, false information, perjuries, doc-
tored books or public registers, and I have seen those who have acquired their 
positions and distinctions by reproachable means, despite knowledge of their 
mixture . . .  they  were taxed shamelessly for their respective honors . . .  [and] 
Spaniards, of Eu ro pe an and American birth alike, marry their daughters, 
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principally for the money.” To ignore the concerns of Article 22 and ignore 
the gap between law and practice, for Cisneros, betrayed Enlightenment ide-
als: “We deceive ourselves; in the darkness and without light, all are black.”31 
Perhaps the most conspicuous American participant was the indigenous 
deputy Inca Yupanqui, a member of Cuzco’s indigenous nobility who had 
moved to Spain with his family during the Túpac Amaru revolt. Speaking of 
free men of African descent in Peru, he explained that “there being nothing 
but love in domestic matters, it follows that they cannot but look with horror 
when society acquires certain distinctions.” He added that in the militias of 
pardos and negros “their offi  cials are of the same castas, including those of 
the staff  of the regiments . . .  many bachilleros [university graduates] of color, 
those writers knowing that souls are neither white nor black.”32
Th e arguments that won out over the eloquent statements in support of 
citizenship for free men of African descent doubled back on the language of 
vecindad and naturaleza. In arguing that African origin should be treated no 
diff erently from any other foreign origin, delegates who sought to include cas-
tas opened themselves to explain the distinction between forced and volun-
tary migration. African- descended Spaniards might be immigrants, but their 
ancestors made no deliberate choice to relinquish membership in one com-
munity for another. With the passage of Article 22 by a vote of 108– 36, the 
Cortes weakly affi  rmed the possibility of African- descended men being 
granted Spanish citizenship under extraordinary circumstances. It resolved 
that “virtue and merit” was the channel for free men with African descent in 
either parental lineage. Mea sur ing virtue and merit by reasonable ser vices per-
formed for the nation echoed the power of monarchs to naturalize loyal vassals 
of foreign origin, and made clear what an exceptional privilege citizenship 
would be. Th e conditions and exclusions in Article 22 might invalidate any 
claim to liberalism’s universalistic pretensions, but the “exclusionary im-
pulse,” as Uday Mehta calls it, was endemic to the liberal tradition.33 In the 
case of Spain, that impulse followed a racial logic imbued with the sedimented 
discursive residue of will, foreignness, and loyalty.
What should we make of the virtually silent Cuban deputies? Th ey made 
no mention in deliberations of the critical role of free- colored militias in de-
fending Spanish authority during two turbulent de cades in the Ca rib be an, or 
even a rhetorical fl ourish about the unwavering loyalty of free people of color 
to make a common illustrative contrast with the slave population. Because of 
their near single- minded attention to preserving slavery and free trade (in-
cluding the slave trade), Cuban delegates skipped the debates about race that 
tested the limits of liberalism’s universal claims. Th ey  were also ner vous about 
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vague promises of citizenship spreading to Cuba. For as much ink as Jáure-
gui spilled on the issue of slavery, his reports to the Havana ayuntamiento 
hardly mentioned Article 22 aside from a brief summary on 3 October. “What 
I always feared has happened,” he explained. “Exalted principles and danger-
ous doctrines forced by publicity that in my judgment will bring many ills to 
America.”34 Clearly opposed to the mea sure, he nonetheless remained silent in 
the Cortes, concerned that additional discussion would only lead to more 
claims to citizenship by castas, and resolved that “it is politic and prudent to 
surrender to the circumstances.” His parenthetical reaction to Article 22 on 
14 November off ered little in terms of po liti cal strategy: “We should place our 
destinies and our existence in the hands of Divine Providence.”35
Th e Constitution Comes to Cuba
In the midst of the Cortes debates about slavery, Jáuregui shared his concerns 
about secrecy to the Havana ayuntamiento in April 1811. Invoking patria (fa-
therland) to refer to Cuba rather than the Cortes’s defi nition as part of the two 
Spains, he recounted his eff orts to “conjurar [ward off ] the storm” threatening 
his homeland. Th e closed sessions he persuaded the Cortes to hold about the 
abolition of slavery attempted to prevent “murmurs among our servants that 
might fi nally degenerate into frightful conclusions.” Jáuregui regretted that 
his votes against further discussion of slavery could not be published in the 
record, explaining that “too many explosive issues have already been mounted 
to allow me to amplify their volume.” Th e other Cuban delegates— Joaquín 
Santa Cruz and the Marqués de San Felipe— had not been present at the ses-
sions, and so it was up to him, he claimed, to protect his country from “this 
destructive bolt” that would likely produce “the havoc that I understandably 
fear and that has not been avoided by those who wish to exploit the slaves at 
the wrong time, leaving no help for free people.”36 Protecting Cuba took prior-
ity over constitutional principles for Jáuregui, and the free- speaking Cortes 
delegates, not just rebellious slaves, posed a threat to order and stability on the 
island. Th e promulgation of the 1812 Constitution gave decisive shape to the 
continuity of empire in Cuba, but not the eff ects that Jáuregui imagined on 
the basis of his worst assumptions about slavery and racial diff erence.
Th e fretting of Jáuregui and other Cortes deputies about the circulation of 
news about the constitutional deliberations may not have been unfounded. 
A signifi cant minority of African- descended inhabitants of Spanish America 
fi gured among a literate colonial public attentive to the po liti cal deliberations 
aff ecting them, and anxieties about their knowledge of the Cádiz Cortes 
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acknowledged, if indirectly, that elite white Cubans did not monopolize Cu-
ban po liti cal discourse. As part of the reforms made by the Cortes, freedom 
of the press had been proclaimed in 1811, despite the maintenance of the Junta 
de Censura (censorship board) in Havana.37 Censors, customs inspectors, 
and police sought to control news of slave uprisings in other parts of the Amer-
icas, and they  were particularly ner vous about information regarding the 
Haitian Revolution. While still alleging a predisposition toward rebellion on 
the part of most Cuban slaves, offi  cials noted that many free people  were not 
opposed to Spanish rule or social peace. In 1804, the captain general worried 
that an issue of the Gazeta de Madrid detailing negotiations between Haitian 
revolutionary general Jean-Jacques Dessalines and French general Jean- 
Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, the count of Rochambeau, would corrupt the 
loyalty of “the people of color of this Island, some of whom are educated, 
come from good origins, and deserve to be thought of well among the rest of 
their especie [kind].”38 In 1811, the governor of Puerto Príncipe informed the 
captain general that a priest residing in Jamaica had sent him news that the 
Gaceta de Jamaica was publishing paragraphs “off ensive to the tan acrisolada 
[proven] loyalty that the inhabitants of this Island are known for.”39 Attempts 
to reassert the integrity of Spanish territory met their limits as ideas and 
people circulated across borders throughout the Ca rib be an.
Indeed, the proceedings in Cádiz sparked conversations in Cuba about 
the possible eff ects of a liberal constitution that might threaten the slave trade, 
slavery, and racial hierarchies. Even critiques of the Constitution and its unset-
tling potential drew on the language of freedom and rights. An anonymous 
cleric in Havana, for example, draft ed a sharp critique of the Cortes delibera-
tions about ending slavery for failing to clarify “an undefi ned freedom” that 
might await slaves. He saw no contradiction between slavery and a po liti cal 
community guided by the principles of liberalism. In this he might have 
found agreement with Francisco Arango y Parreño, but advanced through a 
diff erent logic. Whereas Arango y Parreño drew on Adam Smith (and looked 
past Smith’s critique of slavery) to argue that slaves could not have the same 
self- interest in private property that wage earners did, the cleric writing from 
Cuba looked to Spain’s legal tradition not to argue for slaves’ exclusion or 
subordination but to show how they already enjoyed rights. Th ey had “the 
freedom for the use of their natural rights to enter into matrimony, to change 
their own er, and consequently to improve their fate in ser vice occupations.” 
As for their capacity to be po liti cal subjects, he distinguished between slavery 
during the classical era, when slaves  were “civilized men who formed the 
body of the nation” who  were deprived of law by the privations of slavery. In 
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contrast, Cuban slaves  were men of “diff erent castas; or African tribes among 
which, it can be said, have not encountered social relations: stupid; without 
regular legislation, without fi xed populations.” Humanity, he claimed, was al-
ready favoring Africans by removing them from the wars among “those na-
tions,” but they  were not suited for membership in “the great world Republic” 
as slaves in classical times  were.40 Invoking natural rights, law, and nation al-
lowed the cleric to fashion a similar argument on the same terms that some 
delegates in Cádiz used to defi ne the limits of citizenship.
Once the constitution arrived in Cuba— now clear in its exclusion of rights 
to almost all African- descended subjects— colonial offi  cials did an about-face. 
No longer did they work to keep news of it under wraps. Strict instructions 
came from Cádiz about the formal means of circulating the constitution. And 
circulated it was. On receiving a copy of the constitution, the “chief or judge” of 
each town would read the document in its entirety in a prominent location, to 
be followed that night by bells, fi reworks, and gun salutes. On the fi rst religious 
holiday, an offi  cial would read the constitution again during mass, following up 
with a catechistic exchange: “Do you swear by God and by the evangelical saints 
to guard the po liti cal constitution of the Spanish monarchy, sanctioned by the 
general and extraordinary Cortes of the nation, and be loyal to the king?” Once 
the congregants replied affi  rmatively, they would sing the Te Deum. Th e same 
exchange was required of every corporation, university, religious community, 
government offi  ce, and all military troops— even members of the free- colored 
militia, who might have been alternately encouraged or frustrated about Article 
22 once they heard about it.41 Spreading the news across the island did not have 
the sole purpose of informing a handful of Cubans that they now enjoyed con-
stitutional rights. It also sent a message loud and clear to most of Cuba’s inhabit-
ants that no matter how much value their loyalty had to Spain, their exclusion 
from a new form of po liti cal membership rested on a new set of arguments.
It was lost on few offi  cials in Cuba that aft er years of attempting to regulate 
information about the Cortes of Cádiz, the orders to disseminate the constitu-
tion so widely came at a delicate time. A series of slave revolts proliferated on 
the island in 1812, and suspicions of a coordinated movement pointed to José 
Antonio Aponte, a captain in Havana’s free black militia. Th is intensifi ed scru-
tiny of the militia members. Urban militia companies— including those com-
posed separately of blacks and mulattoes— had been spruced up and given 
new uniforms and weapons, as much to prepare them to combat rebellions as 
“to stimulate their zeal and energize their patriotism,” according to Puerto 
Príncipe’s governor.42 Th e outbreak of slave revolts in the early months of 1812 
confi rmed the fears of those Cubans who had worried about the intersection 
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of slavery and the liberalizing mea sures discussed in Cádiz. Andres de Jáure-
gui, at least, preferred mea sures of vigilance “outside of common order” to at-
tempt to suppress the slave revolts. Clearly committed on one level to the rule 
of law— and, as his actions in the Cortes attest, to a large slave population— he 
expressed little faith in the structures of Spanish rule in the face of wide-
spread unrest: “I do not believe there is a law, rule, or anything to prevail over 
the urgent need to save the patria.” 43 Nevertheless, the new laws and rules 
that accompanied the 1812 Constitution became widespread knowledge no 
matter what their eff ects  were on containing pop u lar unrest.
Evidence of free African- descended men taking advantage of the “open 
door” of Article 22 is frustratingly slim. A search through countless archival 
bundles in Spain and Cuba reveals just one attempt. Manuel Marciel, a mu-
latto from Santiago, submitted a petition on 30 March 1813 for the “grace” or 
favor that would grant him and his descendants “the character of citizen and 
the class of white.” But why ask for whiteness, rather than citizenship? African- 
descended Cuban men could claim to be Spanish without recourse to peti-
tion, but whiteness, nowhere mentioned in the constitution, would ostensibly 
have been purchased through the royal privilege of the gracias al sacar.44 In-
stead, Marciel cited Article 22 of the constitution in his petition for citizen-
ship and then apparently added on whiteness as a bonus requiring no payment 
for a certifi cate. Nimbly couching his image in the likeness of the idealized 
exceptions provided for by Article 22, Marciel noted that he had served for 
thirty years as a member of the pardo militias in Santiago and Bayamo and 
was regarded by various individuals as “a good man, peaceful and obedient to 
his superiors, who provides a good education for his children.” He was married 
to a free parda, María Antonia del Pozo, and his parents had been free from 
birth and married in a church. He possessed two  houses, two parcels of land, 
some slaves, and a copy of his father’s will identifying Nicolás Antonio Marcial 
as a native of Galicia. A little over one year later, Manuel Marcial became 
a white citizen of Spain.45
But by 1816, aft er Fernando VII had nullifi ed the 1812 Constitution, it ap-
pears that even the exceptional achievement of Marcial’s citizenship had lim-
ited public affi  rmation. A list of contributors to a provincial fund for 
expeditions to capture runaway slaves includes Marcial donating six pesos, 
but his name lacks the honorifi c “Don” that appears next to most other men’s 
names.46 Even without the status of citizen, which excluded all Cubans aft er 
1814, the social status that Marcial might have claimed or have acknowledged 
by other santiagueros, whether through his putative whiteness or having 
proved “virtue and merit,” appears illusory.
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Ultimately, affi  rming loyalty to the imperial project may have been what 
off ered more secure footing than Article 22 to some free men of color; this 
new circumstance arose not despite the widespread unrest on the island and 
in the Americas but precisely because of it. What some Cubans came to real-
ize in the years of imperial crisis, as they watched other regions of Spanish 
America dissolve into violent confl ict, was that loyalty— as opposed to exit— 
off ered a relatively stable position from which to negotiate within the empire, 
particularly in the midst of crisis.47 Even before the constitution came to Cuba, 
Pedro Galdíz, a lower offi  cer of the pardo battalion in Havana, successfully 
lobbied for a portion of normal monthly pay during the months of rest. In 
1811, he appealed “with no pretension but obedience and hope for the return 
of our legitimate sovereign to his throne” for a type of recognition that would 
not have been granted by invoking the constitution.48 Whether or not Galdíz 
knew of the Cortes deliberations, the constitution seems not to have mattered 
when he looked to imperial politics to advance his request.
Th roughout the period of Spanish rule in America, the crown played a 
mediating role between Spanish colonists and the colonized populations of 
indigenous and African descent. It was not a static role. In the wake of the 
Haitian Revolution, the beginning of insurrections on the mainland, and the 
unfolding of the Aponte Rebellion of 1812, Spanish offi  cials appeared more 
intent on policing slaves and safeguarding the loyalty of the creole elite than 
off ering opportunities for free people of color to become citizens. Slaveown-
ers, when giving attention to the coherence of Cuban society, might have been 
infl uenced as much by recent slave revolts as by the off ers of po liti cal rewards 
by Spain. In his study of the Aponte Rebellion, Matt Childs documents how 
judicial offi  cials and colonial authorities in Havana bought the freedom of 
slaves who denounced the Aponte Rebellion, in part because their own ers re-
fused uncompensated manumission: in other words, “Loyalty carried no dis-
count for a slave’s price of freedom.” 49 Other Cubans within reach of 
citizenship also reacted with hesitance. In the case of two unique towns in 
Cuba, the off er of citizenship to a surprising group of racialized subordinates 
produced stunning responses.
Becoming Spanish in the Indian Pueblos
Th e constitution’s declaration that indigenous men  were now citizens aff ected 
vast numbers of people and countless communities in Spanish America, far 
more than the population of African descent aff ected by the constitution. 
Residents of Mesoamerican and Andean regions with indigenous majorities 
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faced imposing decisions about how po liti cal change would aff ect social 
stability.50 In contrast, Cuba’s indigenous population fell victim to Spanish 
disease and by the middle of the sixteenth century had experienced cata-
strophic population loss. It was not a complete extinction. Understandably, 
indigenous citizenship in Cuba has merited little attention by scholars. Yet in 
1812 there  were two remaining indigenous pueblos, Jiguaní and El Caney, in 
eastern part of the island. Th e ambivalent promises of liberal citizenship set 
in motion decades- long debates between residents and offi  cials about the 
meaning of citizenship and the signifi cance of “pure” races.
News of the constitution’s promulgation took a while to reach the people 
of El Caney and Jiguaní. Th eir protector de indios (an offi  cial legal advocate 
for Indian pueblos), reported that aft er the document was read and discussed 
in Havana, alcaldes (mayors) and cabildos of smaller towns relied on rumors 
until offi  cial copies arrived midyear. Once word spread, the ayuntamiento of 
El Caney quickly erected a monument in honor of the constitution in its 
main plaza on August 14.51 On hearing the provisions of the constitution’s 
extension of citizenship to Indians, the leaders of Jiguaní and El Caney as-
serted to the protector, Luis Maríon de Arce, that they had in de pen dent juris-
diction from the Spanish government and would decide for themselves between 
Spanish citizenship and the older protections enjoyed by Indian pueblos, such 
as limited self- government and corporate land rights. Th e questions that 
emerged from the confl ict this ignited  were as material as they  were concep-
tual: now that Indians could claim Spanish citizenship— in other words, 
 were Indians still entitled to special protections? And did they even want 
them? Offi  cials in eastern Cuba struggled to take seriously the idea that Indi-
ans could become Spanish citizens on equal standing with white Spaniards. 
Free from the tutelage and surveillance of a protector, would their loyalty to 
Spanish rule wane?
“Th ey want to be Spaniards!” Arce wrote to the Audiencia in Santiago, but 
he was reluctant to abolish the protections they received as legal subordi-
nates. Residents of the towns could not agree: in September, the leaders of El 
Caney told the Audiencia that “in light of the Constitution they do not need 
a Protector”; fi ve residents of Jiguaní wrote in November that over three cen-
turies they “never abused, nor will ever abuse the graces, donations, and privi-
leges that His Majesty with his liberal and caring hands has conceded.” Th ey 
took a swipe at what they perceived as the ignorance of El Caney and peti-
tioned in February 1813 for the Audiencia to clarify the constitution’s mean-
ing so that they could keep their protector and their historic privileges. Th e 
mediating role of Arce complicates the story. On one hand, he wrote elo-
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quently about the fragile condition of the pueblos: despite the implications of 
the “wise Constitution,” and that “in other times it had been proven that Indi-
ans would be better managed without protectors,” he went on to warn that 
“this is a time motivated by the human heart, although among us are evildo-
ers capable of abusing, to sinister ends, the ignorance and simplicity of the 
Indians.” He specifi cally referred to the infl ux into the region of French émi-
grés from Haiti and their “slaves of the rebellious race” who  were capable of 
corrupting and exploiting the Indians. Arce pleaded that even if the Indians 
gave up all of their other privileges, the loss of their protector was not a dis-
grace they should suff er. On the other hand, Arce’s most impassioned defenses 
 were of his own indispensability— this, aft er all, was a man in danger of los-
ing his job.
Th e struggle with Jiguaní over its protector continued well past the revo-
cation of the constitution in 1814 (legal squabbles continued until 1846), but 
offi  cials remained determined to abolish pueblo privileges, with or without the 
promise of citizenship. In 1818, Jiguaní lost its protector under conditions that 
the Audiencia tried hard to cast as good news. It bestowed the title of villa on 
the community, “with the same prerogatives that Spanish pueblos enjoy,” and 
it declared Jiguaní’s residents “among the most faithful vassals, giving to said 
pueblo the title of Leal [Loyal].”52 In other words, the Indians  were declared 
Spaniards free of protections in reward for their loyalty. Th e decision drew on 
a report made in 1814 by Pedro Alcántara— an Audiencia member and former 
Cortes deputy— which claimed that “the spirit of those vecinos has been in-
fl uenced by the new order of things in their municipal government” and that 
“the casta [mixed population] there is entirely extinguished by the general 
mix of whites, Spaniards and Isleños [Canary Islanders], and of cuarterones 
[quadroons] and pardos, such that the natural physiognomy of Indians has 
disappeared entirely.”53 Again, the shady role of the protector confounds an 
easy interpretation. Alcántara argued that Arce’s contempt for the constitu-
tion betrayed the good faith support and patriotism he enjoyed within the 
pueblos— Juan Miguel Randón, the Indian alcalde of Jiguaní, called him 
“one of the most refi ned constitutionalists.”54 Ultimately, Alcántara accused 
Arce of having long abandoned his responsibilities to protect and manage 
these unique communities, but the profi t to be gained from preserving their 
designation trumped the principles of racial diff erence, constitutionalism, 
and citizenship to which he paid lip ser vice.
In consultation with the Audiencia in Caracas, a royal order in 1821 elimi-
nated the offi  ce of the protector de indios in Santiago de Cuba because the 
Indians needed their equality restored, noting that aft er 1814 they had been 
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left  in “a state of minority when before they  were subjects” and “should be 
made equal” like Spaniards in both hemi spheres.55 Th e archives do not give a 
clear indication of what happened in Jiguaní and El Caney between 1823 and 
1837, but we can infer that the abandoned constitutional guarantees of Span-
ish citizenship explain the appearance of yet another paper trail in the 1840s, 
revealing that the towns still had a protector. By now, offi  cials in Madrid 
worked assiduously to eliminate what they viewed as an exotic and arcane 
institution. Th e ultimate demise of the offi  ce of protector in 1846 came when 
Spanish offi  cials acted on the authority to govern by “special laws” and on the 
grounds that there was no longer a “raza pura [pure race]” of Indians that 
necessitated protection. Although the Audiencia blamed the offi  ce for leaving 
the community “backward on the March of Civilization and general prog-
ress,” the census suggested that living in the backward community remained 
an appealing option for many Cubans. In 1837 there  were 1,708 individuals 
living in El Caney, and 1,206  were identifi ed as indios; there  were 111 Span-
iards, 134 free people of color, and 257 slaves. More telling is the prevalence of 
identifying as Indians the children of mixed descent— in other words, white 
Spaniards and African- descended residents had children with the Indians of 
El Caney and strategically “increased” the Indian population by designating 
their children as such. To colonial offi  cials this was a farce; to the residents of 
El Caney, Indian privileges— whether the residents “were” Indians or not— 
may have represented a means of commanding resources in the absence of 
claims to Spanish citizenship.
As with other indigenous communities in Spanish America, under colonial 
rule or in new republics, transformations occasioned by liberal ideals oft en 
occasioned loss more than opportunity. Despite periodic enthusiasm for the 
constitution, particularly in El Caney, the inhabitants of the Cuban pueblos—
“pure” Indians or not— recognized the vulnerability of Spanish citizenship. 
Over thirty years later, when at long last the Spanish government success-
fully abolished pueblo status and the offi  ce of the protector de indios, the 
impoverished residents of those communities found themselves denied both 
special protection and Spanish citizenship.
Commissioning Whiteness
In his insistence on maintaining slavery and the slave trade in the Spanish 
empire, Andrés de Jáuregui counted as one of his great victories in Cádiz 
the silencing of debates about abolition. Yet privately, he expressed concerns 
to offi  cials in Havana about how the “inferior condition” of slaves and free 
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people of color exacerbated the critical situation of the monarchy. Invoking 
the example of the Haitian Revolution, he encouraged offi  cials in Havana to 
fi nd in Spain’s crisis opportunities to attract laborers to the island who  were 
not of African descent. Spanish provinces such as Galicia, Asturias, and the 
Canary Islands “abounded in population and their naturales”  were “quite valu-
able for their good habits.” Although the constitution itself could not mandate 
an increase in the Spanish population of Cuba, Jáuregui noticed an opportu-
nity for the new government and “the liberality of its principles” to encour-
age migration from the peninsula to the Ca rib be an colonies.56 Jáuregui was 
not the fi rst person to advocate increased “white” migration to Cuba as a 
means of naturalizing allegiance to Spanish rule, but his timing was auspi-
cious, coming as it did when the Haitian Revolution, threats to Spanish hege-
mony in the colonies, and new po liti cal categories of belonging redrew the 
boundaries of race and loyalty.
Heightened attention to who came and went from Cuba preceded the 
crisis in Spain and the Constitution of 1812, when instability in St. Domingue 
sent many of its inhabitants to nearby Cuba. Not all migrants enjoyed the 
same status. An edict by Captain General Luis de las Casas in 1796 prohibited 
the entry into Cuba of foreign blacks who  were not bozales (slaves brought 
directly from Africa), targeting slaves from islands that had experienced re-
volts.57 French and creole refugees fl eeing the upheaval of the Haitian Revolu-
tion arrived in numbers too great (approximately 18,000) to solicit individual 
cartas de naturaleza, the naturalization certifi cates historically linked to 
trading and travel privileges. An 1803 report from Santiago noted that fami-
lies from Port- au- Prince  were “seeking hospitality” and that their former 
slaves  were allowed to disembark (sometimes taking loyalty oaths) only be-
cause of their “indispensability” to the families, whose French nationality 
did not mitigate the advantage of “acquiring the largest number possible of 
good white inhabitants” in Cuba.58 By 1804 the king had suspended issuing 
cartas de naturaleza altogether to French immigrants from Saint- Domingue, 
ending local concessions of cartas in Santiago “with the idea of developing 
the agricultural arts and population.” But newly arrived immigrants still 
received opportunities to buy land in the interior once they had taken an 
oath of loyalty and vassalage.59 If the crown, then, became reluctant to extend 
Spanish po liti cal personhood to émigrés, it nevertheless off ered them mate-
rial support in the name of cultivating more “good white inhabitants.”
Other foreigners seeking to enter Cuba encountered fewer problems than 
those from Saint Domingue. Th e island experienced a sharp increase in the 
number of individuals migrating from mainland Spanish America in the midst 
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and wake of violent in de pen dence confl icts. Patriot forces deemed slaves and 
the many property own ers who supported Spain “royalists” during and aft er 
the wars. Th us insurgents sent captured slave soldiers to Cuba and oft en con-
fi scated the property of other Spanish sympathizers. Th ose free individuals 
oft en came to Cuba voluntarily, following kin and commercial networks as 
well as opportunities for state support. Simón Bolívar’s own sister fl ed to 
Cuba from Venezuela and received a pension from the Spanish government 
aft er identifying herself as one of “the defenders of the cause of the King.” 60
Lingering concerns about the destabilizing presence of French émigrés 
extended debates about natives and foreigners in the empire. Most Saint- 
Domingue refugees had been expelled from Cuba in 1808 and 1809 because 
of their unclear loyalties aft er the French invasion of Spain— and out of fears 
that they and their former slaves would spread news of the Haitian Revolu-
tion. Th e gradual return of some of the expelled only intensifi ed doubts about 
racial identifi cation trumping po liti cal affi  liation. Th e abrogation of the consti-
tution in 1814 ceased to off er Cuban- born men citizenship, but those men still 
joined peninsulares in publicly distinguishing themselves from the French, 
doubting the intentions and po liti cal affi  liations of the new foreign residents. 
Suspicions foiled attempts to subsume national diff erences in the interests of 
a unifi ed “white” population. By 1815, with the monarchy restored, Havana’s 
cabildo reiterated concerns to Madrid about the presence of French. Never-
theless, attempts by St. Domingue refugees to return to Cuba aft er the restora-
tion of the monarchy encountered a slightly improved po liti cal climate. Th ey 
had to take oaths of loyalty to Spain once they arrived, but otherwise met 
with fewer restrictions.61 Even fi nancial complications in their resettlement 
received resolution: widows of military men demanded pensions based on 
their husbands’ ser vice alongside Spanish troops in Hispaniola and generally 
found sympathetic treatment.62
Th ese tensions about race and loyalty, in combination with concerns about 
economic growth, had deepened interest in increasing the “white” population— 
specifi cally named as such with greater frequency. In 1812, members of the 
Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, Havana’s premier intellectual and 
economic society, established a Comisión de Población Blanca. In June 1816, 
members Francisco Chacón and Andrés de Zayas assumed responsibility for 
the commission, charged with avoiding the “imminent risk” posed by “veci-
nos of all democracies” of the “states of the American federation.”63 Th e ef-
forts of the commission resulted in a royal order issued by Captain General 
José Cienfuegos in October 1817 that affi  rmed the need for white immigration 
and free trade, both of which  were advanced by leveling the privileges of for-
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eigners and natives. Even with the suspension of the Cádiz Constitution in 
1814, naturaleza rights, if not full citizenship, could still be granted and claimed 
in the interests of fomenting a loyal population in Cuba dedicated to productive 
endeavors.64 And cartas de naturaleza became the principal legal conduit 
through which migration to Cuba took place. In part because of insuffi  cient 
initial interest on the part of Spaniards to migrate, whiteness, as defi ned in 
the development of the immigration project, broadened to include any Eu ro-
pe an Catholic (and even some Protestants)— and was likely also judged by 
appearance and on the spot by local offi  cials in Cuba or by consulates in 
other areas.
Public discussions of the commission’s deliberations linked questions of 
white immigration to po liti cal loyalty but disagreed as to whether whiteness 
or legal freedom was the better indicator of allegiance. In 1817, Pedro Alcán-
tara de Acosta argued for mea sures to increase the white population “for the 
enrichment of those loyal vassals whose love for their sovereign has never 
diminished.” Yet he declared it no less important to recognize “the necessity 
of conceding to the free blacks of the city of Santiago de Cuba the military 
gracias they requested for their conduct. It is only with those that their loy-
alty can be assured, and with the social education we have prestado [lent] 
them . . .  nobody in this eastern part [of the island] fears those free blacks; 
the slaves, yes.” Alcántara carefully defended the “dulce y humano [mild and 
humane] commerce” that brought Africans out of “ignorance or malice” and 
developed the “bien real y moral [real and moral good] that they possess in 
the good treatment of the own ers of this island.”65 If loyalty to Spain repre-
sented the goal of white immigration, Alcántara argued that other means be-
sides whitening the population could achieve the same end. Slaves, however, 
received none of the benefi t of the doubt that Alcántara and other offi  cials 
extended to free people of color.
Th e fi nal guidelines of the Comisión Blanca in 1818— now assuming more 
durable form as the Junta de Población Blanca— laid out rules for any for-
eigners who wanted to migrate to Cuba: they had to be Catholic, they had to 
take an oath of loyalty and vassalage, and, as an incentive to migrate, they 
did not have to pay tribute or taxes on anything but their slaves for the fi rst 
fi ve years. Th is initial exemption recalls the paradoxical double meaning of 
derecho— tax or tribute to the crown, as well as rights— insofar as the “free-
doms” of citizenship did not immediately accompany the instant freedom from 
taxes guaranteed to immigrants. Aft er fi ve years in Cuba, immigrants and their 
legitimate descendants would acquire the rights and privileges of Spaniards. 
As property, any slaves held by those immigrants traveled according to their 
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masters’ designs but with no state regulation or documentation besides a tax 
paid on them. Slaves, then, traveled as property, not as people, and thus ex-
isted for offi  cial purposes as heads to be counted for tax purposes and not 
always subjects with privileges or rights.
A project to attract white immigrants and their slaves presumably required 
little discussion of free people of African descent, but aft er several years of 
deliberation, the Comisión Blanca made an unexpected proposal to the cap-
tain general. If the point of white immigration was to increase a loyal Cuban 
population that could balance the eff ects of an increasing and potentially 
restive slave population, it argued, then free people of color could tip the bal-
ance toward order and stability. Echoing Alcántara’s logic, the commission 
recommended issuing cartas de naturaleza to free men of color residing in 
Cuba who met requirements virtually identical to those in Article 22 of the 
now defunct Cádiz Constitution. Th e commission explicitly invoked the lan-
guage of citizenship and legal identity: it sought to give the captain general the 
authority to “confer the document” to those who sought it, stating that free 
people would “earn the rights accorded to the same class of naturales on the 
island.” Th e proposal pivoted on the distinction between nativeness and for-
eignness. Th e commission sought to extend the right to those free people born 
in Cuba or other Spanish dominions and exclude from consideration anyone 
of African descent who had come directly from Africa or who worked for a 
recently arrived white immigrant.66 At once a signifi cant revision and as well 
an enhancement of the terms of po liti cal belonging laid out in the 1812 Con-
stitution, the proposal placed a tenuous right of citizenship within reach of 
free African- descended Cuban men. Yet the right itself, in the absence of any 
constitutional guarantees, may have lost some of its luster.
Th e fi nal guidelines for white immigration projects did not adopt this 
novel amendment, but its mere proposal helps qualify the signifi cance as-
cribed to whiteness in explanations of Cuba’s loyalty to Spain. As Pedro Al-
cántara de Acosta pleaded from his offi  cial post in Santiago de Cuba, white 
immigration alone could not reduce the threat of Mexican insurgency, Hai-
tian aggression, and a growing slave population.67 By contrasting the loyalty 
of free people with the natural ignorance and malice of the slave population, 
he imagined a supportive and mediating role for free people of color. But they 
could not guarantee Cuba’s allegiance on their own either. Correlating race 
with loyalty never yielded a universal rule that extended to Cubans of diff erent 
backgrounds. When colonial elites and authorities attempted to formulate 
such a rule for whiteness alone, they quickly ran afoul of complications from 
both within and beyond the island.
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Th e Wagers of Whiteness in Cienfuegos
Aft er Spain regained control of Havana aft er the British occupation in 1762 
and 1763, settlement projects gained momentum from the twin impulses 
of  military defense and economic development through commercial agri-
culture. A number of towns and cities founded in the late eigh teenth cen-
tury later developed into sizable communities: Mariel, Manzanillo, Santiago 
de las Vegas, Güines, Cárdenas, Caibarién, San José de las Lajas, Pedro Be-
tancourt, and others. With the institutional support of the Comisión Blanca, 
the goal of increasing the island’s white population became a third goal along-
side defense and profi t. Although some emphasis fell on increasing the white 
populations of well- established cities such as Puerto Príncipe, bureaucrats 
and private entrepreneurs focused their energies on new sites that became 
Guantánamo, Jaruco, Santo Domingo, and Reina Amalia (on the Isle of 
Pines).68 Th e policies of the Comisión Blanca initially favored the equivalence 
of whiteness and Spanishness. As high as expectations  rose that white colo-
nists would be ideal members of the Spanish empire, the projects themselves 
faced formidable obstacles in agreeing on the terms of the whiteness of white 
immigration, affi  rming Spanish rule, and checking the growth of the slave 
population.
Of the towns created with the encouragement of the comisión, the estab-
lishment of Cienfuegos perhaps best illustrates the challenges of creating a white 
population. Although no long- standing Spanish settlement existed around the 
Bahía de Jagua, the region was not new to Spaniards: Christopher Columbus 
was said to have landed there in 1494, and in 1511 the “Protector of the Indi-
ans,” Bartolomé de Las Casas, was granted an encomienda (a grant of Indians 
under his care) on one of the peninsulas in the bay.69 By the late eigh teenth 
century a smattering of people inhabited the area, but its economic potential 
as a major port for southern Cuba was not lost on the individuals who peri-
odically fl oated settlement plans to the Spanish government. Several naviga-
ble rivers fed into an enormous and well- protected bay, and dense forests had 
already been exploited by residents of nearby Trinidad. A proposal in 1798 to 
develop areas around the Bay of Jagua led to the establishment of Nuevitas 
slightly inland, but the incentives off ered by the white colonization project of 
the 1810s led to a successful bid by a naturalized Spaniard.
Louis de Clouet was a Bourdeaux- born lieutenant, a coronel (col o nel) in the 
Spanish army, and a resident of New Orleans, and he made an immigration 
pitch in January 1819 to Captain General José Cienfuegos and Intendant Ale-
jandro Ramírez, drawing explicitly on the real cédula (royal decree) promot-
ing the growth of Cuba’s white population.70 In his proposal, De Clouet gave 
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himself the power to apportion land to individual colonists— any white man 
or woman over eigh teen years old— that would be granted for distribution 
within two years. He also put himself in charge of arranging the transporta-
tion of families, distributing the six months of daily stipends provided to 
settlers, and serving as “moderator and judge” of disputes and disagreements 
among colonists. What made his proposal especially notable was the back-
ground of the families he proposed to attract. Th e core of them  were not from 
Spain or Cuba, but Louisiana, “old naturales or vecinos” who had been “vas-
sals” of the king of Spain and “always wanted to be so and establish themselves 
in Spanish territory.”71 All settlers would need to document that they  were 
Catholic, and those who had not been born “Spanish vassals”  were required 
to obtain letters of domicilio and naturalización. By April of the same year, he 
had arrived on the parcel of land provided by Captain General José Cien-
fuegos for de Clouet to distribute among the forty- six families he brought 
with him from Bordeaux.72 By the end of the year, the 232 residents of the 
colonia Fernandina de Jagua (named for Ferdinand VII)  were a surprisingly 
diverse group: 123 from France, 31 from the United States, and 28 who had left  
Saint- Domingue during the Haitian Revolution, as well as Irish, Spanish, Ger-
man, Italian, Portuguese, and Belgian settlers.73
As ships arrived from New Orleans, Bordeaux, Baltimore, and Philadel-
phia, new arrivals did not easily congeal into a population united by a shared 
identifi cation with being “white.” Inhabitants faced steep challenges in fi ght-
ing off  yellow fever and sharing the responsibilities of building roads,  houses, 
docks, and functioning farms, and the pressure of work coupled with scarce 
resources seems to have produced routine disagreements. Th e confl icts that 
arose oft en laid bare deep distrust among people originating from diff erent 
locations and backgrounds. A robbery, for example, might provoke compet-
ing accusations leveled against the Spanish and French colonists en masse.74 
De Clouet acknowledged that the work of unifying the population might 
better be left  to future settlers, suggesting in an 1823 report that it would ben-
efi t the colony to attract families from the Canary Islands, who over time 
“through their marital bonds with foreigners will result in all becoming Span-
iards.”75 Th at same year, a colonist from mainland Spanish America or ga nized 
Los Yuquinos, a group that plotted to liberate the settlement from Spanish 
rule. It targeted the French inhabitants as those deemed most loyal to Span-
ish rule and circulated rumors of a French plot to rid the region of Spanish 
control. A tense standoff  narrowly avoided violent confrontation, but uncer-
tainty lingered about the po liti cal allegiances of newly arrived migrants un-
der the auspices of white colonization.76 Frustrations with de Clouet’s 
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iron- fi sted control over the city led to an assassination attempt in 1832 or ga-
nized by Spanish and Cuban inhabitants, who called themselves “Th e Ri-
vals” in opposition to the residents from non- Spanish territory, who referred 
to themselves as Los Fieles (Th e Faithful).77
If the diversity of immigrants to the region muddies the defi nition of white-
ness, the presence of an African- descended population confuses the meaning 
of white colonization. African slaves fi gured among the early arrivals to Cien-
fuegos, and in the early rec ords of the settlement an eagerness to record “fi rsts” 
among the white population— the fi rst white child born, the fi rst marriage be-
tween whites, the fi rst white person to die— met its limits when the fi rst two 
baptisms that occurred  were of Roque and Victoria, two slaves belonging to 
de Clouet.78 His original proposal made clear that settlers would pay no duties 
on bozales, as they  were considered “instruments of agriculture” which— like 
food provisions and tools— were considered necessary enough to require a con-
cession from the government.79 De Clouet appointed a notary in 1820 to docu-
ment the increasing number of transactions of land and slaves.80 Th e African 
slave trade to Cuba offi  cially ended in 1820 as arranged in an 1817 treaty be-
tween Britain and Spain, which meant that ships carry ing captives from Af-
rica could not legally disembark on the newly built docks on the bay. In 
practice, slaves continued to arrive illegally through the 1860s, oft en making 
use of bays and inlets close to major port cities to accommodate slave ships. 
In the case of the colonia Fernandina de Jagua, the nearby Bahía de Cochinos 
(Bay of Pigs) became an important site for the arrival of ships from Africa.
New settlements did not always embrace plantation export agriculture im-
mediately, and slaves in the early economy of Cienfuegos likely labored in 
many other endeavors: felling trees for wood and to clear farming land, cattle 
ranching, and small- scale tobacco and coff ee cultivation. Such an economy 
in uneven formation may have proved favorable to slaves who sought their 
freedom, and indeed a free population of African descent developed almost 
as early as the slave population. But as sugar cultivation expanded around 
Cienfuegos during the 1830s, demand for slave labor intensifi ed, the number 
of slaves increased considerably. So, too, did slave re sis tance.81 In 1832 the 
ayuntamiento had to ask a judge to create a separate space to hold captured 
runaway slaves, who  were crowding the municipal jail.82 Periodic slave revolts 
during the 1830s likely reminded inhabitants of the principal motivation of 
the white colonization project and helped bridge the gap between shared Eu-
ro pe an descent and whiteness, as over time their benign identifi cation with the 
city’s French origins posed less of a threat to Spanish order than a potentially 
restive population of African descent.
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By the time that Fernando VII bestowed town status and the name Cien-
fuegos (aft er the captain general) on the settlement in 1827, it had accumulated 
1,129 white inhabitants, 125 free people of color, and 301 slaves. In other words, 
eight years aft er the city was established to increase Cuba’s white population, 
27 percent of the city’s residents  were of African descent. Th e rapid develop-
ment of sugar production accelerated the trend. By 1846, with seventy- one 
sugar mills operating in the city’s jurisdiction, that proportion had increased to 
44 percent.83 By then, the majority of white residents had come from Spain, 
the Canary Islands, or other parts of Cuba. When the Sociedad Patriótica de 
la Habana or ga nized a statistical report on Cienfuegos in 1838, it complained 
that the colonization project did “not progress as it was intended,” noting that 
African slaves outnumbered white individuals engaged in agricultural la-
bor three to one.84 Despite the gap between expectations and outcomes, the 
development of Cienfuegos generally counted as a success for Spain: having 
fashioned a white population out of individuals of multiple national back-
grounds, residents had overseen the creation of a profi table economy even 
before sugarcane cultivation developed in full force during the 1830s and 
1840s. Th ey had also built a church, formed an ayuntamiento, and developed 
other institutions that identifi ed them as members of a stable community 
oriented toward the reproduction of loyal subjects of the Spanish empire.
Rights and Wrongs: Th e End of the Cádiz Experiment
Th e revival of the Cádiz Constitution in 1820 following a military coup 
breathed new life into Cubans’ struggles for po liti cal repre sen ta tion and 
citizenship, with more enthusiasm among the population than among the 
principal authorities. Demonstrations in support of the news occurred again in 
major cities in March, with militia companies leading cheers and with pro-
cessions, singing, and dancing fi lling Havana’s streets.85 But orders emanated 
from the captain general’s palace to temper that enthusiasm. Concerns about 
social order intensifi ed as struggles for in de pen dence  were now succeeding in 
most parts of Spanish America. In a bold move, Fernando VII extended the 
right of free association to Cuba when he returned to the throne, but the cap-
tain general declined and asked that the off er be kept secret. He expressed to 
Madrid his reservations about allowing free Cubans of color to or ga nize 
when talk of in de pen dence was in the air: “Th e class of free pardos and more-
nos, although generally loyal to the nation, would not cease to be seduced by 
it, stimulating their pride and leading them to hatch the idea of an exact 
equality with the same principles as those naturales who have gone astray on 
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the mainland.”86 Cuba’s representatives in the Cortes— restored aft er elec-
tions had been nullifi ed three times— were similarly reluctant to extend the 
liberal policies that the agents of Spain’s “liberal revolution” encouraged. As 
one of the Cuban deputies to the Cortes, Father Félix Varela argued liberal 
positions so radical that they eventually led to his death sentence for sedition: 
the abolition of slavery, self- government for Cuba, and celebrating the in de-
pen dence of the mainland colonies. In an 1822 essay, however, he expressed 
wariness about the prospects of African- descended Cubans embracing con-
stitutionalism and liberalism:
I must warn the Cortes that among people of African origin there is a 
well- known discontent with the Constitution, for they have never given 
the slightest sign of happiness, when it is well known that in any fi esta or 
public celebration they are always the fi rst to create a scandal. Sensible 
people observed that when the news of the reestablishment of the system 
arrived in Havana, it seemed as if the earth had swallowed the blacks and 
mulattoes, for one could count on one hand those that  were in the streets, 
despite the general rejoicing, and for some time they maintained a somber 
and imposing air. Do not believe that they did this out of ignorance, or out 
of adherence to the old system, for we already know that they have tried 
twice to overturn it, declaring themselves free, and I am sure that the fi rst 
person to mount the call for in de pen dence will have almost all of the people 
of African origin on his side. Let us not fool ourselves: Constitution, lib-
erty, equality, are synonyms; these terms are polar opposites to the words 
slavery and in e qual ity of rights. It is in vain to try to reconcile these 
 opposites.87
Attempts to reconcile those opposites indeed came to defi ne much of Cuban 
politics during the nineteenth century. Varela’s warning carefully avoided as-
sessing the dispositions of the rest of the Cuban population, pointing a fi nger 
instead at what was already the most suspect group. In the short term, slavery 
and in e qual ity of rights won the battle. Th e end of the “Liberal Triennium” in 
1823 signaled another abrupt end to the Cádiz Constitution. Beginning in 1823, 
Fernando VII ruled Cuba and Spain without a constitution, and not until the 
end of the bitter Carlist War in Spain was the possibility of constitutional 
rights and citizenship again raised for Cuba.
Th irteen years later, an insurrection in La Granja, Spain, prompted liberal- 
minded ministers to reinstate once more the Constitution of 1812. A royal 
decree of 13 August 1836 specifi ed that the new constitution only applied in 
Spain, not its colonies. Th us the remaining Spanish colonies lost what ever 
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claims to citizenship they had hoped for— ironically, during the same months 
that the Cortes fi nally gave formal recognition to the in de pen dent Spanish 
American nations. A parliamentary report argued for “national pride” in 
observing how members of “that large family . . .  have reached that stage of 
education and maturity which enables them to take leave of their mother.”88 
On 29 September Manuel Lorenzo, the provincial governor of Santiago de 
Cuba, reprinted the Constitution of 1812 and circulated it throughout the city 
with a broadsheet addressed to “cubanos”: “Twice the celebrated law of Cádiz 
has been proclaimed in our ancient monarchy: twice the evil genius expelled 
it from the suelo patrio [patriotic soil]. Th e third time it arrives brought by the 
Mother of Iberia . . .  Long live the constitution of 1812! Long live the immortal 
Governor Queen! Long live the constitutional Isabel II! Long Live Spain!”89 
Th is was not the kind of patriotism that colonial offi  cials wanted to hear. Cap-
tain General Miguel Tacón blockaded the Bay of Santiago and demanded that 
Lorenzo roll back his constitutional pronouncements. Lorenzo refused, Tacón 
relieved him of his duties, and the Santiago cabildo draft ed a defensive state-
ment on 4 November affi  rming their support for Spanish rule.90
Forced out of offi  ce, Lorenzo explained in a pamphlet from 1837 his frus-
tration with Spanish rule in Cuba as a story of broken promises and unre-
quited loyalty. What Tacón and his supporters in Madrid had understood as 
rebellion was, as he put it, an affi  rmation of Spanish government as embod-
ied in the liberal principles established by the Cortes of Cádiz and revitalized 
on the peninsula. He (mis)read back onto the Constitution of 1812 that “it 
specifi es the enjoyment of citizenship rights with relation to the castas,” and 
he defended himself against attacks that he “armed the blacks and mulattoes 
to support the pronouncement.” If he understood himself to be following the 
inclusive provisions of the constitution, “How could I,” he reasoned, “tyran-
nize with the same tool forged to destroy tyranny?”91
Other Cubans who had not gone to such extremes  were no less frustrated 
by their exclusion, yet again, from the rights and citizenship guaranteed by a 
Spanish constitution. Although José Antonio Saco did not support Lorenzo’s 
radical move, he also leveled a damning critique of Spanish republicanism. In 
1835 he had been nominated as the Cuban representative to the Cortes, and 
his refl ections on his short- lived debut in Spanish politics advanced some 
surprising arguments. Saco wrote extensively of his reservations about a sys-
tem of slavery that populated Cuba with dangerous and uncivilized people. 
Ending the slave trade, then, was not a moral position but a practical neces-
sity to guarantee the island a prosperous future with as few infl uences of 
African descent as possible: “We are left  with only one remedy: whiten, 
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whiten, and then we will be respected.”92 By 1837 he complained that treating 
the colonies diff erently by basing their proportional repre sen ta tion only on 
their white population violated the spirit of equality set forth in the Consti-
tution of 1812, “still the fundamental law of the State.”93 Th e entire adult male 
population of Cuba, he contended, deserved to be represented.
Saco still asserted that white Cubans fostered a special love of freedom 
and equality through their direct exposure to those who did have it, com-
pared to Spaniards on the peninsula, for whom “freedom is nothing more 
than a right”; but “when society is composed of slaves and masters,” he wrote, 
“freedom is not merely a right but a rank, a privilege, and, if one wants it to 
be, a matter of vanity.”94  Here Saco got to the heart of the contradictions of 
Spain’s liberal experiment. It was not simply that the per sis tence of slavery 
and colonial rule made discussions of free individuals as the bearers of uni-
versal rights ring hollow. Protesting the denial of rights with the language of 
rank and privilege, as Saco did, disrupted a progressive narrative of the vic-
tory of liberal ideas over putatively archaic forms of authority grounded in 
hierarchy and particularity. Moreover, it laid bare the limits of the freedom 
promised by liberal citizenship in contrast to the freedom defi ned against 
slavery. It situated Cuban elites somewhere in between what Saidiya Hartman 
describes as the “unencumbered individuality of liberalism,” derived from 
the knowledge and enjoyment of freedom, and “the excluded, marginalized, 
and devalued subjects that it engenders . . .  the fl eshy substance that enable[s] 
the universal to achieve its ethereal splendor.”95
But can individuality only be unencumbered through national in de pen-
dence? Certainly the events of 1837 shattered the hopes of liberal inclusion. 
One historian during the early years of the Cuban Republic noted that the 
suspension of constitutional guarantees “can be considered as the origin of 
the armed revolutions that ended with the in de pen dence of the island.”96 Set-
ting aside the search for the origins of Cuban nationalism and in de pen dence, 
Spain’s imposition in 1837 of “special laws,” rather than constitutional gov-
ernment, marked the beginning of a search among Cubans for new ways to 
advance their goals under the colonial rule of Spain. Th at some of those ap-
proaches continued to draw on the language of loyalty and privilege rather 
than citizenship and rights suggests that Cubans never abandoned older forms 
of engagement with the Spanish state in the absence of a viable project for 
anticolonial rebellion and the liberal practices and principles that might— or 
might not— have inspired it.
Evidence of a widespread public crackdown in Cuba is abundant in the 
years aft er 1836, although it is diffi  cult to claim defi nitively that this 
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 represented a real increase in re sis tance or repression— as opposed to an in-
crease in state surveillance by the Comisión Militar, a repressive institution 
sanctioned in 1825. Both possibilities speak to the bleak po liti cal outlook in 
Cuba. Among the well- documented cases of disloyalty, one case in par tic u lar 
sticks out. In 1838, Fernando Estrada, described as a moreno, was caught on 
the streets of Bayamo in eastern Cuba talking to anyone who would listen. 
He was reading from a pamphlet entitled Ejemplo de la libertad civil (Exam-
ple of Civil Liberty), which had been published in 1813 in Puerto Príncipe to 
explain how the rights guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution of 1812 af-
fected Cubans.97 By conjuring the ghosts of the Cortes of Cádiz, Estrada fa-
vored an incarnation of Spanish citizenship and representative government 
that, setting aside his own likely exclusion from the system, was no longer a 
possibility. Yet he was decidedly not advocating in de pen dence from Spain. 
Th at the Comisión Militar snuff ed out his activities as swift ly as they would 
direct challenges to Spanish sovereignty reveals how far Spain and its agents 
in Cuba retreated from attempting to reconcile liberal practices, including na-
tional citizenship, within an empire that was radically smaller than it had 
been in 1812.
no less than Karl Marx attributed the unfulfi lled promise of the 
Constitution of 1812 to pop u lar discontent rather than monarchist foibles: 
when “the sudden disappearance of their social suff erings” did not occur, he 
wrote in 1854, “the very overstrained expectations which had welcomed it 
turned into disappointment, and with these passionate Southern peoples there 
is but one step from disappointment to hatred.”98 Certainly, pop u lar discon-
tent with the limitations of imperial citizenship reached Cuba, but restive 
African- descended subjects, not fi ery Spaniards, fi gured as the “Southern 
peoples” whose disappointment most worried politicians and colonial offi  -
cials who sought to keep Spain’s empire intact.
As much as Spain’s experiments with liberalism in the colonies tells a story 
of dashed hopes, they also shed light on Cubans who sought the rights of 
citizenship within the empire or, when denied them, pursued other channels 
toward inclusion, po liti cal personhood, and a greater voice in Cuban society. 
Colonial rule denied people rights, reinforced social hierarchies, and all the 
while attracted some degree of pop u lar support as a system that might allow 
for mobility, privileges, and protections. When Louis de Clouet, the found er 
of Cienfuegos, found himself appealing a legal decision in 1845, he invoked the 
Constitution of 1812 and the Constitution of 1837 in his defense. As a Spanish 
citizen, he claimed that he should not be treated diff erently in Cuba than in 
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Spain. But he emphasized the particularity of his citizenship, too, not as a 
French immigrant with a carta de naturaleza but through the title of nobility 
he earned in 1821 as a reward for his leadership in developing the island’s white 
population. Even among the Cuban “creole” elite, the rights of citizenship both 
intersected and clashed with the privileges awarded to favored subjects of the 
crown.99
Beyond blanket condemnations of po liti cal ineptitude or naively optimis-
tic assessments of liberal nationalism lies a more useful understanding of the 
Spanish imperial state in the nineteenth century. Policies about racial inclu-
sion and exclusion, about conceding privileges and guaranteeing rights,  were 
nothing if not inconsistent; and perhaps that was precisely the point. As is the 
case with other empires, such a sprawling po liti cal system was not well 
equipped to accommodate universal principles that could be uniformly ap-
plied. Scattered policies administered by multiple and shift ing institutions al-
lowed the Spanish government the fl exibility to adapt its administration to 
alternating moments of relative stability, crisis, and emergency.100 It also 
furnished colonial subjects with multiple po liti cal vocabularies through which 
to express their aspirations. Confl icts over liberal citizenship and older in-
terpellations of the colonial subject established the terms on which rights, 
privileges, po liti cal inclusion, and categories of belonging could all be dis-
cussed. Both depended on aff ective ties to Spain— loyalty and love of country 
above all.101 How those bonds conditioned the participation and exclusion of 
African- descended Cubans in colonial politics is the subject of the next 
chapter.
Two
Suspicious Affi  nities
Loyal Subjectivity and the Paternalist Public
Th e following morning when all the people  were at church, a free servant called 
me aside, and in a whisper, said to me, “my friend, if you suff er it is your own fault; 
you are treated worse than the meanest slave; make your escape, and present 
yourself before the Captain- General at Havana, state your ill treatment to him, 
and he will do you justice”; at the same time showing me the road to Havana.
—Juan Francisco Manzano, 1840
When the Prus sian scientist- explorer Alexander von Humboldt visited Ha-
vana in 1800– 1801 and 1804, his observations affi  rmed the deep opposition to 
slavery he had held before he left  for Spanish America. Horrifying conditions 
in Cuba contradicted the benevolent and protective slave laws and regulations 
enacted by the local authorities— or better put, as Humboldt clarifi ed, the 
rich landowners who populated Havana’s ayuntamiento (town council), 
the Consulado, and the Sociedad Patriótica. He hoped that a more responsi-
ble government, supported by “rich and enlightened citizens,” would improve 
Cuba’s prospects for order and prosperity. If the nominal safeguards of govern-
ment, which Humboldt saw as a vehicle for wealthy interests, cloaked the vio-
lence and degradations of slavery, what Humboldt saw as the empty language 
of loyalty veiled similar injustices. He was annoyed by “perspicacious writ-
ers” given to idealizing the supposed loyalty of free and enslaved Cubans of 
African descent to the government and to their masters. “With the ingenious 
fi ctions of language,” he claimed, they “have invented the terms ‘black culti-
vators of the Antilles,’ ‘black vassalage,’ and ‘patriarchal protection’ ” to dis-
tort the image of social relations in a slave society.1
Humboldt was neither the fi rst nor the only skeptic of the language of 
loyalty. Th e “wily sophisms” at which he took aim became a common target 
among critics of the Ever- Faithful Isle, who oft en took aim at the protections 
and vassalage associated with colonial rule, slavery, and racial hierarchy.  Here 
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was a fi ne example of a public transcript: an expression of relations between 
dominant and subordinate groups as defi ned by the privileged and powerful— a 
fl attering “self- portrait,” as James Scott called it, of how they wish to be seen. 
Subordinates might endorse those terms in the presence of superiors, as the 
documentary record of slaves, colonial subjects, those racialized as black or 
mulatto in nineteenth- century Cuba frequently makes evident. But according 
to Scott, subordinates also express a hidden transcript, a dissonant message 
expressed off stage, behind the scenes, or beneath the surface, which might 
draw on elements of the dominant discourse if only to undermine it. Th us 
even when colonial subjects wrote of their love of country, or when slaves’ 
petitions went on and on about how humble and loyal they  were, their lan-
guage served to “clothe their re sis tance and defi ance”— opposition for which, 
in the Age of Revolutions and in a slave society, there  were plenty of extant 
models.2
Th is innovative framework for understanding pop u lar struggle and poli-
tics has shed bright light on questions of re sis tance and rebellion, especially 
for the history of slavery in the Americas. It has also had the eff ect of compress-
ing a wide range of affi  liations and actions within the categories of re sis tance 
and agency. As observers of the past, should we expect subaltern historical 
subjects to have confronted their subordination in the terms of our contempo-
rary po liti cal vocabularies and expectations? What are we looking for— and 
what do we obscure— when we do?3 Actions and beliefs not easily character-
ized as re sis tance invite us to step back from an instinctual association of 
agency with re sis tance, from assuming re sis tance as the default position of 
subordinate groups, and perhaps from the framework of re sis tance, agency, 
and accommodation as a  whole.4 For much of the nineteenth century, express-
ing loyalty to Spanish rule fi gured as the principal mode of po liti cal self- 
assertion on the island, and Cubans of African descent joined most other 
Cubans in locating themselves in a position of po liti cal or social subordina-
tion. (Perhaps loyalty maintained its purchase given pop u lar disappointment 
from piecemeal Spanish experiments with liberal and republican practices of 
freedom, rights, and citizenship.) If this appears to hew too closely to a “public 
transcript,” one that did little to challenge ubiquitous inequalities, it might 
encourage us to pay a little more attention to the historical logic of ingenious 
fi ctions of language, as Humboldt called them, and to rethink what a public is 
in the fi rst place.
Contrasting a public to a hidden world takes for granted widespread ac-
cess to established spaces and forums of exchange, and in early nineteenth- 
century Cuba, hardly anyone took those for granted. Aft er each suspension of 
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constitutional rule, colonial offi  cials, sometimes more so in Cuba than in 
Spain, tightened their grip on most mechanisms of public life, and fears of 
slave rebellion and race war became their routine justifi cations for restricting 
press and associational freedoms for the entire island. Th e point is not to de-
clare that Cubans of color really  were truly rebellious or truly loyal, but to 
argue that this very dichotomy conditioned the terms of public discourse. If, 
in the fi rst de cades of the century, Cubans met with limited success when 
they entered the fi eld of politics by claiming the rights of citizens (or, in a few 
cases, by declaring in de pen dence), expressing themselves as loyal subjects rep-
resented more than a poor substitute. Loyalty grounded claims to member-
ship in the Spanish empire that could allow the pursuit of various ends in the 
context of in e qual ity by design.
Could anyone, then, become a loyal subject? Th is was the question that 
perplexed and energized those who sought to accumulate the symbolic capi-
tal suffi  cient to enter public life— and those who sought to manipulate it. It is 
also the question that this chapter pursues, and it was a question that loomed 
large during turbulent moments in the fi rst two- thirds of the nineteenth cen-
tury: the Napoleonic invasion and implementation of the 1812 Constitution; 
the 1823  Soles y Rayos de Bolívar conspiracy, led by Colombians determined 
to rid the hemi sphere of Spanish rule; the decision in 1837 that Cuba would be 
ruled by “special laws” rather than constitutional guarantees; and the brutal 
repression of an alleged conspiracy between slaves, free people, and British 
abolitionists in 1844 known as La Escalera.
Th e Loyal Subject
For the authors of the so- called antislavery novels of the 1830s and 1840s, the 
ideal Cuban slaves  were submissive, loyal to their own ers, and possessed of 
innate nobility. Sab, the slave and title character in Gertrudis Gómez de Avel-
laneda’s 1841 novel, claims to be the son of an African princess and explains 
that slaves “drag their chains patiently.”5 Francisco, the intelligent and at-
tractive protagonist of Anselmo Suárez y Romero’s novel, communicates 
with tears more than words, and he serves his mistress faithfully while en-
during relentless beatings. Other slaves in the novels— secondary characters, 
nameless masses— hint in the background at more defi ant responses to the 
brutalities of plantation life. Far from dismantling tropes of African barbarity 
and racial inferiority, the authors of these novels sought to show the pervasive 
decay that slavery caused to an island like Cuba, decay visible even in the pater-
nalistic depictions of the authors themselves. One writer later praised Suárez y 
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Romero for departing from “the ridiculous habit or error of depicting a selec-
tive society: the society, white only, isolated . . .  it is necessary, indispensable, to 
see the negritos.”6 Writers thus carefully featured loyal slaves so that even the 
problems their presence exposed— dangerous intimacies and an ineluctable 
sense of humanity— would appear preferable to more violent alternatives.
Yet it was diffi  cult for Cuba’s literate population to read any of these 
novels, since government censors had prohibited their publication on the is-
land for de cades. Juan Francisco Manzano’s Autobiography appeared in Lon-
don in 1840 and Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda’s Sab was published in 
Madrid in 1841, but Suárez’s Francisco, written in 1839, was not published until 
1880, and Cecilia Valdés did not appear until 1882. In 1859, censors rejected a 
request to publish Félix Tanco y Bosmeniel’s Petrona y Rosalía, written in 
1838, and it remained unpublished until 1925. Th at even these novels, deemed 
too risky for Cuban readers, depicted slaves as submissive and docile reveals 
just how deeply rooted that idealized type was in Cuban society, not surpris-
ing during a period when a growing slave population fueled growing fears of 
rebellion. Th is tendency also underscores a tension running throughout early 
nineteenth- century Cuba, experienced by everyone from writers to planters to 
administrators to common people of all backgrounds. How could expres-
sions of loyalty speak to a sense of social and po liti cal cohesion when public 
restrictions  were so tight that even expressions of support or stability might 
be routinely prohibited or denied? Th at paradox lay at the heart of loyalty to 
Spain, given that constitutional guarantees of citizenship and rights, whether 
within the Spanish empire or as an in de pen dent nation, could not reliably 
ground claims to po liti cal personhood.
Certainly, neither censors nor writers expected antislavery literature to 
serve as how- to manuals for slaves themselves, or that fi ctional repre sen ta-
tions of loyal slaves could seamlessly model colonial po liti cal relationships, 
either in affi  rmation or critique. As Sibylle Fischer has persuasively argued, 
the fi gure of the loyal slave in these works can be understood through the 
prism of fantasy, a negotiation with the values and anxieties of a slave society, 
in par tic u lar the fears of repeating the events of the Haitian Revolution. Th us 
a fi ctional loyal slave could perform useful labor in support of proslavery ar-
guments as well as antislavery ones. To relate the character to a “debate about 
the ‘truth of slaves,’ ” either through “the paradigm of realism or a refl ection 
theory of ideology,” she cautions, “would be to seriously misdiagnose the ide-
ological operations of the narratives.”7
We might deepen our understanding of these dynamics by seeing the 
fi ctional loyal slave as but one manifestation of a widespread valorization of 
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loyalty as a virtue and practice. It was an ideology that accomplished consid-
erable work in holding together a slave society and a colonial regime. Loyalty 
almost always implied hierarchy, and it was through multiple and over-
lapping hierarchies— polar extremes such as master and slave, colony and 
metropole, white and black (followed by intermediate categorizations), male 
and female, parent and child, rich and poor— that most Cubans understood 
themselves in relation to each other and the institutions that governed them. 
Individuals and groups commonly inhabited subordinate positions and un-
derstood that location as a regular point of departure for making claims. Cast 
in religious terms, it might ennoble the loyal as suff ering martyrs. In the case 
of the antislavery novelists, invoking loyalty allowed them to foreground the 
humiliations of slavery. For others, it oft en seemed like the only viable, or 
most successful, mode of expression; individuals and groups might success-
fully petition their superiors as humble and loyal servants, whereas they 
would have less luck making demands as equals who could threaten rebellion 
or in de pen dence. Such positioning recalls the dual meaning of “subjection” 
explained by Judith Butler as a “fundamental dependence on a discourse we 
never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency.”8 Dis-
cussions of loyalty, then, may not reveal a “truth about slaves” or anyone  else, 
but they relate to lived experience and the material world through their abil-
ity to shape common understandings of how society and politics functioned 
on the island.
Cubans  were never dependent on banned novels for models of loyalty. Th ey 
heard other examples in sermons, read them in newspapers, and learned them 
through the daily experiences of various hierarchical relationships that de-
pended on the language of loyalty to appear natural or normative. Th e Co-
varrubias dictionary, for example, defi ned loyalty with the example of a wife’s 
obedience to her husband.9 An 1824 school primer issued by the Sociedad 
Patriótica of Havana attempted to imbue in children the value of loyalty and 
obedience beyond personal relationships, instructing them that “love of 
country is an obligation of social man.”10 Furthermore, newspaper advertise-
ments identifying slaves for sale oft en boasted slaves’ loyalty as one of their 
most important qualities. One slaveowner described a mulata cook he was 
selling as “very effi  cient and untiring at work, fi el [loyal] and humble”; a wash-
erwoman “of the lucumí nation” selling for 640 pesos was described as “very 
loyal, healthy, and without defects.”11 Advertisements in newspapers for 
slaves— whether for sale, for rent, or wanted for purchase or rent— routinely 
valued loyalty and obedience. Predictably, advertisements attempting to locate 
runaway slaves, which ran alongside these other notices, tended to emphasize 
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negative characteristics in the absence of any behavior that could be described 
as loyalty.
Within the po liti cal culture of Spanish American colonialism, locating 
sovereignty with the monarch allowed the king’s subjects to envision a subor-
dinate and personal identifi cation with empire that was routinely expressed 
in terms of loyalty. It was not a discourse that was necessarily emasculating 
or lacking in honor. In the highest social strata, an economy of favors re-
warded elites with titles and professional advancement for what was under-
stood to be their loyalty to the crown.12 Indeed, an aristocratic upper crust 
centered in Havana had maneuvered deft ly in the early de cades of the nine-
teenth century to support the kind of government that would guarantee sta-
bility and profi t. Th e rhetoric used by this elite was saturated with eff usive 
protestations of loyalty to Fernando VII, who rewarded some of them with 
titles of nobility as he simultaneously nullifi ed the 1812 Constitution.13 Th ese 
privileged subjects frequently joined less favored plebeians in large public 
 ceremonies in towns and cities that celebrated Spanish authority: carefully 
arranged pro cessions for a monarch’s new child, oaths sworn to a new mon-
arch, or the arrival of a new captain general. Plebeian Cubans gathered in 
squares and other public spaces to hear royal edicts read or to watch bull-
fi ghts, fi reworks, and parades that commemorated royal power and off ered 
symbolic proximity to the king.14
Social and po liti cal hierarchies, however, never overlapped perfectly, and 
transposing loyalty from a private virtue to a public one posed multiple prob-
lems. Familial ties and tropes of sobbing plantation slaves and trusted domes-
tic servants all point to a feminization of loyalty in the private sphere that 
made an ill fi t for a public milieu dominated by patriarchs. Assumptions that 
adult men would speak for, and not with, women, children, slaves, and ser-
vants regarding po liti cal matters raised questions about how social subordi-
nates might make public their allegiance to Spanish rule, whether imagined as 
the king, the constitution, the Cortes, more localized institutions of state, or 
broader cultural affi  nities.15 Th e absence of a male head of  house hold might 
require a supplicant to amplify the language of loyalty (read especially as patri-
archal subjection) even more: the benefactors of Havana’s Casa de Maternidad 
prefaced an 1833 request for more funding by noting that the women and chil-
dren “do not have nor are able to have any other father than the Sovereign.”16
Th e changing physiology of the body politic in the nineteenth century 
meant that colonial subjects had to revise what they understood the object of 
their loyalty to be. Th e long pop u lar refrain of colonial critique, “Long live 
the king! Death to bad government!” had ceased to carry the weight that it 
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used to with the instability and of the monarchy itself. Fernando VII, the 
Spanish king, lost power to Joseph Bonaparte with the Napoleonic invasion, 
supported the 1812 Constitution that implemented a constitutional monar-
chy, nullifi ed that constitution when he returned to power in 1814, and re-
mained a vexed and complicated fi gure of Spanish authority until his death 
in 1833. Subsequent regencies, child monarchs, and military coups further di-
minished the all- powerful image of the monarch. Also, the monarchy had not 
given way completely to ideas of secular government or pop u lar sovereignty, 
and Cuba and the other Spanish colonies remained on the margins of formal 
po liti cal repre sen ta tion for much of the century.
Although the weakened monarchy may have rattled the vertical links hold-
ing together the po liti cal logic of community in Cuba, the Spanish empire in 
the nineteenth century was by no means on a clear path to substituting this 
older order with horizontal ties of pop u lar sovereignty among a unifi ed pueblo 
(people or community). Celebrating the pop u lar sovereignty articulated in 
the 1812 Constitution may, in one moment, have been understood as a supreme 
act of loyalty that in another moment— aft er 1837 in particular— could have 
been treated as a seditious denunciation of Spanish rule. Critics of colonial 
policies still relied on the language of loyalty more than that of rights and 
citizenship, even though they  were less likely to contrast bad government 
with a benevolent king. Th e Condesa de Merlin drew on the fi gure of a well- 
placed slave to demonstrate the extent of pop u lar discontent with Miguel 
Tacón, the particularly harsh captain general in the late 1830s. Her refl ections 
in 1841 on Cuba included an anecdote about a dinner hosted by the Marquesa 
de Arcos, daughter of the Marqués de Casa Calvo, a Havana noble targeted 
by Tacón. Th e captain general himself was in attendance and fi lled up on 
the food of “the negro Antonio,” the marquesa’s slave and supposedly the 
best cook in Havana. In appreciation for the meal, the captain general 
made the paternalistic gesture of off ering the slave his freedom (and a 
healthy gratuity), but Antonio— apparently aware of Tacón’s off ense against 
his mistress’s family and against Cubans in general— responded, “Tell the 
governor that I prefer slavery and poverty with my own ers to riches and 
freedom with him.”17
Who better to voice discontent than someone who had far fewer privileges 
to lose and much more to gain relative to his wealthy own ers or an elite Span-
ish visitor? And how better to illustrate disdain for Tacón than identifying 
someone who would prefer enslavement to freedom and money from a 
 tyrant? Writers, nevertheless, recognized the limits of locating the plight of 
all Cubans in the character of a loyal slave. In Cirilo Villaverde’s Cecilia Val-
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dés, Dionisio— the literate, cultured, African- born slave with a “fondness for 
dances deemed appropriate only for whites,” reveals some limits. Coinciden-
tally, he was a well- regarded cook for the Gamboa family, had met several 
captains general, the Condesa Merlín, and even Louis Philippe of Orléans. 
Yet he knew with one word when his masters thought he had crossed the line 
and presumed too close an affi  nity with his esteemed company: “Dionisio 
knew very well that he shouldn’t say a word from the moment that his masters 
began to use the formal Usted to address him. Th at was a sure sign that the tide 
of their wrath was rising.”18 Merlin and Villaverde knew that pop u lar po liti cal 
grievances ventriloquized through a slave had to be carefully contextualized 
to avoid collapsing altogether the diff erences between slaves and the elite cir-
cles they sometimes inhabited, or opening up the space for pop u lar demands 
for rights and reform.19
For colonial offi  cials, acknowledging the po liti cal allegiance of Cubans also 
required nimble rhetoric, especially when creole elites justifi ed their criticism 
of Spanish policies with their continued presence within the empire. Some 
Spanish observers defended policies in Cuba by invoking the peculiarities of 
the “Latin race” that made other, usually more lenient, colonial policies in the 
British and French Ca rib be an unsuitable for the island.20 Others extolled the 
loyalty exhibited by Cubans and argued that the Latin race cohered po liti-
cally “because it has the same origin, because there the same language is 
spoken, the same holy religion is venerated and the customs and habits are the 
same.”21 Offi  cial organs such as the Diario de la Marina regularly reminded 
readers that the government’s “active and intelligent authority” and vigilancia 
tutelar (tutelary vigilance)  were the sources of its economic well- being, its 
security, and its education in refi ning its habits and customs.22 Specifi cally, 
the newspaper drew a sharp contrast to the lawlessness and disloyalty that 
characterized the struggling mainland Latin American republics, warning 
Cubans what was possible “if the societies of our race, by habits and ideas, do 
not conceive of power as strong and unitary.”23 Th e language of custom and 
habit  here vaguely resembles references to usos y costumbres common in colo-
nial Spanish America that described local, oft en indigenous, forms of rulership 
and governance. As Cuban offi  cials used it, allusions to custom and habit 
expressed similarity and identifi cation between Spain and its colonies rather 
than denoting cultural diff erences that justifi ed local autonomy. Cubans’ 
loyalty could thus be considered a naturalized cultural affi  nity rather than a 
calculated po liti cal strategy.
In response, Cuban politicians, reformers, and writers took the colonial 
government and its promoters at their word, and oft en invoked a racially 
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charged concept of loyalty to their “Hispanic” brethren on the Iberian Penin-
sula when pressing for po liti cal rights. During the tumultuous 1840s and with 
new possibilities for reform in the 1850s and 1860s, white Cuban writers regu-
larly positioned themselves as loyal subjects. In an essay in 1851, José Antonio 
Saco identifi ed related internal and external dangers to Cuba that “posed a 
new test of its unchanging loyalty.”24 Namely, as the covetous gaze from the 
North intensifi ed, a growing movement among Cubans favored annexation 
by the United States. A longtime advocate of white immigration to Cuba as 
an alternative to slave labor, Saco sought to exclude the population of color as 
a factor in off ering rights to white Cubans in order to maintain support for 
Spain. He explained that “the Indian and African races remained completely 
excluded” from earlier colonial reforms that Spaniards wrongly assumed to 
have led to mainland in de pen dence. Cuba’s new threats, he insisted, did not 
“originate in a clash between blacks and whites.”25 With only white Cubans in 
the picture, then, Saco deployed meta phors of bondage without fear of inviting 
enslaved Cubans to press their demands as well. He asked rhetorically what the 
benefi t of support for Spain might be in the face of increasingly visible alterna-
tives: “Why are po liti cal chains the compensation for such loyalty?”26
Collectively, the deliberate exclusion of Cubans of color by these Spanish 
writers and by Saco would suggest that people of African descent could only 
be loyal subjects in the realm of fi ction. And even there, it is not coincidental 
how few characters of African descent express opinions about colonial politics. 
Slave allegiances beyond the plantation  were rare in antislavery novels, and 
authors placed at a safe distance the idea that the noble slaves they endowed 
with humanity would ever make claims on po liti cal personhood. Gómez de 
Avellaneda might have acknowledged the alienation of the Middle Passage, 
but she was not ready to off er her characters a new patria. Sab explains that 
he is “alone in the world,” without his parents, and further laments, “Nor do 
I have a country to defend, because slaves have no country.”27 Of course, Cu-
ban slaves might have imagined themselves capable of having multiple coun-
tries: African ethnic and po liti cal identifi cations (oft en called naciones) persisted 
throughout the nineteenth century, and some rebellions and legal challenges 
by slaves had as their goal new rights, privileges, and local po liti cal prac-
tices.28 Th e pattern in Cuban fi ction of excluding slaves from the realm of 
formal politics certainly mirrored the laws and policies in place to guarantee 
that prohibition in practice. Beneath both patterns lay suspicions that if 
Cuban slaves comprehended the presence of Spanish government at all, they 
would instinctively oppose it.
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Th e historical record reveals a far broader range of po liti cal subjectivities. 
Th e royal slaves of El Cobre stand out as Cuba’s most celebrated historical 
example of slaves whose rhetoric of loyalty and subordination helped win them 
concrete rights and ultimately their freedom. As mentioned briefl y in the in-
troduction, 271 slaves working in derelict copper mines near Santiago de Cuba 
became property of the king when the crown confi scated the operation in 
1670. Royal slavery was a common, if not widespread, practice in which slaves 
owned by the crown and laboring in public works projects or short- term mili-
tary defense might encounter opportunities for manumission, but the slaves of 
El Cobre experienced multigenerational proximity to state power of a diff er-
ent kind.29 For over a century the slaves and their descendants used their 
special subordination to royal authority to petition for rights to land, tax 
relief, pueblo status, and limited self- government. Th ey cited their military 
ser vice to the crown in defense, mining, hunting down runaway slaves, and the 
construction of a church at what was becoming Cuba’s principal Marian shrine. 
Just as important, their petitions  were replete with mentions of loyalty, obedi-
ence, servitude, and allegiance to a king who was also their master— not the 
cruel, heartless master of antislavery novels but a benevolent protector. Th us 
actions that offi  cials and masters could view as contentious when other slaves 
undertook them— protests, legal complaints, and the like— could be tolerated 
from the cobreros as loyal subjects pursuing the appropriate channels of 
Spanish justice.30 Seeking royal privileges as a corporate group, rather than 
demanding individual rights or openly rebelling, served the cobreros well 
throughout the eigh teenth century. Th e language of loyalty that the cobreros 
used continued to hold purchase throughout the nineteenth century as a 
mode of self- fashioning among all slaves, not just the king’s, and especially 
for the free population of color in Cuba and beyond.
Dynamics among free people more clearly exposed the gendered condi-
tions of loyal subjectivity. In contrast to the feminized valence of loyalty in 
the private realm, what constituted the free man of color as a loyal subject of 
the state was military valor, skilled occupational status, and social relation-
ships that included, among other things, “authority over subordinates.”31 Pub-
lic ser vice that might require the use of force or physical labor frequently 
appeared in the documents attesting to the loyalty of free men of color: par-
ticipation in territorial defense, the suppression of runaways, and labor on 
public works projects as militiamen. Exercising authority over subordinates 
might be demonstrated through marriage, childrearing, or offi  cer status in a 
militia. Depending on their circumstances, and certainly in comparison to 
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slaves, free men enjoyed greater opportunities to attain normative markers of 
honor: better chances of accumulating wealth and property, maintaining 
families and other social solidarities, and acquiring an education. Th e 1841 
census identifi ed just over half of all 152,848 free people of color (about 15 per-
cent of the total population) to be pardo, or mulato, indicating that a sizable 
number of free people could assert partial Spanish descent— although ques-
tions of parentage and legitimate birth might complicate reputational consen-
sus.32 If loyal subjectivity for free people seemed to rely on mimetic proximity 
to Spanishness, that may have had less to do with perceived descent or physi-
cal appearance— aft er all, racial purity and adherence to patriarchal ideals 
also fi gured into estimations of honor— than it did with the ability to inhabit 
social roles whose primary characteristic was not African descent. In Cecilia 
Valdés, a master tailor explains to his assistant that “His Majesty the King 
has declared our art to be a noble one, as is the occupation of cigar makers, 
and we have the right to use Don before our name. Tondá, even though he’s a 
mulatto, has his ‘Don,’ thanks to the King.”33
In a similar vein, the “stain” of African blood precluded the possibility of 
equal status to loyal white subjects not simply because of racial purity but, 
not surprisingly, because free people’s social, occupational, and, above all, po-
liti cal allegiances  were never guaranteed. Although colonial authorities learned 
time and time again that nobody’s loyalty could be assumed, nor determined 
by race, free people of color posed to them a par tic u lar threat. In the minds 
of many Cubans, they  were as likely to marshal their resources in support of 
anticolonial projects or to incite slaves to demand their freedom as to support 
the current order. Th e very “in- betweenness” of free people of color made their 
suitability as loyal subjects a heated po liti cal issue in the fi rst half of the nine-
teenth century. Th e result was that even when free people and slaves behaved 
in ways that would suggest support for Spanish rule and public order, they 
confronted two responses: either an ac know ledg ment of their loyalty framed 
as an exception to a general rule of black rebelliousness, or outright denial in 
line with Sab’s observation that “slaves have no country.”
Here was the fl ip side of claiming loyalty from a subordinate position: it 
reinforced the power of superiors in ways that did not always inspire a be-
nevolent, protective, or reciprocal response. Th is point would not have been 
lost on most of the enslaved, who lived under the constant threat of violence 
no matter how they positioned themselves. Even the authors of the “anti-
slavery” novels acknowledged this. Cuba’s creole elite and free men of color 
learned this lesson, too, when Spain would shut them out of po liti cal life. 
Nevertheless, faithfulness to one’s superiors routinely stood as the necessary 
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precondition for po liti cal voice, and under the right conditions those who 
could inhabit the role of the loyal subject could bend the ear of those in 
power. If loyalty was the magnetic north of colonial rule, the position from 
which all other po liti cal orientations would be mea sured, there  were mutual 
and reciprocating benefi ts to viewing Cuba as an island of humble servants.
Whispers of Revolution: Th e  Soles y Rayos de Bolívar
Th e tight grip of colonial offi  cials on public spaces, publications, and associa-
tional life intended to limit opportunities for subversion. It had the same ef-
fect on loyalty. Restrictions on mobility, information, and public expression 
already concentrated on Cuba’s population of African descent, slave and free. 
With scrutiny by colonial offi  cials on the activities of all of its subjects, pop u-
lar expressions of loyalty  were frequently suppressed, denied, or doubted. Th is 
reality came to the fore during the fi rst large- scale challenge to Spanish rule in 
Cuba emerged in 1823, the movement of the  Soles y Rayos de Bolívar (Th e 
Suns and Rays of Bolívar). Th e involvement of slaves and free people in alerting 
authorities to the threat did little to curb suspicions that they might under-
stand themselves, or be understood, as loyal subjects.
Beyond the island, Cuba acquired a reputation during the 1820s throughout 
Spanish America as a loyalist refuge. Spanish authority from Mexico to Argen-
tina crumbled with the success of various in de pen dence movements, and ex-
iles from new republics and refugees from the wars arrived in Havana. Recall 
that one of them was María Antonia Bolívar, sister of the Great Liberator.34 Th e 
Spanish government shift ed military and administrative resources to Cuba and 
used Havana as a launching point for defensive engagements in the remaining 
areas of mainland control. But such a visible symbol of Spanish power attracted 
attention. Th roughout the Americas, agents and supporters of independence— 
espousing varied combinations of republican fervor and anticolonial grudges— 
made Cuba the setting for their next, and possibly last, attempt to rid the 
hemi sphere of Spanish authority.35 Th ey no doubt had sympathetic potential 
collaborators on the island, but without a blueprint for identifying and or ga-
niz ing them, foreign agents of Cuban in de pen dence faced similar challenges to 
those of the Spanish state: through what institutions and mechanisms could 
Cubans be compelled to support one po liti cal project over another?
One of the most elaborate of the foreign plots to “liberate” Cuba used se-
cret societies to or ga nize clandestinely on the island. Th e restoration of the 
1812 Constitution in 1820 and ensuing Trienio Liberal (1820– 1822) allowed a 
brief reprieve of associational restrictions, which in de pen dence supporters 
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exploited. Despite the role of Masonic lodges in many mainland in de pen-
dence movements, Cuban lodges traced origins and ongoing relationships to 
counterparts in Spain and generally survived intense government scrutiny, 
as did non- Masonic secret societies founded by foreigners, such as the  Soles y 
Rayos de Bolívar.36 By the early 1820s, this or ga ni za tion provided some of the 
or gan i za tion al structure sought by José Francisco Lemus, a resident of Ha-
vana who left  Cuba in 1817 for Philadelphia, Florida, and Madrid, where he 
maintained contacts with supporters of Bolívar. He returned to the island as 
a col o nel in the Gran Colombian army and an agent of Colombian conspira-
tors for Cuban in de pen dence, quietly plotting until 1822, when he received 
orders from his Madrid allies to implement plans to incite pop u lar revolt.
Th ose plans unfolded slowly as agents in various part of the island strug-
gled to spread information to gather pop u lar support without inciting un-
controllable slave unrest. As in other in de pen dence movements, leaders strained 
to avoid complete social upheaval, and some forms of unrest trumped others: 
a co- conspirator from Guanajay called for postponing action “until seeing to 
a matter involving the negros,” and Lemus accordingly waited several months 
before proceeding.37 Even with the openings off ered during the Trienio, the 
absence of a well- developed print culture, associational life, and widespread 
clandestine support that could enable rapid communication and mass mobi-
lization forced Lemus and his co- conspirators to remain constantly on the 
move, shuttling between cities and the countryside to gather support. Re-
sponsibility for or ga niz ing various parts of the island (with an emphasis on 
the western provinces) fell to a small group of individuals, mostly Cubans, 
that included tradesmen, professionals, a capitán del partido (an administra-
tive and judicial offi  cial), and a parish priest.38 José Tolón, who covered Matan-
zas and its environs, reportedly gathered “all of the blacks and mulattoes” at 
the beginning of December with the goal of arming them for a march to Ha-
vana.39 Still unresolved was the role that those blacks and mulattoes should 
play in an islandwide revolt against Spain.
In August 1823, proclamations circulated as broadsides that could be easily 
transported and, literacy allowing, read privately or publicly. Th ey appealed to 
Cubans as “Españoles,” as “free men, enlightened, lovers of in de pen dence,” 
and called for an end to three centuries of “false and monstrous politics” by a 
faraway government. Some of them identifi ed Lemus as “General of the Re-
public of Cubanacán.” Others raised the specter of a British invasion and ar-
gued that only in de pen dence would prevent Cubans from remaining pawns 
of Eu ro pe an politics—“humble serfs and vile slaves.” In general, they took aim 
at what the leaders of  Soles y Rayos imagined as the source of many Cubans’ 
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continued support for Spain: the increasingly distant promise of constitu-
tional rights. Reminding readers how quickly those rights had been revoked 
in 1814, the broadsides noted that those who “answer to the glorious call of 
the Constitution” should never be called rebels. As long as Cubans willingly 
consented to an unequal po liti cal system, the distinction maintained be-
tween vassals of an empire and citizens of a republic, the leafl ets cautioned, 
would devour the Spanish nation from within. For Cuban españoles whose 
ancestral links to Spain might inform their po liti cal allegiances, creole lead-
ers in the new American republics off ered an alternative, imploring Cubans to 
join with mainland patriots, “united with us through the tightest bonds of 
fl esh, the social spirit and life.” 40
A racially (and gender-) exclusive appeal to white Cuban men is not terri-
bly surprising. Even as they modifi ed and selectively dismantled colonial so-
cial hierarchies, including the sistema de castas, many in de pen dence leaders 
wavered on the question of incorporating black and mulatto patriots into the 
upper ranks of armies and governments. Bolívar, for example, worried about 
the rise of a “pardocracy” of free mulattoes whose goals would shift  from seek-
ing legal equality to seizing control of the government.41 On the other hand, as 
Marixa Lasso notes, Colombian nationalist ideology, as it developed in the 
1820s, asserted the “equality and harmony” of its multiracial population.” 42 
Th ese two visions presented competing rhetorical strategies for extending in-
de pen dence beyond Colombia, and the organizers of the  Soles y Rayos, by 
singling out white Cubans, would more closely identify with the former.
But strengthening the “tightest bonds of fl esh” was not their sole strategy. 
Organizers of the  Soles y Rayos circulated a diff erent broadside to selected 
Cubans of color that used a quite diff erent po liti cal vocabulary than the one 
circulated among españoles. On 22 August Luis de Vargas, a soldier in Ha-
vana’s pardo battalion, noticed a sheet of paper lying at the door of the militia 
barracks and immediately delivered it to his superior. In the nearby battalion, 
José de Soto, a soldier on night patrol, descended his barracks’ staircase around 
midnight to fi nd a large number of soldiers gathered to read a letter, which he 
quickly confi scated. Th e documents discovered in the colored militia barracks 
did not demonstrate a common recognition of citizenship associated with 
being Spanish. Instead, the so- called español was portrayed for the milicianos 
(militiamen) as a tyrant who had sustained “the chains that barbarism and 
ambition  were able to invent and that still have not sated the Spanish cannibal 
aft er three hundred years.” In de pen dence was a goal to be pursued, it said, for 
“your protection,” rather than for the promise of citizenship. Th e subordinate 
terms of the milicianos’ possible participation— they must fi ght so that they 
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would be better protected— may have rung familiar given the colonial rhetoric 
that recognized their respectable status as subordinate loyal subjects. More-
over, shift ing the loyalty of well- placed Cubans of color required recognizing 
Lemus as a champion of freedom, but that freedom was ambiguous in its 
invocation of slavery, more as a po liti cal meta phor for colonialism than as a 
lived experience.
Th e proclamations did not completely ignore the social disadvantages that 
blacks and mulattoes with militia status might have faced, including access 
to literacy. Identifying as one of the “true sons of Bolívar” and identifying 
oneself to others did not have to hinge on reading, writing, or even speaking: 
milicianos  were encouraged to communicate their allegiance to the junta 
americana by donning a hat with a colored feather and a coat with a small 
ribbon of the same color. Th e broadsides gave little suggestion of seeking ex-
tensive support from free or enslaved people of African descent in a rebellion, 
despite the presumably wider channels of communication that this might oc-
casion. Instead, the  Soles y Rayos cultivated the support of militia members, 
an elite group assumed to have felt the insult of Spanish subordination more 
acutely than others and whose capacity for patriotism and love of country 
could be placed in the ser vice of a “united call” to end Spanish rule— albeit a 
unity that may have left  intact many of the legal and racial hierarchies main-
tained under colonial rule.43
Despite these attempts to ignite a rebellion for in de pen dence, slaves and 
free people appear to have been instrumental in alerting authorities to the 
 Soles y Rayos de Bolívar conspiracy just days before the planned actions  were 
to begin. Indeed, Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives himself learned 
of the conspiracy through a network of slaves and servants. On 23 July, he 
received a visit from Bonifacio Duarte, a “well- known person in Havana,” ac-
cording to the main government investigator of the conspiracy. Duarte’s 
 house hold included “an old man of color” who was “in his sphere, a highly 
respected man.” Th at old man was also the padrino (godfather) of a slave 
woman whose companion was an African- born slave, Tomás, who worked at 
the Havana printing press of Miguel de Oro. Duarte brought his servant and 
the two slaves to meet with Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives and 
deliver a copy of the broadside that Tomás had been printing on Oro’s re-
quest. Although he could not read, Tomás had begun to notice his own er 
working furtively, with the doors shut, so that no one could see him.44 Tomás 
shared a copy of one document with his girlfriend, who took it to her pa-
drino, who realized that the broadside was a call for Cuban in de pen dence 
and immediately consulted Duarte. Th eir collective visit to the captain gen-
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eral and the subsequent apprehension of Miguel de Oro revealed the exten-
sive network the  Soles y Rayos movement in Havana comprised— and the 
central role of a clandestine print culture in its or ga ni za tion.
Th e success of these underground circuits of communication until this 
point must have irked Vives. Less than two weeks earlier, he had made ex-
plicit his attempt to shut out Cubans of color from po liti cal discussion when 
he rejected a royal order sanctioning free deliberation among and within as-
sociations. He wrote to Madrid that free pardos and morenos, “although 
generally loyal to the nation, will not cease to be seduced, encouraging their 
amor propio [self- esteem] and leading them to hatch the idea of an exact 
equality with the same principles of natural law as those who have strayed on 
the mainland.” Th ere was “infi nitely more to fear,” he argued, from allowing 
slaves access to po liti cal discussion.45 Justifying strict control of the popula-
tion based on anxieties about black rebellion was a familiar policy. What did 
it mean for this strategy to fail so blatantly? Not only did anticolonial con-
spiracy circumvent limitations on public po liti cal discussion; contrary to ra-
cialized assumptions about loyalty and rebellion, it was mostly white 
conspirators who comprised the  Soles y Rayos, and Cubans of color, including 
some well- connected slaves, who had halted it.
Despite the clear barriers they imposed, illiteracy, slavery, and African ori-
gins did not exclude a slave like Tomás from the world of print and po liti cal 
intrigue; in fact, because of his presumed powerlessness, such “defects” may 
have made him an appealing choice to place in close proximity to sensitive 
material. By mobilizing formal and informal networks of kin and patronage 
that existed among slaves, free people, and even Havana’s elite, an esclavo pren-
sista (press slave), as he was called in government reports, made common 
cause with the highest colonial offi  cial on the island.
Traces of the restricted print culture in Havana proper  were scarcely 
 visible just outside of the city. Still, even there illiterate Cubans of color found 
themselves target audiences of printed propaganda. Bruno Aristegui, a free 
moreno and a shoemaker living in the nearby community of Guanabacoa, 
had encountered a piece of paper on the back patio of the Santaya dance hall 
late at night on Saturday, 23 August. Since he could not read, he visited Doña 
María Ignacia Loysa the following morning and asked her to read it to him. 
She told him that the paper was a “bad thing” and would keep it herself. Th e 
following day, Aristegui retrieved the paper in order to try his luck with Fa-
ther José Alayeto, a priest who likewise refused to divulge the message on the 
paper and instead delivered it the following day to authorities in Havana. 
Th ey  were shocked by what they read: a salutation from “the Junta Americana 
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designated by the honorifi c seal ‘Th e Republic of Cubanacán’ ” to “all of the 
Americans of Guanabacoa.” Th is was yet another rhetorical strategy of the 
 Soles y Rayos: not one exclusive to white or African- descended Cubans but a 
general appeal to all. Hours later, Aristegui found himself in Havana and 
under interrogation, still, presumably, with no knowledge of the seditious 
message written on the paper he found.46 But his knowledge was less impor-
tant to the police than his potential to spread news of rebellion to other Cu-
bans of color. Although white offi  cials in the highest levels of Guanabacoa’s 
municipal government ended up linked to the  Soles y Rayos (Lemus had lived 
in the town at some point), it was Aristegui who endured the strictest scrutiny 
from investigators.47 What ever privileges could befall loyal subjects seemed 
well out of reach.
Aristegui, Tomás, his companion and her godfather, and the milicianos 
Luis de Vargas and José de Soto: each of them had either resisted the call of the 
 Soles y Rayos or had been instrumental in unearthing its subversive inten-
tions. Yet they received no offi  cial recognition, and their support never mer-
ited a description of “loyalty” in the documentary record. Th is was not what 
offi  cials wanted to see. In the aft ermath of the conspiracy, investigations— if 
not punishments— disproportionately focused on slaves, free people, and 
sympathetic white Cubans, such as local priests, who might infl uence them. 
Only one free pardo appears to have been among the detained or exiled, but 
authorities seemed as intent to determine the loyalty or disloyalty of Cubans 
of color as they  were to trace the fl ow of information and public dissemina-
tion of the  Soles y Rayos message.48 Rooting out conspirators might resolve 
the immediate confl ict, but leaving their circuits of communication intact— 
especially if they allowed exchange between cities and the countryside— left  
the island vulnerable to future conspiracies.49 Investigators generally exoner-
ated illiterate milicianos and slaves because of their presumed ignorance, but 
the role of slaves and free people in uncovering the conspiracy did not alter 
the worst suspicions of high- ranking offi  cials. In one statement Captain Gen-
eral Vives wrote to Madrid that the free- colored militias, “who express the 
loyalty they have for the King,” had helped prevent the conspiracy, although 
he was cautious “to avoid that they unite among their party.”50 In another 
statement, he attributed Cubans’ pacifi cation to the “intimate relations they 
have with the peninsula, where they maintain relatives and friends.” He ex-
plained that the current laws might let him preserve order if the island was 
inhabited only by these presumably Spanish- descended residents, but those 
laws  were “for countries that did not have the incon ve nience of slaves and 
free people of color like this one.”51 By attempting to attribute allegiance only 
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to Spaniards and creoles, Vives betrayed the facts of the conspiracy— a testa-
ment to how deeply ingrained anxieties could trump the wide applicability of 
loyal subjectivity
To contemporaries, the narrative of the conspiracy did not break down 
along expected lines: a Spanish and creole population resistant to an antico-
lonial plot and a population of African descent itching for rebellion. Never-
theless, that story circulated to the benefi t of those who continued to believe 
that the propensity for rebellion was racially specifi c. Th e subsequent tight-
ening of public space and information did not exclusively suppress Cubans of 
color— Vives declared the creole- predominant Masonic lodges illegal in 1824— 
but they remained the best threat that offi  cials could cite in order to place 
strict controls on po liti cal discussion.
Th e  Soles y Rayos conspiracy does not clearly emerge as a proto- national 
movement of Cubans or as a foreign import wasted on a population content 
with Spanish rule. It does seem diffi  cult to ignore the signifi cant role of a hand-
ful of slaves and free people in defusing a potential in de pen dence plot. Th at it 
was easy for offi  cials in the moment to do just that underscores the limits of 
loyal subjectivity as a po liti cal position that Cubans of color could inhabit 
without scrutiny or suspicion. Th e conspiracy also tells us about two other 
aspects of the po liti cal culture of Spain’s remaining empire in the 1820s: the 
strict limits placed on public forms of po liti cal expression and the privileged 
status of the men in the militias of color, representing both their potential for 
po liti cal leadership among other Cubans of color as well as the contingency of 
their po liti cal leanings, which made them alternately trusted and feared.
Paranoia and the Public
Th e portrait of public life painted in the  Soles y Rayos conspiracy is a bleak 
one. Clandestine meetings, secret societies, broadsides left  outside doors, 
passed hand to hand, and discussed in stairwells: these  were briefl y eff ective 
but ultimately poor substitutes for visible and sanctioned networks of asso-
ciations, publications, and physical spaces where po liti cal discussion could 
occur. Th e conspiracy occurred less than a year aft er the end of the second 
constitutional period in Cuba (1820– 1823), which ostensibly broadened op-
portunities for more Cubans, citizens or not, to engage in po liti cal discus-
sion. But even those liberties had their limits: government censors issued 147 
denunciations to various licensed newspapers in the course of the Trienio.52 
Aft er major turning points away from expanded rights— in 1822, in 1837, with 
the announcement of “special laws,” and aft er the slave revolts and La Escalera 
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conspiracy in the 1840s— moderate reforms coming from Madrid oft en faced 
skepticism from offi  cials on the island, such as Vives’s refusal to permit asso-
ciational freedoms to continue just weeks before the  Soles y Rayos conspiracy 
came to a head. Such refusals, common in the fi rst half of the century, trans-
formed the po liti cal landscape, leaving fi gures such as Father Félix Varela, 
once a Cuban delegate to the Cortes, to relocate po liti cal discussion off  of the 
island— in Varela’s case to the United States, where he published El Habanero 
in Philadelphia and advocated Cuban in de pen dence. Th e restrictions placed 
on public space and association, po liti cal discussion, and publications may 
have been intended to squelch seditious and revolutionary activities, but 
they also confi ned public expressions of support for Spanish rule.
Not surprisingly, a great deal of knowledge about the public sphere in the 
early nineteenth century comes from the government offi  cials who  were con-
cocting plans to eliminate or restrict it even further. Th us public life was at 
least visible enough for censors and governors to target it. Th e continuity of 
colonial rule in Cuba set it apart from the in de pen dent mainland republics 
where, between the 1820s and the 1850s, “Spanish America experienced a veri-
table explosion of the public sphere of civil society,” according to Victor Uribe- 
Urán.53 Nevertheless, in the moneyed and literate circles of the island’s major 
cities, profi ts from agricultural expansion underwrote limited developments 
in cultural life. Manuel Moreno Fraginals notes that between 1824 and 
1834, what was known as the “ominous de cade” in Spain, Cubans experi-
enced “an age of cultural splendor and growing refi nement in the dominant 
sector.”54 At the center of it was the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del 
País, founded in 1793 as the Real Sociedad Patriótica. Composed of Ha-
vana’s creole elite, its members established a public library and champi-
oned education and scientifi c research, as well as laying the groundwork for 
an academy of literature. Th ey also tended to fi ll the posts of the govern-
ment’s civil censor boards and actively removed children and teachers of 
color from schools, thus occupying a dual role as patrons and police.55 Th e 
Sociedad provided a crucial and visible linkage between a public “patriotic” 
institution and the white elite, a link that its publications tended to affi  rm. 
In 1830, the society’s history section published a narrative of the island’s 
past that decried the poor treatment of indigenous Cubans in the sixteenth 
century, who “as our historians suppose,”  were “less barbaric” than Afri-
cans and “did not put up so much re sis tance.”56 Although the Society did 
not always enjoy cozy relations with the colonial government, it usually 
adhered to the norms of acceptable public discourse set forth by the Spanish 
administration.
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Th ose norms frequently hamstrung the periodical press and people’s ac-
cess to it. Newspapers, as Benedict Anderson famously noted,  were pivotal 
among the “creole pioneers” of Spanish America in developing a sense of na-
tionalism; for authorities on the island, news of anticolonial or revolutionary 
movements had to be stifl ed at all costs— and not just from white creoles.57 In 
1804, the captain general acknowledged that enough literate Cubans of color 
existed to warrant mea sures attempting to keep news about the Haitian Revo-
lution out of their hands. Although “some portion of the people of color are 
educated, are of decent backgrounds, and merit esteem,” he worried that news 
about Haiti published in the Gaceta de Madrid might confuse even that 
group into assuming that that the Spanish government endorsed the revolu-
tion.58 Sporadic press restrictions during constitutional periods led to short 
runs of newspapers throughout the island. Yet even before the 1837 decision 
to rule the island through special laws, Cuban offi  cials doubted the idea that 
Cuba and Spain could enjoy equal freedoms. Miguel Tacón, perhaps the most 
severe of the captains general in the early nineteenth century, wrote to Madrid 
in 1835 that freedom of the press was the principal manifestation of the “prin-
ciples of absolute equality” being expounded in Spain, principles he found 
“incompatible with the old colonial regime.”59 Government control of print 
culture extended beyond newspapers. As in nineteenth- century Brazil, when 
the Portuguese court moved to Rio de Janeiro, the imperial government made 
use of the press to attempt to shape public opinion.60 In addition to regulations 
and statistical reports, government presses also published fi ction, poetry, and 
dramatic works, presumably to guarantee the absence of subversive messages 
in pop u lar entertainment. Loyalty was a prevalent theme, from syrupy poetry 
celebrating the regency of María Cristina to an allegorical play, Lealtad cu-
bana, starring Commerce, Religion, Justice, Agriculture, the Diplomatic 
State, and the Arts— and with El Pueblo as a silent supporting character that 
was rarely on stage.61
Colonial authorities extended restrictions on public life beyond publica-
tions to specify practices that, at fi rst glance, did not seem particularly threat-
ening to public order or colonial rule. Form became as dangerous a threat as 
content. One of Tacón’s fi rst acts on becoming captain general in 1835 was to 
prohibit patriotic songs and marches in public, for even those could awaken 
“the spirit of indiscipline and disorder.”62 Several years later, for the same 
reason, he prohibited applause during and aft er per for mances in theaters, 
including the colossal new one he had built in Havana that bore his name. 
J. M. Andueza, who visited Havana in 1841, noted that the applause ban “con-
verted the theater into a church, so religious was the silence and restraint.”63 
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Richard Henry Dana, traveling to Cuba from the United States in 1859, men-
tioned an opera singer being fi ned and imprisoned for refusing to substitute 
lealtá (loyalty) for libertá (freedom) in a per for mance of Puccini’s I Puritani. 
Dana went on to describe the entirety of public life as vulnerable to the state 
of exception: “Th e power of banishing, without a charge made, or a trial, or 
even a record, but on the mere will of the Captain- General . . .  hangs at all 
hours over the head of every Cuban. Besides, that terrible power which is re-
strained only by the analogy of a state of siege, may be at any time called into 
action.”64 For all of the limitations on what could be said and done in public, 
the very act of setting the limits was a public one with a clear message: that 
the power of the Spanish government, especially as embodied by the captain 
general, was absolute and arbitrary— all the more reason for Cubans to at-
tempt to become loyal subjects deserving of benevolent paternal concern.
More oft en than not, justifi cations for these restrictions cited the potential 
for unrest among Cubans of color, even with qualifi ed ac know ledg ment of 
their loyalty. For those prominent Cubans who sought a greater role for the 
island in Spanish politics, assessing the po liti cal nature of Cubans of color 
presented diffi  culties. Emphasizing loyal slaves and free people could per-
suade opponents that extending rights and reforms would not unleash vio-
lence or demands for racial equality. But attributing that docility to successfully 
repressive state mea sures did not help their case if less repression was their 
goal. Allowing for the possibility of willful po liti cal choices on the part of 
slaves and free people only underscored the contingency of their loyalty and 
the possibility of equally willful rebellion. Authors, then, tended to displace 
the less appealing aspects of po liti cal agency onto savage Africa. Juan Ber-
nardo  O’Gavan, writing in 1821, itemized the backward politics and “horrible 
ceremonies” of the African polities from which bozales originated, explaining 
that “there had never existed a government more tyrannical” than those of 
the reyzuelos (“despotic petty kings”).65 Th e Cuban “Africanization scare” of the 
1850s, when British pressure for emancipation clashed with the possibility of 
annexation to the United States, only amplifi ed damning descriptions such as 
 O’Gavan’s.66
Stigmatizing many aspects of African culture and politics became a com-
mon gesture in reformist po liti cal discourse, but there oft en remained the 
possibility for Cubans of color to learn from white Cubans to respect prop-
erty and “paternal authority,” in  O’Gavan’s words, in a way that could simul-
taneously preserve social order and eradicate barbaric infl uences. Domingo 
Dulce, a reformist captain general during the 1860s, went so far as to cite the 
“progressive amalgamation of races” in the Spanish empire as the main rea-
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son to begin eliminating laws that distinguished free people of color from 
white Cubans.67 Th is was but one iteration of “whitening” rhetoric that as-
pired to purging traces of the African past from Cuba’s colonial future. More 
reserved captains general, censorship boards, and local authorities oft en 
restricted even statements like these.
Echoes of Africa
In practice, however, “African” culture, as it was revised and re- created in 
Cuba, provoked mixed responses. Even when they characterized them as 
barbaric and inferior to Spanish customs, observers of African- derived cul-
tural practices noted advantageous overlaps with Spanish colonial po liti cal 
culture. Cofradías (Catholic lay brotherhoods) and cabildos (mutual- aid soci-
eties), the sanctioned institutions in which Africans and African- descended 
Cubans could gather publicly,  were of Spanish origin, even as they preserved 
African ethnic identifi cations (naciones). Th e cabildos became especially vis-
ible on 6 January during the Fiesta del Día de Reyes, or the Feast of the 
Epiphany, when members would take to the streets, celebrate the pre sen ta-
tion of gift s to Jesus by the Th ree Kings, and crown their own kings and 
queens of each cabildo.  Here was a moment of reprieve when slaves and free 
people could take to the streets without excessive surveillance, proceed 
through the city or town in comparsas (carnival bands or pro cessions), and 
end up at the residence of the captain general or other high representative to 
ask for aguinaldos, or gift s of money doled out on special occasions.68
African- descended Cubans’ identifi cations with Spanish culture never 
guaranteed uncritical ac cep tance of the colonial order or slavery, and para-
noia about Cubans of color turning any opportunity to gather into subver-
sion occasionally rang true. In 1838, the slaves on an estate in Manacas used 
the Día de Reyes celebration as an opportunity to plan a rebellion, and other 
plots launched elsewhere around Easter or Christmas led to regulations call-
ing for heightened vigilance of stores, taverns, cabildos, and plantations dur-
ing these religious observations.69 By the 1840s, as slave revolts proliferated 
and government offi  cials looked high and low for causes and conspiracies, the 
embrace of Catholicism and Spanish cultural practices by some Cubans of 
color had become as suspicious as the presumed barbarity of African culture 
that persisted among others. In 1843, a typical report warning of conspiracy 
reached offi  cials in Havana from an “honorable Spaniard and rich landowner” 
in Puerto Príncipe concerned by the formation of a cabildo of over 1,200 slaves 
and free people, both African born and creole. Although the “consummate 
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stupidity” of the bozales, he asserted, prevented them from or ga nized action, 
their support from literate, skilled creoles— who themselves could have ties 
to blacks in Haiti or Jamaica— could prove fatal on the island. Moreover, the 
election and coronation of Miguel Linares as king of the cabildo, with accom-
panying appointments that “imitated” Spanish institutions, appeared less as a 
celebration of empire than an attempt to “parody state dignitaries.”70 Aft er 
investigators traced suspected La Escalera conspirators to cabildos, Captain 
General Leopoldo O’Donnell called for the extinction of the societies.71
On the other hand, observers of these supposed imitations oft en reduced 
to the symbolic complexity to fi t their high hopes or dark suspicions.72 Travel 
accounts from the 1850s describe the per sis tence of cabildos and the Día de 
Reyes celebrations as carefully balancing African, Spanish, and Cuban cul-
tural idioms. When Antonio de las Barras y Prado visited Havana from Spain 
in 1853, he noted generally that Cubans of color at that point  were prohibited 
from sharing public space with whites— separate spaces in theaters, separate 
dances, and so forth, with churches being the only integrated spaces— but he 
was impressed that the Kings’ Day festivities brought the cabildos to the heart 
of Spanish authority:
Once the cabildos are or ga nized they take to the street, presided by their 
respective kings or queens, carry ing Spanish fl ags or those of other colors, 
which they wave in the air, and continue this way, playing and dancing 
and asking the aguinaldo of so many whites they encounter, until from 
eleven to one they swarm the palace of the Captain General, on whose 
patio each tango is allowed a brief dance. . . .  Th e Captain General sticks 
his head out from time to time from the balconies and throws them cigars 
and some reales, to which they respond with shouts of “Long live Spain! 
Long live Isabel II!”73
In its performative dimension, this demonstration of loyalty seems pro forma: 
in expressing gratitude to the captain general, the cabildos acknowledged 
that taking to the streets on this special day was a privilege he granted. Th e 
use of Spanish fl ags is slightly more complicated. Barras y Prado speculated 
about the resentment the fl ag might have provoked among those who came 
from Africa (or, more likely, their ancestors) on ships that bore the same 
standard— or, in the case of recent arrivals, people who might have seen 
Spanish ships in the Gulf of Guinea to load up on palm oil.74 In his study of 
Afro- Cuban religions, David Brown considers the possible meanings of the 
fl ags in the “miniature neo- African monarchies” of the cabildos.75 Kings or 
queens led most of them, or sometimes presidents or capataces (bosses), and 
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sometimes surrounded by a court with other members carry ing military or 
royal titles. Flags, then, reinforced the status of the cabildos as po liti cal, even 
“national,” units. Given, however, that the cabildo fl ags might also index an 
affi  liation with both a Catholic saint and an African deity, the fl ags may have 
served to send multiple po liti cal messages or rework the obvious ones. Th is 
practice itself had African antecedents. Kongo Angola and West African 
groups had “built much of their royal and martial iconography upon Eu ro-
pe an imports” so that “iconographically hybridized royal displays” tell a far 
richer story about diasporic cultural practices than one of black mimicry of 
Hispanic norms— as if mimicry could ever be “mere” or simple.76
At critical moments, the simpler mimetic reading captured the attention 
of contemporaries in ways that connected the survival of the cabildos to their 
intimate relationship to the state. On 3 January 1852, just days before the Día 
de los Reyes festivities, Mariano Mora asked the Matanzas police to inter-
vene in a dispute within the Congo cabildo. According to Mora, the cabildo 
was composed of fi ve “nations or tribes”: Musundi, Bongoma, Cabo Verde, 
Luango, and Reales. Each nation had a capataz (overseer), but a primer capa-
taz enjoyed the privilege of bearing “the royal fl ag with the Spanish national 
banner” behind all of the other fl ags. Mora claimed that he was the rightful 
heir to the title. He alleged that a rival named Valentín Castillo contested the 
claim on behalf of the Luangos and Reales, so he sought the assistance of a 
celador, an offi  cial charged with neighborhood peacekeeping, to resolve the 
dispute.77 Why invite the authorities who policed public life to intervene in 
the internal struggles of the cabildos? Although a Spanish fl ag could denote 
any number of po liti cal affi  liations, its symbolic capital, in this case, provided 
Mora the outcome he sought with Castillo and the Luangos and Reales backed 
by Spanish authority and endorsed locally by the celador. As long as each of the 
nations sought this par tic u lar fl ag, its po liti cal specifi city could be activated, 
however momentarily, to fi nd resolution through a mutually respected au-
thority. And the request provided benefi ts to the celador as well: new access 
to monitor the cabildos, a chance to shape the reception of one of the most 
visible emblems of colonial rule, and evidence that— despite multiple and 
overlapping allegiances— cabildo members expressed some degree of respect 
for Spanish rules and institutions.
Many of the quotidian activities of urban Cubans of color might have been 
stigmatized and criminalized under the rubric of “public order,” yet cabildo 
leaders, free- colored artisans, and militiamen (sometimes the same people) 
remained visible alternative “types” with greater social acceptability and fuller 
integration into populations and practices associated with pro- colonial 
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loyalty than slaves, for example. Similarly, Cubans of African descent, slave 
and free, living on the island generally garnered more trust than those from 
other countries, which explained the ban placed on free blacks on foreign 
ships from disembarking in Cuban ports. Fewer distinctions, however, ap-
plied in areas of rural Cuba with large slave populations, where any collec-
tivity of Cubans of color could set off  fears of unrest that might not 
diff erentiate between slavery and colonial rule as its target. Militiamen 
sometimes remained a notable exception, especially when they reinforced 
their distinction as free men by hunting down runaway slaves and palenques, 
the communities runaways formed. In doing so, according to a military 
commander in 1816, they fulfi lled “obligations owed in ser vice to the King 
and of the Patria and of the commander they respect and obey.”78 But al-
though slave re sis tance and communication occupied the lion’s share of 
concern and scrutiny, their potential to communicate with those free blacks 
who had resources and subversive ideas, frequently fueled accusations of 
conspiracy, most notably with La Escalera in 1844. Prosecutions by the 
Comisión Militar in the wake of that conspiracy would interrogate slaves 
and free people “for having had a dangerous conversation.”79 Controlling 
these plantation publics was primarily a matter of private authority, with 
slaveowners adhering to the standards of treatment set forth in slaves’ codes 
and allowing dancing, drumming, and late- night gatherings in the barra-
cones (barracks) only to the extent that those enjoyments might prevent 
tensions from coming to a boil. Educating slaves did not appeal to many 
own ers, but an 1846 report on slave suicides by a state attorney recounted 
the long history of missionary education of Indians as key to a successful 
colonial project. Despite its potential to give slaves access to a reading pub-
lic, education— the offi  cial noted— would “teach the savages to be men fi rst, 
teach them to be religious later, and fi nish by encouraging them to submit to 
the Sovereignty of the Country.”80
Provincial Publics: Th e Case of Cienfuegos
If anxieties about race war and skepticism about constituting African- 
descended Cubans as loyal subjects conditioned the limited terms of public 
life in most of the island, white colonization projects such as Cienfuegos might 
presumably off er better prospects for open and heterogeneous po liti cal dis-
cussion and public expression. In fact, the development of Cienfuegos reveals 
a pro cess of gradual adaptation to the public norms of a slave society rather 
than off ering an alternative or antidote to them.
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As of 1833, the town ceased to enjoy the protections and exemptions 
granted to it as a white colonization project. Th is was partially the outcome of 
an investigation in the wake of some calamitous disputes among the found-
ers and leaders, culminating in the shooting of Louis de Clouet, the settle-
ment’s found er and governor. Mismanaged funds set aside for the purposes 
of increasing the white population weakened an already complicated project, 
with some early heterogeneous settlers still not assimilated as a fully Hispan-
ized population: some of the interrogations conducted to investigate the cor-
ruption and shooting still required French interpreters.81 A second reason that 
Cienfuegos lost its status is that, as a white settlement, it was not so white 
anymore. Hopes for projects such as Cienfuegos to maintain a white majority 
in Cuba could off set neither the continuing demand for African slaves nor 
the increasing volume of the clandestine slave trade. If slaves constituted a 
common form of property, it should not be surprising that white residents 
brought slaves with them and, over the years, bought even more slaves, some-
times transferred and sold from Santiago but frequently from a less conspic-
uous port than Cienfuegos itself— in the nearby, swampy Bay of Pigs.
By the 1830s, those slaves did not just labor in small numbers for residents of 
the town, Spanish merchants, or own ers of small rural estates. Although ten 
small sugar estates could be found in the hinterlands of Cienfuegos in 1830, the 
following two de cades witnessed a rapid expansion of cane cultivation, and, 
consequently, the slave population. A mea sur able free population of color in 
Cienfuegos was apparent in an 1830 census, showing men working as tailors, 
carpenters, and masons, some of whom owned slaves themselves. By 1838 there 
 were 26 sugar estates employing 1,502 slaves and only 71 white workers, as well 
as 469 smaller farms that, on average, had one or two slaves working on them.82 
By 1846, nearly one- third of Cienfuegos’s 29,000 residents  were slaves, in addi-
tion to almost 4,000 free people of color. And by 1862, with a total population 
at 28,648, Cienfuegos’s slaves and free people of color outnumbered whites by 
almost 4,400.83 So much for a white colony: competition between racial purity 
and economic prosperity had a clear winner in Cienfuegos and a lesson in how 
a white settlement colony could evolve into a slave society.
Although slaves in any situation might create opportunities to change or 
end the terms of their bondage, a fl edgling settlement with unstable economic 
and social foundations may have provided more favorable conditions for re-
sis tance and manumission than, say, a region where intensive plantation en-
terprises encouraged stricter control of slave populations. Th e Cienfuegos 
ayuntamiento received enough requests for intervention with questions of 
slavery and freedom to add a síndico, an offi  cial charged, among other things, 
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with ensuring the applications of Spain’s laws regarding slavery and negotiat-
ing the legal transfers of slaves.84 By 1824, two palenques had developed in the 
Bay of Pigs, prompting one adjacent resident to request the removal of two 
unfazed offi  cials who allowed the communities to fl ourish. (Not incidentally, 
the resident embraced the language of humility with gusto, off ering the 
sacrifi ce of, as he put it, “my few goods and even my life . . .  in honor of the 
government and religion we profess” in exchange for the governor’s “help 
and protection.”)85
Rebellions and conspiracies increased, as did public vigilance, as more 
plantations and larger workforces came to typify the regional geography. 
 Policemen in 1840 overheard a conversation one night at a store in town be-
tween a group of slaves plotting an attack on the army barracks. Not all of 
their words  were intelligible, but whispered mentions of Santo Domingo, os-
tensibly referencing revolutionary action in the mold of Haiti, caused imme-
diate alarm. Fift y soldiers dispatched to the docks, since the slaves mentioned 
something about using a ship’s arrival to signal the start of the rebellion. Of 
ten slaves interrogated, all  were African born; had backgrounds variously iden-
tifi ed as Congo, Gangá, and Carabalí; and  were engaged in trades ranging 
from carpentry to tobacco rolling to cooking. Anxieties about bozales  were 
oft en more acute than fears of creoles, but the rest of the alleged conspirators’ 
profi les— urban, skilled workers suffi  ciently trusted to circulate in the city on 
their own— heightened alarm among cienfuegueros precisely because they did 
not resemble the predictable cast of characters for a slave revolt, namely, rural 
plantation workforces.86
As with fears of anticolonial rebellion, anxieties about slave revolts could 
not be separated from questions of their or ga ni za tion and the circuits of pub-
lic or private communication that could facilitate them. Police investigating 
the 1840 conspiracy  were sure, “or at least one should suppose,” they quali-
fi ed, “that this plan is communicated to everyone of color in this town and 
possibly beyond it.” Th at slaves might “speak bozal,” a nineteenth- century 
shorthand to refer to African languages and African- infl ected dialects, fur-
ther complicated the ability to surveil and control communication.87 During 
a moment of island- wide panic about slave conspiracy, the governor of Cien-
fuegos wrote to the Captain General in July 1843 to request a prohibition on 
slaves beating on drums. Th e drums could get loud, he noted, and thus allowed 
slaves to communicate from long distances to plan gatherings. Th ree months 
later, when a hurricane barreled through the district, rumors abounded that 
slaves  were conspiring to capitalize on the unrest and kill all of the white 
men and take their women.88 Th e informal circulation of information both 
Suspicious Affi  nities • 79
about and among slaves— through rumor, drumming, or whispered conver-
sation in taverns and stores— remained as much of a concern to authorities as 
the strict control of public spaces, organizations, and publications.
Controlling the slave population remained a top priority as the presumed 
loyal white population decreased proportionally to the growing numbers of 
slaves and free people of color. A circular issued in September 1864 to the 
ayuntamientos of Cuba’s largest cities expressed concern about an increase 
in criminal behavior among slaves, free people of African descent, and Chi-
nese indentured laborers. It requested the formation of councils to investi-
gate matters locally and to suggest means of inculcating “Christian morality” 
in these populations and remedying the social ill. Th e Cienfuegos report 
concluded that the slave population posed few problems to social order and 
in fact exhibited “better behavior than the free class of color.” Slaves  were 
obedient and docile, and— thanks to concessions from their owners— 
industrious, “such that they do not have time to acquire the vices so com-
mon by misfortune in the heterogeneous free class.”89 In other words, there 
 were not enough institutional constraints on the free population to ensure 
their loyalty— either to employers or to government. It thus may have been 
the absence of such reciprocities, not repression, that explained the problem 
that the ayuntamiento had raised. Although colonial authorities  were seek-
ing out the loyalty of Cubans, their own policies could leave them with few 
places to look.
For all of its limitations, social life in Cienfuegos also accommodated ca-
bildos, although they  were subject to more scrutiny than other forms of as-
sociation. According to municipal ordinances approved in 1856, cabildos had 
to meet in spaces designated by the teniente gobernador (deputy governor) or 
face a fi ne between three and fi ve pesos. Th ey could only meet on Sundays, 
special occasions, and feast days. Th ey could neither march “with fl ags or other 
insignias,” nor “congregate publicly.” Th e regulations made exceptions for the 
feast days of the Santos Reyes (Epiphany), San Juan, San Pedro, and Santiago, 
important feast days for African- derived religious practices.90 Less formal 
gatherings faced fewer restrictions. On one summer Saturday night in 1865 
three diff erent dances  were featured: one at the Sociedad Filarmónica, one in 
a private residence, and one “of color,” as the newspaper El Telégrafo reported 
it.91 Th e fault lines of public life could not be clearer: a sanctioned philan-
thropic association and racially segregated private gatherings. Th e heavy hand 
of government offi  cials in determining the conditions of cabildos’ public 
expressions— legal freedom, no fl ags, designated spaces, synchronized to 
Catholic feast days— resembled patterns across the island.
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Not that public life among respectable residents escaped surveillance. 
Newspapers and literary publications also fell under the scrutiny of govern-
ment censors and ensured that the community of letrados (lettered men) in 
Cienfuegos would remain small and exclusive.92 Luis Martínez Casado, the con-
servative second editor of El Fomento, installed a lithographic press in 1861 and 
published two issues of El Apuntador, a theater publication. Enrique Edo y 
Llop, the city’s illustrious historian, used the press a year later to publish El 
Chismoso, a journal of literary criticism with drawings, lithographs, and cari-
catures, but censors closed the operation aft er he published the second issue 
in 1865. El Negro Bueno (Th e Good Black), a weekly journal published by Ja-
cobo Domínguez y Santí, lasted from 1869 until the government closed it the 
following year. None of these publications challenged the Spanish empire per 
se, but rigid guidelines about what it meant to exercise public voice meant 
that extinguishing sedition marked only one of the ends of censorship.
When the slave and poet Ambrosio Echemendía arrived in Cienfuegos 
from nearby Trinidad with his master in 1865, the local elite or ga nized ban-
quets, eve ning parties, and other charity drives throughout the year to raise 
the necessary money to purchase Echemendía’s freedom. Once organizers 
had obtained a book of Echemendía’s poetry, published in Trinidad as Mur-
murios del Táyaba under the pseudonym Máximo Hero de Neiba, they en-
listed him to recite his poems at their functions and persuaded Jacobo 
Domínguez Sanctí, then the editor of El Telégrafo, to off er glowing critical 
praise: “Our hand has extended with plea sure to the humble servant in whose 
gaze shines the golden ray of genius, slowly obscuring the mark of color. Th e 
prospective liberto [free man] relies fervently on the protection of the patri-
otic inhabitants of Cienfuegos, remembering with gratitude the promises they 
have made to him.”93 Not only had the residents of Cienfuegos accumulated 
the fi ve hundred pesos necessary to free Echemendía by the end of 1865; they 
had also provided him with fi ve hundred pesos to begin a new life as a free 
person.94 Th ey had also reinforced the paternalistic terms of public life in no 
uncertain terms.
Echemendía’s manumission fi gured as one of several examples of slave 
poets, always described publicly as loyal and humble, patronized by the elite 
of cities and towns. Th e most famous of them was Juan Francisco Manzano, 
the slave and poet who ultimately became the cause célèbre of Domingo Del 
Monte’s Havana literary circle, which became implicated in the supposed La 
Escalera conspiracy of 1844. Impressed by a sonnet Manzano recited at the 
group’s meeting, the tertulia (salon) raised enough money in 1836 to free the 
thirty- nine- year- old slave, whom Del Monte admired for being “docile and 
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humble.”95 (Of course in Manzano’s narrative he identifi ed the precise mo-
ment at which he “ceased to be a faithful slave” and “a humble submissive 
being.”)96 With the elite’s embrace of Echemendía, Cienfuegos could claim its 
own Manzano.97 While Echemendía remained in pop u lar memory as a poet 
from Trinidad, it was cienfuegueros who claimed to recognize his valor and 
attain his freedom. His celebrity and Manzano’s speak to the most optimistic 
and exceptional promises paternalism. In cases like these, public merit and 
honor was recognized not through engagement with the state but through 
private philanthropy and mutual aid. In the pro cess, private values such as 
gratitude, protection, and patronage— which grounded relationships like the 
one between Echemendía and the urban elite of Cienfuegos and Trinidad— 
became markers of public virtue and patriotism. So long as they could be in-
terpellated as loyal subjects— not of Spain, necessarily, but of a civic- minded 
urban elite— select Cubans of color might be off ered subordinate roles in the 
paternalist public.
Beyond Cienfuegos, other poets of color, many of them already free, gained 
similar notoriety in Cuba’s literary circles, and oft en on the same hierarchi-
cal terms as Echemendía and Manzano. Cuban writer Francisco Calcagno 
published a survey of these poets in the 1880s and identifi ed José del Carmen 
Díaz, a slave in Güines, who published his work in local newspapers; Agustín 
Baldomero Rodríguez from Villaclara, who had excelled despite the “abject 
ignorance” of his family; and Vicente Silveira, a pardo from Guanajay.98 An-
tonio Medina was a free pardo born in Havana who wrote and published 
plays, poems, and zarzuelas (Spanish light opera) in the 1840s and 1850s. In 
1878, Calcagno visited the fi ft y- year- old Medina at his  house, which also 
served as a school for Cubans of color, and noted how happy Medina was “to 
encounter a white not dominated by unjust prejudices.” Th en Calcagno went 
on to marvel at how obedient Medina’s wife and daughter seemed, and how a 
“noble smile of gratitude” appeared when Calcagno rewarded Medina with a 
gold coin aft er receiving a free copy of Medina’s work.99
Th is kind of paternalism met its limits in the case of the most famous and 
prolifi c poet of all, Plácido (Gabriel Concepción Valdés). His execution in 
1844 for his alleged participation in the La Escalera conspiracy made him a 
cause célèbre. Subsequent critics throughout the nineteenth century debated 
the po liti cal contents of Plácido’s work, oft en depending on whether they 
wanted to view him as a loyal subject or a proto- nationalist martyr.100 Race 
and allegiance  were clearly never far from the surface. Critics dwelled on Plá-
cido’s Eu ro pe an and African blood when discussing his “half savage” writing, 
and Calcagno found evidence of the “essentially Cuban” Plácido’s “liberal 
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spirit” in his ode to Isabel II.101 In contrast, those same critics assumed the 
writings of Echemendía and Medina to be po liti cally inoff ensive; to be fair, 
Echemendía thanked his own er for such kind treatment in one of his poems. 
Echemendía and other poets of color made their way into literary society 
and literary canons as loyal and ennobled exceptions in a slave society where 
re sis tance and retaliation  were presumed to be at a constant simmer. As Cien-
fuegos developed into a society structured by slavery, the culture wars between 
the various wagers of whiteness gave way to eff orts to subjugate slave and free 
people of color, both through policing their activities as well as defi ning them 
within the discursive scope of the loyal subject.
Th e Free- Colored Militias and the Limits of Loyalty
If the restricted opportunities to publicly claim loyalty or have it affi  rmed left  
many Cubans in a precarious po liti cal state, members of the free- colored mili-
tias enjoyed a long history of a recognizable loyal subjectivity. If agents of the 
 Soles y Rayos conspiracy and the government it challenged agreed on any-
thing, it was the prominence of the men serving in the free- colored militias. 
It was no accident that conspirators targeted the militia barracks with their 
broadsides. Th e milicianos  were the only legally armed Cubans of color on 
the island, and the cultural capital derived from military ser vice aff orded 
them a status recognized across racial lines. It may also have been no acci-
dent that the milicianos reported the conspiracy right away to colonial offi  -
cials. Kings, captains general, and local offi  cials had long recognized the 
allegiance of the soldiers, and the militias survived until the end of colonial 
rule despite a weakened status aft er their banishment in 1844. Th at suspen-
sion, and their reinstatement in 1854, support the point made by Matt Childs 
that the sugar revolution catalyzed the erosion of esteem for the militias in 
the nineteenth century.102 Surprisingly, free Cubans of color became active 
participants in that erosion by the 1850s and 1860s.
Milicianos’ claims on loyalty dated back to the earliest moments of Spanish 
rule. Th e militias fi rst appeared in Cuba in 1600, when the governor of Havana 
or ga nized one hundred mulattoes into the Compañía de Pardos Libres (Free 
Mulatto Company). Th roughout the seventeenth century, separate companies 
of both mulattoes and blacks developed in tandem with white companies. 
Milicianos guarded forts, fought pirates, captured runaway slaves, and some-
times even engaged in military expeditions and battles outside of Cuba. In 
rare circumstances, slaves themselves took part in the military defense of the 
island, which enhanced their leverage with the state. Th e leader of the royal 
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slaves in El Cobre in 1677, for example, used an occasion of military defense 
to petition for more rights for his community. Sidelining the issue of poten-
tial rebellion, Captain Juan Moreno invoked the loyalty of the slaves as a re-
minder that “when the occasion comes up we never fail with ardent zeal what 
our superiors have ordered us,” and he pledged a “desire for greater opportu-
nities in the royal ser vice.”103
Milicianos and their superiors in Cuba and Spain routinely expressed mu-
tual and reciprocal interests in a common colonial project, albeit interests 
contained within strict military and racial hierarchies. In 1714, Philip V praised 
the mulatos and negros in the Cuban militias, “considering them as vasallos 
míos [my vassals],” and he declared that they “should be given the good treat-
ment they deserve.”104 At the time of the British occupation of Havana in 
1762, two- thirds of free- colored heads of  house hold in Havana served as mi-
litia members.105 By the nineteenth century, militias bolstered the military 
presence Spain maintained in response to the Haitian Revolution, turbulence 
in Florida, and eventually the in de pen dence confl icts igniting throughout 
Spanish America. Maintaining racially segregated militia units continued to 
benefi t Spain, as assertions of equality, rights, and citizenship based on mili-
tary service— claims heard throughout the Americas during the Age of 
Revolutions— could be addressed diff erently based on their claimants. White 
members of the national militia formed during the Trienio suspended their 
citizenship when they joined militias— they  were to “return to the common 
class of citizen” on completing their service— and offi  cers  were only supposed 
to “conduct themselves as citizens and direct other citizens.”106 Th is practice 
diff ered strikingly from republican notions of the armed citizen in a militia, 
although some regular soldiers in Spanish America  were also prohibited 
from active citizenship while they served. Th at military ser vice might be held 
as a competing or separate corporate identity from citizenship had origins in 
the fuero rights that relocated an individual from civil to military jurisdiction. 
Occupying an intermediate subject position between vassals and citizens, 
militiamen found no clear path to obtaining concrete po liti cal rewards for 
their professed and demonstrated loyalty.
Some men of color simply bought their status once Spain opened offi  cer 
positions to them. Despite the clear exclusion from these rights, free- colored 
militianos no longer had exclusively white offi  cers. When Leandro Varona of 
Havana’s pardo battalion off ered 1,000 pesos in 1818 to be promoted to captain, 
Spain’s war minister instructed the captain general to take the money and 
forthwith accept payment from men of color who  were willing to pay for 
offi  cer status, upping the amount for captain to 1,700 pesos.107 Th e milicias de 
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color in 1830 made up three battalions and twenty- six companies, as well as 
three full companies of artillery.108 Carefully ordered pro cessions during re-
ligious festivals and major events of state regularly included the milicias de 
color, and the documentary record of these events is replete with colonial 
offi  cials taking special note of their good behavior. Th ey lined up in full uni-
form with other units of white militiamen and the Spanish army and pa-
raded through their towns for celebrations. In Trinidad in 1825, for example, 
they brought up the rear of the Corpus Christi pro cession.109 During the six 
days of festivities in 1833 observing Fernando VII’s death and Isabel II’s re-
gency, an ayuntamiento member in Holguín singled out the pardo and moreno 
militias with admiration, commending them one day for conducting them-
selves in a dignifi ed and praiseworthy manner and another day for their 
discipline and fi ne disposition.110 But such eff usive compliments oft en pa-
pered over anxiety about what offi  cials noted as frequent episodes of militia 
insubordination.
Certainly, the execution in 1812 of José Antonio Aponte, a militiaman sus-
pected of or ga niz ing an island- wide slave revolt— and whose confi scated 
sketchbook drew on the iconography of both the militias and the Haitian 
Revolution— signaled the exhaustion of any easy linkages between militia ser-
vice and support for colonial order. Of course, many rebels interrogated during 
the Aponte Rebellion claimed to be acting against the French as loyal vassals of 
the Spanish crown.111 For many of the nineteenth- century conspiracies, how-
ever, government suspicions of milicianos usually superseded clear evidence. 
With the exception of the  Soles y Rayos, or ga nized re sis tance did not always 
rely on writing anyway and left  few paper trails. What these moments reveal, 
more than a verifi able sense of the suspects’ motives, is how quickly colonial 
offi  cials and other observers could shift  their language to characterize suspects 
diff erently. Th e discourse of loyalty and obedience easily yielded to accusations 
of seditiousness, rebelliousness, and contempt for Spanish institutions. An ar-
ticle from 1823 in this vein in the newspaper La Fraternidad provoked a collec-
tive written rebuttal from Havana’s pardo and moreno militias, in which they 
questioned such fi ckle opinions: “How is it possible that a subject could have 
dictated such infl ammatory ideas, in spite of the fact that we have repeatedly 
and unequivocally proven our loyalty and submission to the governing laws 
and the authorities that dispense them? Why insult us so, when there is not the 
smallest glimmer of suspicion, nor the most trivial motive of distrust to fear?”112 
Many skeptics of milicianos’ loyalty routinely expressed a common goal: pre-
venting a race war in the image of Haiti that would end colonial rule and the 
prosperity it brought to well- placed Cubans.
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Additional suspected conspiracies in 1835, led by Juan Nepomuceno 
 Prieto— a cabildo capataz and retired sergeant— and in 1839, led by León 
Monzón— a former captain of the moreno militia— only compounded authori-
ties’ skepticism about unconditionally believing milicianos’ allegiance.113 A re-
port in 1839 acknowledged the public distrust of the pardo and moreno militias 
but suggested po liti cal reasons for sustaining them, namely that members 
came from “the most visible and notable families in the country” and  were 
otherwise excluded from pursuing the “noble career” of military ser vice.114 On 
the other hand, a royal order from the end of that year called for heightened 
vigilance of the militias in order to identify “symptoms of seduction or de-
sires for innovation.”115
In such a precarious climate, militia members struggled to maintain the 
privileges and esteem that they had long enjoyed, such as guarantees of fuero 
rights and preeminencias, the latter of which occasionally exempted individu-
als from paying servicios (monetary contributions), to the crown.116 Th e ordeals 
of José Joaquín Pompa, a Santiago barber and twenty- year veteran soldier, de-
rived from the decay of informal networks connecting militiamen to other 
prominent inhabitants. When Pompa appealed in 1843 to the captain general 
to reaffi  rm his fuero privileges, he found himself insolvent and imprisoned 
aft er a mishandled case in the civil court system. Th e indignities he endured 
resembled the experiences of most individuals who sought legal action: long 
delays, inattentive clerks, and lawyers who disregarded his requests. But if 
fuero rights could circumvent the pro cess, all the better, and Pompa’s own 
letter made no use of formulaic gestures of humility. He resented his lawyer’s 
“spirit of condescension,” and he cited documents dating back to 1769 sup-
porting his argument; a postscript concluded, “I ask for justice, like I did 
above.”117 Neither deference nor paternal benevolence characterized these 
encounters. Pompa was demanding the recognition of honorable status.
When a wave of slave re sis tance developed across the island in the early 
1840s, the militias faced their most intense scrutiny. José Erice, a moreno 
sergeant from a Matanzas militia company, alerted the new captain general, 
Leopoldo O’Donnell, of potential unrest that preceded the La Escalera con-
spiracy. Free people of color fell under such disproportionate suspicion in 
1844 that even avowedly loyal militia leaders found themselves suspect. If pub-
lic anxiety shrouded members’ activities in distrust, the milicianos themselves 
could not have been clearer in their public displays of subjection. Th ey took 
advantage of the public commemorations of Isabel II’s ascent to the throne to 
display their support for Spanish rule. Th is par tic u lar per for mance of patrio-
tism and social order carried special weight, since Havana’s cash- strapped 
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ayuntamiento openly fussed about its ability to pay for the celebrations and 
they barely happened. On 9 and 10 February 1844, in addition to the usual 
pro cessions, verses appeared on the door of the pardo barracks that included 
the following stanza:
El batallón por siempre de Th e battalion of the ever faithful
leales,
Tremolo sus banderas cual Waved its fl ags during tribulations
crisoles
[H]Ace más de dos siglos y For over two centuries, and  etched
graboles  upon them
En su servicio lauros Everlasting honors in your ser vice.
inmortales.118
Th e milicianos gave the same kind of public per for mance as their pre de ces-
sors had done for centuries, but the government to which they showed their 
support no longer reciprocated. By the end of March, the captain general had 
instructed the governor of Matanzas to confi scate the weapons of the mili-
cias de color and the bomberos (fi remen) as a “precautionary mea sure.”119 
In  June, the government eliminated the milicias de color altogether on 
the grounds that they  were complicit in La Escalera.120 Th e wide extent of the 
brutal crackdown has been chronicled elsewhere, but of par tic u lar note is the 
targeting of free people of color in positions of authority and artisanal occu-
pations. O’Donnell prohibited blacks and mulattoes from working as dock 
foremen or as teachers or master craft smen, or to send their children to 
trade schools.121 What ever symbolic capital the free population of color had 
accumulated through centuries of ser vice and loyal subjectivity had been 
exhausted.
To be sure, the backlash from La Escalera inaugurated an era of intensi-
fi ed state violence, with the African- descended population— slave and free— as 
its disproportionate target. Th e dissolution of the free- colored militias, the 
silencing of the island’s most prominent intellectuals, and the setback to abo-
litionism took a heavy toll. But historians have frequently portrayed La 
Escalera as a point of no return, signaling the end of public freedoms, the 
consolidation of Spain’s repressive regime, and rule by arbitrary and illegiti-
mate force as the norm. To borrow Walter Benjamin’s terms, one can fi nd in 
La Escalera and its aft ermath both lawmaking violence and law- destroying 
violence: “If the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood.”122 
Just under the surface of these arguments lay the idea that milicianos and 
other Cubans of color harbored anticolonial, and possibly proto- nationalist, 
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sentiments that would continue to grow. In contrasting the participation of 
slaves and free people of color, some historians have searched for the locations 
of revolutionary consciousness that foreshadowed anticolonial insurgency.123 
Other historians recognize La Escalera as a moment caused by the culmina-
tion of social tensions and contradictions that would resurface again only in 
1868, with Cuba’s fi rst war for in de pen dence.124
Rather than ending the story of the militias— or of early nineteenth- century 
politics altogether— on a bleak note in 1844, extending the chronology allows 
for a diff erent interpretation. Th e free- colored militias reappeared in 1854 as 
part of a broad attempt, in the words of one commentator, to “invigorate in 
the spirit of the population of color an unlimited adhesion to the po liti cal 
interest of Spain in the island of Cuba.”125 In the formal announcement that 
appeared in the Gaceta de la Habana, Captain General Juan de la Pezuela at-
tributed the policy shift  to the “rigors of the climate” in Cuba that raised 
special military needs and “the loyalty, suff ering, and spirit with which the 
pardo and moreno voluntarios have upheld the Spanish fl ag on diverse 
 occasions.”126
Why reestablish an institution deemed just a de cade earlier as too danger-
ous? One of Pezuela’s po liti cal contemporaries commented that “not every-
one agreed” with his “annoying” decision; slaveholders, remarked Richard 
Henry Dana, “are more impatient under this favoring of the free blacks, than 
under almost any other act of government.”127 Spaniards who sought to keep 
Cuba in the imperial orbit, in contrast, applauded the decision. Mariano Tor-
rente argued in a pamphlet that Cuba would never become in de pen dent from 
Spain, since the crown “could always resort to recruiting colored volunteers, 
who have been constant in their loyalty to the Spanish throne.”128 Pezuela’s 
decision was one of a series of reforms enacted shortly aft er his arrival in 
Havana in December 1853 that aimed to make good on Spain’s treaty with the 
British in 1817 to halt the transatlantic slave trade. He imposed stricter penal-
ties for individuals attempting to import slaves and clearer laws about the 
free status of intercepted emancipados, African captives intended to be sold 
into slavery. Drawing on the military threat of fi libustering expeditions, Pe-
zuela enhanced the military presence to protect Cuba from the United States, 
which sought to annex Cuba as a slave state. Reviving the free- colored mili-
tias would strengthen the military and lay a groundwork for a social order 
with a constantly increasing creole population. With a focus on urban and 
military strength, Pezuela hoped to minimize the threat of social unrest by 
relocating people to what they perceived to be an ordered, modernizing, ever- 
faithful city in opposition to the restive countryside.
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Th e new militias got off  to a slow start. Th e Sección de Guerra y Marina of 
the Consejo Real approved the new reglamento (regulations) in 1858, and in 
1859 the Ministerio de Ultramar laid out plans for sixteen militia companies 
of 125 members each. By another accounting, the additional 7,680 pardos and 
morenos in ser vice would increase the military presence on the island by over 
50 percent, given the (segregated) peninsular force of 14,400 soldiers.129 Th us, 
authorities recruited thousands of free people of color from urban and rural 
areas alike to receive training, clothing, and pay similar to that of their white 
counterparts— and, among other duties, the responsibility for capturing ci-
marrones (runaway slaves).130 Th e captain general specifi ed by locality whether 
the militia companies would be composed of pardos or morenos: Bayamo and 
Trinidad/Sancti Spíritus or ga nized companies of pardos; Villaclara/Cien-
fuegos and Manzanillo/Baracoa raised companies of morenos; Havana, 
Matanzas, Puerto Príncipe, and Santiago de Cuba maintained both types.
Th e blueprint for militia ser vice outlined in the reglamento emphasized 
willful participation and patriotic duty on the part of the soldiers and the 
social status they received in recognition of their fi delity to Spanish goals. It 
defi ned militia ser vice as an obligation of free men of color but placed prior-
ity on its voluntary nature. Chapter Two, Article Four stated that the mon-
arch was “eager to avoid if possible the personal losses that this obligation 
can create” and that the captain general would promote voluntary enlistment, 
“making clear to the people of color the advantages inherent in ser vice to these 
Militias, the same as those granted to the white disciplinados [militias] of the 
Island.” Th at said, the reglamento recommended enlistment for at least eight 
years with the possibility of continuing indefi nitely. Although the offi  cer corps 
was to consist of militia veterans (white, mulatto, and black), and the govern-
ment gave explicit preference to a free person of color over a white veteran. 
Perhaps anticipating that the militias would get off  to a slow start, the captain 
general received a census of the militias each March, and if the companies did 
not fi ll voluntarily, he had the authority to draft  individuals. Lotteries at the 
beginning of May would identify draft ed individuals, who needed to be 
between twenty and thirty years old, strong, and over fi ve feet tall. Most im-
portant, the reglamento stipulated that the milicias de color “enjoy the same 
fueros, preeminencias, and other exemptions as those of the white militias of 
the Island.” Following a decree in 1769, free- colored widows and children of 
militiamen who died in war time action would receive the same benefi ts as 
their white counterparts. Th e new regulations clarifi ed ambiguities about the 
status of the free- colored militias before La Escalera and proposed mea sures 
that placed them in closer proximity to white militias and the standing army.
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Whether it was from a lack of willful participation or patriotic duty, 
enlistment oft en proceeded as slowly as the reinstatement. When slots did 
not fi ll in 1859, the captain general exercised his authority to hold a draft . In 
Cienfuegos, for example, the district government became responsible for fi ll-
ing one- fourth of the tenth company of morenos in the Western Department 
of the island, which amounted to only thirty- three individuals. Th e town 
fared better than most with only two slots remaining empty in June. But the 
wide net that offi  cials cast—eighty- four potential draft ees from various lo-
cales and professions— hints at the determination, even desperation, to fi ll 
every slot, and probably carry out some surveillance at the same time.131 When 
nine of the morenos named in the draft  did not even present themselves to 
authorities in May, they  were declared fugitives and captured in Septem-
ber.132 Beyond their youth (the oldest was twenty- three) and predominantly 
rural backgrounds, the “runaways” did not fi t a type. Some  were married, and 
some  were single. Only one of the nine— a carpenter named Manuel Maya— 
was from the city itself; the other eight hailed from the city’s hinterland. One 
was African born. A demography of (dis)loyalty was elusive.
By 5 August 1859, Cienfuegos had fi lled its thirty- three slots in the com-
pany of morenos, but not before an exhaustive review of the draft ees. Most of 
them tried to avoid militia ser vice.133 Investigators deemed some cases valid: 
one draft ee named Eulogio Navarro had a broken leg that exempted him from 
ser vice. Th e board exempted José Curbelo aft er three (white) witnesses testi-
fi ed that he cared for his mother, who was in her eighties, as well as a brother 
who had been paralyzed since birth. It did the same for Juan Tardio, who 
cared for his mother, who was in her sixties, and his fi ve brothers of minor 
age. Florencio Quesada off ered evidence that he was an only child who pro-
vided for his mother and that he “suff ers fl ights of dementia from time to time 
that make him useless except for the job of selling cigarettes on the street.” 
Others referred to baptismal rec ords to prove that they exceeded the age limit 
for militia ser vice; Juan Crisóstomo Taltabull, born in Africa, could refer to 
no such record and instead presented his letter of freedom to prove that he 
was forty- seven years old. His letter also identifi ed his nationality as “Lucumí 
Ayllo” and his provenance as a slave brought from Africa on a Spanish ship 
intercepted by the British in 1832.134
Competing social identifi cations exempted two of the draft ees. In one case, 
José Mariano Varona presented a letter from a parish priest in Puerto Prín-
cipe citing the book and page number of the church’s baptismal register. Th e 
priest affi  rmed that he had baptized José Mariano himself as the legitimate 
child of two pardos libres and the godson of a white man and woman. Had 
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Varona still been living in Puerto Príncipe, he might have had to serve in that 
city’s company of pardos, but since Cienfuegos only had a company of more-
nos, he was in luck. Juan Vilche, from the partido of Cumanayagua, also ar-
gued for an exemption because he was a pardo, not a moreno, but he had no 
written rec ords to support his claim. Th e commission noted that because “it 
was not obvious by looking, this impeded physical recognition” of his racial 
categorization, and it did not grant Vilche an exemption until he produced 
evidence that he was an only child caring for his seventy- year- old mother. 
Was it impossible, then, for a padre de familia (patriarch or head of  house hold) 
to be a militia member?  Were distinctions between pardos and morenos so 
stark as to disqualify men whose status was confused? In their deft  manage-
ment of the privileges and obligations ascribed to various social groups, the 
maneuvers by the free men, and the commission too, echo the arguments put 
forth in freedom suits initiated by slaves.135
Th e rural backgrounds of many of the draft ees revise a long- standing 
image of militia ser vice as an exclusive opportunity for urban free people of 
African descent. Without documentation of the fi nal composition of the mi-
litia, it is impossible to make generalizations about who actually fi lled the 
ranks. But in the geo graph i cally diverse composition of the draft ees, fewer 
than 20 percent of them from the city, several features of the state’s intentions 
for the militias emerge. A force of thirty- three soldiers severely limited the 
possibility of militia ser vice as a widespread opportunity for social status or 
mobility and thus the maintenance, in Pedro Deschamps Chapeaux’s words, 
of a “petite bourgeoisie of African descent.”136 Perhaps the La Escalera crack-
down disillusioned urban free men of color about militia ser vice. It remains 
unclear, however, if government offi  cials  were also deliberately trying to in-
corporate more rural freedmen as loyal subjects, further sidelining the urban 
population in the pro cess. Clear answers are hard to come by. But between 
the eff orts of Cienfuegos draft ees to avoid ser vice and the routine recourse to 
draft ing milicianos throughout the late 1850s and 1860s, militia ser vice no 
longer cemented close relationships between free- colored communities and 
Spanish colonial rule.
Just as administrators in Cuba  were realizing that the new militia system 
was not working as it used to, events across the Atlantic cast the Spanish 
empire and its military prowess in a new light. In 1859, Spain’s cresting frus-
trations with Morocco led it to claim the ports of Ceuta and Melilla and oc-
cupy Tetuán until Morocco agreed to sign a peace treaty the following year. 
Th e push to war came from Leopoldo O’Donnell, the Spanish prime minis-
ter (and Cuba’s captain general during the 1840s) who sought— in Raymond 
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Carr’s estimation—“to stimulate patriotic enthusiasm and keep the army 
occupied.”137 Th e relative success of the mission did not come easy, but it 
produced the intended public response. Formulaic outpourings of patrio-
tism and loyalty occurred throughout Spain, and in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
as well.138
Despite doubts about the aims of the war with Morocco, Spaniards and 
Cubans alike recognized a new, concrete interest in Spanish expansion into 
Africa.139 Th e war gave rise to the idea of (re)connecting African- descended 
Cubans to Africa that would reappear periodically throughout the rest of the 
century. Th is sits oddly with the regular concern of colonial authorities that 
Cubans of African descent could harbor loyalties to polities and places be-
yond the Spanish empire. But the idea gained slight traction anyway. A Ha-
vana resident named Martín de Arredondo proposed to the captain general 
in February 1860 the formation of a battalion of pardos and morenos to take 
part in combat in Morocco. “Guided by patriotic instinct,” Arredondo imag-
ined a battalion adapted to the African climate, a familiar and dubious racial 
logic that frequently justifi ed putting African- descended people to work in 
awful conditions. He reminded the captain general that “the loyal pardos and 
morenos of Havana took an active part” in past military expeditions. He pre-
dicted that Cuba’s role in Spain’s expansionist designs would earn it the re-
spect of the metropole and, presumably, a more advantageous bargaining 
position in colonial politics. An assistant to the captain general quickly ex-
pressed his doubts about the proposal, citing the existing diffi  culty of fi lling 
the regiments in Cuba, the cost of transporting milicianos from Cuba to 
Africa, and the deleterious eff ects on Cuba’s artisanal workforce, “as almost 
all free people of color are artisans [because of] the disgust that the whites 
have for those trades.” Th e plan never came to fruition, and Cuba’s most sig-
nifi cant contribution to the war eff ort came in the monetary donations that 
individual towns and military units collected.140
Arredondo’s proposal may not appear so far- fetched in the context of other 
imperial policies in the Ca rib be an. British West Indian troops helped settle 
the Sierra Leone colony beginning in the 1800s, and regiments had assumed 
garrison duties in British forts in the Gold Coast in the 1840s.141 As Spain 
clashed with Britain over control of the island of Fernando Po in the Bight of 
Biafra, Ca rib be an troops of African descent  were already present. Rather 
than worrying, as British colonial governors did, about native Africans adopt-
ing the poor habits of the black men of the West Indian Regiments, Arre-
dondo expressed optimism about the advantages that Cuba’s milicianos de 
color could bring to Spain’s colonial project and to Africa.
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For those equally worried about the eff ects of native Africans on the Cuban 
milicianos, redirecting the soldiers to Spain instead became a pop u lar idea to 
ensure their continued identifi cation with Spanish rule. In a public discus-
sion about the future of slavery in 1867, the Conde de Vegamar circled around 
ideas about the inevitable end of the illegal slave trade, freedom for children 
born to slave mothers, and compensation for own ers. He also explicitly 
looked to British and French examples of imperial consolidation, adding his 
own twist to ensure that free adult men remained productive and loyal. He 
advocated their passage to Spain to serve in “black battalions,” a practice he 
attributed to the British, or their incorporation into the navy, as both the Brit-
ish and French had done.142 As proposals like these came and went, the ques-
tion of the militias remained an open one. Th eir loyalty and enthusiasm for 
militia ser vice no longer guaranteed, Spanish and Cuban offi  cials mused 
about the signifi cance of soldiers of color in the colonial project.
in this chapter there have been countless examples of Cubans of color, 
slave and free, expressing their support for Spanish rule, and a mix of rec-
ognition and suspicion by watchful offi  cials and a lettered Cuban elite that 
oft en aligned with the interests of slaveowners. Loyalty assumed diff erent 
guises during de cades when prominent examples of ruptured allegiances— 
independence movements and social unrest in other parts of the Americas— 
captured the attention of many Cubans. Fidelity to empire served many ends: 
it could ground appeals for justice and privileges, justify a critique of Spanish 
rule, or reinforce the multiple and overlapping vertical relationships that pro-
liferated in Cuba, not least of which was the bond between slave and master. 
A wide array of social subordinates could fi gure as loyal subjects, yet in times 
of crisis, obliging acknowledgment of their loyalty could be slow in coming 
if colonial offi  cials considered a confrontational response to be more eff ec-
tive. Slaves might have been instrumental in disabling the  Soles y Rayos con-
spiracy, but the captain general who met some of them himself doubted their 
contributions. In the history of the free- colored milicianos, their faithful ser-
vice to Spain emerges more prominently than their isolated episodes of re-
bellion, but the presumed perils of acknowledging them as loyal subjects left  
their actions unrewarded. Whether valorized, ignored, encouraged, or sup-
pressed, loyalty— more than freedom, emancipation, or equality— represented 
the key term of vernacular politics in Cuba.
Th e early de cades of the nineteenth century  were a period when constitu-
tionally backed equality before the law eluded Cubans because nominally 
universal liberal principles proved a poor fi t for a slave society whose coher-
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ence depended on structured in e qual ity. Inclusion based on declared loyalty 
to Spanish rule— a practice whose origins stretched far back in Spanish 
America— had the appearance of being universal itself, which presented a prob-
lem to those who held authority in Cuba. Th e creole elite, and free people 
more broadly, frequently realized the dilemma in attributing loyal subjectiv-
ity to slaves and free people of color: it was the same subject position that 
most of those superiors themselves had to inhabit in the colonial world. Th e 
prospects of being lumped together with subordinates threatened a social 
and po liti cal order that was imperfect but preferable to collapse. Th is is why 
the mimicry of cabildos’ identifi cations with Spain met with mixed responses. 
Th e “ironic compromise” struck between the wide array of loyal Cuban sub-
jects speaks to what Homi Bhabha has called the ambivalence of colonial 
discourse.143
Lest we reify loyalty as a force unto itself that could regulate its own 
 meaning— as a principle somehow in de pen dent of historical circum-
stances— we should recognize that confl icts throughout the early nineteenth 
century over the loyal subject depended upon the willful action of Cubans 
(and Spanish offi  cials, too). Th e recognition of willfulness on the part of slaves 
and free people of color gave pause to those in power. If the faith of the island’s 
ever- faithful demanded active support, then their activities guaranteed that 
the discourse of loyalty could not enjoy limitless and unchanging infl uence in 
Cuba. If ideology is as pervasive as the air that people breathe, we might learn 
from José de la Luz y Caballero, the formidable and infl uential author who 
explored the essence of cubanidad early in the century: “It is necessary to 
change the atmosphere in order to recognize the impurity of the air.”144 As 
they invested meaning in their faithfulness, loyal subjects challenged ubiqui-
tous inequalities and abuses of power, and the recipients of that fi delity cau-
tiously shaped a public atmosphere intended to root out disloyalty. Th e 
po liti cal limits of that public could not accommodate sharper critiques that 
circulated on the island, and the beginning of Cuba’s fi rst war for in de pen-
dence in 1868 set more dramatic atmospheric changes in motion. In doing so 
it made loyal subjectivity all the more urgent.
Three
Th e Will to Freedom
Spanish Allegiances in the Ten Years’ War
A lusty, sonorous name echoed in your ears and engraved itself upon your minds: 
National Integrity! And the vaulted roof of the national assembly hall echoed with 
the unanimous cry: Integrity! Integrity!
Oh! It is not really so beautiful or so heroic, this dream of yours, for there can be 
no doubt that you  were dreaming. Look, look at the image I shall paint for you, 
and if you do not shudder with fear at the wrong you have done, if, aghast, you do 
not curse the face of national integrity that I present you with, then I will turn my 
eyes in shame from this Spain that has no heart. . . .  
—José Martí, “Po liti cal Prison in Cuba,” 1871
Contrary to what ner vous colonial offi  cials had long anticipated, the instiga-
tors of the fi rst large- scale threat to colonial order  were not rebellious slaves 
but disgruntled planters. Eu ro pe an liberalism, not African retribution, in-
fl ected the Grito de Yara, the call for in de pen dence proclaimed in October 
1868 by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a sugar planter from Manzanillo. Spain’s 
own liberal “Glorious Revolution” the same year, and the fl uency of rebel 
leaders in the language of liberalism, inspired conspirators in eastern Cuba 
to give voice to their grievances. Even members of cabildos (town councils), 
lower government offi  cials, and priests joined in what José Abreu Cardet de-
scribes as the “infi delity of the faithful.”1
For de cades, Cuban and Spanish offi  cials had been fi xated on preserving 
order, maintaining a productive economy, and keeping Cuba in Spain’s im-
perial orbit. Th ese objectives touched virtually every aspect of Cuban life on 
the island, and the concept and practice of loyalty linked them. In the most 
optimistic appraisals of those who benefi ted most from this system, slaves 
would not challenge colonial order if they did not challenge their masters. 
Loyalty to Spain and loyalty to one’s superiors blurred into an imagined 
unitary allegiance to empire. Th e rebellion of 1868 tore apart these bonds. 
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Opposing slavery did not overlap neatly with opposing empire. Some slave-
owners declared themselves in de pen dent from Spanish rule and freed their 
slaves. Other rebels hesitated to support abolition. Still others remained 
committed to Spanish rule while their slaves ran away to fi ght as ciudadanos 
cubanos (Cuban citizens) in the insurgent forces or simply fl ed to escape ser-
vitude. And as some masters rebelled against Spain, their slaves remained 
loyal by continuing to work on farms and plantations, or by fi ghting in the 
Spanish army.
Th roughout the Ten Years’ War (1868– 1878), neither Spaniards nor Cu-
bans could unhinge the bonds of race and empire. In that wrenching de cade, 
the discourse of loyalty acquired added resonance precisely because incidents 
and accusations of perceived disloyalty proliferated throughout the island. 
Now, more than ever, those hailed as loyal subjects could not be guaranteed 
to respond. Struggles over who could play that po liti cal role continued to 
spotlight racial issues during the war, as did debates within the insurgency 
about how widely to defi ne a fraternity of Cuban citizens. Many on the island 
defi ed legal and social conventions in seeking personal and national auton-
omy. Th is was the formative de cade for the separatist movement and the 
development of a nascent Cuban nationalism, and it also occasioned major 
realignments in Spanish strategies to maintain pop u lar support.
On both sides of the confl ict, people of African descent fought alongside 
creoles and peninsulares (peninsular Spaniards). At the same time that au-
thorities warned of the black and mulatto presence among the rebels and in-
voked the threat of race war, they worked actively to counter that presence by 
cultivating comparable allegiance to Spain. Th at loyalty, valued unevenly in 
the early nineteenth century in the face of routine repression, appreciated 
during the urgency of an anticolonial war that necessarily reconfi gured the 
means and ends of long-standing colonial reciprocities. Did the war enable 
ordinary Cubans to advance more and diff erent claims within the Spanish 
empire— or expand the ranks of its loyal subjects? If the military support of 
Cuban men (and some women) of color shaped Spain’s prosecution of the war, 
what eff ects did it have on the military itself? Transformative possibilities 
emerged, too, with the legal initiation of gradual slave emancipation: the 
Moret Law of 1870 included a clause off ering freedom to slaves who supported 
the Spanish during the war, and rec ords of hundreds of offi  cers’ on- the- spot 
interrogations of slave- soldiers provide an unparalleled opportunity to 
witness participants reconciling competing defi nitions of loyalty.
In various locales, distinctions between loyalty and disloyalty sometimes 
remained secondary to more pressing realities. Th e insurrection did not 
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touch all regions of Cuba equally, as the intense fi ghting in eastern Cuba never 
spread as much as rebels hoped to the plantation- intensive areas of central and 
western Cuba. Yet the Ten Years’ War aff ected almost all Cubans— even those 
uninvolved in military engagements. It certainly syncopated the rhythms of 
rural society. Food shortages threatened lives and disrupted productive activi-
ties; tens of thousands of people died from illness and in battle. In cities, public 
life oft en continued as before, with stepped- up vigilance against unrest or disor-
der and with heightened military fortifi cation from militias and army soldiers. 
Leaders policed the boundaries between enslaved and free African- descended 
Cubans much as they patrolled the borders of loyalty and disloyalty, especially 
as increasing numbers of slaves gained their freedom. Th us authorities moni-
tored the po liti cal dispositions of free people of color with one eye on the im-
mediate confl ict and the other eye on the future. “National integrity,” the 
oft - used phrase that so irked the young José Martí, more oft en than not re-
ferred to the unity of Spain and its colonies— a unity under assault during the 
Ten Years’ War— but it was also a term that signaled within the Spanish orbit 
an unresolved relationship between empire, race, and nation that the insur-
gency’s competing national vision brought into relief. In the course of the Ten 
Years’ War, national integrity also acquired social meaning, as racial divisions 
among supporters of Spain raised new questions and opportunities about the 
kind of integrated polity that might emerge from the confl ict.
Loyalty Challenged and Affi  rmed
Th e po liti cal and economic grievances of white island- born elites in the east 
erupted in 1868 and sparked rebellion, with many people of African descent 
leaving their towns, farms, and plantations to join the insurgent ranks. Many 
rebel leaders freed their slaves and called for immediate abolition. Th e leader-
ship’s sometimes egalitarian tone encouraged black and mulatto support, in 
part by valorizing the term ciudadano cubano (Cuban citizen) as a model of 
po liti cal inclusivity within an imagined Cuban nation.2 Th e promises of 
emancipation that Carlos Manuel de Céspedes and other leaders made  were 
lukewarm and conditional, at least at the outset, but they  were strong enough 
to attract slaves to join the rebel forces. Free men of color also joined, not as 
militiamen in segregated units, but as fully incorporated soldiers and offi  cers 
who ascended the ranks of the rebel army to high levels of leadership. One 
Spanish offi  cial in Cuba foresaw unrest on plantations when he noticed slaves 
looking to the rebel fl ag “as a symbol or promise of freedom.” Worse yet, he 
worried, Spain would earn the scorn of Britain and the United States by not 
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freeing enlisted slaves as some insurgent slaveowners had already done.3 For 
many supporters of Spain, the insurgency came into view as threat to the is-
land’s social and economic stability and as a vexing issue in the international 
politics of antislavery. At stake, then,  were nothing less than the prosperity and 
moral standing of the Spanish empire.
Civil and military authorities, increasingly aware of the social threat of 
the insurgency, moved quickly to put down the rebellion. Th ey did so against 
considerable disadvantages. Spain itself was in the midst of its own turmoil in 
which a rebellion (whose liberal leaders held close ties to Cuban planters) had 
temporarily driven Isabel II into exile.4 With fi nancial and military resources 
concentrated on the Iberian Peninsula, leaders in Cuba looked to loyal mili-
tias and volunteers, including units of free- colored soldiers, to control cities 
and rural areas until regular troops from Spain could arrive. Th e militias con-
stituted a force well adapted to local conditions despite a disor ga nized offi  cer 
corps and defi ciencies in supplies and training, likely a result of denied re-
sources.5 Spain worked quickly to mobilize the milicias de color— a little more 
than a de cade aft er their reestablishment— to work on the local level with other 
militias, army volunteers, and the Civil Guard to locate and disable pockets of 
insurgency.6 Enlistment in new free- colored companies had begun late in 
1868, when the captain general authorized the formation of “a battalion with 
the negros that want to go to combat the enemies of Spain who they call, in 
their picturesque language, cimarrones blancos [white fugitives].” Th is was a 
clever inversion of the word usually reserved for runaway slaves and a strategy 
of making even white rebels legible through racialized language. An article 
from a military newspaper reported that three hundred people of African 
descent  were already prepared to enlist at the time of the authorization.7
Fighting initially centered around Bayamo, where leaders constituted the 
fi rst revolutionary government, and Puerto Príncipe. Armed confrontations 
spread west by February 1869, touching Cienfuegos, Santa Clara, Trinidad, 
Remedios, and Sancti Spíritus. Captain General Domingo Dulce requested six 
thousand soldiers in addition to the fi ve thousand already on their way to fi ght 
in the east.8 Local populations responded far more quickly to the outbreak. 
By February, twelve telegraph lines between Havana and central Cuba  were 
operating again, and military offi  cials in the provinces had a clear sense of 
their enemy. Insurgents in central Cuba  were led by Adolfo Fernández Ca-
vada, who had fought in a Philadelphia regiment during the U.S. Civil War and 
was serving as U.S. vice- consul in Cienfuegos. His ties to the United States 
prompted Captain General Francisco Lersundi to suspend the U.S. vice- consul 
in Cienfuegos and the consul in Trinidad.9 Th e creation of volunteer regiments 
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stirred patriotic sentiment on the island, more oft en tied to Spanishness 
(and its racial connotations) or “Spanish Cuba” than anything resembling 
the rebels’ extension of citizenship . Th e ayuntamiento in Cienfuegos, for ex-
ample, hailed the members of Batallón Voluntarios de Cienfuegos, a cavalry 
militia protecting rural areas, for recognizing “with pride its origins and the 
Spanish blood that circulates through its veins.”10
Racial distinctions thus conditioned the symbolic and material contribu-
tions to the war eff ort on behalf of Cuban men of color, both slave and free. 
Th ose who entered the confl ict  were not immediately armed and sent into 
combat. Among the Spanish and rebel forces, slaves and free people also per-
formed auxiliary ser vices somewhat distinct from the kind of military ser vice 
that accorded status in colonial society. Th ey served as stretcher bearers, trench 
diggers, cooks, couriers, and countless other jobs that placed them in close 
quarters with their white Spanish and Cuban counterparts.
Proximity between white and non- white military men did not guarantee 
ac cep tance, respect, or any presumption of egalitarianism, as the actions of 
one civil offi  cial demonstrated. Hipólito Reina Capetillo worked with mili-
tary offi  cers in Holguín, and just as rebels entered the city 30 October 1868, 
he needed to sneak across town to the civil hospital— a Spanish stronghold— 
without rebels taking notice. So, hoping to conceal himself in the dark of 
night, he went in blackface: with burned cork he colored his face, neck, arms, 
hands, and feet. He wore a colored kerchief, mockingly called himself a cara-
balí (the ethnic “nation” associated with the slave port of Calabar), began to 
charlar a lo negro (talk black), and danced around for other offi  cials, to great 
amusement, before leaving. Following Capetillo’s success, a second mission 
required the delivery of a letter to one of the insurgent leaders who had in-
vaded Holguín. Th is time the commanding Spanish offi  cer chose instead a 
streetwise bombero (fi reman) named Belis, described as agile, “de la raza de 
color, and with the heart of a brave man.” Belis pushed himself through the 
crowds to deliver a message that apparently upset the rebels, who  were or-
ga niz ing the bells, luminarias, and dances to celebrate the city’s liberation. 
Belis emerged the hero of the day.11 Alongside the off ensive spectacle of Ca-
petillo and the other Spanish supporters was a specifi c acknowledgment of 
his respectable position as a free man of color.
What might Belis have thought had he watched Capetillo’s blackface ca-
per? No matter how laudable his ser vice to Spain may have been, he still had 
to endure the bigotry of white soldiers and offi  cers who did not seem predis-
posed to tearing down racial barriers, even as they worked together closely. 
Th e incident in Holguín off ers another insight into war time life: setting aside 
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Capetillo’s excuse of traveling in the dark, his choice of blackface to traverse 
the city streets and the Spanish offi  cer’s selection of Belis for the second task 
hint at distinctive abilities for Cubans of color to circulate in public during 
moments of acute confl ict, in these cases with no apparent assumptions about 
their affi  liations (or possibly the assumption by the rebels that Cubans of 
color allied with their cause). If, as Jill Lane argues, blackface per for mance in 
Cuba “off ered a useful, perhaps necessary, alternative technology for mobi-
lizing, or ga niz ing, and otherwise constituting anticolonial public subjectiv-
ity,” Capetillo’s actions complicate that insight and suggest that it extended to 
colonial public subjectivity as well.12
By the end of 1869, thirty- three thousand Spanish soldiers had arrived 
from the peninsula, although the early and sustained participation of slaves 
in counterinsurgent forces aided Spanish forces signifi cantly.13 Th e Spanish 
army struggled to fi nd its place in Cuba and to fi nd a place for Cuba, especially 
its soldiers of color. An 1870 patriotic album published in Spain, for example, 
cata logued portraits of most of the major Spanish offi  cers leading the forces 
in Cuba, but one staged image of ordinary soldiers sticks out: “Defenders of 
National Integrity,” as the photograph was titled, depicted a lone Cuban sol-
dier of color in the group (fi gure 3.1). Next to him stared a white soldier, his 
head whipped around to regard his comrade. Was he gazing with admira-
tion? With anxiety? With disdain? Disbelief? Given the uneven reception of 
Cubans of color in the counterinsurgency, all of these reactions  were within 
the range of possibility.
Two Conscripts of Empire
Because civil and military authority overlapped in policies made from Ma-
drid, decisions about colonial appointments considered the image of Spain that 
military offi  cials might project, both to offi  cers and troops and to the general 
public. Offi  cers, troops, and bureaucrats oft en circulated throughout various 
parts of Spain’s empire, and positions and relationships built elsewhere could 
be mobilized or transformed in Cuba. Moreover, as the government called on 
the support of its subjects to put down the rebellion, pop u lar responses to the 
insurgency could, in turn, potentially shape colonial policy. Domingo Dulce, 
an abolitionist and reform- minded captain general appointed in 1869, ini-
tially eased press censorship and off ered amnesty to rebels who surrendered 
but quickly reversed course when voluntarios (volunteers) reacted violently 
against any concessions to the insurgency. Rumors circulated that he secretly 
sought autonomy, if not in de pen dence, for Cuba, and he left  aft er only six 
figure 3.1 • Defensores de la integridad nacional (Defenders of national 
integrity), in Gil Gelpi y Ferro, Álbum histórico fotográfi co de la Guerra de Cuba 
(Havana: Imprenta Militar de la Viuda de Soler y Compañía, 1870). Courtesy of 
Latin American Collection, George A. Smathers Library, University of Florida.
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months. His replacement, Antonio Caballero de Rodas, off ered the fi rmer 
hand that the voluntarios and many creole elites seemed to prefer. His arrival 
provoked acclamations of loyalty from troops who had served with him in 
the Philippines. Aft er he delivered a speech at a banquet in his honor promis-
ing public calm with the support of “such fi ne Spaniards,” voluntarios took to 
the decorated streets with large candles and music.14
With voluntarios and offi  cers alike ambivalent about men of color serving 
the Spanish cause, the lower ranks of Spanish defense opened up to accom-
modate more Cubans of color. Restrictions on access to the upper echelons of 
the military remained predictably tight. Th e great and notable exception was 
General Eusebio Puello (fi gure 3.2), one of a handful of Dominicans of African 
descent who had, against the odds, attained offi  cer status in the Spanish army 
during the military confl icts that began and ended the Haitian occupation of 
eastern Hispaniola (1822– 1844). Born in 1811, Puello enlisted at age thirteen and, 
aft er each of his successive victories, earned promotions and responsibility for 
larger campaigns. Having fought against Haitian forces in many engagements 
and against insurgents aft er Spain’s reannexation of the Dominican Repub-
lic, Puello was no stranger to rebellion and Spanish counterinsurgency. He was 
as emphatic about the importance of the “free, natural, and spontaneous senti-
ment” of the Dominican people as he was about military success to the strength 
figure 3.2 • General 
Eusebio Puello, from the 
newspaper La Ilustración 
de Madrid, 12 February 
1870. Private collection.
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of Spanish rule in the Ca rib be an. “Burning with enthusiasm for the defense 
of national integrity,” as he described it, Puello arrived in Cuba and initially 
commanded all troops in Sancti Spíritus, Morón, Remedios, and Ciego de 
Ávila.15
As rebel leader Ignacio Agramonte closed in on Puerto Príncipe in June 
1869, Puello relocated to the city and assumed the position of comandante 
general of central Cuba.16 His arrival immediately provoked re sis tance from 
offi  cers, soldiers, civilian offi  cials, and even the Audiencia. Overlooking the 
wide- ranging experience Puello had developed during a career of nearly fi ft y 
years, complaints within the military centered on one par tic u lar skill Puello 
boasted about that proved vital in the most recent Dominican insurgency: 
his valiant per for mance with a bayonet in trench battles. Offi  cials in Puerto 
Príncipe conceded that it had served him well, but argued that Cuban rebels 
with rifl es could fi re constantly and required diff erent tactics. Th ey mocked 
what they thought was his sole meritorious recognition by the government, 
calling it an aureola de lealtad a (halo of loyalty) to Spain, although he had 
previously received at least three such commendations.17 Puello suff ered a 
resounding defeat in January 1870 by the forces of rebel leader (and ex– 
Confederate general) Th omas Jordan, leaving three hundred Spanish soldiers 
dead and forcing Puello, surrounded by insurgents, to hole up for seventeen 
days in the abandoned  house of the Arroyo Hondo estate.18
A black Dominican Spanish general and an ex– Confederate general in 
the Cuban rebel army? Th ese men are not among the cast of characters typi-
cally associated with the struggle for Cuban in de pen dence. In Puello’s case, 
contemporaries in the nineteenth century  were no less confounded. Antonio 
Pirala, a Spanish historian refl ecting on the Ten Years’ War during the 1895– 
1898 War of In de pen dence, claimed that Puello lacked “the proper education 
of Eu ro pe an generals”; he blamed Cuban society, though, rather than Puello, 
for its inability to support the leader. Admittedly, Puello had rattled some 
Cubans with his presence, but “perhaps those who claim that the customs of 
each country should be respected are correct,” he added, arguing that Puello’s 
presence stirred up the slaves in and around Puerto Príncipe. Th ey  were al-
ready “almost in systematic disobedience to their own ers,” and some of them 
 were rumored to have “said with arrogance to their own ers ‘that if a tiznado 
[bastard] like him was going to order around the whites, it was proof that he 
was equal to them, and there was no reason that they shouldn’t all be free.’ ”19 
Th is was precisely the conclusion that had worried Spanish offi  cials when 
they fi rst opposed the migration of the black Dominican offi  cers to Cuba. 
 Were Puello a supporting cast member in the drama of war, his successes and 
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failures might not have caused such a stir. As a lead actor, the audiences he 
attracted became a justifi cation for ushering him off stage.
Despite his long record of achievement and the respect aff orded him in 
Spain, Puello’s reputation suff ered in the wake of his lost battle. When the 
captain general relieved Puello of his duties later in the year, he publicly cited 
the general’s bad health but privately accused Puello of “lacking the energy 
and disposition for leadership of such importance.” Puello himself noted this 
in an commemorative volume (1872). Newspapers, too, had attacked him for 
his lack of military knowledge, which he dismissed in the face of the “loyalty 
and honor” he had displayed a thousand times. Th is merited as much consid-
eration as a set of self- evident truths about war craft  “which are written into 
the ruggedness of the hills.”20 In a more confessional tone, Puello recalled 
stating publicly in Puerto Príncipe that he was a strong soldier yet knew little 
about the work of government, “but what I lack in intelligence I make up for 
with voluntad [determination].”21
Will and determination  were vital in battle but  were not, at the outset, re-
quirements for the freedom ultimately off ered to slaves who lent their labor 
to the Spanish army. In large part, the will of slaves rarely mattered to own ers 
or the state. In the pro cess of freeing slave- soldiers, however, their volition 
became as important to the offi  cials interrogating them as it was to Eusebio 
Puello’s confi dence in his contributions to the Spanish cause. Loyalty to colo-
nial rule, as we have seen repeatedly, was not a passive position to be con-
trasted to an active decision to join the insurgency.
Although leaders on both sides of the confl ict could not easily assess the 
motives and rewards for those acts of will, an instructive contrast between 
Puello and mulatto rebel offi  cer Antonio Maceo highlights the diff erent terms 
on which Spaniards and rebels comprehended racially diverse leadership. 
Maceo distinguished himself as a guerrilla fi ghter early in the war and quickly 
achieved the rank of sergeant, then captain, and then by 1872 a col o nel; by the 
end of the war he had become major general. His superiors, and even some 
Spaniards who saw him in action, routinely praised his skills. With resurgent 
campaigns in 1874, authors of Spanish propaganda began to accuse Maceo of 
inciting a race war, while rebel troops in Las Villas refused to accept him as 
their commander. Th ere are echoes of Puello’s trajectory  here: rapid distinc-
tion for military successes, fast promotion, public admiration, and racist 
reaction. But their responses to that prejudice diff ered in meaningful ways. 
Aft er waiting a full two years, Maceo responded, characterizing the slander 
as an attack on the ideals of Cuban in de pen dence. His letter of 16 May 1876 
accused his “brother” rebel critics of forgetting republican principles and the 
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idea of a nation “that does not recognize hierarchies.”22 For Puello, hierar-
chies  were off  the table. In contrast to the po liti cal vocabulary of the insur-
gency, the logic of Spanish rule made hierarchy one of its fundamental tenets. 
Appeals to liberty, equality, and fraternity— not just the motto of the French 
Revolution but also a phrase invoked, too, during the Haitian Revolution— 
resonated far less in Spanish Cuba than his combination of deference and 
determination. Even so, Puello’s leadership left  many Cubans skeptical of his 
ability to command authority.
His image in Spain, however, suff ered few of these doubts. Less than a 
month aft er his defeat near Arroyo Hondo, an article in La Ilustración de 
Madrid praised his heroism and dedication. Never mind that he blurred the 
sharp distinction Spaniards regularly made between the “sons of Spain” de-
fending the empire and insurgents, characterized as blacks who embodied the 
barbarity associated with African origins. Puello, in fact, provided the best 
evidence of Spain’s inclusive ethos. Th e article’s author praised how Puello 
had taken trenches controlled by over twice as many rebel soldiers as he com-
manded, and hailed “the sincerity of the aff ection he inspires in his adopted 
country.” But the writer didn’t stop there: he used the example of Puello to 
show that myths about Spain’s brutality and prejudice would be revised sub-
stantially if observers  were to search “the catacombs of our archives” instead 
of propagating the “Black Legend.” Compared to the “relative mildness” of 
Iberian slavery, “Yankees” and Eu ro pe ans had little room to argue about the 
treatment of blacks. As exemplifi ed by Puello, he stated, “no color diff erence 
alters anyone’s consideration for his patriotism.”23 Th e author  here replaced 
the Black Legend with a legendary black who redeemed Spanish empire in its 
ideals and in its practice.
José de la Gándara had been one of the most important generals in the 
reannexation campaign in the Dominican Republic, and he recalled the valor 
of Eusebio Puello well in his memoir of 1884, frequently referring to him as 
“the loyal Puello.” During the confl ict, Gándara had begun to take notice of 
a younger offi  cer whose bravery resembled that of the black general, and he 
made multiple attempts for Puello to meet the subordinate. At one point 
the two men  were in the same place, but they  were so involved in their 
various exploits that the encounter never occurred. So it was that Eusebio 
Puello narrowly missed meeting a young offi  cer named Valeriano  Weyler 
(fi gure 3.3).24
By 1898, if anyone remotely familiar with Cuba wanted to embody the 
 whole of the Black Legend in one individual, that individual would have been 
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Valeriano Weyler. Cubans, and especially the U.S. press, called him “Th e 
Butcher.” His policy of reconcentration from 1896— a euphemism for the forced 
relocation of over 300,000 Cubans to isolated areas to clear the path for coun-
terinsurgency operations— killed somewhere between 150,000 and 170,000 ci-
vilians, an estimated 10 percent of the island’s population.25
As recently promoted thirty- year- old offi  cer, Weyler was an early advocate 
of employing Cubans of color in the Spanish military. When various Havana 
businessmen in 1870 fi nanced the creation of Cazadores de Valmaseda— a 
special volunteer force— the responsibility of recruitment fell to Weyler, and 
he saw in this new force a possible solution to the military challenges posed 
by the Cuban rebels. Early confl icts in eastern Cuba alerted him to how “the 
principal action of the enemy” did not conform to the tactics of standard 
armies but rather to “dispersed forces, experts on the places where columns 
pass, using natural features to harass the enemy.” He described the battle at 
the Salado River in January 1869, for example, in which six hundred rebel 
“negros” on the banks of the river waved a white fl ag of surrender but opened 
fi re when Spanish troops approached them “with unpremeditated trust.” 
When it came to recruiting volunteers, then, Weyler looked not to men with 
distinguished militia or police experience but to those who more oft en 
found themselves on the other side of the law. He quickly assembled “a 
figure 3.3 • General Valeriano 
Weyler. Courtesy of New York 
Public Library.
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good number of white and colored Cubans, as well as some foreigners from 
various countries in Eu rope,” but he left  no paper trail of his eff orts because 
he had enlisted “many fugitives or released prisoners and not a few who had 
unfi nished business with the law.”26
Th e new soldiers each received thirty pesos monthly, a Peabody rifl e, and— 
because of Weyler’s worries about their dubious backgrounds— unyielding 
discipline. Weyler threw a punch at one soldier who complained “disrespect-
fully,” and he had another soldier sentenced to death on learning that he had 
wandered the streets of Cienfuegos shouting subversive statements. However, 
Weyler also expressed respect for his multiracial troops. Aft er a bumpy start 
they achieved victories in Las Tunas and Holguín, and Weyler ultimately 
commended their “unbreakable loyalty.” Two months aft er a successful 
surprise attack on rebel general Vicente García, the Cazadores de Val-
maseda joined with a Spanish brigade to attack a rebel contingent near the 
Río Chiquito. In a footnote in his memoirs Weyler mourned a black soldier 
named Joseito—“one of the bravest of my guerrilla[s]”— a death made all 
the more poignant on fi nding in his  horse’s saddle a number of bottles and 
foods, “without doubt intended festejar su santo [to celebrate his saint] the 
next day.”27 Th is oblique reference to one of the principal African- derived 
religious practices (constitutive only much later of santería) sticks out as 
perhaps the most surprising example of Weyler’s degree of sympathetic 
engagement with the black soldiers.
Such a sentimental aside sits awkwardly with the image of Valeriano Wey-
ler. What can we make of his younger self and his aff ection for Joseito? 
Within the context of military camaraderie, even between social and military 
unequals, aff ection between men could safely express itself as a show of patrio-
tism.28 But assumptions about racial diff erence never vanished from cooper-
ative eff orts during war time. Just as continued prejudice qualifi ed the eff usive 
praise for Eusebio Puello’s high- profi le loyalty, Weyler’s appreciation of his 
troops accompanied an estimation of those men less as loyal subjects than 
the hardscrabble denizens of the mala vida, the illicit world of thieving, gam-
bling, and vagrancy, whose lives on the margins taught them useful lessons 
to exploit in combat. In other words, these men  were conscripts of empire: 
historical agents acting within the ideological and institutional structures of 
colonial rule.29 Puello, Weyler, and many others demonstrated their support 
for Spain in a context of presumed racial (and racist) antagonism that was 
hardwired into the circuitry of imperial power.
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Legislating Loyalty: Th e Moret Law
Segismundo Moret, the ministro de ultramar (overseas minister) in 1870, knew 
well from civil and military offi  cials in Cuba how to extend and institutional-
ize the practice of freeing slave- soldiers that  was already taking place. His 
law that set the terms of gradual slave emancipation included an article 
stipulating that “All slaves who have served under the Spanish fl ag, or in any 
manner have aided the troops during the current Cuban insurrection, are 
declared free. Th e State will compensate own ers their value if they have re-
mained loyal to the Spanish cause; if they belonged to the insurgents, there 
will be no occasion for compensation.” Well before the Cortes considered the 
Moret Law, the captain general had been consistently relaying to Madrid 
two confl icting reports about Cuban slaves: their attraction to the anticolo-
nial insurgency’s promise of citizenship and their continued support of Span-
ish rule. He boasted that in April 1870 thirty- two negros presented themselves 
in the town of Puerto Príncipe to claim unanimously that “they very much 
prefer to be Spanish slaves than free Mambís.”30 Less than a month later, he 
wrote that “many individuals of color have given excellent ser vices, taking up 
arms for our cause. Backed by provincial laws, I have granted freedom to 
those who have distinguished themselves making public the resolution to 
stimulate it further.”31 When he freed slave insurgents in a jail, they volun-
teered to fi ght in the contraguerrillas (counterinsurgent forces) or to serve as 
spies against their former comrades. In arguing before the Cortes about his 
proposed law for gradual emancipation, Moret spoke eloquently about the 
presence of slaves in the Spanish ranks “who have fought on our side, who 
have taught the Spanish soldier the hidden road, the rugged path, the narrow 
passage where one could look for the enemy or get out of the tangled jungle: 
these slaves cannot return to [slavery]; the Spanish fl ag, waving before them, 
has converted them into free men.”32 Moret’s colleagues in the Cortes gener-
ally agreed that slaves who fought with Spain deserved their freedom. Free 
people of African descent had been crucial in defending the island in the be-
ginning of the rebellion, and deputies in Madrid had few reservations 
about striking a bargain with slaves: exchanging military ser vice for free-
dom. As one deputy noted, “Our laws, since ancient times, have conceded 
freedom to slaves who have lent great ser vices to the Patria or to their own-
ers themselves.”33
With the practical benefi ts of cultivating and rewarding the loyalty of 
slaves established in debates over the abolition law, the Cortes shift ed its con-
cerns to the economic and po liti cal eff ects of Article 3. Less consensus about 
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the article existed about reconciling the freedom of slaves with the property 
rights of their masters. In this aspect Moret and his colleagues fi ercely dis-
agreed on the question of compensation for slaveowners. Like many of his 
colleagues, he was resolutely opposed to compensating rebel slaveowners, and 
he even expressed doubts about compensating loyal own ers. Some own ers 
who had fought for Spain since 1868 had voluntarily freed their slaves, having 
“recognized the principle of freedom without compensation.” Moret argued, 
“It would be an incredibly strange thing if the Government  were to recognize 
a right that they had begun to renounce.”34 Deputies such as Luis Padial and 
others disagreed. Own ers loyal to Spain would be compensated the price of 
the slave if freed by the state.
Insurgent slaveowners, however, would be stripped of those “assets” and in 
eff ect have their slaves “embargoed,” or confi scated by the government. In a 
North Atlantic po liti cal climate favorable to abolition, this proved an embar-
rassing matter for Spain. Rebel leaders in Cuba and the United States publi-
cized that although they  were willing to free their slaves, the Spanish government 
subsequently might try to capture and reenslave them.35 Article 3, then, in 
its fi nal form, embodied confl icting aims. It cultivated the loyalty of Cuban 
slaves to the colonial government at the same time that it tried to assuage 
observers throughout the North Atlantic world concerned that the war would 
prolong slavery. Once the Cortes passed the Moret Law, the binding power of 
the state backed Spain’s promises of freedom in a way that insurgent leaders’ 
abolitionist policies could not yet achieve.
Spanish press coverage recognized how the Moret Law could help the move-
ment to defeat the insurrection but questioned whether or not slaves or 
former slaves could be loyal subjects. Th e editors of La Iberia, for example, 
hoped that Article 3 would extinguish slave allegiances to separatism, “one of 
the most cherished hopes of the insurgents.” Instead, the new law could seize 
on the dispositions of “the negros, held close to their masters, treated with 
solicitude and aff ection on the part of their own ers.” It went on to say, “Th e 
Government has comprehended the loyalty of those negros to Spain, their af-
fection for Spaniards, and so the project declares them free, compensates their 
own ers.”36 Articles in the liberal daily El Sufragio Universal  were more skepti-
cal. As a mea sure to stimulate slaves freed by the Céspedes proclamation to 
abandon their encampments, Article 3 could not possibly compel slaves from 
Baracoa to Cinco Villas “to change their real and true freedom that they win 
in the battlefi elds, freedom conferred by their own ers, to go in search of a 
fi ctitious manumission like that off ered by the Spanish government, whose 
domination is considered extinguished in that vast expanse of territory.” For 
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slaves in western Cuba, whose loyal own ers had not freed them, the govern-
ment faced a moral trade- off  between encouraging slaves “to change the hard 
labor of barbarous and cruel slavery, to seize the weapons of a soldier, with 
the incentive of freedom,” and “to use slander and accusation against their 
own ers.”37 El Puente de Alcolea warned of a potential labor shortage catalyzed 
by slave enlistment. It looked to the case of Brazil, which “opened its ranks to 
the servile class” during the war with Paraguay, such that “the mining blacks 
responded in huge masses to look for their freedom fi ghting against López.”38 
Another newspaper, La Voz del Derecho, accused Moret and certain deputies 
in the Cortes of underestimating the selfl ess ties that slaves might have to-
ward Spain. Arguing that slaves might fi ght without recompense, one jour-
nalist surmised that Moret “has believed that the colored race could not have 
aff ections for the patria,” thereby reducing loyalty to Spain to a desperate 
bargain for freedom. By separating “within the same race” freed loyal slaves 
from vanquished rebel slaves, Moret fostered the type of resentment among 
slaves that had taken violent, disastrous turns in the past. Once again, the 
specter of Haiti loomed large: “Unfortunately,” the article lamented, “Señor 
Moret has forgotten the lessons of history.”39
Th e initial Spanish press reaction to the insurrection itself did not imme-
diately express fear of racial reprisal and sometimes downplayed the partici-
pation of Cubans of color. One editorial in the Diario de Barcelona dismissed 
parallels to earlier Latin American in de pen dence movements, as well as the 
notion that a “new race” born of the “crossing of races, united by the infl uence 
of the tropical climate” was to blame for the rebellion. Th e author claimed to 
know many rebel leaders personally and assured readers that “the Cubans, 
then, in their im mense majority are white, of pure Caucasian race and all of 
Eu ro pe an origin,” adding that “the people of color are, in their near totality 
devoted and loyal.” He understated the presence of mulattoes among the reb-
els, who  were “insignifi cant as much by their number as by their position and 
infl uence.” Th e driving force of the insurrection, instead, lay in the hands of 
white men “driven by ambition and greed and infected by the predominant 
ideas in the United States.” 40
Spanish writer Gil Gelpi y Ferro looked to the past and the future when he 
celebrated the military achievements of African- descended Cubans for their 
contribution to a reinvigorated empire. He reported in 1871 that rebels consti-
tuted a minority of Cubans, in contrast to the “many peaceful workers in the 
countryside of all conditions and races.” He praised how African- descended 
Cubans, “little knowing what to expect from the so- called regeneradores [re-
formers] and how much they owed to Spanish laws and Catholicism, have 
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contributed on their part to combat those who have neither patria nor be-
liefs.” He singled out the “valiant negros” of Havana’s milicias disciplinadas 
and bomberos “that with such enthusiasm and patriotism have gone when 
the Government commanded it.” He specifi cally credited a battalion in 
Punta Pilón, Camagüey, with defeating a massive attack by black rebels who 
had united “in order to surprise the negros who guarded that point: the val-
iant voluntarios of color, to the shout of ‘¡Viva España!,’ a shout that might 
cause horror among certain people, obligated them to fl ee hastily, leaving the 
countryside covered with cadavers.”
But Gelpi reminded his readers that Spain’s soldiers of color demonstrated 
loyalty to more than their patria; they had achieved success through the coop-
eration, if not supervision, of white superiors. He bestowed equal praise upon 
white Spaniards in Havana, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and Cárdenas who “nego-
tiated with the notable Spanish negros just as the French negotiated with their 
neighbors in Senegal, the British in Sierra Leone, and the Portuguese in An-
gola.” 41 It was a bold suggestion: imbued with the spirit of indirect rule that 
was solidifying Eu rope’s imperial claims in Africa, Spaniards and creoles could, 
for Gelpi, usher in a new colonial era in Cuba that built on the alliances 
forged by blacks and whites during the war. Before Spain could assume a re-
spectable place alongside Eu rope’s other national empires, it would need to 
demonstrate that the alliances produced the intended outcome of negotiating 
with “Spanish negros.” Incorporating Cubans of color into the war eff ort had 
largely been an improvised and instrumental mea sure, not one with the le-
gally backed bargain codifi ed by Article 3. Would modifying the means of 
preserving empire also change its ends?
Mea sur ing Loyalty: Field Interrogations of Slaves
Despite issuing a decree establishing obligatory military ser vice in the insur-
gency, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes criticized the Spanish army for forcing 
Cubans “against their will” to join their ranks.42 At the same time, he re-
quired that any slaves seeking to join the ranks of the rebellion required the 
permission of their masters.43 Th ere  were few clear answers to questions of 
voluntarism and decision making on the part of individuals in choosing sides. 
Whether allegiance to a cause required proof of willful intent remained a 
vexed question for both sides in the confl ict.
Arming slaves, what ever its successful historical antecedents, required a 
degree of trust between military leaders and slaves that did not always prevail 
over offi  cers’ perceived threat of reprisal. Indeed, some slaves quickly deserted 
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the Spanish ranks with weapons that they subsequently used in the insurgent 
army. Th e conditions of freedom under Article 3, however, depended on the 
conditions of enslavement and emerged from interrogations in Spanish army 
camps that expressed little concern about the anticipated behavior of freed 
slaves. As superiors questioned slaves and their fellow fi ghters, proceedings 
oft en focused on rewarding ser vices rendered rather than welcoming slaves 
into a brotherhood of free subjects of the Spanish crown. In an examination 
of over three hundred of these interrogations, it becomes clear that labor and 
ser vice  were necessary, but not suffi  cient, conditions for freedom. Determin-
ing the merits of slaves’ affi  liations with Spain became a pro cess of reconcil-
ing competing defi nitions of loyalty. Offi  cers encountered slaves with diff erent 
ideas about what behaviors and arguments made them deserving of freedom.
Th e fi rst order of business in applying Article 3 was to determine the spe-
cifi c contributions that slaves had made to the war eff ort. As they oft en did in 
the insurgent ranks, slaves performed menial labor for voluntarios and stand-
ing regiments as oft en as they engaged in armed combat. Nicolás Gonzalo, 
a thirty- year- old member of the Batallón de Antequera, is one example. Guill-
ermo Bell, who fought in the Batallón Cazadores de Bailén, worked as a 
stretcher- bearer and a muleteer, and sometimes took up arms.44 José Caimares, 
who had joined the army on 7 June 1869, was described as “lending his ser-
vices of camillero [stretcher bearer], acemilero [muleteer] and others analogous 
to his class.” 45 Th e majority of slaves interrogated responded similarly. Yet free-
dom did not depend solely on armed combat: Alejandro Néstor, a slave from 
the Perseverancia estate and a member of the Th ird Company of the Batallón 
de Matanzas, claimed in his interrogation that “he was always fi el [loyal] to the 
cause of the Spanish Government, performing the ser vices of muleteer and 
stretcher- bearer.” 46 Although these auxiliary activities may not have carried the 
symbolic power of combat, they nevertheless justifi ed freedom. In the case of 
carry ing bodies, slaves performed a ser vice as important for sanitary reasons as 
for symbolic ones, given the frequency of illness and death during the war. Slave 
recruits in the rebel army frequently performed the same labor. A North Amer-
ican war correspondent described stretcher bearing in the rebel forces during 
the 1895– 1898 war: “Stout negroes  were detailed to carry the helpless. Ham-
mocks  were borrowed from those who had them to lend, and the wounded  were 
borne in them, slung on poles on the shoulders of their comrades. Two men 
carried a pole for a hundred yards or so, and rested it on crotched sticks that 
they drove upright in the ground at each halt, while they caught their wind and 
mopped their sweaty brows.” 47 Much of the labor performed by slave- soldiers, 
then, seems to have been labor that voluntarios and Spanish soldiers avoided.
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Attentive to the unity and diversity among African- descended Cubans, 
offi  cials took great interest in the ethnic self- designations of the slaves under 
interrogation. When asked about his “primitive nationality,” Guillermo Bell 
responded with the ethnic designation “Gangá.” When asked if there  were 
other slaves with his surname— presumably from his same plantation— who 
fought with him, he replied that one was “Congo” and two  were creoles. Dur-
ing the interrogation of Félix Bell, another slave from the Perseverancia sugar 
estate near Santiago, offi  cials cross- checked Bell’s ethnic self- identifi cation 
with an eye toward spotting falsifi cation. Félix himself took great care to ex-
plain how his name diff ered from the one on his baptismal rec ords. Creole 
slaves apparently did not garner suspicion for identifying as Cubans. When 
asked of his place of origin, Ignacio Calixto, a slave from Bayamo, responded 
with “his patria Cuba.” 48
In the course of their interrogations, slaves sometimes provided military 
offi  cials with intelligence about insurgent slaves and masters. Th eir knowl-
edge of local conditions provided critical information about the composition 
of the rebel forces and the contours of disloyalty. Slaves who identifi ed rebel 
own ers alerted offi  cials to estates that could be embargoed. Still other slaves 
traded information about insurgents not for their freedom, but for special 
privileges and mobility. Eustaquio Adelín, who one offi  cial estimated to be 
nineteen or twenty years old, off ered a detailed analysis of the recruiting ef-
forts of the rebel general Donato Mármol. In exchange, he asked only to be 
able to see his mother, Leocadia, “slave of his own er Don Amá, who is still on 
the cafetal (coff ee plantation).” 49 In other cases, slaves fl ed from insurgent own-
ers. Instead of holding the slaves as embargoed property or punishing the 
slaves for escaping, Spanish offi  cials freed them for having actively sought out 
Spanish troops and off ering their ser vices. Such was the story of Luciano Sosa 
from Cienfuegos who had fl ed an own er and somehow made his way to the 
eastern part of the island in the Spanish army.50 Having a rebel own er oft en 
aided the cases of slaves obligated to show that they had presented themselves 
voluntarily to Spanish forces for enlistment. Manuel Olivares identifi ed his 
own er, Ramón Rubio, as the head of an insurgent battalion, thus demonstrat-
ing that his ser vice was not performed only at the command of his master.51 
Andrés Aguilera, a creole slave from the Santa Gertrudis estate in Manza-
nillo, identifi ed his own er as rebel general Francisco Aguilera. When his 
insurgent own er and the estate’s overseers abandoned the plantation, the 
workforce dispersed to the Santa Isabel hills until Andrés, with “his woman 
the negra Ursula” and three other male slaves, presented himself to the Fift h 
Battalion Cazadores de San Quintín to work as a stretcher bearer.52 Many 
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slaves admitted that they did not know what allegiances their own ers had, 
which also bolstered their claims to voluntary participation.53 Th ese slaves all 
affi  rmed that they had voluntarily presented themselves to the Spanish army 
for employment.
Other slaves ended up with the Spanish aft er a stint in the rebel ranks, a 
shift  that elevated the issue of voluntad, or will. Even when slaves did not ex-
plicitly affi  rm loyalty to the Spanish government, they improved their cases 
when they demonstrated a choice to support the Spanish army. Interrogators 
might even ask a slave “if he had presented himself voluntarily or induced by 
a second person or if he was forced into it.”54 While some slaves strategically 
switched sides during the Ten Years’ War— depending on resources, patron-
age, or perceptions of which side was winning— others expressed less of a 
choice in their military participation. Vicente del Castillo, a slave who worked 
as a pan maker in Santiago de Cuba, declared that he presented himself to the 
Conde de Valmaseda of the Spanish army during a battle in Saladillo, “being 
that the insurgents, against his will, had taken him from the ingenio La 
Unión, his own er’s property.”55 Th e relative weight ascribed to the accom-
plishments and intentions of slaves seeking their freedom through Article 3 
shift ed to will in later years, but even during these early moments interroga-
tors attempted to discern the nature of slaves’ allegiance.
Many of the early interrogations of slaves in eastern Cuba referred to the 
rebel general Donato Mármol as the driving force behind slave recruitment 
for the rebel army. On a trip to the Esperanza coff ee estate, Mármol or ga nized 
about forty of the slaves and swore to the Virgen de la Caridad that all slaves 
would be freed if the insurrection succeeded. He then led the slaves to a point 
near Sabanilla, where nine thousand other soldiers  were already stationed. Th e 
slaves performed manual labor— digging trenches to keep the Spanish from 
advancing and building fortifi cations— and during an engagement with the 
Batallón de Matanzas, led by the Conde de Valmaseda, at least one slave 
switched sides, fought for the Spanish, and earned his freedom.56
In the testimony of Felipe San José, who worked on a cafetal in Guantá-
namo, the easternmost region of Cuba, he explicitly related his status as a 
slave to his decision to fi ght: “Asked how he found himself in the actions in 
Saladillo between rebel parties and the Spanish government and not at the 
cafetal where he was a slave, and who induced such a defection, or if it was 
voluntarily, he said that accustomed by his condition to blind obedience, he 
put up no re sis tance, without conscience of disloyalty, to heed the order that 
the mayoral [overseer] Eduardo Pochet gave to follow the party commanded 
by the leader Donato Mármol to join the campaign.” Pochet, the French 
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overseer, had been approached by Mármol to recruit from the plantation’s 
workforce, and it was only aft er the slaves joined the insurgent ranks that 
Felipe and Santiago— a slave from the same plantation— were taken prisoner 
by a general in the Spanish army, “recommending to [them] fi delity hereaft er 
to the Spanish government.” Felipe and Santiago assented to this recommen-
dation, “remained loyal ever since,” and thus only months aft er the passage of 
the Moret Law, their circuitous route to the Spanish army— and to a situation 
they could describe as “loyalty”— led them to freedom.57
Th e contradictions in Spanish policy become starkly visible  here. Loyalty 
could be a morally neutral category or a virtue disconnected from a par tic u-
lar value or cause. And in the encounter on the coff ee estate, loyalty worked 
to the disadvantage of Spain. Felipe San José’s “blind obedience” was to his 
insurgent master, not the Spanish government. Th e loyalty that won Felipe 
and Santiago their freedom was voluntary, a willful allegiance to Spain if not 
a decisive rejection of the insurgency.
But a slave’s alleged loyalty to Spain did not always necessarily trump loy-
alty to an own er. Interrogations routinely attempted to ascertain from slaves 
if they had continued to work on the plantation in the event that their own ers 
had abandoned them to fi ght in the insurrection. In November 1870, offi  cials 
promptly denied Antonio Abad’s petition for freedom because he had neither 
off ered meaningful ser vices to the Spanish army— he had simply camped out 
among troops for several days— nor had he fl ed his master for any good rea-
son acceptable to the authorities. His off ense: “re sis tance to obedience.”58 Loy-
alty to Spain was a necessary but insuffi  cient condition in the practical 
application of Article 3. Slaves had to demonstrate moral freedom— that is, 
evidence of an unforced choice— as a condition of juridical freedom.
Slaveowners, too, had to navigate the variable currents of loyalty and 
disloyalty when their slaves became free. Th e Moret Law stipulated that only 
loyal slaveowners would be compensated when the government freed slaves 
who had served in the army. Some insurgent slaveowners had freed their 
slaves at the outset of the rebellion. Others had already had their property, 
including their slaves, embargoed by the government. But those own ers whose 
loyalty was still in doubt when their slaves petitioned for freedom had to 
make the case for her loyalty to be compensated. When an urban slave named 
Felipe sought liberty through Article 3, Juana del Castillo— the widow of an 
army captain— had to argue on behalf of herself and her daughter Luisa for 
compensation. In the midst of the rebellion’s turmoil, the two women had 
slipped out of the city of Puerto Príncipe to the seclusion of a friend’s rural 
residence. Th ey left  Felipe, a chocolatier and meat vendor, in the city to con-
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tinue working to pay off  the debts they had accrued during the war. Th e women 
returned to the city as Felipe was gaining his freedom “for the fi ne qualities 
that distinguish him” but with none of his earnings to be found. Th ey 
aroused suspicion because they had abandoned their slave and left  town; cit-
ies typically remained Spanish strongholds during Cuba’s in de pen dence 
wars, whereas the untamed countryside promised less stability. Ultimately, 
the Consejo de Administración in Madrid ruled that they  were “of good 
moral and po liti cal opinion” and had not acted with negligence with Fe-
lipe.59 But the case revealed that Article 3 allowed the Spanish state to exam-
ine and monitor the relationship between masters and slaves that undergirded 
colonial stability. Th us, offi  cials oft en seemed as intent on ascertaining the 
allegiance of slaveowners as they  were the loyalty of the slaves they consid-
ered freeing.
Aft er the initial years of the war, regular arrivals of numerous Spanish 
troops reduced the urgency of slaves’ military contributions. Assuming that 
slaves learned about the nature and stakes of the war as it progressed, offi  cials 
gave greater attention to the intentions and motivations of slaves to join the 
Spanish cause. Other Cubans worried that the insurrection threatened the obe-
dience of slaves to their own ers. Even travelers frequently affi  rmed the idea that 
the institution of slavery guaranteed the loyalty of naturally rebellious people 
of African descent. Antonio Gallenga, on visiting a sugar estate in Güines, 
noted with no lack of hyperbole that “the Negro in a state of slavery is as 
effi  cient and willing a labourer as the master can desire. I have seen crowds of 
them clustering round Señor Zulueta, on their knees, joyously crying, ‘¡El 
Amo! ¡El Amo!’ as if the master  were a demigod to them and his presence 
among them an angel’s visit.” But the planters he spoke to— conscious of 
slavery’s long- term unfeasibility— worried that immediate abolition would be 
tantamount to “leaving to their own devices an enormous mass of slaves, in-
dolent by temperament, placed above all want”: “Th e immediate emancipa-
tion of the Negroes would soon bring back the  whole black race to the 
instincts of its native African savagery.” Because “Negro sympathies” buoyed 
the insurrection, Gallenga implored planters to develop strategies to phase 
out slave labor while maintaining the obedience of black and mulatto work-
ers that would stave off  rebellion and ruin.60 In this sense, granting freedom 
only to those slaves who had “proven” their loyalty to Spain through military 
ser vice provided ner vous planters and colonial offi  cials with a gradual and 
regulated approach to the ties that held Cuban society together. It also gave 
institutional weight to their defi nitions of loyalty over those of the many 
slaves who sought their freedom by contributing to the war eff ort.
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Other Loyalties
In poring over the hundreds of Article 3 cases, it becomes clear that slaves’ 
understandings of the master- slave relationship consistently collided with 
military offi  cials’ assessments of the po liti cal loyalty of slave- soldiers relative 
to  their fi delity to their own ers. In the pro cess, labor relationships made 
visible and disrupted by anticolonial rebellion came to condition social 
relations— and the possibilities for mobility— within Spain’s counterinsur-
gency. Yet to imagine slavery as the only labor arrangement on the island, 
or to take the master- slave relationship as the root meta phor for all social 
order and hierarchy, submerges other unequal relations in Cuba that oper-
ated by diff erent but related rules. Abundant “others”— in par tic u lar, Chi-
nese contract workers and enslaved and free women— experienced war time 
instability that pulled them into the increasingly urgent issue of pop u lar 
loyalty to Spanish rule.
By the beginning of the Ten Years’ War, African slaves and free people of 
color had been working for years alongside Chinese and Yucatec Maya con-
tract laborers who arrived through migration schemes borne out of anxieties 
about the suppression of the transatlantic slave trade. Working long and il-
legally extended periods of indenture, these workers oft en experienced the 
brutality that characterized African slavery, as employers rarely honored the 
stipulated freedoms laid out in labor contracts. Th e dislocations of war af-
fected these workers as well as slaves and raised concerns about their fi delity 
to their contracts, their employers, and to Spanish rule.
When the Chinese government formed a commission in 1873 to visit Cuba 
and report on the conditions of Chinese laborers, general concerns about the 
violation of labor contracts on plantations led investigating authorities to in-
quire whether “Coolies serve their employers faithfully.” Th ey concluded in 
their report from 1876 that the Chinese “cannot be otherwise than obedient, 
through the terror inspired by the administrator and overseers, by the chains 
at their side, and by the rods and whips which goad them into labor.” A peti-
tion from ninety workers and oral testimony from seven others painted a 
picture of forced obedience; for example, Chung Shêng, one of many workers 
forced to continue laboring aft er the contract term had ended, explained that 
“I was against my will constrained to continue labor, and had open to me no 
course but obedience.” Since insubordination and fl ight  were among the of-
fenses that employers and government authorities could cite to discipline 
contract laborers, including extending their period of indenture, the com-
mission scrutinized the actions and statements of the Chinese workers to 
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understand their ideas about loyalty and disloyalty and the pervasive threat 
of violence against them.61
What happened when war time disruptions led plantation discipline to 
break down? Like slaves whose masters and overseers had left  their estates to 
join the rebellion, Chinese workers also faced choices about how to proceed. 
Th e commission could not reach rebel camps to investigate the presence of 
Chinese insurgents, but individuals who off ered oral testimony or written 
petitions argued for their adherence to established hierarchies.62 Th e petition 
of Chang Luan and thirty others claimed that despite the many planters re-
belling and “endeavouring to induce the Chinese labourers to do likewise,” 
the number of Chinese rebels “is not considerable.” As they saw it, a Chinese 
worker, “born in a country where the principles of right are respected,” was 
“able to refuse to attach himself to disturbers of law and order,” although skep-
tical Cubans denied the “display of such feelings” and thus “use this denial as 
an excuse for fresh prohibitions and restrictions.” Other Chinese emphasized 
that they continued to work despite the transformations around them; one 
“remained, and worked for the new own er”; another “attached [himself] to a 
gang of labourers and worked under its head.” Displaced Chinese who could 
not document their free status  were imprisoned or otherwise confi ned, and 
sometimes destined for public works projects, which could include military 
defense. Th e report estimated that 1,827 of the 1,932 people dispatched to the 
trocha— a massive fortifi ed line intended to prevent the rebels’ invasion of the 
prosperous west— were Chinese. And several men explained that once their 
masters joined the insurgency, they sought out Spanish forces for ser vice. 
Wang T’in- kuei, for example, disobeyed his master—“I refused to go with 
him”— but “ran away to the Government offi  cials, one of whom I served as a 
cook.”63 Without the promise of freedom, loyalty did not carry the legal weight 
that it did for African slave- soldiers, but the Chinese involved in the confl ict 
still seemed to recognize the value of loyal subjectivity as they testifi ed to their 
exploitation.
Slave and free participation on all sides of the war shook up established 
assumptions about race and about master- slave relations, even though many 
such arrangements continued unchanged in regions less aff ected by battle and 
within cities. If civil and military offi  cials fretted about the long- term conse-
quences of the changing legal and social climate of slavery, they  were far less 
speculative about the toll taken on the institution of the family, another so-
cial institution meta phor ical ly frequently linked to the po liti cal order. Th e 
war was no less disruptive to masters and slaves than it was to Cuban families, 
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but normative gender and domestic arrangements or structures  were to be 
protected at all costs. Th e Spanish held long- established associations between 
the cohesion of the family and the cohesion of colonial rule. Rural evacua-
tions sent white women, children, and the el der ly to cities for protection, and 
rebels and Spaniards alike recognized the moral authority to be claimed by 
guarding their safety.64 Slaves who built family and kin networks against 
much greater odds struggled to maintain bonds, oft en in the face of greater 
labor burdens placed on them in the war time economy and multiple reloca-
tions. Despite these conditions, most women could not anticipate signifi cant 
changes in their status as a result of the war. When insurgents gathered in 
April 1869 to approve the Constitution of Guáimaro— a new vision of na-
tional government and citizenship that did not achieve sovereign authority— 
there was no proposed change in the po liti cal status of women. In the context 
of nineteenth- century constitution making in the American republics, this 
comes as little surprise; but as a vision of citizenship conceived in reaction 
against Spanish rule and proposing broad social changes, the constitution’s 
denial of women’s citizenship made for a notable continuity.
In contrast to the opportunities it held for men, military ser vice rarely of-
fered an avenue for freedom for slave women. But several dozen of them gained 
their freedom through Article 3 for the kinds of domestic work that  were ex-
tensions of the gendered labor they might have done within  house holds and 
for masters. Cooking, nursing, cleaning, washing clothes, and even ironing 
all qualifi ed these slave women to receive letters of freedom.65 Aft er three years 
of performing all of those tasks, Juana Sariol, for example, was able to leave the 
camp at Las Parras, near Las Tunas, where she had come in 1870 aft er fl eeing 
her insurgent own er. Despite receiving only a single ration of clothing in her 
years of ser vice, Sariol had oft en “helped out all by herself with the most zeal-
ous effi  ciency.”66 Manuela Betancourt, an African- born slave from the com-
munity of Las Minas, near Puerto Príncipe, had spent almost three years 
with troops— cooking and cleaning— and in a hospital— caring for soldiers 
stricken with cholera— before being returned to her own er at the Serecá es-
tate at the end of 1873. Offi  cers actively intervened on her behalf. Four of 
them went to the provincial governor to testify to her contributions, and 
Manuela brought along her husband, Anselmo, in order to seek his freedom 
as well in recognition for his own ser vice to the Spanish troops. Such a dem-
onstration of support by so many superiors led the governor to free them 
both as an expression of “protection for his loyal subordinates.”67 And with 
that one phrase, the governor constituted and rewarded Manuela and An-
selmo as loyal subjects using a catch- all shorthand that reinforced multiple 
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paternalistic relationships. Never mind that Manuela was the one who took 
the initiative on behalf of her husband; even if that constituted a violation of 
patriarchal norms that paired men’s protection with women’s obedience, she 
and Anselmo experienced plenty of other structured inequalities that pro-
vided ample ground for their subjection as loyal subordinates.
Although the ser vices that these slave women performed normally justi-
fi ed freedom to the authorities charged with hearing the petitions, concerns 
about their voluntad  were never far from the surface. How much agency could 
a slave woman exert without threatening the normative social relations that 
routinely negated and subordinated those like her? Interrogators carefully 
noted that Juana Sariol had arrived “spontaneously” to the encampment of 
Spanish troops when she left  her rebel master. In contrast, once an African- 
born slave named Manuela Betancourt and other workers had been left  on 
their own in Puerto Príncipe, they marched “without knowing where,” and 
with unclear intentions, according to the overseer at the Serecá estate.68 Other 
slave women confronted doubts and challenges when they articulated their 
motives for supporting the Spanish army, sometimes witnessing their claims 
to freedom recast as aff airs of the heart. A mulata slave named Candelaria 
Almaguel infi ltrated several insurgent camps around Holguín, ascertained 
the whereabouts of Donato Marmol’s encampment in the Lomas de Mi-
randa, and enabled a major victory for Spanish forces. Despite a commander’s 
endorsement of her freedom request and testimonies that she had acted volun-
tarily, the governor of Oriente province denied the claim because Candelaria 
acted “with no other motive than being in love,” following a man to whom 
she had taken a fancy. He also claimed that she was pursuing her freedom by 
“acquiring the protection of a gran señor [prominent man] by seducing him.” 
And so Candelaria returned to her own er, who claimed that he had raised her 
“in his  house, more as a daughter than as a slave.”
Caridad Zaldívar had petitioned the captain general directly for her 
freedom in 1872, and her case— reassigned to military offi  cials in Puerto 
Príncipe— was complicated by her status as a coartada (a slave in the pro cess 
of gradual self-purchase) with seven hundred pesos more to pay for her free-
dom. Th ere  were few doubts about her contributions, which diff ered from 
those made by most slave women. Zaldívar had made her way to a Spanish 
column near Puerto Príncipe “voluntarily without being advised by anyone,” 
but left  several times “to the hills” to round up insurgents and present them 
to Spanish offi  cers.69 At least fi ft een rebels— offi  cers and soldiers, morenos 
and blancos, men and women— ended up facing Spanish offi  cials because 
Zaldívar had either persuaded or ordered them to return to the city.
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Aft er Spanish offi  cers testifi ed “applaudingly” to Zaldívar’s eff orts in her 
Article 3 petition, the summary report declared that her eff orts “did not 
amount to much”; it seemed unlikely that a woman “on foot with a child in 
her arms” could wield the necessary infl uence to aff ect the voluntad of the 
insurgents, especially the four offi  cers who presented themselves. Rather than 
grant Zaldívar her freedom in recognition for her work, offi  cials reframed her 
petition as the “weak essence of a poor sick woman who has lived shackled by 
the chains of slavery since birth.” Her own er received the balance that Zaldívar 
owed on her freedom thanks to the government’s “innate and magnanimous 
feeling of goodness.”70 Th e paternal state’s concerns for its weaker subjects, 
not the willful allegiance of a loyal subject, informed the gendered logic of 
Zaldívar’s claim. Characterizing enslaved women’s volition in ways that reaf-
fi rmed paternal authority could just as easily raise suspicions about their mo-
tives for aiding the Spanish.
Defi ning as auxiliary the labor of women— whether performed by slave, free, 
Spanish, or creole— enabled its equation to the work done by noncombatant 
men of color. Th e early victory by rebels in Holguín in the initial months of the 
war left  the Spanish volunteer lieutenant Luciano Martínez with a bullet wound 
in the ass. A city leader, Antonio José Nápoles Fajardo, reported that the señoras 
who tended to him included the wives of other offi  cers who “acted as nurses” 
despite having no practical training, relying instead on their abilities “to allevi-
ate and console those who suff ered.” By their side at all times was Antonio Or-
ozco, a black phlebotomist from the cuerpo de bomberos, whose skilled 
contributions  were folded into the buenos servicios performed by all of them, 
including a woman whose outsized “humanitarian sentiments”  were attributed 
by Nápoles to having had “no family.” Nápoles recounted a dialogue between 
Atilano Mustelier, a bombero, and his wife, Dolores Castillo, who had nursed 
him back to health just in time for him to resume fi ghting the insurgents:
—“I’m going to the Castillo.”
—“Th ey’ll kill you on the way,” the woman responded.
—“Th ey’ll kill me  here, too,” said the bombero. “Why not just join those 
troublemakers? Th erefore, I’m going.”
—“Th en I’m going with you,” Dolores said. “But our children?”
—“Leave them in the care of one of your sisters. Duty calls and I’m going. 
I’m not telling you to accompany me, but it will make me happy if you 
come. God will save us.”
Th e choice  here was for Dolores to make. Framed as a decision Dolores made 
of her own volition— putting support for the Spanish and her husband even 
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above the care of her children— the description of her actions strays from 
common assumptions about women of color.71
Together, these cases further muddy the misleading distinction whereby 
“female slaves preferred to emancipate themselves through legal routes 
while men, according to mainstream historiography, preferred to fi ght.”72 
Indeed, they broaden the horizons of loyal subjectivity to include Chinese 
laborers, women, and others whose will was rarely even expected, much less 
mea sured.
Loyalty Resurgent: Th e Final Campaign
Rebels had regained their footing in the war by 1873 and 1874 and mounted 
new off ensives against plantations and Spanish military fortifi cations— albeit 
with fewer resources and in smaller groups. Spain, too, revitalized its eff orts. 
Aft er a second rebellion late in 1874, the liberal Republic collapsed and Spain 
restored its monarchy under Alfonso XII. With this transition came more en-
ergy and resources to end the stalemate with insurgents. In 1875, the reformist 
general Arsenio Martínez Campos arrived with a force of 25,000 Spaniards 
to share command with Joaquín Jovellar y Soler and put an end to the rebel-
lion in Cuba. In many parts of Cuba, they confronted incinerated crops, 
demolished ingenios, and exhausted soldiers and civilians. Th e military 
campaign led by Martínez Campos, combined with his conciliatory policies 
that promised amnesties and pardons to the rebels and moderate land redis-
tribution, contributed to the ending of most fi ghting by late 1877.
Yet this wave of fi ghting was not limited to eastern Cuba. By December 
1873, offi  cials in Cienfuegos noted a growing number of bandits circulating 
in outlying areas, and by February 1874, the ayuntamiento had mobilized the 
militias and approved the formation of a new forty- two- member guerrilla 
force for six months to extirpate a band of rebels active in the Cumanayagua 
district.73 Th is required, for the free- colored militias, the appointment of four 
captains of color. Th e new guerrillas  were to rid the countryside of any threat 
to the region’s agricultural wealth. Th us charged, they searched out and at-
tacked armed groups, captured runaway slaves, and guarded the sugar 
mills of dozens of estates.74 Milicianos from across the island  were to be or ga-
nized into eight batallones de color. Prestación (the loaning or lending of 
slaves) followed the padrón (estate census) of 1871 and own ers  were permitted 
to substitute white men or free men of color for slaves. Distinct from the 
prestación was a draft  of 1 percent of the entire male population. Slaveowners 
 were required to send 1 percent of their slaves to work in fortifi cations and on 
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the trocha, and those slaves would be declared free at the end of the war, with 
1,000 duros for each slave in compensation to the own ers.75
Like the beginning of the Ten Years’ War, in which Spanish victories came 
on the heels of initial fi ghting by the voluntarios and milicias of color and by 
slave soldiers, Spain’s renewed campaign in the mid- 1870s followed a second 
wave of black and mulatto recruitment. A circular in February 1874 for Santa 
Clara province, for example, called for mobilizing the milicias de color and 
augmenting the bomberos with off ers of a tax exemption in return for their 
ser vice. Suspiciously, the circular did not call for the formal enlistment or 
even the willful loyalty of slaves. Instead, it called for the prestación through-
out the region, including sugar plantations.76
Municipal leaders in Cienfuegos did not wait for approval from Madrid 
to step up plans to suff ocate the insurgency. Late in 1873, the Junta de Arma-
mento y Defensa of the new Casino Español pushed through the ayuntamiento 
a new tax that would fi nance a new and larger army to defend the city.77 In 
February 1874, the council called for a new guerrilla force of forty- two sol-
diers and two offi  cials to fi ght new rebel bands that had descended on the 
city’s hinterlands. In May and June, it called for a draft  for new militias com-
prising single white men between 20 and 45 and single men of African de-
scent between 20 and 30 who  were not already voluntarios. Th e diff erent age 
guidelines may have served to sustain rural and urban economies, already 
disrupted by war. Th e draft  raised a milicia de color of 140 soldiers and a mi-
licia de blancos of 150.78 On hearing the news of the restoration, cienfuegueros 
held a parade in which the bomberos and voluntarios marched. Th e ayunta-
miento sent “an expression of loyal and monarchical ideals” to the crown; the 
Casino Español hailed the “salvation of the loyal” and honored “such gener-
ous and loyal blood” that bound Spaniards. Despite the continued recruit-
ment of Cubans of color, public rhetoric about war time eff orts still adhered 
to the racially charged association with Spanish blood.
Reports of slave recruits trickled in to military leaders in Havana from 
Santa Clara, the administrative seat of Las Villas. In early March, offi  cials in 
Sagua sent news of fi ft y- four slaves yielded from the draft ; Remedios had or-
ga nized seventy- one. By mid- March, no other regions had responded, and the 
numbers from Sagua and Remedios did not correspond to their respective slave 
populations. A worried defense of the low numbers came from one offi  cial in 
Santa Clara on 20 March. On 28 March, a tele gram announced 256 more 
slaves for the prestación from Sagua and Remedios. On 3 April, word fi nally 
arrived from Cienfuegos: José de Merás notifi ed the military command from 
Cienfuegos that the region’s own ers had eight days to comply with the draft . 
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Combined with the four slaves taken from the depósito (jail), the city had 
contributed 136 slaves in total, followed by 30 more on 8 April. Trinidad re-
ported the formation of “a section of slaves,” but did not provide numbers. In 
most cases, local authorities defended the lag time and low numbers by citing 
the diffi  culty of rapid communication and of fi nding able- bodied soldiers 
among the draft ed slaves.79
Th e delay may also have had something to do with the reluctance of 
 slaveowners to yield to the government’s decree. Th e new method of slave 
recruitment caught planters and slaves alike off  guard, albeit for diff erent rea-
sons. At the beginning of the war, hostilities had so disrupted the lives of 
many on plantations or farms that slaves looked to the confl ict as an alterna-
tive path. In this later phase of the war, on the other hand, the Spanish govern-
ment actively targeted plantations and farms that had maintained a fragile 
order amidst the chaos. Cooperative planters had provisioned Spanish troops 
and continued to produce sugar, even as both sides of the confl ict routinely 
demanded, or simply stole, a portion of the food crop yield. Depending on the 
perceived loyalties of estate own ers, Spanish troops burned cane fi elds and 
mills. To compound those losses, planters now had to send part of their work-
force into battle, even as they paid taxes on each slave to cover the costs of 
administering the Moret Law. Th e cost of loyalty— in this case, a concrete 
sacrifi ce of labor and provisions— had begun to impinge on planters’ profi ts 
and property rights.80
Perturbed overseers on the Santa Rosalía estate in Cienfuegos, for exam-
ple, routinely reported receiving orders from Spanish authorities demanding 
the loan of par tic u lar slaves. As late as 1877, Manuel Blanco (who had as-
sumed own ership of the estate one year earlier) received requests for the 
prestación of one par tic u lar worker. Juan de Dios received orders to join a 
battalion in January 1877 from offi  cials in the nearby town of Arimao. When 
he still had not appeared by March, a stern letter from the province’s military 
command summoned him once more. Traced through plantation ledgers and 
work rosters, the long- term trajectory of Juan de Dios’s life off ers a telling 
contrast to the Article 3 manumissions of the earlier phase of the war. Al-
though Article 3 and specifi c statutes in the 1874 reglamento (regulations) 
promised freedom to conscripted slaves, Juan de Dios’s subsequent military 
ser vice did not lead to his freedom. He continued to work alongside Santa 
Rosalía’s unfree workers through emancipation in 1886. Even a de cade later, 
when he was in his fi ft ies, plantation ledgers recorded him working nearly every 
day.81 Th e Spanish military “borrowed” hundreds of slaves from the Cienfuegos 
region alone, and probably thousands from Santa Clara province, and 
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 “returned” most of them to their own ers without freeing them. Prestación 
provided a means of dodging the loyalty bargain of Article 3, and even avoid-
ing its own provisions to free slaves.
Th e need for military reinforcement from slaves and free men of color 
became less urgent in the new wave of fi ghting than during the fi rst four 
years of the war, when a desperate need for soldiers facilitated the freedom of 
many slave- soldiers based on their ser vice. Now, the Spanish government 
backed away from that earlier pact. Th eir loyalty unrewarded by Spain, slaves 
fought nonetheless to preserve colonial rule even as offi  cials in Madrid and 
Havana continued to mount a racialized smear campaign against the insur-
gents. Sizable numbers of Article 3 freedom claims persisted nonetheless 
through the remainder of the war, but with an added emphasis on voluntad. 
In his own hand, an African- born slave named Ramón Gangá petitioned for 
his freedom in 1874 based on aiding in the defense of Puerto Príncipe. He 
put  love of country—“so he could fi ght against the enemies of his beloved 
Spain”— above the limitations of his advanced age. He made no mention of 
his specifi c ser vices, only robust statements of willful participation and sup-
port for Spain: he gave his ser vices for “Integridad Nacional,” he fought for 
the “glorious Spanish fl ag and always- Spanish Cuba,” and he off ered his plea 
“with the greatest voluntad and submission” from the national prison in Ha-
vana, where he claimed to have been unfairly placed.82 His successful suit 
mirrored many others that emphasized will and the language of loyalty above 
specifi c accomplishments as soldiers or auxiliaries.
For many free men of color, the second wave of the war appealed less than 
earlier in the war, likely an outgrowth of concern about their ill- defi ned so-
cial roles. Although military participation off ered status and compensation 
on par with those for Spaniards, potential recruits still resisted leaving their 
productive and profi table routines. Furthermore, the labor expected of them 
in military campaigns oft en remained relegated to manual labor and auxil-
iary ser vices. On Captain General José Gutiérrez de la Concha’s inspection of 
Júcaro in October 1874, he described the miserable conditions of sick and 
hungry soldiers who had the freed blacks in the Duero battalion carry their 
baggage and supplies above their heads. He complained, too, that exemptions 
for bomberos and regular volunteers impeded his ability to form more bat-
talions of milicias de color. He found more success, however, in central Cuba 
with the slaves “who in great number voluntarily joined the companies de li-
bertos, in which they served full of the greatest enthusiasm.”83 In Cienfuegos, 
the draft  for the milicias de color provoked two attempts to excuse a free 
person of color from ser vice. Juan María Arrillaga, a white resident, presented 
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one thousand pesos to the ayuntamiento in February 1875 to exempt “el mili-
ciano pardo libre Rafael Díaz” from ser vice. In a parallel case, Rufi no Gersa 
off ered one thousand pesos for the exemption of José de la Rosa Román 
Artillera. Neither man was excused from ser vice, but rather “returned to the 
bosom of his family.” Th e ayuntamiento fl atly refused the off ers and returned 
the money to prevent the men from deserting. Although the rebuff  by the 
government may have revealed how seriously it needed to fi ll the ranks of 
anti- insurgent units, the requests alone shed light on the trajectories of Díaz 
and Román. Th at white residents off ered the money for the exemption sug-
gests deep personal or material ties to the free milicianos. Th e economic bond 
seems the more likely scenario: one or both of the men in each situation saw 
fi t to pay the government over two years of militia wages (members earned 
forty pesos per month) in order to devote themselves to other, presumably more 
lucrative, productive activities. Yet the statement’s allusion to family reveals 
consequences, if not motivations, that went beyond materialism.84 Like all 
men recruited in 1874, free people of color could substitute another person in 
their place, but Jovellar’s pronouncement prohibited buying one’s way out of 
ser vice.85 Th e property rights of slave own ers ultimately trumped the rights 
of many slaves to their freedom through military service— and even trumped 
Spain’s claim on the obedience and allegiance of those slaves.
the survival of Spanish rule by the end of the Ten Years’ War produced 
ambiguous outcomes for Cubans of color. One concession granted to the reb-
els in the Pact of Zanjón in 1878 was the freedom of slaves who had fought for 
Cuban in de pen dence, fi nally backing the rebels’ longtime promise with a le-
gal guarantee. Yet the overall numbers of slaves freed by military ser vice for 
Spain remain unclear. By 1875, fi ve years aft er the passage of the Moret Law, 
over fi ft y thousand slaves had probably been freed through its various mea-
sures. One newspaper account in 1870 surmised that Article 3 could possibly 
have freed no more than three thousand slaves.86 Other estimates  were sig-
nifi cantly more moderate, numbering in the hundreds. Beyond tallying actual 
manumissions, Spanish offi  cials  were more careful to note the symbolic con-
tributions of people of African descent to the Spanish military during the 
war, even when white voluntarios received the lion’s share of attention. And 
although debates in the Cortes strategically characterized the rebellion as a 
race war, its deputies also consistently lauded the loyalty and heroism of 
Spain’s African- descended troops.
Although a postwar overhaul of Spanish policy regulating the press and 
associational life gave new life to expressions of that support, the war itself set 
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in motion a fundamental reframing of loyalty for Cubans of color. Aft er ten 
years of war and division, an individual’s conscious choice became a more 
consistent defi ning condition of the loyal subject, and much of the evidence 
favoring this shift  came from attributing will and intent to the words and ac-
tions of slave- soldiers and free men in the Spanish forces. But choice had its 
limits. Th e war also made visible the limits of willful loyalty as the Spanish 
reinforced gendered understandings of work and choice, namely by valuing 
women’s auxiliary labor over their value in military engagements. Hopes of 
universalizing the possibility for freedom through Article 3  were dashed with 
the turn to slave prestaciones near the end of the war. Especially as they 
interacted with Spanish offi  cials, though, slave- soldiers gave meaning and 
shape to the loyalty sought by Article 3 of the Moret Law, and in negotiating a 
par tic u lar kind of unfreedom as slaves, they began to  etch the initial outlines 
of a par tic u lar kind of freedom under Spanish rule.
Do the strong voices and assertions of will in the Article 3 interrogations 
evince what Frank Tannenbaum celebrated as the “moral personality” of 
Spanish American slaves? Th at quality— sporadically, if ever, transposed to a 
legal personality— supposedly derived from Catholic doctrine and “ancient” 
Spanish laws regarding slavery that made “new Negro slaves automatically 
endowed with the immunities contained in ancient prescription.”87 Th at it 
took until 1870 to codify the freedom available to slaves for military ser vice 
makes that endowment anything but automatic, but it had pre ce dents none-
theless. Th e interrogation of each slave- soldier—by no means a broad swath 
of the island’s slave population— revealed so many diff erent paths to freedom 
that Article 3 might still be better understood as a strategy for individual 
mobility rather than an affi  rmation of universal assumptions about slaves’ 
morality or personhood. Th e futility of searching for the origins of the Cuban 
liberal subject should caution against overrreading the signifi cance of will 
and choice into the slave- soldier interrogations and other testaments to the 
participation of military support by Cubans of color.
Th e signifi cance of national integrity, on the other hand, only grew during 
the war as pressure mounted on the war’s antagonists to clarify the roles to be 
played by diverse actors in ill- defi ned polities. Peter Beattie notes in his study 
of Brazilian military reform that Cuba, the United States, and Brazil all experi-
enced military mobilizations in the second half of the nineteenth century that 
weakened slavery and its institutional supports. Comparing the struggles of 
Cuban rebels to those of Brazilians in the Paraguayan War and North Ameri-
cans during the U.S. Civil War, he notes that “in all cases, belief in racial hier-
archies hampered eff orts to imagine a leveled and homogenized ‘race’ as the 
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basis of an organic nation- state.”88 Th is was only slightly less true for 
Spain’s national empire than it was for the Cuban insurgency. Neither the 
Spanish government nor the in de pen dence movement unanimously and 
 wholeheartedly espoused the goal of a homogenized “race.” Th e idea of an 
organic nation- state held appeal on both sides of the confl ict, but those sides 
expressed similar positions in radically diff erent terms. Th inking like an em-
pire, to borrow Frederick Cooper’s term, limited the ability to imagine a 
Spanish nation- state that incorporated the colonies in any organic way that 
extended the same rights and repre sen ta tion to those enjoyed on the penin-
sula. Despite the eff orts to preserve Cuba as a part of Spain’s  whole, po liti cal 
in e qual ity stood in marked contrast to the rebels’ aspirations of ending slav-
ery with their own liberal constitution. And Spain’s maintenance of slavery 
hampered a transformation of racial ideology that would homogenize racial 
diff erences— not that race only performed the work of sustaining slavery. 
Even the role of the loyal subject could not fully be homogenized. Th e po liti-
cal vocabulary with which insurgents spoke of racelessness and nationhood 
embraced citizenship, freedom, and rights. Hierarchies may have remained, 
but Spain’s experience of the war preserved a system of in e qual ity by design 
within the folds of national integrity— a system that nevertheless continued 
to enjoy the support of many Cubans of color.
To examine the war by thinking like an empire we can revisit the explana-
tory power of race— that is, the idea that racial subordination automatically 
drove African- descended Cubans to the cause of separatist nationalism. More-
over, the ambivalence about claiming Cubans of color as adherents to a cause, 
wavering between rewarding their ser vice and denouncing their supposedly 
rebellious nature, refl ected an inability to predict loyalty and disloyalty in terms 
of race. Th e transition to peace relocated this ambivalence to a dramatically 
remapped po liti cal terrain. It also amplifi ed questions about how the war time 
valorization of loyalty would aff ect planters, soldiers, slaves, and free people 
alike and, just as important, the spaces and terms through which Cubans of 
color could make their loyalty publicly meaningful.
Four
Publicizing Loyalty
Race and the Post- Zanjón Public Sphere
On the contrary, the constitution of the Metropolis has done nothing to benefi t 
any par tic u lar group, but all Spaniards, be they white or black. It is not the 
birthright of those who have more or less clear complexion. It does not inspire 
the absurd privilege of color. It represents what is called politics, in what is called 
government, to all organisms.
—Rodolfo de Lagardère, 1887
As rebel leaders and Spanish offi  cials met on 10 February 1878 to sign the 
treaty offi  cially ending the Ten Years’ War, more radical members of the 
anticolonial insurgency continued fi ghting. Among separatists, confl icts 
over ideology and between civil and military authority led some of them to 
denounce the Pact of Zanjón aft er seven months of negotiations. In March 
1878, Antonio Maceo, now a major general, issued the Protest of Baraguá, in 
which he and 1,500 troops continued fi ghting for ten additional weeks in defi -
ance of the compromise reached by more moderate rebel leaders. Early in 
1879, Calixto García led a new military campaign that he had planned in New 
York, but poor strategy and war- weary soldiers weakened its impact. Th e par-
ticipants in the Guerra Chiquita, or Little War (1879– 1880), frustrated even the 
fragile alliance that had taken shape during the war: they continued to oppose 
Spanish rule, but now they also opposed those rebel leaders who  were pursu-
ing peace. Ultimately they failed to achieve the scale of military engagement 
comparable to that of the Ten Years’ War; the leaders struck a far more radical 
tone than the original insurrection, with black rebel leaders acquiring increased 
prominence and some white insurgents, aware of a propaganda blitz by Span-
ish offi  cials warning of a race war, distancing themselves from the changing 
composition of the rebellion.1 With the end of war operations in 1880 came 
small but enduring pockets of military and social re sis tance that would ac-
quire the peacetime label of “banditry.”
Publicizing Loyalty • 129
Th e wars redrew the boundaries of loyalty. Th ey posed for the loyal sub-
ject concrete, if fl exible, po liti cal choices to make willfully, in contrast to fewer 
alternatives prior to the war. Colonial offi  cials could no longer rely on previ-
ous methods of suppressing public discussion, since those eff orts, as they 
learned with the outbreak of the Ten Years’ War, had been unsuccessful in 
squelching the networks of communication and or ga ni za tion that allowed 
the insurgency to take shape. Aft er a lengthy and unforgettable reminder that 
the allegiance of its subjects could not be assumed or coerced, Spanish 
 authorities gambled that widening the spaces for public expression would 
raise the volume of loyalty talk and possibly drown out the gritos (shouts) of 
revolution.
Th ose same offi  cials also had on their mind the end of slavery. In 1880, it 
ended in name with the establishment of an apprenticeship period called the 
patronato. It off ered “former” slaves, or patrocinados, meager wages and left  
intact their work routines and limited mobility. Working through local and 
provincial Juntas de Patronato (apprenticeship boards), so many slaves had 
obtained their freedom that it made sense to some deputies in the Cortes to 
end the period two years prior to the 1888 target date.2 Th ese developments 
gave dramatic shape to the social instability that preoccupied so many Cubans 
and offi  cials aft er the war.
As for former insurgents, reintegrating themselves into peacetime society 
required a public disavowal of their anticolonial affi  liations. In material 
terms, expropriation decrees robbed self- identifi ed and suspected rebels of 
their property. No matter how insistently they comported themselves as loyal 
subjects, even remote suspicions of prior separatist affi  liation excluded Cu-
bans from administrative positions. Confronted with new limits on exercis-
ing voice, many frustrated insurgents (and ex- insurgents) chose exit: they 
left  Cuba altogether and joined expatriate communities in other parts of the 
circum- Caribbean, in Eu rope, and especially in the United States.
Plotting another rebellion from afar presented communication and trans-
portation problems, especially for African- descended rebels whose return to 
the island confronted legal bans on disembarking in Cuba on arrival from 
foreign ports. A group of “Blacks and Mulattoes residing in Jamaica” submit-
ted a letter to Spanish authorities in the “year 1879, and 378 of our enslave-
ment,” protesting the maritime policy.3 Th eir tone did not particularly evoke 
the voice of loyal subjects. Th ey attacked the “arbitrary power” and “pedantic 
bureaucracy” of the colonial government that left  them “excluded from the 
regular life of civilized societies,” and their exclusion, they contended, 
 “negated the justice that helps us aspire to enter the banquet of the public.” 4
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To what banquet  were they referring? Th e meager off erings of the paternalist 
public before the war favored famine over feast. Th e reforms in the wake of the 
Pact of Zanjón began to satisfy a healthy appetite for public exchange. Th at 
Spain had made these policies is a decision that might perplex scholars who 
consider the relationship between the public sphere and national (and proto-
national) states. Jürgen Habermas, whose generative study of the public sphere 
examined bourgeois society in Western Eu rope, might have recognized in Cuba 
the prominent po liti cal idiom of loyalty and tight state control of press and 
public spaces, that had existed in Western Eu rope, but as a much earlier phe-
nomenon that nationalism and the public sphere had displaced.5 Benedict An-
derson, who identifi ed mainland Spanish American creole leaders as pioneers of 
nationalism, even ahead of Eu rope, linked the phenomenon in part to new print 
cultures that circulated ideas crucial for imagining in de pen dent states.6 With-
out understanding the post- Zanjón reforms as a response to Cuban rebels, 
Spain’s decision to allow an expansion of press and associational life immedi-
ately following a separatist war appears poorly timed and contrary to the goal of 
maintaining rule in Cuba. What the public sphere enabled was what Geoff  Eley 
has called “an ideal of critical liberalism” within, and not against, Spanish colo-
nialism; insurgent demands and the calls for change in the 1880s and 1890s 
constituted a public that was “as much an eff ect of its emergence as a cause.”7
When the Cubans of color in Kingston wrote that they “have nothing 
to look for in the shade of the Castilian fl ag,” they diff ered from Cubans who 
benefi ted from rebel pressure on Spain that encouraged public po liti cal delib-
eration on the island. If anticolonial criticism of Spain “caused” the extension 
of press and associational rights to Cuba,  were opportunities for intracolo-
nial criticism— especially that which aspired to the rights of citizenship— 
opened up for loyal subjects? At the limits of those opportunities was the 
per sis tent question of who could be a loyal subject, a question now re oriented 
to consider citizenship by Cuban men of color. Spain had opened up deliberate 
spaces hoping for a more vocal affi  rmation of colonial government; doing 
so enabled Cubans to link its norms and very existence to citizenship. Th is 
chapter traces the contours of the fl ourishing of public life in the 1880s with 
an eye toward critical liberalism’s limits and possibilities.
Repressing Revolution in Santiago de Cuba
One of the fi rst proclamations by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes and other rebel 
leaders vowed that if Spain recognized freedom of reunion, press, and con-
science, it “would fi nd in Cuba a loving daughter.”8 Aft er the Ten Years’ War, 
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Cubans experienced unpre ce dented opportunities to exercise po liti cal voice, 
and many of those Cubans expressed themselves in the language of loyalty.
Th e peace treaty made some signifi cant compromises with those who 
turned against colonial rule in the preceding de cade. Spain off ered a general 
amnesty to rebels, who nevertheless continued to face persecution, and it ap-
peased demands for immediate and total slave emancipation by freeing those 
slaves and Asian indentured workers who had fought in the rebel army, thus 
neutralizing one of Spain’s most radical incentives for attracting slaves’ loy-
alty.9 On the economic front, Spain made no real concessions, working quickly 
later in the year to impose taxes that would place the burden of war time ex-
penses on Cubans. But by loosening press and association restrictions and 
sanctioning po liti cal parties, and allowing Spanish liberal Arsenio Martínez 
Campos to police them as captain general of the island, the Spanish had given 
Cubans a starting point from which they could contribute to an emerging 
national/imperial agenda.
Th e pact bestowed upon Cuba some of the limited mea sures of tolerance 
and inclusion that Spaniards had recently won in the Constitution of 1876, 
which the Restoration monarchy hoped would stymie revolutionary currents 
within Spain. For the fi rst time since 1837, Cubans had repre sen ta tion in the 
Cortes: twenty- four deputies to be chosen from the six newly delineated prov-
inces on the island.10 On 28 December 1878, the Cortes promulgated an elec-
toral law for Cuba, albeit one that imposed far stricter qualifi cations for 
voting than those that existed in Spain. All voters in the Spanish system paid 
a tax based on either their commercial and industrial assets or on their rural 
and urban properties. Th e 125-peseta fl at tax for Cubans was a remarkable 
burden in comparison to the 25 pesetas that Spaniards paid on property and 50 
pesetas on assets. Th e explicit rationale for the increase was to exclude Cuba’s 
growing middle class, its small landholders and petty merchants all believed 
to be susceptible to separatist ideas. Although no slaves could vote, the 
Cortes did not restrict suff rage or offi  ce holding to whites. Th ose African- 
descended Cuban men who had been free for at least three years and who 
paid the tax could vote, and those who had been free for at least ten years could, 
in theory, hold offi  ce.11 Th e law also allowed for more inclusive municipal elec-
tions and po liti cal parties, and by the end of 1878 Cuba had inaugurated ver-
sions of Spain’s Partido Liberal (oft en called the Liberal, Autonomist, or Liberal 
Autonomist Party in Cuba) and conservative Partido Unión Constitucional 
(oft en called the Conservative Party).12 (Th e Partido Revolucionario Cubano, 
or ga nized by José Martí, formed in exile in New York and Tampa because 
separatist politics  were not accommodated by the post- Zanjón reforms.)
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Yet eff orts to draw Cubans back into the Spanish orbit did not end with 
limited electoral participation. Spain extended to Cuba the civil rights guaran-
teed to Spaniards by Article 13 of their constitution: “Every Spaniard has the 
right: to freely utter their ideas and opinions, in word and in speech, having 
access to press and to other similar methods, without subjection to the prior 
censorship; to meet peacefully; to associate for the purposes of human life; to 
direct individual and collective petitions to the King, the Cortes, and the au-
thorities.”13 Note the absence of references to citizenship: the language defi n-
ing this public right reproduced the distinction between Spaniards and citizens 
made in the 1812 Constitution. In other words, the constitution extended new 
rights to public expression and reaffi  rmed old privileges of petition to those 
born in Spanish territory without necessarily extending citizenship to them. 
To administer the new demands that the reform would generate, the govern-
ment created a Registro de Asociaciones, by which old and new associations 
would formally register with the state, and it created a press tribunal in Madrid 
to evaluate alleged infractions. For the many Cubans prevented by poverty, 
low status, or sex from voting, these additional reforms allowed them to en-
gage each other and the colonial government in public discussion.
Exercise of these public rights began immediately. In October 1879, a little 
over a month aft er the Guerra Chiquita began, the leadership of the Casino 
de Artesanos de la Clase de Color (Club of Artesans of the Class of Color)— a 
social or ga ni za tion of free tradespeople of color— sent Santiago’s provincial 
governor a protesta de fi delidad y adhesión (demonstration of loyalty and sup-
port) to “our dear Country and to His Majesty the King.” Signed by the eleven 
members of the casino’s executive committee, the letter condemned the “crim-
inal acts” of the insurgents who “hurl the country again into the stormy sea 
of revolts.” Th e casino asserted that Santiago’s artisans of color  were “lovers 
of liberty” who would support Spain unconditionally: “In Spanish territory 
they have been born; Spaniards they are, and they have defended Spain for 
ten years, as individuals in the corps of Voluntarios, as enlists in the corps of 
Bomberos [fi remen].”
As we have seen, the Ministerio de Ultramar in Madrid wavered on con-
ceding that black and mulatto Cubans could justifi ably call themselves 
Spaniards—“compañeros and sons,” as the artisans claimed in their letter. 
But the governor’s offi  ce was suffi  ciently moved to reward such “spontaneous 
declarations of patriotism and loyalty” as the artisans’ statement with a 
three- day run in the Boletín Ofi cial, its offi  cial newspaper.14 Th e military ser-
vice cited by the casino’s leaders represented loyalty to the Spanish nation 
that validated their claims to inclusion, and the publication of the letter sig-
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naled in some small mea sure that the colonial government took those claims 
seriously.
In the middle of a rebellion articulating a language of multiracial citizen-
ship, the provincial governor and the Ministerio de Ultramar had good rea-
son to publicize the loyalty that Santiago’s artisans of color pledged to the 
crown. But the artisans’ declaration went beyond the formulaic proclama-
tions of loyalty that appeared in times of crisis or transition, and also beyond 
bet hedging or po liti cal clientelism.15 Casino offi  cials demonstrated that they 
 were policing disloyalty in its most basic expression. Th e supervisory commit-
tee advertised that the casino had “entered a new era . . .  to exclude once and 
for all the number of members of the Casino who directly or indirectly are 
supposed to have taken part in the criminal rebellion . . .  against the Govern-
ment and the existing legality.”16 Earlier in the month, the casino had purged 
members who sympathized with the separatist cause.
Also, when they recounted their history of military ser vice for the crown, 
they claimed in their letter that “it would be a great error to suppose [the arti-
sans] capable of abjuring all of those antecedents aft er the new institutions 
with which they have acquired rights and conditions that before they did not 
have.” Th e artisans drew a direct connection  here between their loyalty, evi-
denced through their military ser vice and their expulsion of rebel sympathiz-
ers, and its reward: rights and access to the traditional institutions of the public 
sphere in order to engender new forms of po liti cal voice. As late as 1883, 
squabbles within the casino over membership drew on ambiguous and some-
times arbitrary distinctions between insurgents and their sympathizers, on 
one hand, and those supportive of Spain and grateful for the newly bestowed 
rights, on the other. Juan Díaz, one of the vice- presidents, writing about doz-
ens of members who had joined in the previous month, complained of sub-
jective decisions to exclude those who, on this evidence,  were declared to be 
former insurgents. And like the cabildos of earlier de cades, he asked that 
Spanish authority be put to use in resolving disputes among members.17
In addition to Cubans who left  the island, those in municipalities and in 
the countryside distanced themselves from the separatist cause as they sought 
to reestablish order in their uprooted communities. Residents of eastern Cuba, 
in which much of the combat had taken place, tried their best to put the up-
heavals of war behind them and to convince wary offi  cials that the fl ames of 
insurgency had been extinguished. In the immediate aft ermath of the Ten 
Years’ War, prominent white pro- Spanish residents of Santiago expressed 
their confi dence in the post- Zanjón reforms’ potential to quell re sis tance by 
openly including African- descended Cubans in two signifi cant public 
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events. In January 1879, Néstor Rengifo y Sánchez had invited a large group 
of blacks and mulattoes to his residence to convene the fi rst meeting of the 
Casino Pop u lar, Santiago’s fi rst sociedad de color or asociación de color (soci-
ety or association of color) registered under the new associational guidelines. 
Aft er poetry readings and an orchestra per for mance, members proceeded to 
the chambers of the Gobierno Civil for formal approval of their or ga ni za tion, 
which enjoyed the patronage of two white residents.18 Seven months later, 
Santiago’s ayuntamiento (city council) staged an elaborate ceremony to honor 
two particularly loyal defenders of Spain: the voluntarios (Spanish volunteer 
forces) and the Batallón de Bomberos. According to the newspaper La Ban-
dera Español, Comandante General González Muñoz addressed the large 
crowds gathered and thanked the bomberos, “gathered today under the fl ag 
to which they dedicate themselves,” for having “come to demonstrate with 
their presence the loyalty of their patriotic sentiments and their love of or-
der.”19 In contrast, offi  cials had acted quickly just two months aft er the Pact of 
Zanjón, anticipating the formal provisional associational laws established in 
June 1878, to shut down the cabildo Cocoyé Francés aft er a dispute about the 
unbecoming nature of the club’s dances, although the offi  cial justifi cation 
was that the members had neither or ga nized themselves nor registered ac-
cording to new practices.20
But by January 1880, patriotism and love of order had not suffi  ciently 
cemented the members of the new Casino Pop u lar. Th e morenos and pardos 
who had joined the or ga ni za tion had resisted being grouped together under 
the umbrella designation “de color,” and they preferred remaining separate 
to glossing racial diff erences.21 Moreover, military offi  cials still reeling from 
the Guerra Chiquita’s radicalization feared the consequences of African- 
descended people entering into public life. Adolfo Jiménez Castellanos, an in-
fantry col o nel in the Spanish army, off ered advice in 1883 to other offi  cers on 
how to curb subversive activity in Cuba. He warned of the rising expectations 
among African- descended Cubans as slavery waned: “Th e negro, once free, 
wants to have the same rights as the white: he wants to harangue in casinos 
and ataneos— black professors!;— he wants to rub elbows with the white in all 
social activities, to learn his ways, to sit in comfortable orchestra seats in the 
theaters, to enter brand new cafes, to show up at tertulias in a frock coat and 
a crown, to celebrate his meetings and discuss everything imaginable.” In 
other words, Jiménez worried about the integrationist public stance that many 
civil authorities hoped would improve social conditions— an abandonment 
of uncivilized African practices for more refi ned Iberian culture. But for Ji-
ménez, the trappings of the public sphere would induce the “prideful negro” 
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to “want to subjugate everything, sweeping away everything he fi nds in his 
path; to plant destruction and death, burning the  house where he was born 
and lived, and ruining the patria that converted him to a free man. Th is has 
been the thanks that they have given us for abolishing slavery.”22 In the wake of 
major reductions in the number of troops and the amount of military expendi-
tures for Cuba, many military offi  cials grumbled about the threats still loom-
ing aft er more than a de cade of confl ict.23 Unlike the fi ghting, which had 
remained focused in the eastern parts of Cuba, the expectations of African- 
descended Cubans indeed  rose across the island, and participation in the 
public sphere became more diffi  cult to suppress.
Th e rec ords produced by government offi  cials attending sociedad meet-
ings reveal just how precariously they ascertained the po liti cal allegiance of 
members. In the steady handwriting of an offi  cial scribe in 1879, the names of 
Guantánamo’s Casino de Artesanos leadership committee named nine men; 
in a much shakier hand, likely that of one of the members themselves, are notes 
about several of them: “good behavior, honorable, and has no other knowledge 
than his work”; “is not familiar with seditious ideas”; “it is believed that he 
does not look kindly on those of color blanco”; “imprisoned for suspicion of 
infi dencia [treason] during the events in Guaso in 1875.”24 Th e much earlier 
date of 1875— still during the war, no less— indicates that the list of offi  cers 
may have been an old one that members themselves had to amend, and they 
did so fully conscious of the scrutiny under which they found themselves. 
 Here was governmentality at work: the members did their own policing, gov-
erning themselves according to their internalized understandings of state 
power. Th ey  were oft en well aware of what roles they  were supposed to be 
playing, and likely with hopes of avoiding more direct interventions from 
state offi  cials.
What sort of public sphere, then, did the post- Zanjón reforms authorize? 
Th e institutions and organizations of Cuba’s fl edgling civil society provided a 
space, both material and discursive, that mediated relations between the Span-
ish colonial state and Cuban society. Th e public sphere provided the institu-
tional arrangements for circulating opinions in Cuba about politics, economics, 
and society. Vitriolic newspaper articles, urbane tertulias and club meetings, 
and infl ammatory po liti cal speeches became the media of exchange through 
which Cubans made sense of the changes (and the lack of change) taking place 
around them. Crucially, they escaped the bounds of literate bourgeois culture, 
which frequently modeled as the locus of public sphere activity.25 Although 
these institutions existed on the island well before 1878, the capacity for in-
creased communication grew exponentially with the post- Zanjón reforms. 
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In its scope and function, the invigorated public sphere brought the mixed 
blessing of state approval and surveillance to po liti cal discussion and dissent, 
an in de pen dent press, and associational life.26 In important ways the colonial 
public sphere also sought to institutionalize separatism, to contain dissent 
within media that could be closely monitored by colonial authorities.
Seen through the prism of race, the public sphere had the potential to 
bring the private aspirations and obstacles of African- descended Cubans— 
that is, as the obstacles to their achievement— to the fore of colonial politics. 
It held equal power to bring long- simmering private racism and discrimina-
tion to a full boil, usually to the benefi t of those of lighter color and heavier 
pockets. While the post- Zanjón public sphere established the rules for mak-
ing claims to citizenship, equality, and freedom, those claims held special 
currency for individuals shedding their slave status and confronting long- 
standing barriers to social inclusion. Yet African- descended Cubans also had 
to tread more carefully in making those claims. Employing an emergent post-
war racial etiquette predicated on continued and shared loyalty to the colonial 
apparatus, they could yield signifi cant improvements. Making excessive de-
mands could unleash surveillance or repression from Spanish offi  cials who 
routinely equated separatism with race war. Th us the post- Zanjón reforms 
fulfi lled the inclusionary promise of the public sphere that allowed many 
African- descended Cubans to situate themselves between the realm of high 
politics and the more mundane world of everyday life.
Anticolonial sentiments sometimes found sanctioned expression follow-
ing the Ten Years’ War and Guerra Chiquita, but the post- Zanjón public sphere 
primarily gave voice to support for Spanish rule. In part this was the outcome 
of conscious design by authorities; in part, Cubans themselves actively made it 
so. Although it may ultimately have provided a space in which separatist sen-
timent could ferment, Cubans operated within an idiom that continued to 
make rigid distinctions between loyalty and disloyalty. As ideas previously 
expressed and negotiated in private acquired public prominence, those better 
attuned to the norms and protocols of Spanish colonial politics fl ourished 
while those affi  liated with Cuban separatism more routinely sought shelter 
away from a wary populace.
Havana: “Our History Is the History of Loyalty”
While residents of Santiago openly wrestled with the issue of eliminating the 
rebelliousness attributed to the east during the war, Havana’s population 
boasted a robust civic culture with a long history of affi  rming Spanish rule 
Publicizing Loyalty • 137
and culture. As the military and po liti cal seat of Spanish authority, Havana 
also had the largest Spanish population, and though it too felt the eff ects of 
the war, sentiments of allegiance oft en drowned out separatist counterpoints.27 
At the beginning of the Ten Years’ War, white Cubans across the island created 
patriotic clubs called Casinos Españoles, principally for the purposes of raising 
funds for military recruitment. By 1871, twenty- seven such casinos  were in 
operation (fi gure 4.1). Found ers constructed large and elaborate buildings to 
 house their growing numbers, and eventually the casinos included libraries, 
schools, literary readings, concerts, and other per for mances.28 What they did 
not include  were Cubans of color. Th is was one more expression of race and 
loyalty that located pro- Spanish sentiment solely in the hands of white Cu-
bans. But the casino in Havana spawned an auxiliary for African- descended 
Cubans— the Casino Español de la Habana de Hombres de Color— served as 
the primary (but not the sole) institution in the city expressly dedicated to 
affi  rming the loyalty of black and mulatto habaneros to Spain.
Strategically, casino members could invoke their loyalty to the crown to 
cushion demands. For the casino de color, this entailed holding the govern-
ment to its postwar promises and assuring that the prescriptions of inclusion 
 were put into practice. In 1881, they protested for equal treatment in public 
establishments by pressuring authorities to dictate special dispositions call-
ing for toleration.29 Th ey struck a conciliatory tone that contrasted with the 
figure 4.1 • Casino Español, Matanzas. Courtesy of Cuban Heritage Collection, 
University of Miami Libraries.
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uncompromising demands of former rebel leaders such as Antonio Maceo, 
who sought some of the same reforms. In doing so, members of the casino 
expected the government to reciprocate: avoiding armed confl ict with the 
state might inspire a more generous response.
Aft er a temporary closing, the casino reopened in 1882, ostensibly to guide 
Cubans of color to embrace an active role in colonial society through the 
association’s renewed presence in Havana’s burgeoning public. Th e casino 
planned an elaborate ceremony. When members gathered on the night of 11 
March, they anticipated the arrival of Captain General Luis Prendergast to 
hear the speech by the president of the casino: Rodolfo Fernández de Trava 
Blanco de Lagardère. Well before the reinstatement of the casino, Lagardère 
had moved quickly to capitalize on the post- Zanjón reforms by founding and 
directing newspapers intended for an islandwide African- descended reader-
ship, among them El Ciudadano (Th e Citizen), La América Española (Span-
ish America), and La Unión (Th e  Union). In addition to his leadership in 
Havana, Lagardère had also helped found similar casinos in Santiago de las 
Vegas and Santiago de los Baños.30 His writings off er few biographical clues, 
but several details recur: he professed steadfast faith in God and Christian-
ity; he was of mixed Spanish and African descent; he was extraordinarily well 
read in classical Western texts, as well as contemporary social and po liti cal 
commentary; and he consistently affi  rmed the principles, if not always the 
practice, of Spanish rule in Cuba. Th e captain general canceled his appear-
ance at the casino’s reopening at the last minute, and he sent in his place a 
high- ranking military offi  cial, the comandante general del Apostadero, along 
with clerks to record the full text of Lagardère’s speech. It addressed the 
question of who the “man of color” was and what his role was in Cuba. It 
looked toward the future but was grounded in an interpretation of the pres-
ent and past. More specifi cally, he saw the possibility of citizenship as recip-
rocating the support that African- descended Cubans had continuously off ered 
the Spanish government: “Spain knows too well that we men of color want to 
continue being Spaniards. Our history is the history of loyalty.”31
Behind Lagardère’s deferential plea for the audience to indulge, as he put 
it, “my early age, my African origin” lay an impassioned defense of “the free-
doms and interests of my poor race, at last on the eve of being declared free 
and citizens of these Spanish provinces.” He struggled to diff erentiate the 
men of color from white men while emphasizing their shared loyalty and 
claims to citizenship. Racial mixture complicated the problem: although he 
never excluded those of full African descent from his po liti cal agenda, he 
acknowledged that through the veins of three hundred thousand mulattoes, 
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Lagardère noted, coursed “the blood of the whites. We cannot hate our Span-
ish or Spanish- descended fathers nor our African grandmothers.” Instead of 
a fratricidal war, African- descended Cubans wanted “a more complete  union” 
with white Cubans and Spaniards that entailed equality and cooperation as 
fellow citizens. In this direction, Lagardère argued for the Spanish govern-
ment to affi  rm the humanity and citizenship of the “negro,” “with equal rights 
and equal obligations as the rest of the citizens of other races.” What made 
the “man of color” distinct from white men, then, was not aptitude, intelli-
gence, or even necessarily blood, but rather mere appearance, and this was 
no reason to withhold rights and excuse obligations.
An eclectic blend of biblical and social scientifi c references grounded the 
statements that Lagardère made about race. He derived his notion of racial 
equality from “modern science,” which taught that “man” is not free by being 
white or by being from a par tic u lar city, but that “man is free because he is a 
man. And man is also a negro.” “Anthropology,” on the other hand, had of-
fered the “scientifi c dogma” that the blood and the humors (bile included) of 
the negro were richer in carbon than that of the white, proving that “colors are 
nothing but mere accidents.” But religion also fortifi ed arguments of racial 
discrimination, as Christianity “established the holy dogma of equality” and 
as the “yellow,” “African,” and “Caucasian” races emerged from the off spring 
of Adam and Eve. Challenging Bible- backed notions of black inferiority based 
on Jehovah’s condemnation of the sons of Ham, Lagardère argued that, in 
turn, Jesus died for everyone and proclaimed “in his holy agony the liberty, 
equality, and fraternity among all races of the earth.” Drawing from “an 
eminently religious, eminently Christian education for my race,” he perceived 
African- descended Cubans as capable of taking on “the great obligations that 
freedom imposes.” At once an exhortation to his audience members to edu-
cate themselves and a savvy demonstration of his own erudition, Lagardère’s 
racial thinking off ered ideological tools to challenge the racism that contin-
ued to structure Cuban society, all the while placing faith in a commodious 
empire that would uphold its promises.
In arguing that African- descended Cubans could be worthy Spanish 
citizens, Lagardère pointed out instances of their present, unrewarded partici-
pation in spite of the system’s fl aws. Th e ayuntamientos in Santa Clara, Trini-
dad, and Guantánamo counted “men of our race,” he said, among their 
membership. In the milicias and cuerpos de bomberos, as well as in the army 
itself, “offi  cials of the class of pardos and morenos” had risen to leadership. 
“Our dearest youth,” he proclaimed, fi lled the offi  ces of the Gobierno Gen-
eral and the classrooms of the Instituto de Segunda enseñanza . . .  And just as 
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signifi cant was the growth of societies, clubs, and associations through which 
“we defend our freedoms within the circle of the laws” and which “are heard 
and attended when we approach the authorities.”
Th e problem, as Lagardère saw it, lay in the inability of members of the 
Cortes to change Spanish laws to address the underappreciated commitment 
of black and mulatto Cubans. Th e paradox of abolitionist politicians who still 
owned patrocinados seemed to him at least incongruous, if not utterly hypo-
critical. Although he resisted immediate emancipation, Lagardère assured the 
audience that the patronato law needed revision. But associations and iso-
lated ayuntamiento members, much less militia soldiers, could not alter laws. 
It was thus the responsibility of the Cortes and Alfonso XII to recognize that 
“its politics in the future will be based on the race of color, which will be at 
once the soldier and farmer of this dream,” and work more assiduously to in-
corporate African- descended Cubans into colonial po liti cal life.
In his arguments for Spanish citizenship regardless of race, Lagardère 
backed away from notions of mutual aid and of self- improvement—the pref-
erence of indiff erent conservatives— in favor of advancement grounded in 
Spanish patronage and participation in the institutions of Spanish colonial 
civil society. As opposed to loyal subjectivity reserved for exceptional indi-
viduals, Lagardère championed the need for collective endeavors that extended 
beyond individual sociedades. In slight contrast to single cases of black or 
mulatto Cubans who had used loyalty as a strategy for mobility, the casino’s 
president saw racial equality as a collective struggle based on loyalty to Spain 
that demanded cross- racial participation.
When Captain General Luis Prendergast forwarded the speech to Madrid, 
he encouraged the overseas minister to pay heed to Lagardère’s leadership 
among black and mulatto habaneros in “defending Spanish rights as their 
own and living por España y para España [with Spain and for Spain].” Pren-
dergast identifi ed Lagardère as “intimately linked to the Peninsula” and 
someone “whose erudition and well- being can be trusted.” But Prendergast 
did not limit his praise to the casino and its leader. He defi ned Havana as the 
standard by which other cities should be mea sured for the degree of loyalty 
on the part of Cubans of color. He singled out Santiago as the city “where 
there exist people of color who are not supportive, because there the Ameri-
can labor movement exercises its infl uence.” If peace, not war, had reigned in 
the east instead since 1868, Prendergast surmised, “it would change very much 
the disposition of the disaff ected and would win proselytes for the Spanish ele-
ment.”32 Th e black and mulatto separatists whom Santiago’s Casino de Arte-
sanos purged did not seem to have such a visible counterpart in Havana’s 
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more urbane meeting halls. Associations across the island treaded gingerly 
between affi  rmations of their loyalty and suspicions of their subversion.
Cienfuegos: Associational Life and Respectable Españolismo
Cienfuegos lay slightly closer to Havana, both geo graph i cally and ideologi-
cally, than to Santiago, and despite the absence of a polished and prolifi c per-
sonality such as Lagardère, associational life there heeded the lessons learned 
from similar histories of loyalty.
In 1884, the conservative newspaper of Cienfuegos, La Lealtad (Loyalty), 
and one of the city’s more po liti cally neutral newspapers, El Crisol, reported 
on “a gift  from the King” to the Centro La Amistad, one of the sociedades de 
color active in the city. Th e article described a “felicitous” exchange between 
La Amistad and Rodolfo de Lagardère’s Casino Español de Personas de Color 
in Havana, including congratulations to the casino for “the courtesy with 
which it had recently honored His Majesty the King” and thanks for “giving 
the gift  of several works that contributed to the most rapid advancement of 
the industrious class of color.”33 Alfonso XII himself had given the Casino 
Español de Personas de Color four boxes of “instructive works” and a metal 
tube containing a collection of ninety- three plates from the national engraver, 
and the provincial governor of Havana had delivered the gift  himself to La-
gardère. Th e Havana casino appeared to be sharing its gift  with affi  liated 
associations of black and mulatto Cubans, including La Amistad, which likely 
deposited the engravings in its library for the benefi t of its members.
Th e bonds of reciprocity between La Amistad and the Casino Español de 
Personas de Color refracted similar bonds that African- descended Cubans 
forged with each other and with Spain through post- Zanjón associational life. 
Although views of racial similarity and diff erence, respectively, certainly 
modulated those relationships, their stronger bond was shared loyalty to the 
colonial order. Th e article in El Crisol referred to La Amistad as “the generous 
cienfueguera society,” hinting that the casino might have been repaying La 
Amistad for earlier fi nancial or institutional support, just as it described as 
“eager the Government of His Majesty to procure the well- being and instruc-
tion of the inhabitants of this island [Antilla]” as a reward for their loyal 
subjects. Th e incident further revealed the degree to which associations com-
municated with each other for mutual support and how government offi  cials 
in Havana and Madrid knew of and cultivated that allegiance.
Aside from such open manifestations of loyalty to Spanish rule, societies 
of color recognized that their inclusion depended on adhering to the rules of 
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the new public sphere. Following the repression in the mid- 1870s of societies 
centered around African- derived cultural practices, the organizations that 
took shape in the wake of the Pact of Zanjón carefully navigated the po liti cal 
currents of loyalty and disloyalty in order to claim rights to public speech 
and space. As evidenced by the maneuvering of the Casino de Artesanos in 
Santiago, many Cubans of color sought to follow the law to the letter to pres-
ent themselves as faithful members of the community. Even at the most quo-
tidian level, the new groups deployed the languages and behaviors of 
respectable, law- abiding colonial subjects in order to participate in the public 
sphere and aspire to Spanish citizenship.
Associations registered with the government by submitting a statement of 
their reglamentos (regulations) to the provincial administration for examina-
tion. Th is pro cess applied to preexisting societies as well, including the 
Liceo— which had existed in Cienfuegos since 1847— and the Sociedad 
Filarmónica— which the government had suppressed in 1869.34 Government 
approval did not depend on exacting scrutiny of these reglamentos; in fact, 
permission to inaugurate new societies oft en preceded the inspection of their 
or ga niz ing regulations. Despite being largely formulaic, these reglamentos 
revealed the norms and protocols that governed post- Zanjón institutional life. 
For the Sociedad El Progreso in Cienfuegos, its reglamento easily passed mus-
ter as much for a bureaucratic refl ex as for its model or ga ni za tion, goals, and 
public self- image. On 10 June 1879, the gobernador general gave permission to 
“the pardo Masimo Coimbra” to found El Progreso, “composed of individuals 
of the clase de color in Cienfuegos.” Th e society did not submit its reglamento 
for over a month, but the government took less than fi ve days to approve it.35
Like most newly constituted organizations, El Progreso expressed its pur-
pose in terms of mutual aid and  wholesome sociability, pledging to “foment 
learning and morality, tightening the bonds of friendship among individuals 
of” its “class,” with well- delineated social and educational activities. Its lead-
ership included a president, vice- president, trea sur er, secretary, board mem-
bers, a librarian, and a porter. Sociedad members  were oft en young, skilled, 
unmarried male workers— living in cities, they might work as mechanics, 
cooks, machinists, tobacco workers, and so on. El Progreso restricted its 
membership to men and allowed four distinct types of members: contribut-
ing, de mérito (those who could not pay), honorary, and corresponding. Ex-
cept for honorary members, most individuals contributed six pesos to the 
society on entering.36
Th at money paid for the various markers of respectable sociability com-
mon among almost all associations. El Progreso proposed to open a Centro 
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de Instrucción y Recreo in which it would conduct night classes for adults 
and, later on, a day school for children. Society members donated money 
and books for a library, which also subscribed to periodicals. On the fi rst 
Sunday of each month, the centro would host a reunión familiar (family 
party) and with suffi  cient funds, it held dances at which señoras and señori-
tas of buenas costumbres (good habits) and morality could attend. Th e soci-
ety’s leadership policed these dances strictly: males in attendance over the 
age of fi ft een needed to be members (sixteen was also the minimum age for 
bringing guests), and the reglamento promised that “indecorous ways of 
dancing will be punished with severity.” It permitted “all types of juegos 
lícitos [legal games],” such as dominoes and chess, but not on workdays or 
following night classes.37 Aware of the fi ne line between the gaming and 
dancing of civil society and those of the mala vida, El Progreso avoided the 
negative characterizations that infl uenced the closure of the Cocoyé Francés 
in Santiago.
Echoing virtually every other reglamento, El Progreso prohibited discus-
sions that would raise disgustos personales (personal quarrels) or, more impor-
tant, that would raise religious or po liti cal concerns. Th ese constituted the 
terms of respectability and acceptable public discourse: the society and its 
members contracted with the state to maintain moral decency and a nomi-
nally apo liti cal stance. Th e unwritten assumption was that being apo liti cal 
equated to affi  rming Spanish rule. Th e Casino Asiático in nearby Cruces 
made this explicit, requiring members to “remain subject to all the laws im-
posed by our Spanish Government and respect in every way the mandates of 
the Authority.”38 It took the added step of naming Nuestra Señora de la Cari-
dad del Cobre as its patron, as if adopting the island’s principal Marian cult 
was devoid of po liti cal meaning.39
Th ese societies or ga nized themselves at a time when the government in-
creasingly persecuted long- standing cabildos and sociedades de ñáñigos (se-
cret societies or gangs for men of African descent), which  were more closely 
identifi ed with African- derived practices and traditions than with the civic 
culture of the Spanish empire. Government suppression eased in the 1880s, 
when a new associational law altered the laws of 1876 and 1877 about regulat-
ing and monitoring cabildos and cofradías (Catholic lay brotherhoods). It also 
allowed creoles to join their parents’ cabildos, thereby extending the lives of the 
organizations that could not reproduce themselves with new African- born 
members.40 Th e transformation came at a cost: whereas the cabildos once 
explicitly embraced African- derived cultural practices, linking them to 
Catholic and Spanish cultural forms, they now had to disavow “primitive” 
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 practices publicly. Recognition of their legitimacy had to happen on the terms 
of modern, “civilized” associational forms.41
Sharper turns from African origins occurred when some sociedades ex-
plicitly tried to cross racial lines. La Armonía, in Matanzas, had accepted 
members regardless of racial distinctions since 1879; La Bella Unión, in Agua-
cate, later proposed to accept white members; and El Abrazo, the newspaper 
of one Sancti Spíritus or ga ni za tion, stated in 1888 that it sought to unite “ne-
gro and mulatto together in ideal.” 42 Societies composed primarily of African- 
descended Cubans nevertheless faced greater scrutiny because of pop u lar 
associations between race and rebellion. Legal steps to diminish the “Afri-
can” nature of societies did not eliminate the possibility that they would 
identify as Cuban, not Spanish, and attacks on those societies subsequently 
continued.
But in the post- Zanjón atmosphere of nominal toleration, that persecu-
tion tended not to take the direct and sometimes violent forms that it had 
in the past. If in the early nineteenth century cabildos and cofradías faced 
routine institutional threats that coexisted with some tentative appreciation 
for their monarchist intonations, a more capacious public in the 1880s and 
1890s off ered more consistent offi  cial support but far less tolerance for 
African- derived practices. Th us, authorities increasingly drew on tropes of 
respectability when they categorized the “African” or conspiratorial activi-
ties of African- descended societies and their individual members as danger-
ous or uncivilized. In 1880, for example, the provincial governor of Santa 
Clara notifi ed the captain general of articles in a Remedios newspaper called 
El León Español denouncing the or ga ni za tion of a sociedad de ñáñigos and 
applauding the detention of the pardo Ramón Pérez Morales who had or ga-
nized it. Municipal authorities made their case by amassing unfavorable 
opinions of Pérez from many sources. Th ey took testimony from numerous 
men holding the title of Don to improve their case and numerous mulatas 
and morenas to lend accuracy. As Don Andrés Avelino Ruiz argued, Pérez 
“did not deserve buen concepto (high esteem) because he is always seen in the 
plaza dirty and wearing sandals.” Others noted how Pérez looked young and 
did not wear a sombrero when he walked the streets alone late at night. In his 
absence of cultivated behavior, Pérez represented not only a social threat, but 
a po liti cal one as well. Th e specifi c questionable practices of the suspected 
sociedad de ñáñigos went unarticulated. As if color alone did not arouse the 
suspicion of authorities, a lack of respectability belied a disregard for the 
public ideals that the colonial state upheld, and thus forged an easy partner-
ship with separatist sentiment. As Rebecca Scott noted, “ ‘Spanish culture’ 
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and ‘civilization’  were more than euphemisms for proper behavior; they  were 
values in themselves, in opposition to the concept of Cuban nationality.” 43 In 
attempting to impose those values on Cubans, government offi  cials fashioned a 
rationale for their continued surveillance in the corollary: that uncivilized and 
un- Spanish behavior made visible Cuban nationalist sentiments and needed 
to be eradicated.
Yet in terms of the impact that new associations in Cienfuegos made on 
governing institutions, clubs and  unions did not have recourse to the new 
range of po liti cal and juridical means with which to infl uence colonial policies. 
Despite the inauguration of rival Liberal and Conservative po liti cal parties and 
limited elections, African- descended Cubans confronted a po liti cal system that 
still operated through long- standing patron- client relations and entrenched 
leadership that struggled enough to accommodate the new competing po liti-
cal parties. One of the few groups to petition the ayuntamiento of Cienfuegos 
successfully was the Gremio de Fabricantes de Tabaco (Cigar Manufacturers’ 
Guild). A corporate group of tobacco industrialists, planters, and merchants 
in Cienfuegos enjoyed advantages of class and color that enhanced their clout 
relative to other organizations.44 In January 1881 the gremio solicited recogni-
tion from the ayuntamiento, in addition to the provincial government.45 In 
July it requested that twelve new individuals to be recognized in the munici-
pal tax list as own ers of cigar factories. In December it pleaded for control the 
industry “that has been exploding in this City.” In response, the ayunta-
miento ordered alcaldes of the various barrios to identify manufacturers 
by name and address in order to bring them under the gremio’s control. Al-
though the incident provides an instance of successful po liti cal action moti-
vated by the intercession of a new association, it didn’t exactly break ground 
in the pursuit of citizenship rights.
Th e scant references to asociaciones de color in the rec ords of the Cien-
fuegos ayuntamiento evince a less successful record of mediation between 
state and society. In the midst of its bitter, protracted debate in the 1880s over 
racially integrating public schools, the council took the cautious step in 1884 
of subsidizing the schools for boys of color at the Centros La Amistad and El 
Progreso.46 Th ese schools embodied their societies’ goal of mutual aid by of-
fering primary instruction to African- descended children who could not yet 
attend public schools for white children. By defraying some of the operating 
expenses, the ayuntamiento provided a stopgap compromise while the de-
bate continued.
Despite the initial help, the council delayed, ignored, and bureaucratized 
requests for increased school assistance, especially those from sociedades de 
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color that had not previously been funded. Th e director of the Colegio Santa 
Ana, a school for fi ft y indigent girls of color, attended the council meeting in 
February 1886. She requested seventeen pesos monthly to help pay her sole 
profesora, arguing that two schools for boys presently received subsidies 
whereas only one school for girls held the same privilege. Th e following month, 
the leaders of the Centro La Igualdad requested “some subsidy like the other 
Schools that the clase de color enjoy.” Th e council, however, referred both 
matters to its Sección de Instrucción Pública for scrutiny instead of discuss-
ing and deciding the requests itself. Two months later, the [format]sección 
reported that it “cannot accede to what they request for the reasons that they 
cite,” and, hoping to stave off  future requests from other schools, the ayunta-
miento denied the petitions.47 It worked much more quickly in 1887, when the 
president of La Amistad petitioned for the council to declare his society’s co-
legio a municipal school. Th e sección took less than two weeks to decide that 
there was no need “to make any alteration” in the status of the schools run 
by the sociedades de color. Two years later La Amistad made the same re-
quest to the same end.48 Although the ayuntamiento was content to allow the 
sociedades de color to shoulder its educational obligations, it resisted the 
groups’ attempts to claim po liti cal capital for performing work that the gov-
ernment nominally promised to complete itself.
Nevertheless, the consolidation of the public in the 1880s did not just am-
plify the voices of local elites; it also created the venues themselves in which 
old and new voices echoed and resonated. Th e ayuntamiento placed heavy 
emphasis on staging exchanges of ideas and espectáculos públicos (public per-
for mances). It sold lottery tickets to fund the construction of new buildings, 
and it installed chairs in plazas and parks, and along the city’s main streets.49 
As cienfuegueros built theaters and annexed spaces for new clubs and associa-
tions to gather, the ayuntamiento likewise allocated resources to maintain-
ing and creating spaces in which to foment participation, as long as participants 
played by the new rules of public life.
Newspapers and the Politics of Repre sen ta tion
So- called black newspapers, like most periodical publications sanctioned in 
the wake of Zanjón, occupied a less secure position than associations in the 
public sphere. Unless new publications— black newspapers in particular— had 
clear ties to the two po liti cal parties or offi  cial state institutions, few of them 
had extended runs. Th ey fared slightly better when they  were organs of spe-
cifi c sociedades de color.
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Within that narrow deliberative space occurred some of the defi ning ar-
ticulations between respectable public life and a mode of loyal subjectivity 
that might warrant Spanish citizenship. One of the few black newspapers 
whose contents are still partially known today, El Hijo del Pueblo began in 
1885 and— like most other newspapers— cost only ten centavos per copy. It 
employed writers in more than eight diff erent cities and towns to dispatch 
news and drew on the patronage of prominent individuals and sociedades in 
Remedios and Cienfuegos. Historian Pedro Deschamps Chapeaux noted how 
many black newspapers chafed against what he called the integrismo of 
Rodolfo de Lagardère that called on African- descended readers to maintain 
their loyalty to Spain.50 El Hijo del Pueblo was one of the few newspapers in 
central Cuba that explicitly engaged in polemics with Lagardère and his 
Havana- based newspaper: La España. Nevertheless, it championed the re-
spectable ideals of the theoretically apo liti cal public sphere and echoed the 
calls of other newspapers for educational and moral strength. Without edu-
cation, for example, it warned that “we would be free in name, but slaves in 
reality.” It challenged readers that in order to be “loyal” to their “purpose,” 
they needed to forego politics until they  were literate. It made the same call 
for aspiring politicians of color as well. In 1885 it asked readers, “For what do 
we need politicians who do not know how to read? Th ey would obtain the 
vote without knowing who they’re giving it to. Th e praise of the men of El 
Hijo del Pueblo is not destined for politicians, but for those who regenerate 
our social status, which is currently found in a sad state, for the conditions 
are not valid, nor are skin colors.”51
African- descended women of the sociedad Las Hijas del Progreso forged 
alliances with Liberal and Conservative Party representatives alike to pub-
lish their newspaper La Familia, which began in 1884. Th ey counted among 
their collaborators Antonio Medina y Céspedes— a poet, schoolteacher, and 
student of Juan Gualberto Gómez, the well- known black journalist and, in 
the 1880s, a Liberal Party stalwart. Like most newspapers addressed to Cu-
bans of color, it addressed and republished articles and information from La 
Amistad; El Crisol, a Liberal daily; and El Profesorado de Cuba— all in Cien-
fuegos; El Ejemplo, in Sanctí Spiritus; El Brujo and El Aviso, in Sagua la Grande; 
and La Aurora, in Bayamo. Th e women of Las Hijas del Progreso initially had 
their biweekly newspaper published by the press of La Lealtad, the Cien-
fuegos Conservative Party daily. Six months aft er it began in 1884, La Familia 
announced that it would continue publication but had severed its ties to Las 
Hijas del Progreso. It remained under the editorial control of the formidable 
Ana Joaquina Sosa, who edited the newspaper in addition to running the Las 
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Hijas del Progreso school for African- descended girls. Th ere, she oversaw a 
curriculum that included reading, writing, religion, grammar, arithmetic, 
Spanish and Cuban geography, as well as sewing, embroidery, upholstery, 
and crochet.
Sosa’s dual management of the school and newspaper may explain the call 
in the issue of La Familia from 15 May to establish a benevolent society for 
children in Cienfuegos. An article publicized the idea of several cienfuegue-
ros to establish such an or ga ni za tion to educate and eventually fi nd employ-
ment for as many children as possible. In the context of a local debate about 
public education and school integration that had been raging for nearly fi ve 
years, the proposal struck a conciliatory tone. Working in concert with the 
Centro de Remedios and other public institutions to advance the idea of the 
charitable society, Sosa and her colleagues at La Familia avoided the stan-
dard tactic of devising racially exclusive solutions to the problem. Although 
most black newspapers clearly followed the lead of societies, po liti cal parties, 
and other public institutions. In this instance La Familia itself took the ini-
tiative in attempting to shape civic life.52
Th e question of literacy had par tic u lar resonance among Cubans of color. 
Newspapers could have an eff ect on the community only to the extent that its 
members could read or hear the contents. Despite low literacy rates, Cubans 
in the nineteenth century  were privy to traditions of listening to newspapers 
and other texts read aloud— in cigar factories, on rural estates, and likely in 
the meeting halls of clubs and associations.53 In their calls for expanded edu-
cational opportunities, cienfueguero newspapers such as La Familia  were sur-
prisingly complimentary of the sentiments of Lagardère. “It is not enough to 
declare the negro free,” he implored an audience in 1881. “It is necessary to 
educate, to instruct, to prepare him for freedom, for citizenship, to moralize 
and found families.” Most African- descended Cubans, he lamented, lacked 
the basic prerequisites such as family and education for equal membership in 
Cuban society: “Without family, freedom is impossible.”54 La Familia’s writ-
ers agreed heartily, and they worked to strengthen these basic institutions 
that slavery had long maligned. Indeed, in their attention to family and edu-
cation, both central to the biological and social reproduction of the popula-
tion, the women writing in La Familia shift ed the grounds of citizenship 
claims. If they fell short of claiming the rights of citizenship themselves, they 
nevertheless provided an alternative foundation to the military ser vice oft en 
cited by men.
Mainstream newspapers likewise promoted sociedades de color nearly 
as frequently as they publicized others. In Las Villas in 1883, a newspaper 
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described a confl ict between the Junta Local de Patronato in Cruces and “el 
moreno Martín,” a worker on the Mercedes estate. Martín had accumulated 
more than enough money for his manumission, but the junta had repeatedly 
refused to issue his cédula personal, the document that proved his legal free-
dom. Th e author painstakingly delineated the pro cess by which Martín had 
not followed the proper procedure, thus blaming the patrocinado for the delay 
in receiving his papers.55 Although the paper exonerated the Junta Local, the 
Junta Provincial, and the estate’s own er and administrator for any wrongdo-
ing, it did not explicitly take the side of Martín’s superiors. In fact, the article 
off ered concrete advice for patrocinados seeking to navigate the pro cess of 
manumission that frequently remained unexplained by emancipation’s gate-
keepers. Th at a resident of Cruces wrote to La Lealtad in Cienfuegos to sum-
marize these events only underscores the new possibilities for newspapers to 
educate African- descended Cubans, even patrocinados, about their new 
rights. Connecting rural and urban publics became especially important dur-
ing patronato since recently freed apprentices oft en moved back and forth 
between the city and the countryside. How might a sociedad de color incor-
porate rural folk as upright members, and thus as loyal subjects, unless some 
structures on plantations and farms existed to instill practices of respectable 
sociability, if not patriotism (fi gure 4.2)? In this sense, sociedad leaders 
could oft en express the same anxieties that offi  cials oft en did— oft en pub-
licly, through the press— about the licentious and suspect activities of rural 
Cubans of color.
Urban life, however, still occupied the attention of mainstream newspapers, 
and the most open embrace that they gave to the African- descended popula-
tion appeared in their routine reports and endorsements of the sociedades de 
color. Th e leaders of the associations provided the newspapers with synopses of 
their meetings and activities, and the newspapers published them, with com-
mentary, alongside reports of the elite Sociedad Filarmónica and the Casino 
Español as well as the Junta de Obreros, bursting with “the desires that animate 
the working class to regulate wages in harmony with capital.”56 In 1883, La Le-
altad in Cienfuegos published a sympathetic article about the rumored merg-
ing of La Amistad and El Progreso. La Amistad had made repeated eff orts to 
fuse the two groups, despite animated disagreement among some of its mem-
bers, but the proposal had received no interest from El Progreso. La Lealtad 
reported that the members of La Amistad felt snubbed for no reason: El Pro-
greso had never actively rejected them, and the notoriety that the proposal had 
provoked would allow “the public to favorably judge its attitude in the future.”57 
In step with the government’s repression of cabildos, La Lealtad complained 
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about the boisterous festivities that African- descended cienfuegueros held that 
kept their neighbors awake. A stinging article asserted that “he who invented 
the delightful instrument that ought to be the drum of the negros de nación 
[African- born blacks] should be in the depths of hell.”58
Th e exchanges documented by newspapers in the 1880s gesture toward 
one more telling phenomenon about post- Zanjón racial politics. Public iden-
tifi cation of racial status, or at least a relaxed surveillance of race, waned in 
the fi nal de cades of the nineteenth century in Cuba. Typically this trend has 
been attributed, with good reason, to the race- transcendent nationalist dis-
course of insurgents and postemancipation disavowals of previous potential 
markers of slave status.59 Yet the emergent public sphere in the 1880s also had 
a signifi cant impact on the diminishing of racial categorization in public 
discourse. Even as some journalists saw themselves as the vanguards of a so-
cial order that very likely maintained racial hierarchies, they relegated those 
distinctions to the private sphere, hidden from respectable public discussion. 
In shift ing the line between public and private, then, they articulated a new 
figure 4.2 • Cubans of color dancing, Havana, c. 1898. Th e tri- band fl ag does 
not have a clear symbolic referent but the design allows for the possibility that it 
is a Spanish fl ag. Th e caption described this “typical Sunday morning scene in 
one of the side streets of Havana” and a dance referred to as “up and down and 
all chassée.” In Greater America: Heroes, Battles, Camps, Dewey Islands, Cuba, 
Porto Rico (New York: F. T. Neely, c. 1898). Courtesy of the Cuban Heritage 
Collection, University of Miami Libraries.
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racial etiquette that aspired to the social relations appropriate to national 
citizenship.
Race and the Public Sphere
To be sure, the disappearance of many judicial barriers for African- descended 
Cubans did not erase racial discrimination on the island. As José Piqueras 
explains, “Discrimination now came to manifest itself to a greater extent 
through the combination of norms and habits of conduct tacitly sanctioned 
by the white community.”60 As sociedades de color made confronting contin-
ued discrimination a priority in their public interventions, those Cubans who 
perpetuated discrimination faced new codes of racial etiquette: what should 
be said, what could no longer be said, and the eff ects of what was said. Proper 
españolismo came to include the careful avoidance of those divisive statements 
about race that elsewhere found a growing audience. Cubans who had long 
directed public discourse in the realm of high politics now answered to a 
public that educated itself about politics through the newspapers and associ-
ations that the Pact of Zanjón had encouraged.
Most ayuntamientos had typically comprised the cities’ wealthiest mer-
chants and estate own ers. Th is composition remained well aft er the post- 
Zanjón reforms, when its members largely identifi ed with the Conservative 
Party. In December 1884, the ayuntamiento held its monthly meeting at an 
auspicious moment in the local school calendar. Th is mattered because edu-
cation represented a common concern within communities, and politicians 
seeking to curry favor with a population enjoying newly bestowed rights rec-
ognized the opportunity to affi  rm their support for schools publicly. More-
over, the visibly precarious conditions of many youth of color in cities was an 
aff ront to the ideals of respectability championed during the 1880s (fi gure 4.3) 
In schools for children of color in Cienfuegos, to the likely dismay of students, 
exams  were public events to which their parents, teachers, and “all persons 
fond of education”  were invited to observe. For the newly inaugurated schools 
themselves, these eve nings provided an opportunity to display their accom-
plishments and to attract greater enrollment. Th e heads of the schools at La 
Amistad, El Progreso, and La Igualdad published warm invitations to their 
exams in El Cristal and La Lealtad.61 El Cristal gave ample attention to pri-
vate school exam invitations as an aff ront to the ayuntamiento. A group of 
private schools had invited the members of the ayuntamiento to a morning 
mass and a late aft ernoon pro cession of students in celebration of the feast of 
the Immaculate Conception. Disregarding the newspaper’s call to all councils 
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in Cuba to “represent all residents of their respective Municipalities without 
distinction of races or religions”— the ayuntamiento members refused to at-
tend the event and accused the school directors of obscuring the true intent of 
the activities.62 With raised public expectations of the possibilities of politics, 
the limits of the ayuntamiento’s authority had changed. El Cristal gave public 
prominence to private struggles over education, which the Spanish govern-
ment had pledged to provide to its subjects. Th e ayuntamiento was now but 
one voice in an expanded conversation about race and education, and a voice 
answerable to challenges to even their personal opinions.
Th e ayuntamiento entertained a motion from the teniente alcalde (dep-
uty mayor) Dámaso Pasalodos at its 15 December meeting to subsidize the 
Nuestra Señora de Lourdes school for African- descended girls with a monthly 
contribution of one ounce of gold. Pasalodos alone had recently attended 
the school’s exams and was “left  satisfi ed” by what he saw. One of the coun-
cil’s most se nior members, Esteban Cacicedo, contributed the opinion: 
“Well I would abolish all of these schools for being unsuitable.”63
Yet the following morning, the conservative Cienfuegos daily La Lealtad 
published a letter from Cacicedo that held the black schools in much higher 
figure 4.3 • Group of Negro children playing in front of school house, c. 1898. 
Th e caption noted that the children  were “members of the se nior class” who 
graduated at age eight, and that “no further schooling for negroes is provided for 
by the Spanish Government.” In Greater America: Heroes, Battles, Camps, Dewey 
Islands, Cuba, Porto Rico (New York: F. T. Neely, c. 1898). Courtesy of Cuban 
Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries.
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regard. He lauded the exams at La Amistad and El Progreso for fulfi lling “the 
civilizing mission that they have undertaken.” Without admitting to his 
position on school integration or subsidization during the meeting, Cacicedo 
hinted in his congratulations that the private black schools provided “the 
system, and no other, by which the children of those classes, to those today 
who open themselves to such extensive horizons, [will] be, with time, wor-
thy men in society and useful citizens of the great Spanish fatherland.”64 
Th us the public served to conceal and distort sentiments that had long sim-
mered in private. Cacicedo disguised his private disapproval of the black 
schools with a public statement in a newspaper.
But Cacicedo underestimated the potential of the new publics to dissemi-
nate information quickly and to pass judgment. El Cristal brutally attacked 
Cacicedo, “guided by his passions,” for making the off ensive comment in the 
council meeting.65 One writer took plea sure in reporting the next day how 
Cacicedo had contradicted himself by assuming that statements in each of the 
venues would never be juxtaposed. Further, it questioned how La Lealtad— 
which regularly expressed favorable opinions of black societies— could pub-
lish lies from one of their loudest opponents in the ayuntamiento. El Cristal 
had the power to place the contradictory statements in full public view, and 
the newspaper was well positioned to challenge Cacicedo to explain how 
he was helping African- descended Cubans to become “useful citizens of 
the great Spanish fatherland” by “abolishing their schools, preventing them 
from learning, leaving them submerged in the ignorance that up until now 
has enveloped them.”66
If Cacicedo’s promise of eventual citizenship to African- descended Cubans 
rang hollow in light of his utterance at the ayuntamiento meeting, his compla-
cent statement in the newspaper nonetheless reminds us that loyalty was as 
much the public default for white Cubans as it was for African- descended Cu-
bans. Th e limits of loyalty derived in part from the private racism that still 
pervaded Cuban society and the unequal pressure that diff erent individuals 
and diff erent publics could exert on the shape of public discourse. As the public 
expanded, so too did public expressions of private opinions, including those 
contrary to the respectable discourse endorsed by the reforms. Increasingly, 
Cubans on the island and abroad saw the realization of greater po liti cal voice 
in an in de pen dent republic that would free Cuba from Spanish rule. In the 
meantime, many African- descended Cubans, in their associations and news-
papers, held Spanish culture, politics, and society to its own highest standards 
as Cuba returned to peace. But loyalty to Spain provided a common ideological 
framework by which Cubans could imagine and debate Spanish citizenship.
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Public debates between African- descended Cubans about po liti cal strat-
egy and collective identifi cation also acquired public prominence. Despite, or 
perhaps because of, the warm reception that Lagardère received from colonial 
authorities, he encountered many outspoken critics, notably among in de pen-
dentistas outside of Cuba and among other African- descended Cubans on 
the island who advocated a more confrontational relationship with the colo-
nial state. Lagardère found his most vocal antagonist in Martín Morúa Del-
gado, the son of a freed slave and a Basque baker. Morúa was a self- educated 
free person of color from Matanzas province who launched a newspaper 
there in 1880; exiled to the United States for conspiring against the govern-
ment, he became a typesetter and a reader in a tobacco factory. Returning to 
Cuba in 1890, he joined the Liberal Autonomist Party and became, along 
with Juan Gualberto Gómez, one of the two fi rst African- descended mem-
bers of the Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, the esteemed insti-
tution of the creole elite. He is perhaps better known in Cuban history for his 
actions aft er in de pen dence: a member of the constitutional assembly, he be-
came the senate president and draft ed the notorious amendment in 1910 that 
banned the Partido Independiente de Color, the island’s fi rst black po liti cal 
party.67
Aft er Lagardère accused Morúa Delgado of shorting a publisher forty pe-
sos for the publication of one of his recent tracts, Morúa launched an all- out 
assault on Lagardère for using papers such as El Ciudadano to act against the 
unity of the raza de color. He centered his attack not on Lagardère’s ideas but 
on his genealogy. He identifi ed Lagardère’s father as Don Pedro Blanco, a 
wealthy Catalan who lived in Havana, “dedicated to the humanitarian trade 
in African slaves.” Having made numerous trips to Africa on behalf of what 
Morúa mocked as “honorable” commerce, he built a residence on the coast 
and befriended a king who was at war with a neighboring rival. Blanco capi-
talized on this confl ict to acquire more slaves, and persuaded the aging king 
Manhas to “cede” one of his daughters to him for the sole purpose of strength-
ening commercial ties. Blanco named her “Rosa,” moved to France, where she 
gave birth to Rodolfo and was subsequently married off  to a Frenchman, and 
then moved with the child to Barcelona.
On arriving in Cuba, Morúa claimed, Rodolfo took on a variety of names; 
his fi rst one— a refl ection of his status as a helpless exile— was El Mandinga, 
a reference to an African nation that in pop u lar lore was known for its osten-
tatious dress.68 Morúa ridiculed Lagardère for having so many names and for 
claiming so many titles— doctor of law and philosophy at the central univer-
sity of Madrid and vizconde de Illescas, among others. Faithful to his ances-
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try, Morúa argued, Lagardère should sign his name “Blanco y Manhas,” not 
“Blanco de Lagardère.” In diving further into his rival’s biography, Morúa 
noted that Lagardère spent subsequent time in Spain and had returned to 
Cuba as a member of the militias, and later— aft er spending a short time in 
prison— reemerged to found the paper El Ciudadano and advocate for black 
passivity and baseless allegiance to the Spanish crown.69
What’s striking  here is less what Morúa vilifi ed in terms of Lagardère’s 
opinions than in how he traced the origins of Lagardère’s monarchism— 
namely, through his ancestry. Without any corroborating historical evidence 
to verify the validity of Morúa’s genealogy, such a dramatic yarn should be 
regarded with suspicion. But its cast of characters are telling: Pedro Blanco 
was not just any Spaniard but a slave trader, an example of the cruelty and 
callousness that undergirded Spain’s wealth and prominence. And Lagardère’s 
mother was herself royalty, the daughter of an African king who willingly 
placed her in the hands of Blanco for economic gain. In mocking the ostenta-
tion of Lagardère’s public self- fashioning, Morúa’s attack alluded to the fi gure 
of the negro catedrático, a stock character in Cuban pop u lar theater who 
drew ridicule from audiences for his pretensions of wealth and education 
despite humble origins.
Whether or not Lagardère ever responded to Morúa’s attack is unclear, 
but the exchange between the two men adds an additional layer to the prom-
inence of the post- Zanjón public sphere in expressing relationships between 
race and po liti cal allegiance. Like Cacicedo’s remarks in Cienfuegos, Lagar-
dére’s statements about race that might once have evaded public dissemination 
now came under public scrutiny. Occasionally, as in the case of Morúa and 
Lagardère, those statements bolstered claims to speak on behalf of African- 
descended Cubans as a unifi ed community.
writing in 1915, W.E.B. Du Bois referred to the “cruel and bloody” war 
in Cuba that ended in 1878 “with the abolition of slavery” and a subsequent up-
rising in 1879 that “secured civil rights for Negroes.”70 He was mistaken about 
the date of abolition but correct about the war.71 Th e story of “civil rights”— or 
at least civic or public rights— has its roots in the joined actions of insurgent 
demands and Spanish policy. What happened aft er that is a story of ordinary 
Cubans across the island transforming the nomos of loyalty. A commonly 
understood range of acceptable behavior in the post- Zanjón public had to be 
worked out through experience, and as public discourse increasingly circled 
around the issue of Spanish citizenship, evolving codes of conduct produced a 
form of loyal subjectivity to which Cubans of color could aspire. Support for 
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in de pen dence or excessive critique of colonial rule  were among the easier 
exclusions that Cubans made from what they wrote in newspapers and what 
they did within various associations. Other, more intricate considerations 
of race and politics also infl uenced the peculiar shape that colonialism gave 
to the public sphere. Although the policies that followed the Pact of Zanjón 
conferred new rights on Cubans, the distinct experiences of those of African 
descent in the emergent postwar public sphere reveal much about the tangled 
relationship between the rights of liberal citizenship and the maintenance of 
colonial authority in Cuba.
Th e words of Du Bois in 1915 might also have noted in the wake of the Ten 
Years’ War a partial lift ing, as he described it, of the veil that hung between 
blacks and opportunity. Th e post- Zanjón reforms, as José Piqueras explains, 
created “a civil society in relation to a po liti cal system that aimed to assure 
Spanish dominion but contributed at the same time to relieve the insuffi  cien-
cies and oppressive character of dependence.” For the thousands of African- 
descended Cubans shedding their legal status as slaves in par tic u lar, this new 
civil society, he argues, developed in tandem with “civil rights and education or 
access to equitable treatment.” Beyond the press and associational reforms, the 
government took other steps to narrow racial segregation and inequalities. 
Th e Ministerio de Ultramar legalized interracial marriages in 1881. In 1885, 
four years aft er the Casino Español de la Clase de Color initially pressured 
authorities, the ministerio issued a circular stipulating that “people of color” 
could not be prohibited from entering and circulating in “public spaces and 
establishments.”72 By the 1890s, public spaces and forums allowed disaff ected 
Cubans to advance the cause of Cuban nationalism and to or ga nize and agi-
tate for in de pen dence. If Cubans of color  were attaining civil rights within 
the Spanish orbit, they did so in a po liti cal system that affi  rmed them as loyal 
subjects, even when doing so appeared to confl ict with increasing talk about 
the rights of citizenship.
Th us although the post- Zanjón public facilitated access to the public sphere, 
it was not “multiracial” in the sense that public life entirely accommodated 
or facilitated a race- neutral society— although plenty of new associations 
admitted Cubans of all backgrounds. But this isn’t entirely the point. Th e 
question is less one of who could or could not be an actor in the public sphere— 
despite the many restrictions— but rather what parts  were available to the ac-
tors to play. Cubans of color who worked from the scripts of loyal subjectivity 
 were neither improvising entirely nor being fed words. Understanding loy-
alty in part as a per for mance of governmentality is not to render it fake or 
meaningless. Rather, as Partha Chatterjee notes, “Governmentality can also 
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create the ground for pop u lar politics to endow itself with high rhetoric and 
moral passion.”73 Participation required adherence to Spanish norms and 
protocols and the general suppression of “uncivilized” African traits.74 As it 
ushered in an unpre ce dented expansion of participation in civic life, the post- 
Zanjón transformations reordered social diff erences without necessarily con-
stituting counterpublics, that is, publics that “contravene the rules obtaining in 
the world at large, being structured by alternative dispositions or protocols, 
making diff erent assumptions about what can be said or what goes without 
saying.”75 Although African- descended Cubans oft en maintained, “con-
sciously or not, an awareness of [their] subordinate status,” their public institu-
tional presence adhered to Spanish norms that conditioned loyalty. Beyond 
mimicry, they struggled to claim rights as respectable subjects without allow-
ing meaningful inequalities and diff erences to escape public view.
Five
“Long Live Spain! Death to Autonomy!”
Liberalism and Slave Emancipation
Simultaneous regulation of free- colored labor and the moral and intellectual 
education of the freedman.
White immigration exclusively, giving preference to that made by families, and 
removing all obstacles in opposition to peninsular and foreign immigration.
— Excerpt from the program of the Provisional Committee of the Partido Liberal, 
1 August 1878
Either darkness had fallen on Cienfuegos unnaturally early on 20 October 
1886, or none of the city’s residents wanted to tell authorities who had initi-
ated a disturbance in front of the Teatro Zorrilla that night. Th e cienfuegue-
ros who gathered for the Partido Liberal Autonomista (Liberal or Autonomist 
Party) meeting at the theater as early as six  o’clock included many of the black 
and mulatto residents from the surrounding neighborhood. Yet most people 
the police questioned in subsequent days claimed that it was far too dark to 
identify the specifi c individuals who produced a tumult so uncharacteristic 
of their respectable city.
Perhaps there  were too many suspects to choose from. Th e Teatro Zorrilla, 
built a year earlier to accommodate around three hundred people, was burst-
ing with over one thousand individuals by the time the meeting began at eight 
 o’clock. Th ey had come to hear the province’s two newly elected Liberal depu-
ties to the Cortes— Rafael Fernández de Castro and Miguel Figueroa— less 
than two weeks aft er a royal decree from Spain formally abolished slavery. 
Fernández de Castro began his speech that eve ning by criticizing the govern-
ment in Spain, prompting an outburst of cheers and jeers. Next, he claimed 
that the abolition of slavery was the result of the eff orts of the Liberals, which 
led to a second interruption, some people shouting approval, others yelling 
“¡Mentira!” (Lie!) and “¡Fuera a autonomía!” (Out with autonomy!).
“Long Live Spain!” • 159
Once guards had quieted the audience again, Fernández de Castro reiter-
ated that Liberals had secured abolition for those Cubans who remained in 
bondage. Outside the theater, over fi ft een hundred cienfuegueros began shout-
ing “¡Viva España! ¡Muera a autonomía!” (Long live Spain! Death to auton-
omy!). Some threw sticks, rocks, and bottles at the building; someone fi red a 
revolver repeatedly. Inside the theater, people broke chairs as audience mem-
bers clambered out of doors and windows and as people outside tried to push 
their way into the building. Fernández de Castro and Figueroa slipped out of 
the theater through a side door and fl ed the commotion, leaving behind over 
10 percent of the city’s residents in the throes of disorder. A rumor circulated 
in newspapers in subsequent days that a black participant named Pedro Jimé-
nez had been killed during the upheaval, and authorities spoke of “an excite-
ment among the people of color” in the city that had sparked the confl ict. 
One eyewitness from the meeting said that the theater and street  were “com-
pletely full of people of bad appearance and for the most part people of color 
in shirtsleeves.” A guard outside, however, insisted to investigators that the 
commotion had nothing to do with racial tensions, that instead “it is a ques-
tion of Liberals and Conservatives.”1 How these contrasting descriptions 
coexisted, and what that implied about the politics of loyalty among cien-
fuegueros of color, are the subjects of this chapter.
Although 1886 marked the end of slavery in Cuba, historians have under-
standably qualifi ed the signifi cance of its formal legal demise. Spain’s 1880 
abolition of slavery in name set strict limits on the freedoms enjoyed 
by patrocinados (apprenticed former slaves) in the implementation of the 
patronato (apprenticeship period). Aft er 1886, per sis tent inequalities and dis-
crimination continued to condition the meaning of freedom. As Rebecca 
Scott notes, “Th e abolition of slavery . . .  had not in itself brought respect or 
equal rights, and the defeat of open po liti cal revolt had not diminished ordi-
nary Cubans’ resentment of Spanish privilege and elite opportunism.”2 Ex-
cluded from most electoral lists and limited in their economic options, most 
former slaves— and people of color and Cubans on the  whole— indeed found 
no lack of grievances with conditions enabled by Spanish rule. Th at resent-
ment did not necessarily radicalize them, but racial subjugation foreshortened 
possibilities for new social formations with the end of slavery, including those 
that did not require the work of race as much as they had in the past.
Th e formal conclusion of the patronato did matter enough that politicians 
such as Fernández de Castro and Figueroa embraced it as a po liti cal triumph 
for their party and that over two thousand cienfuegueros violently disagreed. 
Politicians had been tinkering with the laws that regulated slavery and 
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 abolition for years, and in some respects the end of the patronato was as 
much a success story for a new partisan politics as it was a nonevent for many 
Cubans unaff ected by the mea sure. Zooming in on Cienfuegos in this mo-
ment allows a glimpse of the extent to which these politics mattered for ordi-
nary Cubans across the island. Th e disorder at the Zorrilla dramatized 
offi  cial and pop u lar struggles over the meaning of formal abolition in the 
context of other colonial reforms. Th e Spanish government’s authorization of 
po liti cal parties aft er the Ten Years’ War gave Cubans increased repre sen ta-
tion in colonial aff airs.3 Because these reforms overlapped with gradual 
abolition, Spain’s enhanced eff orts to maintain colonial order also laid the 
institutional groundwork for an integrated postemancipation society. Th e 
fl aws in that groundwork became evident as Cubans tested the limits of 
the reforms and as Liberal and Conservative politicians debated their merits. 
In addition, the partisan factions that had delineated the legal conclusion of 
gradual abolition also increasingly defi ned local networks of po liti cal pa-
tronage and clientelism. On 20 October 1886, cienfuegueros disrupted the 
Partido Liberal meeting based on an understanding of liberalism’s strategies 
of exclusion.
Since the promulgation (and then repeal, and then promulgation and re-
peal again) of the Constitution of 1812, liberalism had captured the attention 
of Cubans. Th e post- Zanjón incarnation of liberalism off ered no clear an-
swers to the long- term question of liberal politics under Spanish rule, even 
with the institutionalization of the Liberal Party. Brazilian historian Emilia 
Viotti da Costa argued that liberalism can be best understood by examining 
its contradictions, in par tic u lar the contradictions between its ideals, slavery, 
and patronage.4 Examining Cuban liberalism at the moment of emancipa-
tion through this prism reveals the frictions that had long been simmering in 
the consent forged between the Spanish state and most African- descended 
Cubans. In the late nineteenth century, Liberal politicians toured the island 
to seek the public support of ordinary Cubans, many of whom had little or no 
electoral power and may not have identifi ed Cortes repre sen ta tion as a prin-
cipal goal of belonging to Spain. Th e politicians spoke in theaters whose very 
spaces had become highly politicized in the wake of the post- Zanjón reforms, 
and they gave speeches that frequently drew upon a racialized and divisive 
vocabulary. Th e changes in the public sphere that the Partido Liberal had 
championed exposed the possibilities and limits that people of African de-
scent faced in the wake of slave emancipation.5 As a formal po liti cal event, 
slavery’s conclusion prompted a reconsideration of the relationships between 
politicians and their supporters and of the terms on which those relation-
ships operated.6 Th e turmoil at the Teatro Zorrilla, and the events leading up 
to it, revealed the confl icts between the liberalization of the public sphere 
and the associational affi  liations through which so many Cubans of color 
affi  rmed their loyalty to Spain.7
Th e Politics of Liberalism in the Post- Zanjón Détente
Institutional divisions between liberals and conservatives  were relatively 
new in Cuba, a product of concessions made by the colonial government in 
the Pact of Zanjón. Th e peace settlement authorized municipal elections and 
the selection of twenty- four Cuban representatives to the Spanish Parlia-
ment. Initially, the main found ers and supporters of the Partido Liberal  were 
creole planters and property own ers. Primarily, they sought greater control 
over the wealth that they generated and relief from the excessive infl uence of 
peninsulares. Established in July 1878, the party articulated a set of reformist 
positions over the course of several months, on the heels of a swift  Conserva-
tive response with the formation of the Partido Unión Constitucional later 
that autumn.8 Whereas propertied Spaniards and other defenders of colonial 
rule constituted the principal membership of the Unión Constitucional, the 
Partido Liberal came to attract supporters ranging from former insurgents to 
moderate reformers. Prominent Liberals had their economic interests at heart 
when they demanded the abolition of all duties on Cuban exports, further 
reductions of tariff s and customs fees, and more fl exibility in trading with 
other countries, especially the United States. Th ey sought the full extension 
to Cubans of the rights guaranteed under the Spanish Constitution of 1876 
and the separation of po liti cal and military authority on the island. Ulti-
mately, they sought self- government for Cuba in the control of local institu-
tions, albeit under the continued tutelage of Spain. In 1881, the party amended 
its name to the Partido Liberal Autonomista, and “Autonomist” frequently 
stood as a synonym for “Liberal” in subsequent years.9
Liberals fought a near- constant battle against claims by peninsular Span-
iards and members of the rival Partido Unión Constitucional that labeled them 
separatists in autonomists’ clothing. In fact, Liberals occupied an uneasy 
space between separatists and supporters of Spain. Although they clashed 
with peninsulares and Conservatives over the degree of decision- making 
power to be placed in the hands of Cubans, they also recoiled from the radi-
cal solutions proposed by the in de pen dentistas that would threaten their 
dwindling economic success. Liberals such as Rafael Fernández de Castro ar-
gued that colonial rule protected Cuba from the disorder that characterized 
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the struggling in de pen dent nations in mainland Latin America— including 
their racial discord. In an early speech, he warned against a Cuban strain of 
“the germs of disorder and revolt that have undermined the existence of the 
Spanish American republics, condemned to perpetual uprisings between 
class antagonisms, odios de raza [racial hatred], the despotism of caudillos, 
the passions of sects, and the lawless appetites of civil and military bureau-
cracies.”10 Liberals hoped to channel those sectarian passions into a new in-
stitutional politics. Whether that expanded the boundaries that defi ned the 
loyal subject became a principal debate within the party as much as between 
Conservatives and other po liti cal players.
In the face of constant harassment by peninsulares and questionable elec-
toral results that usually kept Conservatives in control of local government, 
Liberals sought and invoked pop u lar support to bolster their claim to a voice 
in colonial politics. In part, cultivating a pop u lar following echoed a broader 
concern among deputies in the Cortes, who worried about a strained, if not 
hostile, relationship with Cuba’s provinces. War and emancipation had cre-
ated a countryside of free people whose loyalty to Spain needed confi rma-
tion. Deputy José María Carbonell expressed this sentiment in 1886 when he 
argued that the provinces  were no less important to order than municipali-
ties, “the foundation of Spanish nationalism.” National integrity depended 
on conscientious attention to “the voice of the countryside, nothing less in 
a country eminently agricultural and in which, for that reason, rural aspi-
rations and interests need better guarantees.”11 Th ese sentiments provided 
the impetus for the excursiones políticas, or po liti cal tours, of the sort that 
Fernández de Castro and Figueroa undertook in 1886. Liberals maintained an 
uneasy presence in colonial politics, and they sought to reach out to ordinary 
Cubans to prove themselves as legitimate and faithful representatives of the 
Spanish government.
Among those itinerant Liberals  were the men Paul Estrade calls “paradig-
matic exponents of ‘historical’ creole autonomism.” Rafael Montoro, Anto-
nio Govín, Eliseo Giberga, and Rafael Fernández de Castro constituted the 
handful of party chiefs and deputies who remained powerful politicians in 
Cuba, even aft er some of them shift ed allegiance during the War of In de pen-
dence of 1895– 1898.12 Th eir public speeches, together with partisan news-
papers, served as the means by which ordinary Cubans educated themselves 
in colonial politics. Despite calls for major changes to the relations between 
Spain and Cuba, the early statements of Partido Liberal leaders pledged their 
continued loyalty to colonial rule, setting a simultaneously oppositional and 
conciliatory tone. Rafael Montoro inaugurated the Partido Liberal in Cien-
fuegos on 22 September 1878, declaring that “the base of our politics, as many 
eloquent orators before me have said, can be nothing other than national 
unity, and the widest regimen of public freedoms.” He warned of Conserva-
tives “who want to monopolize power” and called on cienfuegueros to wage a 
“legal and peaceful struggle in which the triumphs cost not one tear and are 
of inexhaustible productivity in public benefi ts.”13 Antonio Govín affi  rmed 
the national unity of Spain and Cuba several days later in another meeting in 
Cienfuegos: “Th e peninsular has in Cuba his home, his heaven, his patria; the 
Cuban, at the same time, has in Spain his home, his heaven, his patria”; “to-
gether they are the sacred soil of the patria.”14 Liberals thus cut a path be-
tween presumed Conservative inertia and radical antagonism to present a 
unifi ed voice for reform. In contrast to Liberal leaders in other provinces, 
members of the junta of Santa Clara Province, which included Cienfuegos, 
had neither rebelled during the Ten Years’ War nor led earlier reformist ef-
forts. Th us, as Montoro and Govín oversaw the election of Tomás Terry, Au-
relio Rodríguez, and Laureano Muñoz as president, vice- president, and 
secretary, respectively, of the Liberal junta in Cienfuegos, they worried about 
more unpredictable leadership elsewhere and had good reason to publicize 
the moderate approach to post- Zanjón reformism that characterized Liberals 
in Cienfuegos.15
In its policy agenda, the Partido Liberal made top priorities of ending slav-
ery (with compensation for slaveowners) and the establishment of the patro-
nato. Aft er that system took eff ect, Liberals championed its early termination.16 
Th is had its benefi ts from an electoral perspective. Th e Pact of Zanjón fi xed 
the number of deputies to be elected to the Cortes according to the number 
of free men, which discounted the population of former slaves. As Montoro 
pointed out in his fi rst speech to the Cortes in 1886, the Spanish government 
reaped signifi cant po liti cal benefi ts by abolishing slavery in 1880. But the num-
ber of Cuban deputies (twenty- four) never increased aft er the law passed: “Now 
then, I ask: What is the legal condition of the patrocinados? Are they free men 
or are they slaves? Are they free men? Th en correspondingly increase the num-
ber of deputies. Are they slaves? Well then you should make this declaration. 
I should add, however, that in the course of these eight years, the number of 
patrocinados has diminished notably.”17 Additional repre sen ta tion for Cuba 
off ered, at most, more seats for Liberals in a crooked electoral system that al-
most always saw Constitucional victories. Translating that into legislative 
victories for Liberals relied on the questionable assumptions that freed Cuban 
men of color could obtain voting privileges in their communities and 
would be predisposed to support the party. At the very least, it augmented 
“Long Live Spain!” • 163
164 • Chapter 5
the Cuban bloc in the Cortes and worked toward the Autonomist aspiration 
of giving more Cubans a louder voice in Madrid.
Beyond po liti cal maneuvering, slave emancipation had moral, economic, 
and social rationales that partially resolved the signal paradox in the early 
nineteenth century that excluded Cubans from citizenship and repre sen ta-
tion. If the question of abolition sometimes divided the party, with slave-
owners such as Fernández de Castro frustrated by the radical abolitionism of 
colleagues such as Miguel Figueroa, the division was suffi  ciently malleable 
for those two men to campaign together in 1886.18 Newspapers weighed argu-
ments for ending slavery in moral and social terms. One writer in El Crisol, 
Partido Liberal daily in Cienfuegos, characterized emancipation as a natural 
extension of Spanish ideas of freedom, stopping well short of linking that 
freedom to equality. It represented the crucial step toward bringing Cuba and 
Spain closer together, for “when freedom opened its gates to the people of 
Spain, they saw that on the distant shores there was an enslaved race, and 
they could do no less than proclaim the emancipation of those disgraced be-
ings.” To illustrate the aff ective consequences of social and national unity, 
the writer leaned on gendered meta phors: “Th e virgin slave will be protected 
by her lover, and the orphan will not remain unsheltered, because it will be 
re united with its family.”19
Th e conservative newspaper in Cienfuegos, La Lealtad, would have none 
of this. In 1883, it portrayed Liberal slaveowners and Spanish abolitionists as 
ignorant of Cuban realities— Spaniards for having never even visited Cuba, 
Liberals for their hypocrisy. Th e Liberal planter who sought to accelerate 
emancipation was the same man, a writer in La Lealtad argued, who calmly 
read po liti cal pamphlets on his porch next to “the negrito in chains,” pausing 
between puff s of tobacco and cups of coff ee to “order shackles put on Mateo 
for having broken the spurs on a fi ne cock the day earlier.” Th e newspaper 
especially mocked the praise showered upon the Liberals by the London Times 
for their eff orts to end slavery, so much more sanctimoniously than even the 
British had famously done that Cuban Liberals seemed “more papist than the 
Pope.”20 Abolition promised to deepen, not heal, political wounds.
No matter the partisan discursive battle about abolition, the transition to 
free labor raised new social concerns. Planters frequently invoked a labor 
shortage as the inevitable result of emancipation, a means of comprehending 
the unpredictability of postemancipation sugar production and of cloaking 
their desire to suppress wages. Liberals addressed this apprehension with a 
sustained commitment to encouraging immigration from Spain. Although 
migrant workers had been coming to Cuba from China and Yucatán since 
the middle third of the century, they did not provide the adaptive, coopera-
tive workforce that planters and politicians desired. One of El Crisol’s writers 
argued that if the “Hispano- Cuban provinces” attracted white laborers, the 
population would not feel “the evils that racial heterogeneity brings with it.” 
Chinese workers in both rural and urban Cienfuegos exemplifi ed these evils 
and, to the journalist, raised doubt as to their suitability as loyal subjects: “It 
is such an exclusive race, so devoted to its habits and customs, that despite 
years of living in this country it has not been able to vary its dress or customs; 
its stores contain goods from its country and that they consume themselves: 
clothing, medicine, china . . .  there is nothing from our country, for it seems 
that they despise it, to the extent that if they cultivate a piece of land they do 
not scatter seeds other than those of their own country.”21 According to the 
author, legal restrictions had long regulated the free migration of Spaniards 
to Cuba, forcing planters to use labor “that converted the countryside of this 
fertile land into a cemetery of the Ethiopian and Asiatic races, such that by 
natural law one can conclude that their introduction should always be prohib-
ited.”22 White Spanish workers, on the other hand, would contribute to what 
Fernández de Castro would later call “the harmony of the Spanish family,” 
already accustomed to the routines and practices of “Hispano- Cuban” life. In 
concert with other Liberal aims, the capacity and initiative of Spanish work-
ers to cultivate wheat, cotton, cacao, and coff ee would reduce Cuba’s de pen-
den cy on imports and foreign competition, augment foreign trade, and thus 
compel the government to reduce tariff s. Spanish immigration, then, com-
plemented the most basic assumptions of Cuban liberalism as it off ered a 
comprehensive solution to the social, po liti cal, and economic tensions of the 
1880s. As colonial policy, it institutionalized racial preferences based on the 
assumption that the populations of African and Chinese descent constituted 
a degenerative force in Cuba’s economy and society.
Emancipation and immigration  were also on the minds of cienfuegueros, 
where by 1886 the eff ects of gradual abolition  were in plain view. According to 
censuses, the slave population in the region (including the plantations in the 
city’s hinterland) had dwindled from over 11,000 in 1877 to 5,447 by 1883. In 
the city itself, only 346 patrocinados remained in apprenticeship in 1886, com-
pared to 1,710 two years earlier.23 Th e precipitous drop had not drastically 
decreased the number of workers in the sugar industry. Other transforma-
tions of rural labor had a more profound eff ect on sugar production, espe-
cially the centralization of sugar mills and tenant cane farming.24 Th e transition 
to freedom did off er former slaves additional mobility, and ledger books from 
the Santa Rosalía estate near Cienfuegos note brief, periodic departures by 
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workers “to the city” in the months following their emancipation.25 Canary Is-
landers and Galicians  were arriving in larger numbers to the city and country-
side, where, as Soledad estate own er Edwin Atkins noted, they “worked with 
the negroes in the cane fi elds.”26
Planters also identifi ed a related phenomenon that fueled their arguments 
about a labor shortage: the migration of African- descended workers to the 
Isthmus of Panama to build a canal. As patrocinados became free, some of 
them responded to calls for workers to leave Cienfuegos altogether for new 
work in a new country. Th e canal project drew labor from many Ca rib be an 
islands and surrounding mainland regions. Th e number of migrants was still 
small in Cuba, but a comparison to Jamaica startled Conservatives. Nearly 
25,000 Jamaican workers had left  to work in Panama in 1883 alone, and a 
proportional exodus from Cuba could have devastated the sugar economy. 
Locally, contractors had recruited two hundred workers to leave Cienfuegos 
in December 1885 on a schooner bound for the canal zone.27 Th e Diario de 
Cienfuegos pleaded for awareness of the grim working conditions that awaited 
workers in Panama: “We hope that no more emigrants from Cuba will leave 
for this slaughter house,” which promised workers “elevated wages that are 
perfectly illusory.”28 Th e North American overseer of the Soledad estate 
changed his perspective on migration dramatically in the course of several 
months. He wrote to Edwin Atkins in October 1885 that “laborers still con-
tinue to go to Panama, but at present we have more than we require”; by Jan-
uary 1886, he complained that “our greatest diffi  culty in the future I fear will 
be the labor question and our only remedy to pay higher wages as so many 
laborers have been taken to Panama and St. Jago. Th is meaning all the white 
laborers refused to go to work and the greater part of them have gone off .”29 
Th e Cortes and the Ministerio de Ultramar had intended gradual emancipa-
tion to circumvent crises brought by sudden legal changes. But in Cienfuegos 
and elsewhere in Cuba, the end of the patronato and other forces generated 
real and imagined concerns about the future postemancipation society and 
economy.
Because these changes aff ected nonelite Cubans, the institutions of public 
opinion sanctioned by the Pact of Zanjón developed at an advantageous time, 
for they off ered unpre ce dented potential for open discussions of po liti cal is-
sues. Cubans of African descent faced limits on their abilities to participate 
in the new colonial politics. If the loyalty of free people of color had consistently 
been mea sured by their relationship to a presumed dangerous slave popula-
tion, the elimination of the slave- free legal distinction only raised additional 
questions about their educational and civic capacities for citizenship. Th e 
challenges they faced  were steep. Most lacked the material and educational 
resources to cultivate the respectable public personae that could mark them as 
loyal subjects— one of the many reasons that more radical affi  liations, includ-
ing the in de pen dence movement, could have held more appeal. In Cienfuegos, 
the Casino Español had no counterpart among residents of color, and attempts 
to make private opinions public continued to center on the development of 
other clubs, societies, and associations, and on the spaces where they could 
meet.
Th e Th eatrics of Public Space and Associational Life
Th e pro cess of fi nally extending full legal freedom to all inhabitants of the 
island marked an especially momentous year to test the limits of the post- 
Zanjón reforms. How would public life change with more Cubans of color 
enjoying greater mobility? What changes would occur in public demands for 
citizenship, since, fi rst, the enslavement of so many subjects had long compli-
cated eff orts to include the island in national- imperial politics, and second, 
the ill fi t between slavery and liberalism had allowed politicians in Madrid to 
dismiss or sideline claims to citizenship even by the island’s elite? And how 
might defi nitive legal emancipation, as opposed to the gradual transition to 
freedom over the previous sixteen years, aff ect the loyalty of the Cuban popu-
lation to Spanish rule? Certainly, allegiance to the state was rarely the sole or 
primary affi  liation of individuals, and emancipation, combined with unpre-
ce dented access to public spaces, held the potential to destabilize the ideal-
ized link between public rights and loyalty to empire.
Religious and spiritual solidarities represented forms of authority that 
people could look to as an alternative to state power. And when Catholicism 
was not the religion in question, colonial offi  cials gave rapt attention to deter-
mining the po liti cal content of institutionalized spiritual beliefs. One par tic-
u lar clash over associational rights in Cienfuegos sparked broad inquiry into 
the racial and po liti cal leanings of relatively new centros de espiritismo. French 
educator Allan Kardec (the pen name of Hippolyte Léon Denizard Rivail) 
explored principles of communication with spirits, and his writings caught 
on like wildfi re in former (or remaining, in the case of Brazil) slave societies 
in the Americas, where some African- derived cultural practices involved 
communication with spirits and the dead. Spiritist centers in Cuba devoted 
themselves to the study of Kardec’s writings but attracted a large following 
among Cubans of color. Clemente Pereira y Casines, the pastor of Cien-
fuegos’s main church, halted a meeting of espiritistas at the Teatro Zorrilla 
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on 31 March 1886. He appealed to the gobernador civil to deny the followers’ 
request for offi  cial authorization. In letters to local newspapers, Pereira re-
minded readers that Article 11 of the Spanish Constitution proclaimed Ca-
tholicism the offi  cial state religion. It affi  rmed religious tolerance but forbade 
public displays of non- Catholic practices. Espiritismo, the pastor argued, 
challenged Christianity and disturbed “conscience, family, and society.”30 Th e 
alcalde of Cienfuegos, Juan de Campo, attempted to quell the confl ict by ex-
plaining that his hands  were tied: the Ley de Reuniones Públicas (Law of 
Public Association) from 15 July 1880 approved of meetings such as the velada 
lírica- literaria (music- literary gathering) that the espiritistas had planned.31 
Unconvinced that naming an event as something other than a religious dis-
play was a guarantee of anything, both Pereira and de Campo sought an-
swers about what could take place in the Zorrilla.
Th eir queries launched a subsequent islandwide investigation of espirit-
ismo that yielded numerous examples of meetings attended primarily by 
African- descended Cubans, and according to authorities, “in which they pro-
nounce against the white race and Spanish Nationality.”32 Nevertheless, the 
espiritista group in Cienfuegos petitioned the captain general in Havana 
to revoke the suspension of their meeting at the Zorrilla based on “the legal 
precepts that help us.” Th ey referred to the public reunion law and to a royal 
decree from 1881 that extended the law to Cuba to regulate the exercise of 
rights proclaimed in Article 13 of the Spanish Constitution— that is, the right 
of every Spaniard to associate peacefully. Th e espiritistas had complied with 
the stipulation in the 1880 law requiring groups to inform local authorities 
in writing twenty- four hours in advance of a meeting. Such meetings  were 
oft en advertised in three legally sanctioned newspapers—La Luz de los Espa-
cios, El Buen Deseo, and La Nueva Alianza— that  were “dedicated to the adver-
tisement and defense of the doctrines of Espiritismo.” A group of cienfuegueros 
petitioned the captain general and asked, “If in Havana and Matanzas . . . 
these meetings take place with the protection of the Laws, what motive, what 
legal reason, can exist for this city, under the protection of those same laws, 
not to be able to celebrate meetings of the same nature and disposition?”33
Th is question represented only a fraction of the confusion in Cuba and 
Spain over the limits of free association. Generally, secular groups encoun-
tered less interference from local authorities, who allowed the or ga ni za tion of 
scientifi c, artistic, charitable, and social groups.34 Offi  cials continued to mon-
itor the proliferation of associations in terms of their potential loyalty or 
disloyalty to colonial rule, and Cubans of all backgrounds showed remark-
able literacy and agility with the associational laws. Th e three weekly and 
monthly periodicals begun by and for black and mulatto cienfuegueros in 
1886 attest to the presence of a literate, self- aware urban public.35
As a consequence of the associational boom, organizations and wealthy 
residents built new theaters. Construction fi nished in 1885 on the Teatro 
Zorrilla at the corner of Castillo and Bouyon Streets, which lay approxi-
mately four blocks west of the city’s main square. It opened early in 1886 with 
enough space for up to three hundred people, and it competed with other 
medium- sized theater spaces in the city.36 It featured public entertainment, 
including numerous per for mances by compañías de bufo, which off ered the 
most pop u lar form of public entertainment with their comic plays and vi-
gnettes (fi gure 5.1).37 Bufo grew in popularity in the late nineteenth century 
as a form of music and theater that almost always involved blackface per for-
mance, and its coexistence with other features of civic life in theaters attests 
to the pervasive anxieties and preoccupations with race at the end of the 
century. Bufo companies performed pieces that commented on Cuban poli-
tics, with such titles as Liberales y conservadores and Confl icto municipal. As 
politics premiered at the Zorrilla in these comic pre sen ta tions, formal po liti-
cal meetings tended to take place in other venues. Predictably, the Partido 
Unión Constitucional continued to hold its meetings at the Casino Español, 
the conservative pro- Spanish club, which hosted a vociferous debate on the 
diff erences between the Partido Liberal and the separatists in mid- January.38 
Th e Partido Liberal meetings oft en occurred in the Teatro Pabellón Campo, 
one of the city’s most prominent venues.
By 1886, societies of color formed a complex network with other associa-
tions in Cienfuegos. Th ese organizations oft en developed within the physical 
spaces that they claimed in the city. Although the spaces included centers 
and schools, the size and versatility of theaters gave them special prominence 
in public life. Only a half century earlier, Captain General Miguel Tacón wor-
ried so much about the potential for unrest in theaters that he briefl y forbade 
applause. Aft er the Zanjón reforms, audiences clapped at all kinds of per for-
mances. Po liti cal meetings and speeches, plays, dramatic readings, and dances 
by diff erent organizations could all take place in the same theater. Th e Teatro 
Zorrilla, aft er all, hosted not only the Partido Liberal meeting that ended in 
chaos but also the espiritista meeting earlier in the year. Cienfuegos historian 
Victoria María Sueiro Rodríguez has argued that following the Ten Years’ 
War, the colonial government attempted to impose a reactionary character 
on the activities of theaters, to transform the theater into “an instrument 
contrary to the aspirations of the in de pen dence of the people.”39 Th is was 
certainly the case: it was unlikely that any theater would open its doors for a 
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figure 5.1 • Cover image of Repertorio de bufos habaneros. Th e volume features 
the play Los negros catedráticos: Absurdo cómico en un acto de costumbres cubanas 
en prosa y verso (Th e black professors: An absurd one- act comedy of Cuban 
customs in prose and verse), fi rst performed at the Teatro de Villanueva, Havana, 
31 May 1868. Courtesy of the Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami 
Libraries.
planning meeting for another in de pen dence war. But the po liti cal activities 
that did take place, including Liberal gatherings, occupied a spectrum of 
po liti cal ideas too broad (but not by much) to be considered universally reac-
tionary. Public space could easily be divided along racial and ethnic lines, 
with many theaters converting themselves into “purely Spanish” enterprises: 
the Teatro Albisu, for example, almost exclusively performed Spanish zarzue-
las. Other groups proceeded accordingly. In 1883, a theater opened exclusively 
for Chinese- descended cienfuegueros that  housed per for mances by a com-
pany of Chinese actors.40
Sociedades de color embraced the theater milieu as well. A further indica-
tion of the post- Zanjón associational boom came in 1883, when the Conser-
vative Cienfuegos newspaper La Lealtad reported that “the youth of the class 
of color have opened a new Center on Bouyon Street” near the Zorrilla that 
included a school for children.41 Th is new center was on the same street as the 
building of the Sociedad La Amistad, one of Cienfuegos’s main societies of 
color, whose meeting space La Lealtad described as suffi  ciently “spacious and 
ventilated” for residents of Cienfuegos to attend its functions.42 Th e Centro La 
Amistad regularly held eve ning meetings with entertainment for men, women, 
and children. Activities of the Centro La Amistad ranged from magic shows by 
“Sr. Jiménez, El Negro Brujo” to poetry readings and plays to dances. Th e 
educational and mutual aid functions provided members with tools that the 
municipal government, to say nothing of the overseas ministry in Madrid, 
 were slow to off er.
In other moments, however, members of La Amistad acted as part of a 
larger civic community that included Cubans of all backgrounds who expressed 
loyalty to the Spanish government and even to Spaniards themselves. Th rough-
out September and October 1885, the theater at the Centro La Amistad held 
widely publicized benefi t per for mances by a bufo company, “the fi rst com-
pany of people of color that has begun to travel throughout the principal 
populations of the island,” which had arrived in Cienfuegos for several months. 
It was directed by Federico Pedrosa, a well- known bufo author, a former per-
former, and— according to the local newspaper El Fénix—“a young man of 
color.” 43 Pedrosa directed his own works for the benefi ts, and publicity subtly 
noted that white Cubans  were especially welcome. Th e proceeds from his 
per for mances did not help the members of the company or La Amistad. In-
stead, they went to Spain to help “the disgraced provinces of the Peninsula,” 
“the disgraced who suff er the consequences of cholera in the Mother Country.” 44
News of a cholera epidemic in Spain in 1885 had reached as far as rural 
communities, farms, and plantations around Cienfuegos, and charitable 
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eff orts fl ourished. Patrocinados and free workers on the Santa Rosalía sugar 
estate, for instance, donated small portions of their meager wages to help vic-
tims and their families.45 Centro La Amistad’s more centralized, or ga nized, 
and lucrative fundraising garnered widespread praise from newspapers and 
municipal leaders. As much as the society’s activities may have affi  rmed a 
racial identifi cation as a patron of performers of color, their public self- 
fashionings did not simply assert a racially exclusive “Afro- Cuban” or “Pan- 
African” identity.46 Th e society also staked a claim to membership in a larger 
colonial po liti cal community, one that might have promised more symbolic 
than material rewards for the loyalty of La Amistad’s members, but one that 
benefi ted nonetheless from their civic and fi nancial contributions.
A multiracial civic identity sometimes allowed for some fl exibility within 
the general segregation of associational space, as various centros and socie-
dades in Cienfuegos lent out their buildings to other organizations for func-
tions. Th e leadership committee of the Gremio de Obreros del Ramo de 
Tabaquerías— the cigar makers’  union and the principal labor  union in Cuba 
between 1878 and 1886— held a meeting on a Sunday morning in October 
1885 at the Centro La Igualdad, the space held by the similarly named sociedad 
de color.47 A per for mance of Pedrosa’s Compañía de Bufos de Color moved, 
on very short notice, to the nearby Centro Artesano.48 In the middle of May 
1886, the Casino Gran China advertised a three- day series of “fi estas de cos-
tumbre,” to which  were invited “all of the asiáticos [Asians],” and, “on the 
last day, the clase de color.” 49 However, the newspaper El Fénix reported that 
police took a pardo to their headquarters in late August for throwing rocks 
at the casino. Th e contested spaces revealed a fractured public sphere— or, at 
the very least, an interest on the part of police and journalists in highlight-
ing racial and ethnic tensions between cienfuegueros of diff erent back-
grounds. Th us a familiar colonial dynamic of racial division could coexist 
with a common identifi cation with the mother country. Even these acts 
could constitute sociedad members as loyal subjects with a broad vision of 
imperial solidarity.
By February 1886, some degree of confl ict or rivalry appeared to be brew-
ing between the Teatro Zorrilla and the Centro La Amistad. On 27 February, 
the Diario de Cienfuegos abruptly announced that “to night [the compañía de 
bufos] works in the Centro La Amistad, as a result of having terminated the 
dates that they had with the Business of the Teatro Zorrilla.”50 Two days later, 
the newspaper reported that the Zorrilla would begin per for mances by a “new 
zarzuela company or ga niz ing these days,” while the Compañía Bufa gave two 
per for mances over the weekend at La Amistad, “where they hope to remain 
for some time.”51 Weeks later, the Zorrilla boasted such large audiences that it 
scheduled additional per for mances of such works as La mulata de rango (Th e 
ranking mulata) and La mala raza (Th e bad race). On 17 October, just two 
days before the disturbance erupted at the Zorrilla, the theater hosted a 
meeting of the Galician- born Spaniards in Cienfuegos to explore the for-
mation of a Sociedad de Benefi cencia, a charity and mutual- aid society.52 Al-
though sources do not reveal details about the theatrical companies, the 
per for mances, and the audiences, the increasing polarization between the 
Zorrilla and La Amistad suggests that the urban population by October felt 
allegiances to par tic u lar theaters that delineated racial solidarities. As Cubans 
of color sought a presence in public spaces, associations, and forums, they 
confronted social impediments that tipped the resources of public opinion in 
favor of less marginalized groups. Th eir exclusion, voluntary or not, from the 
Zorrilla and from some of the public and po liti cal events that took place 
there likely amplifi ed the controversy surrounding the Partido Liberal meet-
ing on 20 October.
Liberalism, Now in Th eaters Near You
In this environment fragmented by race, associational affi  liations, and public 
space, Rafael Fernández de Castro and Miguel Figueroa attempted to cultivate 
pop u lar loyalty to themselves and to the Partido Liberal. In 1886, the men 
campaigned for two of the six seats in the Cortes reserved for representatives 
of Santa Clara province. Th roughout the year, they visited countless cities in 
Santa Clara and even other parts of Cuba. Although Figueroa was no less 
prominent than Fernández de Castro in party politics, he took a supporting 
role in the excursiones políticas and rarely gave speeches. Together, they 
appeared at centers, clubs and associations, and theaters with varying con-
nections to the Partido Liberal, and, of course, at local party meetings them-
selves. By the end of 1886, they had visited Santa Clara, Sagua la Grande, 
Cienfuegos, Remedios, Sancti- Spíritus, Trinidad, and other small towns in 
the province. Fernández de Castro coined the tour an “excursión política,” 
the fi rst trip he had taken with Figueroa, “my unforgettable friend and com-
pañero.” He had made a similar trip several years earlier with Rafael Mon-
toro, in what constituted the most direct contact that Liberal politicians had 
with the Cuban populations for whom they spoke.53 In light of the worries 
that Cortes deputies expressed about their tenuous ties to Cuba’s provincial 
population, the excursión had added signifi cance as an attempt to communi-
cate ideas about colonial government to the public.
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In pivotal moments during his tour, Fernández de Castro peppered his 
remarks with discourteous swipes at Conservatives that oft en played on ra-
cial ste reo types. During a speech in Cerro in September, he cautioned 
against taking for granted the Liberal presence in Spanish politics. Th e battle 
with the Partido Unión Constitucional required sustained vigilance: “Our 
constitucionales are simply and essentially the conservatives of this society; 
but not of the style of the conservatives of Eu ro pe an people, rather, in the 
style of primitive African societies: they are the ferocious reactionaries, sys-
tematic and eternal enemies of the freedom of this land in which they have 
received all that they have and where they have achieved all that they are and 
all that they are worth.”54 Th e struggle against conservatism, then, did not 
embody high- minded po liti cal ideas as much as what Fernández de Castro 
saw as Cuban society’s most dangerous and retrograde elements: African- 
descended people and their unsophisticated capacity for loyalty, which could 
shift  as easily to “primitive African societies” as to the ferocious reactionaries 
in the Conservative Party. In the months preceding the formal end of slavery, 
he bore witness to the ideological compatibility of abolitionism and racism 
and communicated his po liti cal statements in the language of race. He made a 
weak case for the broad extension of citizenship to Cubans of color.
One week before the elections, Fernández de Castro once again appealed to 
racial antagonisms when he spoke in Cienfuegos on Monday, 29 March at the 
Teatro Pabellón Campo. He came accompanied not by Miguel Figueroa, who 
was in Remedios “to make good,” but with Antonio Govín, the secretary of 
the general committee of the Partido Liberal Autonomista. Th e secretary did 
most of the talking during the meeting of two-and-one- half hours, but Fernán-
dez de Castro gave brief opening remarks. Although the Diario de Cienfuegos 
reported that he spoke “with a certain moderation,” he blamed Conserva-
tives for Cuba’s problems and proceeded “to depict the class of color with the 
same point of view as Saco, that is, as an inferior race that was not right for 
Cuba. It goes without saying the eff ect that such words had in one part of the 
auditorium.”55 Fernández de Castro referred  here to José Antonio Saco, the 
early nineteenth- century creole planter and intellectual who warned of slav-
ery’s social menace and who advocated white immigration to ensure the suc-
cess of the island. Whether Fernández de Castro warranted the newspaper’s 
comparison to Saco by underscoring previous Liberal calls for Spanish migra-
tion is debatable. Given the critical tone of the Diario de Cienfuegos article, 
however, it was likely an unfl attering association and one pointing to the 
strong possibility that even that cienfuegueros of color had fi lled that “one 
part of the auditorium.”
If Fernández de Castro’s racism raised eyebrows in Cienfuegos, it had lit-
tle eff ect on his campaign. He won the fourth- largest number of votes in the 
election of deputies to represent Santa Clara province in the Cortes. Candi-
dates with the fi ve- highest vote totals won Santa Clara’s seats; Miguel 
Figueroa came in fi ft h, behind Fernández de Castro and three Unión Consti-
tutional candidates.56 Constitucionales won eigh teen of the twenty- four Cu-
ban seats, an imbalance that left  Liberals to augment their legitimacy through 
appeals to public support. Th at Fernández de Castro and Figueroa did not con-
clude their excursión política aft er the elections suggests that winning seats in 
the Cortes was not their only end in crisscrossing the island.
However, the deputies interrupted their tour to make the two- week voyage 
back to Madrid for a momentous Cortes session in July. Fernández de Castro, 
Figueroa, and their colleagues tended to administrative matters including 
military reform in Cuba. Although the Ten Years’ War and the Guerra Chi-
quita had ended six years earlier, Fernández de Castro still saw provincial 
Cuba as a breeding ground of disloyalty, of theft , and of vagrancy and un-
ruliness. Th e Ministerio de Ultramar had nevertheless decreased the mili-
tary presence in Cuba in the early 1880s. Th ose soldiers who  were still on the 
island had ill- defi ned responsibilities, whereas the onerous burden of main-
taining public order fell upon municipal police forces and veterans. In late 
July, Fernández de Castro made his case for allowing Spanish soldiers to as-
sume partial responsibility for public order, thus increasing greatly the amount 
of work that this obligated the military to carry out. He singled out Cien-
fuegos as the city that would most benefi t from such mea sures, not only by 
shift ing the attention of the many local battalions and militias to public order 
but also by cutting costs. He even provided statistical data regarding cost- 
eff ectiveness with specifi c recommendations for the Ayuntamiento of Cien-
fuegos.57 His po liti cal fortunes secure, he set himself to the task of making 
potentially unpop u lar decisions about the province he represented to the high-
est levels of colonial government.
Ending slavery, however, was the main event of the Cortes session. Aft er 
six years of Liberal advocacy for ending the patronato early, most patrocina-
dos had already obtained freedom by 1886. Po liti cal debates over abolition in 
Madrid and Havana had proliferated during the economic downturn of the 
mid- 1880s, and the Spanish government, as Rebecca Scott notes, was “eager 
to dispense with the issue once and for all.”58 When Fernández de Castro 
spoke to the Congreso de Diputados in late July, he attempted to assuage re-
calcitrant planters and Conservatives who still opposed abolition. As Cubans, 
he pleaded, “we faithfully understand that in order to explain all of the vices 
“Long Live Spain!” • 175
176 • Chapter 5
from which social order suff ers in the Antilles, they are explained by the slav-
ery that has disturbed moral order and by the military despotism that has 
disturbed the order of law.”59 Free of slavery, he argued, Cuba would be more 
capable of managing itself eco nom ical ly and po liti cally while still remaining 
a Spanish colony. On 30 July, aft er brief debate, the Senate passed a resolution 
to end the patronato for good.
When the royal decree ending the patronato fi nally came on 7 October, 
celebrations occurred throughout the island. Even before the formal an-
nouncement, news of the decision in Madrid inspired an upbeat reaction in 
Havana. On 31 August a crowd of African- descended habaneros gathered 
outside Miguel Figueroa’s residence in a “testimony of gratitude.” Figueroa 
emerged from his  house, “reassigned” their good thanks to all of the deputies 
from the Partido Liberal, and off ered the well- wishers drinks from the 
nearby El Louvre Restaurant.60 On 7 October, the day of fi nal abolition, Cu-
bans of color took to the streets in Havana: bands and orchestras played while 
representatives of cofradías and cabildos from Havana and ten other cities 
marched toward the Parque Central. Many of them carried banners com-
memorating abolitionist politicians and the Sociedad Abolicionista Española. 
Th e pro cession ended with a large coach, fl anked by four smaller  horse- drawn 
carriages, carry ing a youth who represented freedom and who wore the col-
ors of the Spanish fl ag.61 Public ceremonies elsewhere experienced less hoopla. 
In Santiago de Cuba, for example, the Círculo Español built a triumphal arch 
that stretched from its building to the main plaza, and it or ga nized festivi-
ties on a Sunday eve ning that included fi reworks. Th e Círculo planned the 
celebration with “a few members of the clase de color,” but without much 
publicity. Few individuals attended, and rain showers further dampened the 
occasion.62
Residents of Cienfuegos needed no rain to muddy their enthusiasm about 
emancipation. Th ey reacted with little fanfare when the city’s 346 remaining 
patrocinados became free.63 Th e only newsworthy public activities occurred 
the weekend earlier, when the church in the main square held a mass, sermon, 
and fi esta for the Virgen de Caridad (Virgin of Charity) on Saturday eve ning 
and Sunday morning. Members of the local Carabalí cabildo, whose patroness 
was the Virgen de Caridad, attended and carried an image of the Virgin in 
pro cession throughout the city to “the Cabildo  house of the grey carabalí 
[Carabalí nation].”64 Conservatives in Cienfuegos  were less than enthusiastic 
to receive the news. Th e Diario de Cienfuegos ran a lackluster story that be-
gan, “Laws are made by necessity, and it is necessary to comply with them,” 
and ended with the cautionary tale of an ill- prepared Matanzas planter 
whose ingenio had just failed when he had no replacements for his former 
slaves, now given to “theft , gambling, and drunkenness.”65 Th e fi nal abolition 
of slavery, then, found no public commemoration in Cienfuegos as it did in 
other parts of Cuba (and, in fact, the rest of the Americas). Less than two 
weeks later, Fernández de Castro and Figueroa would learn the consequences 
of trying to stage one of their own.
“With Sticks, Stones, and Revolvers”: Figueroa and 
Fernández de Castro at the Teatro Zorrilla
Th e fi rst sign of trouble on Wednesday, 20 October appeared with the very 
arrival of Fernández de Castro and Figueroa at the train station in Cienfuegos 
at midday.66 Th ey came accompanied by Liberal colleagues from neighboring 
Sagua, Santo Domingo, Lajas, Cruces, and Palmira. Liberal sympathizers  were 
waiting to welcome them as they proceeded to the residence of Rafael Ca-
brera, one of the local party offi  cials and or ga niz er of the meeting at the 
Teatro Zorrilla where they would speak that eve ning. Cienfuegueros of color 
fi gured prominently in the entourage, provocatively throwing kernels of corn 
at the  houses of prominent constitucionales that they passed.
According to one investigator, the Teatro Zorrilla was a last- minute choice 
for the party meeting, “aft er having looked at other locales that did not want 
to cede the space, despite the own ers’ being affi  liated in the party.” By early 
eve ning, authorities noted how quickly the Zorrilla had fi lled with “the people 
of color from that barrio, having invaded the locale to the extreme of being 
absolutely impossible to penetrate the theater.” Suspicions arose that many of 
the people gathered had heard “some rumor that had been delivered to them, 
as a consequence of the speeches given in Sagua, Santo Domingo, and 
Palmira.” Despite the eff usive protestations of darkness that witnesses invoked 
to excuse themselves from identifying individual instigators, nearly all of them 
agreed on the Conservative overtones of the initial “dark” presence: the most 
common descriptions of the crowd identifi ed it as mostly constitucionales and 
people of color (not always distinct groups). But overall the group assembled 
defi ed easy categorization. One offi  cial off ered the tepid compliment that 
“within the locale and despite being mostly people of color, there was a diver-
sity of opinions.” But consistent narratives of the event ended  here. Nearly ev-
ery account of the meeting told a diff erent version of the basic narrative at the 
point when Fernández de Castro began his speech. Th e concern that this 
prompted sparked an in- depth investigation that irritated local partisan adver-
saries who had seized on the disorder to intensify years- long rivalries.
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Local Liberal and Conservative newspapers bristled with antipathy for 
their po liti cal opponents. El País, the island- wide Liberal daily, condemned 
the “rude interruptions of the conservatives” throughout the “highly con-
ciliatory and governmental sentiment” of Fernández de Castro’s speech. It 
chastised the alcalde, Juan de Campo, who “crossed his arms” while the 
deputies  were in physical danger, and scorned him for doing nothing in the 
immediate wake of the incident while “the  houses in which our friends sleep 
 were the objects of violent threats.”67 Th e Diario de Cienfuegos, on the other 
hand, expressed a modicum of remorse for the violence that broke out, but 
asserted that events  were beyond the control of Conservatives or Liberals. 
“Insupportable insults, gratuitous suppositions, and at times scoffi  ng”  were 
bound to produce confl ict and alarm, especially with “2,000 people of all 
classes at night.”68 It claimed that similar conditions had produced similar 
disorders as far away as Tapaste, Madruga, and San Antonio de los Baños. 
Most of all, the newspaper took off ense at Fernández de Castro’s claim that 
the Partido Liberal, not “the government of the Nation, Spain” should receive 
credit for the abolition of slavery: “Th e gratitude of the raza de color that has 
received that benefi t, should be suffi  cient, and we do not doubt that it is 
Spain, the noble Spanish nation, whose glorious fl ag is and will always be the 
protective aegis of their rights, of their well- being and their progress.”69 Not 
only, then, had the reaction to the tumult amplifi ed partisan bickering about 
who better represented the Spanish government; the terms of that debate 
now centered on protecting the rights of African- descended Cubans— an 
tacit acknowledgment of their citizenship couched in paternalistic terms. 
Th e loyalties of people of color, derived from the “protective aegis” that each 
party off ered them, held a prominence for each party disproportionate to the 
po liti cal or public role that African- descended Cubans played in the region.
Th e overtones of patron- client maneuvering raise an important question 
about the willful participation of black and mulatto residents in Liberal and 
Conservative politics.  Were the corn throwers who escorted Fernández de 
Castro and Figueroa from the train station, then, hired or coerced into a 
staged per for mance? Several of the people interviewed in the subsequent in-
vestigation thought so. And a curious incident in nearby Trinidad the day 
aft er the Zorrilla commotion raised further doubt about the nature of the 
welcome extended to the deputies. Th e two men  were scheduled to appear in 
Trinidad to speak at another Partido Liberal meeting. Th e Autonomists 
in Trinidad had built a platform in the Plaza de Serrano just for the occasion, 
“so that they could be heard easily by the public that attended the meeting, to 
which they  were invited the night before.” El Imparcial, the Conservative 
newspaper in Trinidad, noted that “it seems that from the countryside come 
people, principally of color, excited to hear them.” Th e people of color in the 
city already had something cooked up: “Th e cabildos de negros of this city 
descended on the train stop, carry ing fl owers and bouquets, with the object 
to welcome the autonomist orators, in the erroneous belief that to them is 
owed the complete extinction of the patronato. A musician, too, waited at the 
stop; a musician that, at the sound of the train whistle, would begin to play, 
with those from the cabildos prostrating themselves to receive the orators in 
this position.” It is unlikely that so elaborate a demonstration of support was 
coerced or encouraged by a bribe, especially with acknowledgment that 
people of color could indeed maintain beliefs.
Fernández de Castro and Figueroa never appeared. Th ey took a train back 
from Cienfuegos directly to Havana, where they waited until their tour could 
safely continue. Th e crowds of negros in Trinidad returned to their homes 
and cabildo  houses disappointed because, as El Imparcial noted, “they believed 
that they  were going to greet expressly authorized representatives of the Na-
tional Government.”70 Th e Conservative author didn’t seem so sure. Yet again, 
Liberals stood separate from pop u lar understandings of who or what consti-
tuted the Spanish government. Conservatives in Trinidad, like those in Cien-
fuegos, expressed frustration that Liberals took credit for the fi nal abolition 
of slavery. Th e added insult was that “those fi ne people” of African descent in 
Trinidad properly esteemed the Spanish government but  were duped by Lib-
erals who made a mockery of their loyalty and, the Diario de Cienfuegos edi-
torialized, “abused the derecho de reunión [right of association].” Apparently, 
black and mulatto cienfuegueros had been a bit wiser.
Th e municipal and provincial governments expressed less interest in the 
competition for loyalty than in guaranteeing public order and sound asso-
ciational laws. Th eir interrogations of locals piled on questions about associa-
tional leadership, public order, race, party affi  liation, and social status. Within 
hours of the confl ict, tele grams shot from Cienfuegos to Santa Clara to Ha-
vana and back asking for procedural clarifi cation and promising a quick re-
turn to order. Rafael Correa, the gobernador civil of Santa Clara province, 
placed cardinal importance on the question of whether the numerous people 
in the theater violated “the use of the right of the Constitution of the State 
and the mentioned Law guaranteed to all citizens.” With the same rapidity 
and with the same extensive mandate that the orden pública (public order) 
investigation of espiritismo carried, the disturbance in Cienfuegos became 
the subject of deep inquiry. Although authorities obsessed over the sources, 
origins, and instigators of the outbreak, their investigative approach focused 
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equally on the behavior of the police and municipal authorities in promot-
ing, maintaining, and restoring public order. Correa sent representatives to 
Cienfuegos to speak “with persons of distinct classes of society in Cienfuegos, 
as well of distinct po liti cal colors” about what happened on 20 October at the 
Teatro Zorrilla.71
In the course of two weeks, Correa and his subordinates had interrogated 
thirty of the city’s residents, including theater guards, Partido Liberal orga-
nizers, meeting attendees, and the mayor, Juan de Campo. Correa visited the 
Teatro Zorrilla to count bullet holes and broken chairs. His investigation 
weathered a suspicious intervention when de Campo demanded new scribes 
and interrogators aft er two witnesses suggested names of possible instigators 
who  were closely aligned with the alcalde. Witnesses observed exemplary 
behavior on the part of police, complimenting them for not using arms to 
control the uprising. Correa questioned only two African- descended 
residents— the mother of the black demonstrator Pedro Jiménez, and also a 
mulatto barber who attended the meeting— to ascertain whether or not he 
died from wounds suff ered during the melee, as newspapers in Cuba and 
Spain had reported. (He lived.)
Juan de Campo himself was one of the fi rst cienfuegueros to testify, enu-
merating a small disturbance in the Zorrilla and in the streets outside be-
tween 8:15 and 8:30 p.m., and a second one ten minutes later that the police 
could control inside the theater but not in the street. Th e third outburst could 
not be contained, he explained, because the more orderly people from inside 
the theater spilled into the crowd outside and those in the streets scrambled 
to enter the building. Chairs broke and rocks fl ew accordingly. Yet de Campo 
was quick to emphasize how quickly municipal authorities reestablished 
order. He claimed that many residents of the city had assisted the police in 
calming the unrest, but noted Manuel Rivero, a col o nel in the volunteer 
forces, and José María Aceval in par tic u lar. Various newspapers had recently 
maligned the two, “treating them as rebellious, being the contrary,” and de 
Campo wanted to acknowledge their devotion to public order. De Campo 
claimed that he had received word late in the eve ning that the home of Rafael 
Cabrera, where Fernández de Castro and Figueroa  were staying, had been 
attacked “and other news of a private character” that made him “understand 
that the personas de la clase de color had risen up.” Once he dispensed the 
Guardia Civil to the Cabrera residence, all was calm.72
Despite the consensus that cienfuegueros of color had been the major ac-
tors in the disturbance, Correa’s commission never clarifi ed who, if anyone, 
led them. Of course, interrogators never bothered to ask. Th ey questioned 
Spaniards and white island- born residents disproportionately to their in-
volvement in the events, excluding the hundreds of black and mulatto eye-
witnesses from giving their account of the events. Esteban Cacicedo, the 
ayuntamiento member who caused a stir in 1884 with his racist comment about 
La Amistad and El Progreso’s schools, did not even attend the meeting, but 
he made a statement nevertheless. Pledging “complete impartiality,” Cacicedo 
conceded that some people of color threw corn, but he argued that the Par-
tido Liberal meeting should never have taken place in the fi rst place because 
“its promoters really should have realized that this is a pueblo eminently 
contrary to its ideas.” Moreover, he claimed, Fernández de Castro and 
Figueroa came preceded by the disturbing mala fama (rumor) of their re-
cent dishonor, “according to the Voluntarios at the Teatro Uriarte in Sagua la 
Grande.”73
Rumors of disparaging remarks about the voluntarios emerged in several 
of the testimonies. As one witness recalled an “insult” directed at the Spanish 
government at the beginning of the meeting in Cienfuegos, several more wit-
nesses claimed that Fernández de Castro aimed his criticisms in Sagua at 
the military. In light of Fernández de Castro’s call in July to reduce the mili-
tary presence on the island, voluntarios in Sagua may have perceived Fernán-
dez de Castro as a threat to the vitality of their institution— and to the rewards 
of military participation. A rumor of this tenor would have struck a note 
among those Cubans of color who derived status, material gain, and an argu-
ment for citizenship from their military ser vice.
Th e resentment generated by Fernández de Castro’s past speeches that in-
sulted people of color or that threatened military institutions emerges from 
the testimonies as a plausible explanation for the 20 October unrest. Joaquín 
Fernández, another prominent planter and businessman in Cienfuegos, 
placed the blame on the residents of color of the neighborhood surrounding 
the Teatro Zorrilla, but he also noted the presence of comisiones forasteros 
(external delegations) from Sagua. Like Cacicedo, he explained that “this pop-
ulation is contrary to the doctrines” of the Liberals and that “the spirits  were 
excited” by the news of the insults toward the voluntarios and of the corn 
thrown at the  houses of Conservative leaders.74  Here the observers wavered: 
they believed that Cubans of color  couldn’t possibly support the Liberals be-
cause they supported the Spanish nation, which only Conservatives repre-
sented. But they also cast them as pawns in a partisan game, with little agency 
to support one cause or another.
Agreements like this among the witnesses  were rare. Workers, planters, 
and city offi  cials off ered radically diff erent interpretations of the events at the 
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Zorrilla. One guard claimed that the individuals from Sagua  were sympa-
thetic Liberals. One lone witness, in defi ance of the famed darkness that envel-
oped Cienfuegos on 20 October, actually named names. Antonio Castiñeyra 
accused one Spaniard, Diego Riverón, of taking orders from Juan de Campo, 
and another— José María Aceval, who won the praise of de Campo— to de-
nounce the Liberals in fl ight from the theater as traitors and insurgents. But 
both men denied it. Aceval claimed that he and a few of his friends had sim-
ply overheard news of the meeting the following day at the Café El Escorial. 
Th e police chief of Santa Clara tellingly closed his summary without making 
a formal accusation against any of the people mentioned as possible instiga-
tors of the eruption. He doubted the validity and objectivity of any individual 
accusation and attributed the fracas to “personal quarrels exist among those 
of that locality.”75
Of all of the cienfuegueros questioned, the Liberal or ga niz er of the 20 
October meeting had the strongest obligation to convince offi  cials to see the 
events as a local squabble and not a sustained threat to public order from 
Cubans of color. Rafael Cabrera admitted in his testimony that Liberals and 
Conservatives in Cienfuegos bitterly resented one another, but that he had 
extended a personal invitation to local Conservative leader José Pertierra to 
attend the meeting at the Zorrilla. He added that the violence had its origins 
and targets in Cienfuegos, not in broader po liti cal confi gurations, and that 
he lamented what had happened “as a citizen and loyal observer of the Law.” 
Finally, and unlike other residents of the city, Cabrera tried to distinguish 
between the Liberal- Conservative feud and what he saw as a less po liti cally 
charged outburst by African- descended cienfuegueros. According to the tes-
timony, he “had recorded in his declaration that there had been alarm among 
the clase de color; but this was produced as a consequence of what had oc-
curred at the Zorrilla, and was generally able to be considered as a true pro-
test of the grave illegality committed, and under no concept as an attitude 
manifestly contrary to the Government nor, consequently, to nacionalidad.”76 
Cabrera likely anticipated a double condemnation of the Partido Liberal by 
colonial authorities in Havana and Madrid: one for the clash with Conserva-
tives and another for the disturbance by the population of color. To distant 
observers, the apparent overlap between those groups might evince a failure 
of both Liberal politics and liberal principles. If the Partido Liberal on the 
 whole took credit for emancipation, its local or ga niz er in Cienfuegos now 
headed off  accusations that Cubans— including those recently freed— were, 
at best, ill- prepared to exercise their new rights and, at worst, disloyal to the 
Spanish state. Cabrera tried to reiterate that the post- Zanjón reforms created 
public spaces for making claims to inclusion in the colonial po liti cal com-
munity, not for disrupting urban life and heightening racial discord. Attest-
ing to the loyalty of Cienfuegos’s black and mulatto residents protected the 
principles, if not the party, of liberalism that valued the free circulation of 
ideas among free men.
When the Cortes met in November, Fernández de Castro had no opportu-
nity to off er his own account of the fl are- up. Liberal and Conservative depu-
ties agreed on two matters as they discussed the events in Cienfuegos: that 
questions of race  were subordinate to partisan issues and that there was no 
concrete solution to the problems that they raised. Beyond that, they dis-
agreed vociferously on matters of fact and interpretation alike, and Fernán-
dez de Castro remained conspicuously silent. Furious Liberal deputies 
condemned the manner in which “voluntarios, in  union with Conservatives, 
had determined to obstruct Autonomist propaganda.” Conservative depu-
ties, on the other hand, did not take such a clear position. Th ey tried to por-
tray the violence that erupted as the direct result of Fernández de Castro’s 
infl ammatory remarks, not a commotion caused by some of their own sup-
porters. Th ey questioned whether Cubans “have the aptitude, loyalty, and sen-
sibility” to deserve the rights of or ga ni za tion and press that they had recently 
won as a concession in the Pact of Zanjón, but they recognized the favorable 
po liti cal valence of the disorder. Disloyalty to the conventions of the bur-
geoning public sphere had, ironically, affi  rmed loyalty to Spanish rule.77
Following their troubles in October, Fernández de Castro and Figueroa 
attempted one more time to spread the good news of liberalism to the people 
of Cienfuegos. In mid- November, four municipal guards on  horse back escorted 
the men from the docks to the  houses where each of them would sleep sepa-
rately. Th e next day, Juan de Campo foiled their plans to hold a meeting in a 
store house on the city’s northern limits when he exonerated the ayuntamiento 
from providing guards and security for such an isolated location. Local Liber-
als quickly secured the meeting rooms of the Liceo, but municipal offi  cials 
again blocked the men from speaking, citing the public reunion law that re-
quired advance notice of twenty- four hours.78 In turn, the deputies departed 
Cienfuegos for good, leaving the city’s Conservative leaders to dominate lo-
cal politics until the outbreak of the fi nal war for in de pen dence in 1895.
At heart, Fernández de Castro’s gaff es throughout his excursión política 
reveal a profound ignorance of local realities. As a wealthy planter from Ha-
vana province, his claim to represent the population of Santa Clara was weak 
at best, but representative politics on the island was not the only issue at hand. 
Building and strengthening a po liti cal relationship between politicians in 
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Madrid and subjects in provincial Cuba acquired a more important role. To 
this end, Fernández de Castro and other Liberal colleagues attempted a 
 po liti cal experiment of reaching out to disfranchised Cubans with an eye 
toward preparing the island for self- government. In 1881, during a speech in 
Guanabacoa, he expressed sympathy for “cities to impede the po liti cal inva-
sion of the State that threatens their local initiative.”79 In 1886, local initia-
tives in Cienfuegos had sparked an invasion of national- imperial initiatives. 
Th e racial vocabulary of liberalism and conservatism among Cuban politi-
cians attempted to check metropolitan fears of social unrest and violent local 
initiatives by asserting the loyalty of African- descended Cubans.
by february 1887, Rafael Fernández de Castro had ended his excursión 
política for good and had returned to Havana. He ensconced himself in the 
capital’s cosmopolitan circles, heading to a theater once to take in a per for-
mance by Sarah Bernhardt and mingling with his Liberal colleagues. He gave 
a speech to the Círculo Autonomista that showed a tireless determination to 
challenge Spanish prejudices about Cuba’s unpreparedness for self- rule. Yet 
he was surprisingly articulate about the degeneracy and disorder attributed 
to Cubans— informed, perhaps, by the recent memory of gunfi re and fl ying 
rocks and sticks four months earlier. He faulted Spaniards for viewing Cu-
bans as “worthless, ignorant people,” those who “thought without reason and 
spoke without agility, that we  here are ‘Indians in frock- coats’ or mimicking 
monkeys of the most depraved customs in the world.” Alongside the allusion 
to indigenous Americans, the simian reference replicated pervasive associa-
tions in late nineteenth- century racial discourse between apes and people of 
African descent. Despite his faith in Cubans, he admitted that some of the 
island’s woes  were beyond his comprehension: “To give an exact idea of 
the social chaos in which we live, there are neither words nor concepts in the 
language of po liti cal men.”80
Indeed there  were no suffi  cient words or concepts for many people in Cien-
fuegos at the moment of emancipation, especially those whose turn to vio-
lence drew from their self- understandings as “po liti cal men.” For them, 
neither the ethic of liberalism nor the ethic of patronage, in Viotti da Costa’s 
memorable framing, off ered a wholly secure approach to claiming or exercis-
ing rights. When hundreds of black and mulatto cienfuegueros swarmed the 
Teatro Zorrilla and its surrounding streets to shout “¡Viva España! ¡Muera a 
autonomía!” they expressed the social chaos of an expanding public sphere 
whose capacity to accommodate Cubans of color as loyal subjects met sharp 
limits.
In many respects, the tumult in Cienfuegos illustrates a familiar story of 
nineteenth- century Latin America: of liberals and conservatives vying for 
power in a po liti cal climate that favored clientelism over demo cratic participa-
tion, dramatic acts over substantive debates. On the  whole, competing factions 
shared a number of assumptions that  were plainly racist and protective of the 
propertied classes. In Brazil, for example, liberals and conservatives com-
bined forces to pass electoral “reforms” in 1881 that stymied the entrance of 
tens of thousands of freedmen into electoral politics.81 In Spain and Cuba, 
the end of slavery occasioned debates between liberals and conservatives over 
who better served the interests of African- descended Cubans. Th at both 
groups lamented the presence of lo africano in Cuban society attests to the 
limits of the debate. Fernández de Castro, Figueroa, and other leaders of the 
Partido Liberal Autonomista actively sought pop u lar support as they traveled 
from town to town, but they seemed remarkably unconcerned with reconcil-
ing liberalism’s inclusionary pretensions with their exclusionary practices. In 
their excursiones políticas, their reach exceeded their grasp.
At the same time, liberalism in late nineteenth- century Cuba neither con-
formed to models elsewhere in Latin America that repudiated the colonial 
past nor to the liberal vision of the Constitution of 1812.82 Liberals constantly 
fought off  accusations of in de pen dentismo as they sought legitimacy within 
the colonial system. Th ey did so as Conservative propagandists tried to dele-
gitimize Liberal claims to po liti cal authority by branding them separatist and 
illegitimate, as evidenced by the widespread confusion over which po liti cal 
entity could justifi ably take responsibility for slave emancipation. Colonial 
offi  cials had to adapt to rapidly changing conditions as their demands for 
loyalty exacted a heavy toll. And Cuban men of color left  out of the po liti cal 
pro cess now had more plausible claims to constitutional rights.
At the moment of formal emancipation, an autonomous, much less revo-
lutionary, future was by no means certain to most Cubans, and they pro-
fessed loyalty to Spain as various factions solicited and boasted pop u lar 
support. Th e racist assumptions under which Fernández de Castro cultivated 
followers chafed against the multiracial composition of those who celebrated 
the Spanish government for ending slavery. Th e shouts outside the Zorrilla, 
however, diff ered from the “Long live the king, death to bad government!” 
slogan that loyal subjects in mainland Latin America invoked in earlier 
periods, for colonial politics now operated under diff erent terms and new 
vocabularies of nationhood, government, freedom, and citizenship.83 What 
Fernández de Castro’s excursión política off ered to ordinary Cubans, besides 
racist denunciations and exclusionary rhetoric, was an important and imperfect 
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education in key po liti cal languages. Th at African- descended Cubans  were 
becoming fl uent enough to gather at po liti cal party meetings and claim fi del-
ity to Spain testifi es to the possibilities of inclusion in the post- Zanjón order. 
Th at such a declaration had to be voiced in such a confrontational context 
reveals its limitations.
In 1943, the renowned Cuban intellectual Jorge Mañach mused about the 
island’s colonial past and attempted to recast the story of slave emancipa-
tion as an accomplishment of Cuban nationalism, not Spanish po liti cal ma-
neuvering. (Nowhere did he cite the actions of patrocinados themselves in 
ending slavery.) In order to do so, he reclaimed Miguel Figueroa as a hero of 
Cuban nationalism. He recounted Figueroa’s tireless eff orts to establish the 
Liberal Party in Cuba, including an early visit to Cienfuegos to drum up sup-
port within the Casino Español. Of the tumult that occurred in 1886, Ma-
ñach blamed Spaniards for inciting the protest as a means of “po liti cal 
propaganda,” but he did not let Figueroa off  the hook, either: “And  here is one 
of those crossroads in our inquiry when our sympathy for our hero is an-
nulled with a subtle anguish.”84 On the  whole, however, he lauded Figueroa’s 
eff orts on behalf of the raza de color, and for inspiring multiracial audiences 
at Liberal gatherings across the island to create “a site for pure democracy”— 
and end of empire hardly ever mentioned under Spanish rule.85 Mea sur ing 
the ability of such sites to transform Spanish rule became a vital gauge by 
which Cubans of color mapped out their po liti cal allegiances in the years 
aft er emancipation.
Six
Th e Price of Integrity
Limited Loyalties in Revolution
If the Africans didn’t know what they  were getting into, the Cubans didn’t either. 
Most of them, I mean. What happened was that there was a revolution around 
 here, a fi ne mess everybody fell into. Even the most cagey ones. People said “Cuba 
Libre! Down with Spain!” Th en they said, “Long live the King!” What do I know? 
Th at was hell. Th e solution  wasn’t to be seen anywhere. 
Th ere was only one way out, and it was war.
—Esteban Montejo, as told to Miguel Barnet, 1966
As the rest of this book has tried to demonstrate, reports of the inevitable 
death of colonial rule in Cuba have been greatly exaggerated. Th at Spain per-
sisted in its control of Cuba through the 1890s was not the result of unyield-
ing brutality or passive ac cep tance. Violence and inertia had their place, but 
the po liti cal logic of colonialism also emphasized in e qual ity by design, aff ec-
tive reciprocities between the state and its people, and, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, widespread confusion about whether belonging to an empire 
made someone a subject, a citizen, both, or neither. Spain had more or less 
maintained pop u lar consent and contained re sis tance for de cades aft er 
its mainland colonies achieved in de pen dence. Esteban Montejo, the former 
slave and insurgent who recounted his life story when he was 103, acknowl-
edged both uncertainty and inevitability when he recalled the fi nal years of 
Spanish rule. Neither the “Africans” nor “Cubans” he described seemed to 
have much direction or say about where they stood, but there was apparent 
consensus about where they  were headed.
As Cubans evaluated their po liti cal status in the period between emanci-
pation in 1886 and the war for in de pen dence from 1895 to 1898, they faced a 
crisis of integrity in the most literal sense. Integridad nacional (national integ-
rity or unity) had gained momentum during the Ten Years’ War as a syn-
onym for the coherence of the Spanish empire. Spaniards and Cubans alike 
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invoked the concept, celebrating integrismo as a derivative po liti cal ideology 
or deriding it as a sugar- coated false unity. But the slow progress of integrat-
ing Cuban men of color as Spanish citizens with public rights caused the 
issue of racial discrimination to ignite passionate debate in the 1880s and 
1890s. Integrity became a concept around which race and loyalty inter-
twined. Disagreements about how Cuban society and Spanish empire would 
cohere led to a proliferation of po liti cal options, rather than the contracting 
options that Montejo described and that many have understood to set Cuba on 
a course toward in de pen dence.
If at the beginning of the century fears of slave revolt convinced privileged 
Cubans to remain a part of the Spanish empire, what motivated their coun-
terparts many de cades later, once slavery had ended? More broadly, what value 
was to be found for Cubans of color in being a loyal subject if universal legal 
freedom had not eliminated racial inequalities or barriers to citizenship? Th e 
defeat of Spain in the 1895– 1898 War of In de pen dence would suggest that the 
ultimate resolution to these questions was a death blow to pro- colonial loy-
alty. We might better understand the war as an extension or amplifi cation of 
a fragmented island in the years preceding it. In that slow disintegration, ar-
guments for supporting Spanish rule never completely disappeared, but 
the  proliferation of po liti cal affi  liations— not all of them oriented toward 
independence— radically decentered loyalty. Even aft er the intervention of 
the United States and the end of the war, questions would remain as to how 
and if Cuba could remain  whole, whether as a new nation, a former colony, or 
a new one.
Military Reor ga ni za tion and the Decline of Loyal Ser vice
For much of the nineteenth century, Spanish soldiers had migrated to Cuba 
with the frequent charge of protecting white Cubans from the African- 
descended population. In addition to the end of the Ten Years’ War and the 
Guerra Chiquita, the end of slavery occasioned a reduction of the military 
presence on the island. “With this legislation,” note historians Manuel 
Moreno Fraginals and José Moreno Masó, “the ‘black problem’ ceased to be a 
migratory motor for the transfer of troops although it continued being, for 
many years, a fundamental factor of insular politics.”1 Th e ministro de ultra-
mar (overseas minister) remained deaf to complaints from Cuban offi  cials 
that the military presence was too small to maintain order or to put down 
another large- scale rebellion. In Cienfuegos, for example, the surviving local 
volunteer regiments— the Batallón de Cazadores, the Batallón San Quintín, 
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the Sección Caballería— barely escaped periodic eff orts to disband them, and 
in 1885 the government even reduced offi  cer salaries by almost 10 percent.2
Th e forces that remained on the island aft er the Guerra Chiquita attended 
to rural lawlessness. “Banditry” became an umbrella term for peasant unrest, 
separatist sympathies in the countryside, and small- scale anticolonial skir-
mishes. Island authorities  were quick to link banditry to disloyalty and worried 
most when bandits gained the support of local populations and government 
offi  cials. Th e 1894 kidnapping of Rafael Fernández de Castro’s brother Anto-
nio became a jarring symbol of Spain’s inability to subjugate individuals who 
competed with its authority and to protect even its well- placed citizens.3 More-
over, the piecemeal eff orts to curb banditry became for many property own-
ers a barometer of state legitimacy. Th e optimism and permissiveness that 
characterized select colonial policies immediately aft er the conclusion of the 
Ten Years’ War and Guerra Chiquita gave way to frequent attempts by the 
government to cast Cubans as their own worst enemies. Within that formula, 
Cubans of African descent did not necessarily emerge as a more restive or 
threatening group than any other Cubans. Yet the onset of emancipation raised 
serious questions about the role that former slaves and other black and mu-
latto islanders would play in the island’s defense. Civil and military offi  cials 
had to weigh, as their pre de ces sors had throughout the century, when to hail 
them as loyal subjects and when to subject them to skepticism and scrutiny.
Just as the reformist mood in the 1850s and the outbreak of the Ten Years’ 
War promoted opportunities for free men of color in the Spanish military, 
slave emancipation held similar promise. Civil authorities in Havana alerted 
the minister of war in 1885 that the expense of maintaining a larger military 
presence in Cuba was nothing compared to the danger of having too few sol-
diers when abolition came. Foreseeing the potential for postemancipation so-
cial unrest, they proposed allowing Cuban men of color to serve in the army 
volunteer corps as regular members, “subject to their obligations, with the 
protections of all who enter into ser vice to the Patria, that correspond to all 
Spanish citizens.” Th e mea sure would have off ered some Cubans of color— 
men in military service— standing equal to peninsular and creole volunteers. 
One offi  cial went further in emphasizing the po liti cal consequences over the 
military benefi ts: “Th e people of color, with greater sympathies towards us 
than the creole inhabitants, by their number, by their strength, and by their 
nature, are constantly solicited by revolutionary elements, and with more 
determination today than yesterday; and my purpose, in proposing to com-
mit this to resolution, is to give to this race all the conditions of free men, 
raising it to the extreme . . .  so by their ser vices and by their acts, they may be 
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worthy of high posts or honors, opening to them the path to achieve them.” 
Both Cuban and Spanish authorities recognized that, beyond military de-
fense, the mea sure could model broader projects for racial integration. In the 
same letter, the offi  cial remarked that “the negro has great temperaments of 
re sis tance, sobriety and valor but in order to develop it, and above all its in-
domitable bravura, he needs to emulate a practical example and mix with our 
soldiers.” 4 For civil authorities perhaps more concerned about social issues 
than military leaders in Madrid, cross- racial cooperation between soldiers 
of African and Eu ro pe an descent contained an opportunity to prepare all 
Cuban men for a postemancipation society, one in which military promotion 
would represent only one example of equal status.
Within the military, the proposal raised mild interest but never received 
approval from the crown. An offi  cial from the Ministerio de Ultramar wrote 
back to the offi  ce of the captain general recommending the formation of an ad 
hoc company “by battalion” in moments of unrest. Th e language was crystal 
clear in its opacity: the more modest mea sure would “avoid the diffi  culties” that 
develop when racially diverse troops mix “for various considerations that you 
will understand, without enumerating them.” Although the ministerio allowed 
for the possibility of a gradual experiment of substituting Cuban soldiers of 
African descent for those of Spanish ancestry, it made no pretensions of allow-
ing such a regiment to defend the Iberian Peninsula, “for known diffi  culties.” 
Mixed troops  were better suited, apparently, to laboring in Spain’s remaining 
overseas possessions in Asia and Africa.5 Th us, with veiled language and criteria, 
the overseas ministry nixed a proposal that would have given African- descended 
men unpre ce dented military status within the Spanish empire.
Instead, they found their opportunities for demonstrating loyalty through 
soldiering in turmoil. Beyond the suffi  ciently fortifi ed capital, the labor of 
soldiers oft en had a more mea sur able impact in cities and towns across the 
island that added material weight to the symbolic value discussed by policy-
makers. As it has been, the case of Cienfuegos is instructive. In the absence of 
an integrated volunteer army, African- descended cienfuegueros successfully 
joined racially segregated volunteer units in the late 1880s.6 In August 1887, 
authorities in Cienfuegos responded to local pressure for public works proj-
ects and approved the creation of a Compañía de Voluntarios Ingenieros 
(Volunteer Company of Engineers), which the Diario de Cienfuegos reported 
would be “composed of the clase de color” and “workers” and would have “all 
the privileges earned by the Cuerpos de Voluntarios.”7 Sixty- eight men joined 
the unit.8 Masimo Coimbra, the found er of the sociedad de color El Progreso, 
was one of the original members of the company.9
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On a Sunday aft ernoon in December, the Compañía de Ingenieros staged 
an elaborate inaugural ceremony that included pre sen ta tion for review to 
Fidel Alonso Santocildes, the jurisdiction’s military commander, speeches by 
Santocildes and Antonio Guimerá, the white captain of the new unit, and a 
parade that ended at the El Escorial Café in the center of town. Th e Diario de 
Cienfuegos praised the ingenieros for having “suffi  cient instruction and 
great enthusiasm” and for the music that its band played.10 Predictably, the 
speeches by Guimerá and Santocildes deployed the language of loyalty that had 
historically reinforced reciprocities between militiamen and empire. Santo-
cildes lauded the soldiers for passing “an unequivocal test of how much trust 
there is in your loyalty, and of the importance given to the cooperation of all 
of the elements that constitute the Spanish people, without distinction of ori-
gin or of race.” Guimerá took the language a step further. Akin to Santicildes, 
he said that he trusted the soldiers “to hold high the just name of valor and 
loyalty, such proven examples of which your ancestors bequeathed to you.” 
He conveyed that the city’s Spaniards, “descendants of generous races” who 
had trusted soldiers of color with arms in the past, had no doubts that the 
ingenieros would follow in the noble tradition of military ser vice and be 
“strong supporters of the national fl ag.” But then Guimerá prophesied that 
possible dangers in the future would not “weaken the fulfi llment of our sa-
cred obligations as residents and citizens.”11 By identifying the soldiers as citi-
zens, Guimerá made explicit the end to which the ingenieros would devote 
their ser vice, and he staked out ground more solid than the indeterminate 
po liti cal rewards extended to milicianos in prior de cades.
A little over a year aft er chaos erupted in Cienfuegos about the role of Cu-
bans of color in colonial politics, Guimerá named as citizens a group of black 
and mulatto soldiers who almost certainly had experienced the tumult at the 
Teatro Zorrilla or at least its aft ereff ects. As many people on the island spoke 
increasingly about the rights of (Spanish and/or Cuban) citizenship, Guimerá 
focused instead its “sacred obligations.” He described the ingenieros’ ser vice as 
the natural extension of good civic behavior by “peaceful citizens and indus-
trious workers in times of peace.” His point was relevant not only to soldiers 
of color. White offi  cers also felt the sting of the government’s military cut-
backs. Most of them had previously held positions in companies that had 
been dissolved, such as the bomberos and the cavalry, or reduced in number, 
such as the artillery unit. Beneath the pomp and per for mance of the inau-
gural ceremonies lay a powerful message for all involved: that every mem-
ber of the Compañía de Ingenieros was a citizen fulfi lling an important 
civic responsibility for the benefi t of Spain.
192 • Chapter 6
It took less than a month for local offi  cials to begin casting doubts on the 
character and signifi cance of that contribution. A counterpoint to the confi -
dent and supportive speeches published in the local paper, the internal re-
ports that made it all the way to the war ministry in Madrid told a more 
ambivalent story about the eff orts to cement national integrity in Cienfuegos. 
Santocildes chafed at a request by Guimerá to consider the company’s musi-
cians as volunteers, thus allowing more individuals to join the unit. Th ey 
 were not even armed, the commander reminded Guimerá, but the shift  would 
nevertheless qualify the ingenieros for more munitions at the government’s 
expense. On 29 December, the head of the Batallón Cazadores de San Quintín 
No. 4 in Cienfuegos wrote to Santocildes to recount a meeting he arranged 
with leaders of the Batallón de Tiradores y de Guías. Th e men considered the 
“best way for the Compañía de Ingenieros to lend [their ser vices] or not, in 
the interests of all involved,” for the guardia de prevención (patrolling duty). 
Th e guardia had long been the responsibility of the volunteers in the battal-
ions, some of whom  were wary of allowing the new company to share the 
task. Th e leaders agreed to a system in which the ingenieros “would be ad-
mitted with plea sure” into a rotation in which each of the companies would 
alternate guardia ser vice. Th e resolution came aft er a heated debate about 
forming a single battalion composed of members of the diff erent companies, 
including the ingenieros. Th e San Quintín captain noted that there was “a 
diversity of opinions” about the prospect of an integrated force. Although he 
himself thanked and celebrated the ingenieros “for having nourished the 
ranks of the institution,” the separate- but- equal compromise “was in better 
harmony with the fractions among the whites.”12
Th e ingenieros continued to observe more fractions than harmony as the 
dispute unfolded. Just a week aft er the inaugural ceremonies, the subinspec-
tor for the voluntarios wrote to Santocildes that having thoroughly scruti-
nized the outfi t, “there exist some divisions among the gente de color.” He 
inquired among the men out of curiosity “about friction with the white race,” 
and they responded that the division had more to do with “the unquestion-
able right that the Constitution of the State concedes to them, which has 
recognized them in their deference to it by the highest authority on the Is-
land.” At the same time, they told the inspector that they “have not been ex-
empt from a certain antagonism that until now has not boiled over.” Th e 
subinspector warned Santocildes ominously that the day when all armed 
institutions felt such discontent was not too distant.13
Faced with competing accounts of racial confl ict centered on guard duty, 
Santocildes sought advice from the provincial military commander in Santa 
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Clara and received a surprising response. On 26 December, the leader of the 
Batallón de Tiradores y de Guías had received an order from the commander 
to allow men of color into the unit for the express purpose of sharing the 
guardia de prevención. Th us, Santocildes focused on limiting the public fall-
out over the confl ict and avoiding accusations of racism. In a letter to Gen-
eral Manuel Sánchez Mira, he proposed meeting with the leaders of the 
ingenieros to “try to convince them— they have no right to said guardia but 
that if they want they can join the Battalion as seventh [grade members], ex-
plaining besides— there exists no antagonism between whites and [people] of 
color.” If he was not entirely persuasive  here, he would resort to placing blame 
not on the soldiers in any of the units but on rivalries between the white 
leaders of the various regiments, especially Lieutenant Isidoro Huertas, of 
the ingenieros, whom Santocildes referred to as a “repulsive character” and 
“the principal motor” of the confl ict.14
Ultimately, the battle over the guardia de prevención ended in something 
of a draw. Members of the Compañía de Ingenieros earned the right to join 
white volunteer battalions in limited numbers and for limited purposes. Th eir 
leaders’ claims of racism, however,  were subject to the outright manipulations 
of Santocildes, who was more concerned with avoiding the appearance of rac-
ism than with the discrimination that seemed to be festering between units. 
Although some of the leaders of white units lost their fi ght to keep the volun-
teers racially segregated, they retained their rights to the guardia de preven-
ción, and, just as important, they maintained the confi dence of Santocildes. A 
second wave of young new recruits may have had little direct memory of earlier 
attempts to cultivate loyalty, or of the trade- off  between military ser vice and 
manumission during the Ten Years’ War. Th ey also joined Spanish regiments 
during a proliferation of war memoirs published in Cuba and abroad in which 
former insurgents spoke of slaves and free people who had fought in the rebel-
lions. Th ese accounts gained popularity and told stories that  were not predi-
cated on subordination or a well- defi ned place in the traditional hierarchy of 
colonial society. Th e black insurgent as a literary type, Ada Ferrer argues, was 
“more than just safe or unthreatening; he was also a Cuban hero and patriot.”15 
Th e loyal subject, in contrast, lost valor among a restless population.
Th e Ties that Unbind: Public Leadership and Associational Life
Th e tumult in Cienfuegos in 1886 surrounding abolition crystallized the dis-
tinction that some Cubans of color made between support for the Spanish 
government and the rules of respectability governing the expression of that 
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support. Rafael Fernández de Castro and Miguel Figueroa became targets of 
a provincial urban public frustrated by the gap between the Autonomist Par-
ty’s racist rhetoric and its noble claims of eff ecting abolition. In the long run, 
however, activists of African descent emphasized adherence to the decorum 
expected in public discourse and spaces— even as they pushed their limits 
by advancing po liti cal projects that variously affi  rmed and challenged colo-
nialism.
Th is distinction in strategy came into clear view on the death of Figueroa 
in the summer of 1893. A new, island- wide black newspaper, La Igualdad 
(Equality), was facilitating connections and comparisons between communi-
ties of color throughout Cuba. At its helm was Juan Gualberto Gómez, the 
formidable journalist and activist who had spent the 1880s in exile in Ma-
drid, was a supporter of the Liberal Party, and came to support Cuban in de-
pen dence.16 In conjunction with La Igualdad, he established the Directorio 
Central de las Sociedades de la Raza de Color in 1892, a federation of ap-
proximately seventy- fi ve sociedades on the island that increasingly took on 
issues of public discrimination in addition to their respectable social and cul-
tural activities. For months articles in La Igualdad had been updating readers 
on Figueroa’s declining health, and his passing in July mobilized nearly every 
sociedad de color to commemorate his dedication to ending slavery. What-
ever stumbles he made in Cienfuegos years earlier had been forgotten. No 
mention appeared of the Autonomists’ contradictory race rhetoric or of 
Figueroa’s disastrous speaking engagement; in fact, La Igualdad praised 
Figueroa as an orator above all. Even the Cienfuegos sociedad El Progreso— 
the only one in the city affi  liated with the Directorio Central—sent condo-
lences to Figueroa’s family through the newspaper and lamented the loss “to 
the country and to the raza de color.”17 Th us in one stroke, club members— 
some of whom certainly remembered the fracas at the Teatro Zorrilla— had 
identifi ed both with race and country as they expressed their opinions in La 
Igualdad’s letters section.
Th ese gestures did not go unnoticed: representatives of the sociedades 
played prominent roles in the elaborate funeral or ga nized in Havana for 
Figueroa. Th ey formed an honor guard around mourners and delegates from 
every Havana group gathered in the Plaza de Belén with their respective fl ags 
for a pro cession to the cemetery. In the main funeral pro cession, three groups 
immediately preceded the pallbearers. Musician Félix Cruz and his orchestra 
played a funeral march as girls from the schools run by El Progreso Habanero 
and the Centro de Cocineros marched in their uniforms. Th us the clubs that 
embodied respectability under Spanish rule endorsed the image of the loyal 
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subject from which cienfuegueros had strayed seven years earlier. Setting aside 
the opposition to Figueroa expressed in that fracas, those commemorating 
Figueroa’s life cemented a bond of gratitude to a man who was instrumental 
in the legislative demise of the patronato— and a man who emphasized re-
peatedly that the Spanish government had assented to one of the most per sis-
tent demands made by Cubans of color in the post- Zanjón public sphere.
Cuban politics by the 1890s off ered more options than an all- or- nothing 
choice between Spanish colonialism and anticolonial rebellion. National in-
de pen dence loomed constantly as the most apparent radical alternative for 
the island, but other po liti cal projects beyond a national frame— be it Cuban 
or Spanish— and within cross- racial structures captured the imagination of 
Cubans as well, socialism, anarchism, annexation to the United States among 
them. Th ese affi  liations took various institutional forms, from loose networks 
of dispersed activists to formally registered associations to clandestine clubs 
in close contact with allies beyond the island. For Cubans of color, too, a pro-
liferation of leadership and politics diff used support for Spanish rule. Although 
the Directorio Central served as an umbrella group for associations of color, it 
never entered into formal politics along the lines of a po liti cal party. Gómez 
likely knew better: anxious rumors of the creation of a black po liti cal party 
 were common, and support among Cubans of color for the Partido Liberal 
Autonomista was generally favorable to the Partido Unión Constitucional.
Maintaining the conservative position embraced by the latter party was 
Rodolfo de Lagardère. Before emancipation, he withheld his unconditional 
support for the Conservatives because it was the Liberals who more aggres-
sively advocated for an early end to the patronato. Aft er 1886, however, that 
ambivalence evaporated. In a book he wrote in 1887, La cuestión social de 
Cuba, Lagardère skewered Liberal politicians who, in his view, had desecrated 
the ideals they championed. “Th at word ‘equality,’ ” he surmised, “so oft - 
repeated in the program of the Antillean Liberal party, is written in sand.” 
Th e leaders of the Autonomists spoke as if “the black would apparently be a 
guaranteed citizen,” but Lagardère argued that they had no intention of 
opening the leadership of an autonomous Cuba to its African- descended 
citizens. Not only would autonomism privilege whites over nonwhites; it 
would revoke its support of “the magnifi cent ideal of the abolition of races, 
the abolition of castes. To the contrary, it will perpetuate crippled freedom, 
the right of freedom, abolished by the right of color.”18 An imperfect expression 
of national integrity, autonomism would defer the promised ends of Spanish 
sovereignty and perpetuate a racially fragmented society. In earlier speeches 
and writings, Lagardère expressed high hopes for Spanish liberal citizenship 
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as a position from which to challenge discrimination. He now hinted at some 
skepticism, but not in the direction of upending his support for colonial rule.
Lagardère resolved the question of racial integration by waxing poetic on 
the nature of hybridity. Spain itself, he argued, was a multiracial society that 
had integrated people of “huge diff erences of race, of interests, of customs, of 
dialects, of climate and history.”19 It would have to recognize eventually that 
mulattoes in Cuba  were but one of the diverse groups who constituted Spain. 
He ended his text with a rhetorical fl ourish affi  rming the role of mixed- 
descent individuals in the imperial world: “Yes, mulatos, mestizos, hybrids, 
we descend from Eu ro pe an Spaniards, and as such, we are heirs to their name 
and their glories . . .  We are [Spanish] by blood, by language, by religion, and 
more than anything, by the loyalty we hold for our patria. Who are our par-
ents? What is our patria? Our parents are Spaniards. Our patria is Spain.”20 
Although Lagardère’s overall project was not explicitly racially exclusive, it 
left  little space for people entirely of African descent who could not lay (hy-
brid) racial claim to the glories of the peninsula. And if this line of argument 
bears out Fernando Ortiz’s assumption that nonwhite loyalty to Spain de-
rived from mulattoes’ ancestral connections to Spain, countless examples 
throughout this book have suggested many alternative explanations. Carmen 
Barcia’s argument that Lagardère was a victim of interest groups and offi  cials 
who fed him ideas is not far- fetched, but if Lagardère encountered criticism 
and skepticism from less reactionary counterparts, he was in agreement 
with virtually every other public fi gure of African descent about the need to 
end discrimination.21
Emanating from Havana in the early 1990s, however, was a strain of 
 or gan i za tion al leadership that rebuked the clientelism many associated with 
Lagardère and party politics. Individual leaders of color, sympathetic in vary-
ing degrees to the separatist cause,  were gaining new prominence. Rafael Serra, 
a prominent journalist of African descent and a former tobacco worker, took 
advantage of the post- Zanjón reforms immediately to publicize the idea of 
racial harmony. In 1879 he founded La Armonía, a newspaper with the same 
name as a sociedad in Matanzas, and he founded La Liga in the early 1890s 
for “the intellectual advancement and the elevation of the character of the 
men of color born in Cuba and Puerto Rico.”22 In his writings, Serra praised 
insurgent leader Antonio Maceo and Juan Gualberto Gómez. Above all, he 
expressed aff ection and esteem for José Martí, the in de pen dence movement’s 
principal leader who sought “a nation for all, and for the good of all.” In a 
speech on 10 October 1891, he spoke to the growing frustrations of Cubans 
of color in terms of re sis tance and confrontation, calling for “the study of the 
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origins, contrasts, bitterness and accomplishments of revolutions; those 
which engulf us in the examination of social themes and which are suited to 
the possibility of equilibrium in a people of ethnic variety.”23 Serra saw in 
Spanish rule an equivalent subordination that people of African descent ex-
perienced as slaves. Th e labor of in de pen dence, he argued, went beyond con-
verting individuals loyal to Spain. Separatists who passively accepted Spanish 
rule and its reinforcement of “the arrogance, privilege, and custom of slav-
ery”  were obligated to fulfi ll the demo cratic mission of in de pen dence and 
“elevate and equalize men in the legal sphere.”24
Th e expanded public sphere that Spanish reformers had hoped would 
preserve colonial order was buckling under pressure for inclusion and inte-
gration. Serra personifi ed an alliance between journalism, activism, and 
associational life that expanded the range of normative po liti cal discourse., 
New or gan i za tion al currents— and po liti cal factions that courted various 
constituencies— tended to fl ow in the direction of the in de pen dence move-
ment. Th e “non- political” requirements of the post- Zanjón public had clearly 
fallen away, but limits existed nonetheless. Martín Morúa Delgado had to 
leave the island for the United States when offi  cials in Matanzas shut down his 
newspaper El Pueblo for accusing the Spanish press of racism. Later than many 
others, he remained a supporter of the Autonomist Party.25 Th e Directorio 
Central contested the regular and widespread denial of civil rights, while his 
newspaper, La Igualdad, circulated information to various cities and regions 
across Cuba. At the congress of the Directorio Central, organizations agreed 
to a common focus on education and schools, eliminating offi  cial record- 
keeping that was racially distinct, changing the Código Penal (Penal Code) and 
municipal laws when they applied harsher sanctions to Cubans of color, and 
soliciting the support of po liti cal parties.26 Newspapers at this point adopted 
a more aggressive tone in acknowledging discrimination in Cuban society, as 
witnessed by the disputes in Santiago de Cuba in 1893 between the black news-
paper La Democracia (Democracy) and the white newspaper El Loco (Th e 
Madman).27
Defying the conventions that marginalized any mention of Africa from 
claims to belonging— and, more broadly, to “civilization”— one or ga ni za tion 
looked to Africa as a source of inspiration. In 1892, the Unión Africana regis-
tered in Havana as an association with most of the same features as others in 
the post- Zanjón period: it made provisions for the establishment of schools 
and a system of mutual aid to cover medical expenses, for example; when 
mourning, for example, women  were expected to wear white dresses and black 
capes. It also lobbied for regular ship traffi  c between Cuba and Africa and for 
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the incorporation of cabildos into Cuban politics. Aware of po liti cal transfor-
mations occurring in Africa, the association petitioned in 1893 to use a blue 
fl ag with a gold star in the center— the fl ag of Africa, it claimed— and justi-
fi ed its validity by citing the treaty that Spain had signed with the Interna-
tional Association of the Congo in 1885. Th e Spanish government denied the 
request on the grounds that there  were no foreign Africans in Cuba for the 
fl ag to represent! Instead, those individuals  were recognized as Spaniards.28 
Th is was a categorical somersault that accomplished two feats. It attempted 
to imagine the Cuban po liti cal landscape as one free of retrograde African 
infl uence, and it prevented the members of the Unión Africana from embrac-
ing a source of sovereignty external to the Spanish empire. In the pro cess, it 
attempted to fold Cubans of color, even those who explicitly identifi ed with 
Africa, into the category of Spaniard. Th is had been an unfulfi lled promise of 
the 1812 Constitution, and now, as citizenship as well as Spanishness  were in 
reach of men of color, po liti cal projects not easily contained within the Span-
ish system met with re sis tance.
Th e transnational orientation of the Unión Africana extended even to its 
leadership, in the fi gure of William George Emanuel. In 1894 the or ga ni za-
tion named the Antiguan activist the “only representative of the African race 
before the Government” and elevated his title in 1895 to Aurora de la Esper-
anza, or Dawn of Hope. Emanuel sought a diff erent approach than Gómez to 
creating an unifying or ga ni za tion for Cubans of color. Given the extensive 
membership of the cabildos, Emanuel built alliances that would bridge the 
 houses’ spiritual authority and the Spanish government’s po liti cal authority. 
His eff orts continued well into the fi nal in de pen dence war. In 1896, represen-
tatives of ten diff erent cabildos gathered, but in the midst of protests they 
voted to remove Emanuel from his position; a year later, the presidents of the 
Gangá, Mandinga, Carabalí, and Minas cabildos reor ga nized a scaled- back 
Unión Africana.29 Clearly, Gómez’s Directorio Central— and its relatively safe 
distance from African cultural forms— garnered the larger role in public life, 
but Emanuel and the Unión Africana, in their successes and failures, broad-
ened the po liti cal landscape to include po liti cal projects that  were transna-
tional, non-national, and African.
By and large, however, organizations and their leaders avoided mentions 
of Africa and its cultures in their public statements, hewing closely instead to 
the language of civility and respectability. Th ey also resisted associations with 
Haiti, although the nation and the revolution that created it remained a power-
ful symbol. Readers of La Igualdad had only to look to the bottom of the page 
on which the main articles appeared to fi nd serialized excerpts of Bug- Jargal, 
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Victor Hugo’s novel about the Haitian Revolution, originally published one 
year aft er France fi nally recognized Haiti’s in de pen dence in 1825. For the 
editors of La Igualdad, this was a daring choice. Despite the many meanings 
of the Haitian Revolution, colonial offi  cials and critics of black or ga niz ing 
tended to view the event almost exclusively as a race war, and this interpreta-
tion routinely grounded attacks against the calls for equal rights made by 
African- descended Cubans in newspapers, associations across the island, and 
the in de pen dence movement. With the translated title of Bug- Jargal, o el negro 
rey (Bug- Jargal, or the Black King), the novel gave readers of La Igualdad an 
account of the revolution in which Hugo compressed key events into the 
early, highly contingent years of insurrection and left  the fi nal outcome un-
spoken. Like the editorial essays and new articles in La Igualdad, the novel’s 
diverse themes contained the elements of a complex po liti cal vocabulary that 
could express many of the positions circulating in Cuba at the time: in de pen-
dence, revolution, antirevolution (especially for Hugo himself), monarchism, 
identifi cation with Africa or Africanness, identifi cation with Haiti, and a 
struggle for rights within an empire, as well as a repudiation of those rights 
in favor of a new order. By leaving readers to develop their own interpreta-
tions of the meaning of Haiti, the editors off ered a small corrective to the 
problem, which they identifi ed in an article from 1893, that “all of the histori-
ans of Haiti are white and Eu ro pe an.”30
Careful avoidance of upsetting public expectations did not prohibit mass 
public action. Together, many associations of color facilitated island- wide 
demonstrations in 1894 to protest the exclusion of people of African descent 
from public establishments. Demonstrations that took place in Havana, Matan-
zas, and Cienfuegos attracted participants from surrounding rural areas. Th e 
Directorio Central spearheaded most of the or ga niz ing eff orts in dialogue with 
various sociedades de color. Within La Igualdad, contributors recognized the 
possibility of a civil exchange with local offi  cials and even the captain general, 
but only on the condition that Cubans of color adhered to the peace. Ever 
since Zanjón, sociedades had worked locally to secure public rights, yet col-
lective action threatened to feed accusations of race war. One writer thus 
called for restraint, explicitly warning against the incivility and violence that 
characterized the incident in Cienfuegos in 1886. Carlos Trelles deplored the 
“immoderate note” that recently struck Matanzas, his home, “placing it at 
the level of Cienfuegos, the intransigent city that threw stones at the Cuban 
deputies Figueroa and Fernández de Castro.” For the editors of La Igualdad, 
however, this stance diminished the gravity of the struggle at hand. It ac-
cused the Matanzas newspaper that published Trelles’s letter of speaking “of 
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the negro as if we still lived in barbarous, feudal times.”31 Leaders of color had 
to tread carefully, advancing an agenda in terms that did not violate princi-
ples of the very public they  were trying to transform.
Negotiating with the Spanish government remained a principal activist 
strategy that occasionally achieved results. At 10:30 on the morning of 2 Janu-
ary 1894, Captain General Emilio Calleja called Gómez on the telephone— 
relatively new technology in Havana— to summon him to the captain general’s 
palace immediately. Lengthy quotes of their conversation, likely provided by 
Gómez himself, appeared that aft ernoon in La Igualdad. Calleja sought both 
to reassure Gómez of his commitment to racial inclusion and to acknowledge 
recent confl icts between Cubans of color who faced continuing discrimina-
tion. He affi  rmed his commitment to the “exercise of rights” by “individuals 
of the raza negra [black race]” in public establishments, “rights that the Con-
stitution and the laws granted to them, which makes them human beings 
identical to the rest.” Gómez reminded the captain general of intransigent 
local authorities in Havana and Cienfuegos who continued to deny access to 
residents of African descent. Calleja promised in the future to correct any 
offi  cial “hostile to the government’s resolutions,” including those who Gómez 
intimated  were conspiring to repeal the circulars from 1886 and 1887 ban-
ning racial discrimination that Calleja’s mea sures attempted to reinforce: “I 
will repeal nothing! . . .  I have ordered these mea sures because it is the natu-
ral consequence of the evolution that this society has made since slavery hap-
pily ended and there have been laws established that make all Spaniards 
equal, without distinction of birth, race, or colors; and although I have made 
these at the request of interested parties, I have made it because it seems sensi-
ble and necessary to do so.” Gómez, in response, assured the captain general 
that the raza de color had no interest in confi rming the suspicions of skeptics 
who expected retaliatory violence. Cubans of color would build their reputa-
tion with “calm and prudence”: “We are interested in being seen that we are 
civilized, that we are moderate, that we are elements of order, that we are 
 prepared for the life of freedom and of law, that we know how to control im-
patience. Others will hear the voice of despair and follow the path of vio-
lence. Ordinary tribunals will punish their misconduct immediately, and the 
tribune of History will whip them for the  whole duration of the future.”32
Here Gómez acknowledged the diffi  culties of presenting a united front for 
Cubans of color. Eschewing violence was one of the few lines he drew, despite 
his personal support for the cause of in de pen dence. Even if he questioned the 
pace of the evolution that Calleja cited, he still acknowledged that there was 
much to gain within the Spanish system. Th us he and his writers at La Igual-
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dad would celebrate the pronouncement of universal male suff rage in Spain, 
and they would also sharply criticize electoral irregularities. Th ey could scold 
a white association for a blackface per for mance and a black association for 
behaving too raucously. In this sense po liti cal diversity in the 1890s avoided 
accusations that Gómez and La Igualdad  were in the pocket of a single cause 
besides the Directorio. It also gave them the fl exibility to off er criticism.
Enunciations of loyal subjectivity surfaced occasionally, too. La Igualdad 
aired grievances about the use of fl ags, such as the suppression of a party on 
the Central Victoria in Yaguajay because it displayed a fl ag other than the 
Spanish one— as if bearing a diff erent fl ag implied the disavowal of Spain.33 
Perhaps the most telling article of all included a complaint about how the 
Directorio received short shrift  at a Liberal Party meeting when members 
tried to present a statement of its principles. Who was the party to silence 
them when the captain general himself had received their proposals? Th ey 
had exercised “the right of petition that the humblest of citizens can exer-
cise.”34 It was no longer subjects who  were humble but citizens; in the absence 
of guaranteed voting rights, petitioning took their place. Colonial forms of 
po liti cal participation merged with expressions of liberal citizenship as they 
had regularly throughout the century. More than a tactic to keep all po liti cal 
options open, Gómez and La Igualdad used an idiom common to many of 
the diverse positions embraced by the Directorio’s community. Even as pro- 
Spanish loyalty moved further away from the po liti cal center, the language of 
loyal subjectivity had become hegemonic such that multiple positions could 
be articulated through its po liti cal logic.
Loyalty Eroded: Th e War of In de pen dence
With the outbreak of war in February 1895, virtually all negotiations between 
Gómez and the captains general— to say nothing of the struggles of less prom-
inent Cubans of color— ground to a halt. In its fi rst year, Cuba’s war for in de-
pen dence had so unmoored the foundations of Cuban society that presumed 
logics of po liti cal affi  liation no longer held. Louis A. Pérez Jr. has noted the 
paradoxical separatist support among property own ers precisely as in de pen-
dence leaders identifi ed property itself as a target to undermine the colonial 
system. Agricultural and commercial leaders who had been the most con-
sistently committed to colonial rule had suff ered from Spain’s inability to 
maintain basic stability, if not guaranteed control. One momentous factor 
jeopardizing pop u lar support came in February 1896 with the replacement of 
Arsenio Martínez Campos as the island’s highest offi  cial with Valeriano 
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Weyler. No longer the ambitious young offi  cer who recruited soldiers of color 
during the Ten Years’ War, Weyler unleashed widespread devastation during 
the twenty months he was in offi  ce. He ordered the forced relocation of ap-
proximately 400,000 Cubans to centralized camps under army control. Span-
ish legitimacy withered as almost half of those people died in the camps. 
Many members of the Autonomist Party refused to stand by Spanish policies 
and gravitated to the insurgency some of their peers had already done.35 Th e 
net eff ect of these shift ing loyalties was a blow to national integrity and the 
relocation of the multifactional po liti cal conversation among Cubans to chan-
nels within the separatist movement. Moreover, with the accelerating decline 
of support for Spain, the various decrees and mea sures that inched toward 
Cuban autonomy garnered less and less attention.
As in the Ten Years’ War, observers  were quick to question the willful 
participation of Cubans of color. Because the insurgency found vital support 
among vast segments of the population, sizing up the nature of pop u lar alle-
giance to one cause or another became a top priority among colonial and 
rebel leaders alike. Attention focused on central and western Cuba in par tic u-
lar as rebel forces began working their way west across the island with the goal 
of gaining control over the island’s more populous and wealthy areas. A com-
mon observation among leaders was to view the presence of Cubans of color 
in the insurgency as the product of material scarcity or the manipulations of 
white patrons rather than a deliberate and intentional choice. It further con-
founded colonial offi  cials when men of African descent led white men. Mar-
cos García, the governor of Santa Clara province, wrote to military authorities 
about “the negro González” who was recruiting soldiers of color for rebel 
leader Francisco Carrillo. When José González proved instrumental in a 
 decisive battle near the Dolores sugar estate in Abreus in 1897, Carrillo gave 
him command of a cannon stolen from the Spanish.36 Th us García attributed 
what ever authority González held to Carrillo’s questionable judgment. But 
when a white assistant to González presented himself to the Spanish command 
in Cienfuegos, García described the assistant as “an intelligent youth” who 
could infl uence the handful of other white soldiers under González. Under 
García’s orders, the assistant then returned to the rebel camp with letters to the 
other soldiers that sought to undermine González’s authority.37 Th at it was 
easier for García to view González as a pawn than his white assistant exposes 
the deep roots of assumptions about the weak wills of Cuban soldiers of color.
As colonial authorities noted the multiracial composition of the insurgent 
army, they  were reluctant to attribute ideological motives to the black and 
mulatto rebel anticipation. Some commentators warned yet again of black 
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rebellion and race war, whereas others  were more circumspect.38 If hunger 
and hardship  were principal factors that drove Cubans of color into the re-
bellion, they wondered, then perhaps racial animosity took second place to 
material need.  Were rebel recruits just looking for a free meal? Ricardo Don-
oso Cortes, an early war observer from Spain, explained that there  were “many 
Cubans, white as well as of color, who tried in vain earlier to fi ght for the 
cause of Spain; this shows that it is not the spirit of in de pen dence that in-
spires most of the rebels but that . . .  [they are] disposed to fi ght by the impo-
sition of hunger, or simply by the infl uence of an adventurous temper.” Donoso 
criticized Spanish offi  cials for being too distrustful and strict in their recruit-
ment of irregular troops. Rebel authorities had scared, threatened, and in-
timidated rural Cubans into enlistment, he claimed; Spanish offi  cials had 
more resources to bargain with, but they  were not off ering them. Donoso 
hoped that the collective memory of institutions of the volunteer corps and 
bomberos would inspire more Cubans to join the individuals, “peninsulares 
and insulares [Spaniards from the peninsula and the island], and of those the 
whites and those of color,” to join the ranks of the Spanish.39 A Matanzas 
sugar administrator who joined the rebellion attributed black and mulatto 
participation to personal allegiances to white superiors. Th e example of a 
promising young planter named Dolores who joined the insurgent ranks 
stirred him to ask: “What are they to think, those workers, colonos [contract 
cane farmers], guajiros [peasants], and negros, vassals of Señor Deudal de 
Dolores, who is no good, to whom they owe nothing, when they see a young 
man abandon his riches to enlist in the holy legion of the Liberation Army?” 40 
Convinced that dire need explained pop u lar support for the insurgency, many 
witnesses  were slow to acknowledge that African- descended Cubans had 
placed loyalties to their families, communities, livelihoods— and egalitarian 
ideals and commitment to Cuban independence— above their fi delity to colo-
nial rule, and that they could prioritize those affi  nities on a principled basis.
Or perhaps not. In the midst of a refugee crisis, of rampant illness, and of 
the breakdown of many social institutions, defi ning will in opposition to ma-
terial need may unfairly prioritize one motive over the other. At the begin-
ning of the war, and just weeks before his death, José Martí recounted a 
conversation on an expedition in eastern Cuba with an insurgent named Luis 
and Máximo Gómez, the military commander of the in de pen dence war. Martí 
quoted one of them reacting with incredulity, “But why do those Cubans fi ght 
against Cubans?” he asked. Not out of conviction or “an impossible aff ection 
for Spain,” he surmised: “Th ose pigs fi ght like that for the pesos they’re 
paid, one peso per day minus the food they get. Th ey are the worst vecinos 
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[residents] of the caseríos [villages], or those who have a fi ne to pay, or the 
vagrants who don’t want to work, and a few Indians from Baitiquirí and Ca-
juerí.” 41 By the middle of the war, it was diffi  cult to tell the worst residents 
from the best ones in many areas. Never mind that Spanish supporters gener-
ally assumed that insurgents, too, came from similarly marginal social back-
grounds. Usually aware that they faced the same accusations by some of their 
opponents, insurgent leaders associated pop u lar loyalty with a combination 
of avarice, social deviance, and material desperation.
Martí was uncommon in attributing pro- Spanish support to rural areas, 
and in acknowledging Indians at all. Th e Batallones de Voluntarios that took 
shape in 1895 generally drew recruits from cities and in par tic u lar from the 
workforce of relatively recent Spanish migrants.42 Although memories of the 
voluntarios during the Ten Years’ War prompted early optimism among Span-
ish offi  cials about the participation of ordinary Cubans in irregular troops, 
they provoked frustration among rebel leaders. Despite an early pronounce-
ment by General Valeriano Weyler encouraging offi  cers to “reanimate public 
spirit” by putting los leales (the loyal) to work in old and new volunteer regi-
ments, volunteer recruitment and deployment  were slower and less regi-
mented than they had been in the prior insurrection.43
In a time of scarce resources, offi  cers raised volunteer units with the fi nan-
cial support of businesses, banks, and organizations. Th is opportunity was 
not lost on Cubans of color who still identifi ed with Spanish rule. José Berna-
beu, president of the Casino Español de la Raza de Color, recruited a moder-
ate group of soldiers in Havana, but more men of color responded to the 
recruiting eff orts of the Conde de Sagunto, a titled Spaniard living in the 
city’s burgeoning Vedado neighborhood. Th rough his eff orts, the Batallón 
Movilizado de Color began sending hundreds of black and mulatto troops to 
the western and central provinces as early as 1896. Th ey appear to have made 
it at least to Cruces, where Spanish troops defeated rebels dispatched there by 
Máximo Gómez.44 Th e benefi ts of this military ser vice were unclear, as  were 
the rewards for the sponsors. As a public display of loyalty, sponsoring volun-
teer battalions reached a limited public at best, as war time disruptions muted 
the publicity to be gained.
Spanish government attempts to recruit Cuban men of color as soldiers 
 were not nearly as robust as they had been during the Ten Years’ War. Despite 
military cutbacks during the previous de cade, the situation for the Spanish 
army looked much stronger at the outbreak of the war than during the fi rst 
war. Th e urgency of recruiting had lessened. Weyler himself regularly staged 
one of the most visible displays of black support. On a trip to Mariel from 
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Havana in November 1896, he inspected the fi ve battalions stationed there 
and “accepted the off ering of volunteers and bomberos.” In his words, among 
the bomberos, “thirty of color  were chosen, at the orders of an offi  cial, to 
form my personal escort.” 45 Th e visibility of this group, and its physical prox-
imity to Weyler, attracted the attention of many observers. Th is may have 
been Weyler’s intent. Adelaide Rosalind Kirchner, a North American traveler, 
claimed that Weyler gave equal treatment to blacks and whites in the army 
“in order to off set the prominence the Cuban blacks have attained in the in-
surrection.” “His body guard is composed of blacks,” she noted, “and a num-
ber of the guerrillas are black; a band of which is attached to each battalion of 
the army, their chieft ain being Benito Cerreros.” 46 She referred  here to one of 
the most notoriously violent guerrilla leaders, for whom there is little evidence 
of directing guerrilleros of color exclusively, or of leading a black unit, and the 
association subtly linked the black soldiers to the worst of Spanish brutality.47
Weyler made sure that Cubans would see his bodyguards during the dwin-
dling regularity of public ceremonies in cities. U.S. war journalist Stephen 
Bonsal noticed Weyler’s black bodyguards in the context of an elaborate cere-
mony in “the loyal city of Santa Clara.” Aft er lengthy speeches by city leaders, 
Weyler began his pro cession from the cemetery outside the city to the main 
plaza, “escorted by a squadron of cavalry and followed on foot by about fi ft y 
men of his black escort.” Despite all of the pageantry, the strength and sup-
port that the event intended to convey showed signs of fatigue. A weary Wey-
ler watched the military parade, but “as the last of the black bomberos went 
limping by,” he immediately dismounted his  horse and went inside.48 Public 
commemorations like these grew rarer as the war progressed, drawing feeble 
audiences for Weyler’s showy escort— or foreign visitors stationed in cities. 
Yet for the man who actively recruited black soldiers during the Ten Years’ 
War, the personal escort spoke to a longer history of military engagement 
that complicated the frequent accusations by supporters of Spain that the 
insurgency was, at heart, a race war.
What ever their motivations, ordinary Cubans  were or ga nized into guer-
rillas in cities and the countryside to accompany Spanish columns. Usually 
understood as an urban phenomenon, guerrillas also formed in plenty of 
small towns on the island, and, as Spanish troops diff used into rural areas, 
they recruited from rural estates as well. Guerrillas or ga nized in San Antonio 
de los Baños frequently found themselves dispatched to rural estates to at-
tack rebel camps.49 Th e humble backgrounds of most of the volunteers be-
came one of their most salient features. Insurgent offi  cer Bernabé Boza des cribed 
the guerrillas as being composed mostly of “white and colored Cubans” 
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and only a few Spaniards, presumably recent immigrants “who  were familiar 
with the country.”50 Perhaps the best evidence of a racially mixed Spanish 
eff ort comes obliquely from the maneuvering of one cunning rebel. Ricardo 
Batrell, a black soldier in the Liberation Army’s western invasion, recounted 
in his memoir a mission near the end of the war to fi nd cattle for the infantry. 
Near Jovellanos, outside the city of Matanzas, Batrell and a small group of 
soldiers took fi ve Spanish guerrilleros prisoner and wore their clothes in or-
der to pass into town without raising suspicion. Th e sight of black guerrille-
ros was apparently common enough that Batrell’s comrades could pass for 
enemy soldiers simply by donning Spanish gear.51
Detailed information about the composition of the guerrillas is rare, but a 
lieutenant col o nel’s report from Matanzas in 1896 off ers a few clues about 
who enlisted. Charged in April with recruiting a battalion composed of some-
where between eight hundred and one thousand “white and colored volun-
teers,” Adolfo Álvarez Almendariz had recruited three hundred men by the 
end of May. Th e only list of individual recruits identifi es the twenty- seven 
men, ranging in age from eigh teen to forty, who gathered at the Aguedita 
sugar estate on 14 May. Th e guerrillas contained more than a few Spaniards: 
thirteen of them, including three of the four offi  cers,  were from various areas 
in Spain. Th e roster did not identify recruits by race, although a curious pat-
tern of repeating surnames emerges among nine of the non- Spanish mem-
bers. Despite the conventions of taking the surname of both the father and 
mother, codifi ed in the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, many Cubans of color 
struggled to adapt to this system when their parentage was unknown or 
when they or their parents had no surnames under slavery and had taken the 
surname of their own er. Michael Zeuske has identifi ed the record- keeping 
practice of using sin otro apellido (without another surname). Ángel Barbón 
Barbón, Agustín Barbón Barbón, Candelario Delgado Delgado, Juan Pinillos 
Pinillos, and fi ve other guerrilleros are all listed with both a father and mother 
identifi ed by fi rst name. It is certainly possible that both parents happened to 
have the same surname, and that one- third of a guerrilla formed on a sugar 
estate happened to experience this phenomenon. A more likely possibility— 
though still highly speculative— is that these nine non- Spaniards  were of 
African descent, having only one surname but repeating it— with both par-
ents having taken the surname of their common master.52
If Spaniards fi gured more prominently in the guerrillas than Boza acknowl-
edged, why would he minimize their presence and simultaneously highlight 
guerrilleros of color, especially when the rebels themselves claimed substantial 
black support for the cause of in de pen dence? Th e answer lies in Boza’s charac-
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terization of the guerrilleros as dangerous and marginal types. He claimed 
that the Spanish government deliberately avoided recruiting “honorable 
men” and instead targeted murderers, thieves, and pickpockets, and pris-
oners. Crimes such as arson and forgery, in his opinion, constituted “the 
best letter of recommendation” for admission into the guerrilla.53 Th is mili-
tary strategy was not, for Boza, a desperate mea sure forged in crisis. Instead, 
it exposed the very foundations of Spanish rule: the kinds of behavior that 
counted as valor and honor; the values that people identifi ed with the Span-
ish fl ag and soldier’s uniform; the credentials that qualifi ed Spain to be a 
“civilized nation” in contrast to the values honored by the rebels. For Boza, 
the criminal and corrupt Cubans of color who joined guerrillas did so be-
cause they recognized aspects of themselves in the leadership and execution 
of the counterinsurgency. Th is stinging portrayal cleared the way for Boza to 
praise the black leadership of the liberation army as a more esteemed group 
of individuals. In contrast to the “exaggerations and quixotic” denigrating 
characterizations of the multiracial insurgency, the image Boza conveyed was 
of “enlightened, enthusiastic, and active” men who  were not bound by Spanish 
conventions.54
Evidence of widespread creation of segregated black and mulatto units 
fi ghting for Spain is rare— again, in part because of the race- blind record- 
keeping of local offi  cials (at least in military registers).55 Manuel Corral, a 
Spanish volunteer, recalled that the black soldiers he encountered  were always 
rebels. Yet he did note that among the volunteer units or ga nized in and around 
Cienfuegos, the only racially segregated battalion was the Batallón Tiradores 
de las Lomas, “composed in its near totality of Chinese.” He praised it more 
for its patriotism and the low costs of maintaining it than for the ser vices its 
members lent to the war eff ort. Th e battalion’s vigilance of the military hos-
pital in the city, however, proved a task more signifi cant than Corral recog-
nized given war time conditions.56 Th e cuerpos de bomberos frequently 
fortifi ed cities and towns, and in 1896, Weyler or ga nized three hundred bomb-
eros under a black col o nel to fi ght in the western provinces, specifi cally 
against Maceo.57 Maceo was developing plans to take Candelaria, a town in 
the west and a key Spanish fortifi cation along the railroad. When he heard 
that many of the troops defending Candelaria  were of African descent, he 
veered from his normal practice and ordered all enemy combatants of color 
to be killed with machetes aft er victory.58
Th is episode of targeted killings represents one of the highest estimates of 
the price of integrity. What may be lost in the attention to loyal subjectivity is 
a keener sense of the repressive forces that most Cubans of African descent 
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confronted regularly in their lives, and not just during war time. It downplays 
the idea that supporting Spanish rule— or at least the perception of sup-
porting Spain— could be a life- or- death decision. If loyalty constituted the 
normative subject position in Cuban society, the violence infl icted on the 
disloyal— rebel and runaway slaves and insurgents, especially— could ap-
pear more conspicuous to war observers, either in the interests of making 
an example or making a martyr. Loyalty, too, had its costs, most apparent 
during military confl icts to be sure, but in noncrisis moments as well. Each 
side of the confl ict had its traitors on the other side, and neither side mo-
nopolized brutality. Aside from loyalty concerns  were warfare traditions; that 
is, actions of Maceo’s troops appear to have had parallels in other confl icts: 
pro- Spanish Cubans forced to dig their own graves, beheaded, fi ngernails 
pulled out.59
By the middle of 1897, Spanish forces reported numerous desertions. Rea-
sons for desertion  were likely as varied as the deserters themselves; nonethe-
less, the increasing advantage of the insurgents over the Spanish troops 
precipitated a gradual exodus to the Liberation Army. Manuel Corral described 
how his unit, camped in Arimao one night in October with nothing to con-
sume but coff ee, heard news that the guerrilleros movilizados in nearby Cu-
manayagua who accompanied them “showed that they served no one, [and] 
many of them proceeded to enemy lines.”60 Elsewhere in Santa Clara prov-
ince, a cavalry unit in Remedios posted a notice for the capture of a guerril-
lero from Caibarién named Luis Abreu, “of unknown parents, native of 
Africa.”61 Mateo Sarría, described as “color negro” and the son of “la morena 
Nicolasa Sarría,” deserted the Guerrilla de San Fernando in Cienfuegos on 
14 July.
With a rebel victory becoming an increasingly probable outcome at the 
end of 1897, the Spanish government made a last- minute and unpre ce dented 
conciliatory move. In November, two royal decrees established full equality 
of po liti cal rights for residents of Cuba and Puerto Rico in accordance with 
the Spanish electoral law of 1890, which guaranteed universal male suff rage. 
Autonomism, once a movement eyed with offi  cial suspicion and synchronized 
to the machinations of a single po liti cal party, now reigned as a new politics 
of empire. Elections  were scheduled for the following March. Th e momentum 
of the new Autonomist government ground to a halt just one month later 
when the United States entered the war. On 22 April 1898, William McKinley 
gave orders for a naval blockade.
At last, Cuban men of all colors received the full po liti cal equality that had 
motivated them, and their pre de ces sors, to remain loyal subjects in recent 
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de cades. Certainly the U.S. invasion curtailed many of the possibilities of 
this moment, but general fatigue from the war, multiple conversions of Liber-
als and even Conservatives to the cause of in de pen dence, and the perceived 
illegitimacy of the Spanish government by much of the island also foreclosed 
the potential that autonomy held. Yet this did not necessarily cause the death 
of the loyal subject. Even those who could no longer imagine why anyone 
would still be ever faithful nonetheless valued loyal subjectivity, even as the 
object of that loyalty changed, as did the terms on which it operated.
Seeing through Loyalty
As Ada Ferrer has noted, the entrance of the United States into the confl ict 
compelled vast numbers of men to join the rebel forces. Not least of those 
new supporters  were Spaniards: soldiers, offi  cers, and civilians alike.62 Th is 
shift  dealt a critical blow to any pop u lar support the Spanish government 
might still claim. What ever national integrity meant as an idea or a practice 
had lost virtually all meaning in the fi nal months of the war, and its demise 
came at a steep price. Th ere  were thousands of deaths among the Spanish and 
Cubans involved, productive endeavors in disarray, unmoored social rela-
tions, and a new imperial presence. Th e end of the war obscured the ends of 
empire that many Spaniards and Cubans had pursued over the previous de-
cades. Cuba by 1898 was an island of dislocations: bodily, in the goriest and 
most visceral image of war time violence (recall the fi ngernails ripped off  of 
pro- Spanish Cuban soldiers); socially, as families, communities, and many 
post- Zanjón associations did not survive the war intact; and po liti cally, as 
alliances shattered and forged between various “sides” bore little resem-
blance to their earlier forms. With no preexisting visions of how all of these 
pieces might now fi t together, Cubans, Spaniards, and North Americans 
struggled in the fi nal months before and aft er the war to reconcile old and 
new connections between po liti cal allegiances and the other solidarities that 
gave their lives meaning.
In spite of obstacles, Cubans began to make sense out of the mayhem. 
Ricardo Batrell found that there was “truly a Cuban community” as city 
crowds cheered entering liberation forces in 1899: “Th ere  were no worries or 
any races. Everyone was joyful and full of brotherly love.”63 Indeed, celebrat-
ing in de pen dence from Spain fi gured as perhaps the easiest po liti cal change 
to pro cess, and triumphal arches, parades, and music rang in a new, albeit 
ambiguous, order. Th ere  were also holdouts. Two days before the signing of the 
armistice, the leaders of the Cienfuegos brigade had taken to the street in 
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protest. Th ey accused public authorities of imposing peace on Spain despite 
the continued vigilance of the “intact and determined” Spanish army in the 
city.64 Despite their celebration of the new or stubborn defense of the old, 
Cubans had no choice but to reconsider their relationships to the states to 
which they risked their lives.
Th e end of the war for Cuban in de pen dence had also been the beginning 
of the confl ict for U.S. soldiers and the masses of supporters they left  behind. 
War time mobilization raised questions about the po liti cal aspirations of the 
nation and government, and who might claim the rights of its citizenship 
based on fulfi lling the obligations of military ser vice. Across the country  were 
advocates for sending black soldiers from the United States to fi ght in Cuba. 
Booker T. Washington fi gured among those who recognized a rare opportu-
nity for African Americans to demonstrate their loyalty to the nation. And 
indeed, loyalty fi gured as one of the most common themes among the black 
soldiers who wrote letters to newspapers in the United States about their ex-
periences in Cuba. Over three thousand black soldiers had converged on 
Tampa in early May 1898 to await embarkation to Cuba, and George Prioleau, 
a chaplain in the Ninth Cavalry, refl ected on his upcoming mission in a letter 
to the Cleveland Gazette. As black troops left  communities in the United 
States ravaged by poverty and violence to free Cubans from Spanish brutal-
ity, he had to ask: “Is America any better than Spain?” Despite his ambiva-
lence about the promise of national citizenship, he insisted on the allegiance 
of the race: “Yet the Negro is loyal to his country’s fl ag. O! he is a noble crea-
ture, loyal and true . . .  Forgetting that he is ostracized, his race considered as 
dumb as driven cattle, yet, as loyal and true men, he answers the call to arms 
and with blinding tears in his eyes and sobs he goes forth.” Prioleau’s hope 
was that black regiments would return home “and begin again to fi ght the 
battle of American prejudice.”65 “When I fall I intend to draw my last breath 
for the old fl ag under which I was born,” wrote Simon Brown of the Twenty- 
Th ird Kansas infantry to the “Citizens of Oswego.” In recognition of a com-
mon racial bond, Brown was also ready to die for “the poor Cubans as well”: 
“I am convinced that these people are of our Negro race, although they cannot 
speak the En glish language, but they have the complexion of our race.”66 In the 
meantime, many soldiers who fought in “colored regiments” hoped that their 
actions would be rewarded with inclusion in the regular U.S. Army. Th e war 
thus brought into focus the transnational dimension of loyalty as po liti cal 
practice. In a comparative sense, people of color invoked their allegiance to 
their respective nations where they resided in order to attain similar goals of 
po liti cal inclusion; in a connective sense, a recognition of shared African 
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 descent or blackness generated by encounters such as the war in 1898 nodded 
to allegiances that transcended national boundaries and might ground alter-
native projects for collective progress.
Th e fact that U.S. intervention extended the United States beyond its bor-
ders met with diverse responses by black soldiers. For some of them, loyalty 
and patriotism had their limits, especially when, as a member of the Tenth 
Cavalry asserted, “Cuba was a paradise.” “Th ere is not one soldier in the 
camp,” he argued, “who would not rather go to Cuba than remain in any 
part of the South.”67 Th ey saw other opportunities in Cuba and mused about 
abandoning the United States and seeking new lives in a new Cuba: a “Negro 
republic,” imagined W. C. Payne, “because the greater portion of the insur-
gents are Negroes and they are po liti cally ambitious.”68 In this possibility, 
some recognized the strength of transnational loyalties. In Santiago, wrote 
W. C. Warmsley, a surgeon in the Ninth Infantry, “the professional colored 
man would be idolized.” He cited “the businessmen (colored) of Santiago” 
who expressed a desire to share their national in de pen dence with “one mil-
lion colored men of education from the States. Th e colored  here, unlike those 
in the states, are loyal to each other and honest to a fault. Th ey will support a 
colored man in what ever business he undertakes.”69 Th e combined strength 
of Cubans and North Americans of African descent, wrote M. W. Dadler to 
Th e Freeman in Indianapolis, would “show to the world that true patriotism is 
in the minds of the sons of Ham.”70 Capitalizing on such true patriotism had 
been the goals of every power involved in the confl ict. Debates about the 
meaning of race to that devotion had been far from resolved when Spain sur-
rendered in August. Even as loyalty to Spain dissipated, the power of the idea 
of loyalty continued to give perspective to new conditions of citizenship and 
patriotism.
Perspectives on Spain in the United States changed as the contours of in-
tervention came into view. Spaniards had claimed the moral high ground 
in the war by casting insurgents as barbaric and uncivilized, which they rein-
forced by linking the insurgency to race war. By the end of the war, they 
found themselves on the losing side of the battle between civilization and 
barbarism. Th is characterization echoed that of Antonio Maceo during the 
Ten Years’ War, but it had now gained internationally recognized importance. 
Building on routine reports of Spanish tyranny—“Butcher” Weyler, the re-
concentration, an iron grip on an enticing market, and the destruction of the 
USS Maine— North American observers linked Spain to the unspeakable 
brutality of the general. Th e power of the U.S. state to suppress that brutality 
became a powerful image. Po liti cal cartoons in U.S. newspapers regularly 
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represented Cuba or Cubans through an easily recognized depiction of sub-
ordination: a child, a woman, and, quite oft en, a black child or woman. In a 
period when African Americans, too, appeared in cartoons as apes, one Phil-
adelphia Inquirer image portrayed “the Great Weyler Ape,” not as an un-
tamed savage beast running amok but as one caged and safely viewable (see 
fi gure 6.1). As a “great addition to our museum,” Weyler signifi ed a domi-
nated and contained strain of Spanish barbarism.
So, too, did Weyler’s personal executioner. Th e Greater America Exposi-
tion that took place in Omaha in 1899 featured a Cuban Village that included 
“Valentine” (probably a poor translation of Valentín or Valentino), billed as 
Weyler’s hangman responsible for hundreds of executions. On a daily basis 
he gave per for mances that reenacted executions (with his chair and garrote 
brought from Cuba). Fairgoers could take in the spectacle from safe distance, 
and they could take home stereographs of Valentine and his chair. In the 
comfort of their parlors, they could gaze at Valentine’s black savagery in 
the ser vice of Spain, content in knowing that his killing days  were behind 
him.71 It was on the foundation of images like those that Major- General James 
Wilson reminisced in 1912 that he knew in 1898 that Spain was “powerless to 
carry on the war in civilized fashion,” not because of material shortcomings 
but because of the impoverished condition that “her rapacity and misrule for 
four hundred years” had created on the island.72 Th at he came to attribute 
this same lack of “civilization” to Cubans as well speaks to the heavy lift ing 
that concept did at the time. In Wilson’s and many other imaginings, Cuba 
remained linked to Spain, though through a common lack of civilization 
rather than a formal colonial relationship.
How did Spaniards make sense of this new realignment? Th e evolution of 
the great Spanish Liberal statesman Francisco Pí y Margall off ers a glimpse into 
the malleability of Spanish racial and po liti cal discourse. A champion of Iberian 
federalism, he had long supported autonomy for Cuba, and his arguments as 
early as the 1850s made a strong case for abolishing slavery as an application 
of “the lessons of Santo Domingo” and a necessary step in preserving Cuba 
as part of the Spanish empire.73 With slavery abolished, Pí y Margall took a 
diff erent approach to balancing Cuban autonomy with continued support for 
Spain. By the 1890s he spoke of Cuba’s relationship to Spain in gendered 
terms— that Cuba was “already of age” and no longer in need of Spain’s fa-
therly protection. His advocacy for Cuban in de pen dence during the war 
distinguished him among his po liti cal peers, and so did his advocacy for 
conceiving of a “Latin race” whose imagined community would preserve com-
mercial ties between Spain and its former American colonies.74 He joined a 
figure 6.1 • Cartoon of “Th e Great Weyler Ape,” 1898. Th e caption reads, 
“Would make an excellent addition to our museum.” Originally published in 
the Philadelphia Inquirer.
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small chorus of Spanish writers who placed a history of global imperial dom-
inance and fantastic wealth in the ser vice of rendering the Spanish world 
civilized. Pseudoscientifi c arguments about Anglo- Saxon superiority lurked 
in the shadows, motivating these arguments, and aft er the war for in de pen-
dence of 1898, the implications for Spaniards  were none too subtle. Refl ecting 
in 1900 on what the Spaniards came to call El Desastre (Th e Disaster), Spanish 
journalist Joaquín Costa acknowledged the failures of old social categories 
and called for a new Spanish raza “as a counterweight to the Saxon race, to 
maintain the moral equilibrium in the infi nite game of history.”75
Th at the game had changed was still diffi  cult for some Cubans to accept. 
In August 1898, as Cubans watched with distress as Spain and the United 
States negotiated peace without repre sen ta tion from the Liberation Army, Ro-
dolfo de Lagardère took time to write to a Spanish lieutenant col o nel. If any 
person in this book could justifi ably represent a Spanish “loyalist,” it was 
Lagardère. He wrote to remind the offi  cer of the historic contributions of 
people of African descent to the Spanish empire. “I’m sure you know better 
than anyone the virtuous history of loyalty of the long- suff ering black race,” 
Lagardère wrote. Citing nearly one hundred years of in de pen dence move-
ments against Spanish rule in Latin America, his words of praise  were for “our 
conduct in Chile, in Buenos Aires, in San Juan, in Cartagena, in the past and 
in the current war, as well our decision to take up arms when the maintenance 
of order has demanded it.” He also requested, “in reward for our ser vices,” 
that the ser vices of Cubans of African descent be acknowledged in a public 
forum. Lagardère wanted assurance that dispatches would be sent to Madrid 
to document “that we  were fi ne Spanish soldiers and that this, with complete, 
free, and honest authority, is agreed to, in recognition of nuestra fi delidad 
jamás desmentida [our never- betrayed loyalty] during this century of so many 
revolts.”76 As he saw it, Cubans of color had been as ever- faithful to Spain 
over the long haul as the island as a  whole, and this was no time to betray that 
fi delity. He pinpointed, in the broadest terms possible, the signifi cance of 
African- descended peoples’ historical allegiance to Spain: it had been a cen-
tral element of Spanish rule in its American colonies that demanded public 
recognition, and the disintegration of national integrity threatened to devalue 
this remarkable contribution.
But what, one wonders, was Lagardère thinking? Hadn’t he also witnessed 
during that same century countless disappointing examples of Spain’s lim-
ited and broken promises to the “long- suff ering black race”? Th e evidence 
amassed in this book has intended to widen our po liti cal imagination to 
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 understand how even those broken promises could be accommodated by a 
subjective mode— not necessarily a fi xed identity— that maintained faith in 
Spanish colonialism. In his classic formulation of exit, voice, and loyalty, Al-
bert Hirschman postulated that “loyalty is at its most functional when it looks 
most irrational.”77 Of course, this depends on who’s doing the looking. La-
gardère only appears irrational from the perspective that his attachments to 
Spain  were unwarranted and counterintuitive (a free upgrade from “irratio-
nal”) and that he should have been supporting the cause of Cuba libre— that 
it was in his interests to do so. Even allowing that his support of Spain now 
put him in the minority, and that the historical value of loyalty needed better 
reconciliation with the state of Cuba at the end of the war, the assumption 
that his embrace of “exit” was prolonged fl attens a position that many Cu-
bans of color had long inhabited. Especially during a month when the sup-
porters of the Cuban in de pen dence movement realized their clear subjection 
to a new imperial power, neither adherence to Spain nor to Cuban national-
ism entirely fulfi lled Hirschman’s dictum that “loyalty holds exit at bay and 
activates voice.”78
spain’s defeat and the conclusion of the war confounded expec-
tations on all sides of the confl ict. For insurgents, U.S. intervention had com-
promised their vision of national in de pen dence. Spaniards  were left  to discern 
meaning in El Desastre. And while the U.S. military government had identi-
fi ed and secured the support of the island’s “best men”—“the propertied, the 
educated, the white,” in the words Louis A. Pérez Jr., including longtime sup-
porters of Spain— it faced an uphill battle to convince most Cubans of its le-
gitimacy.79 If the po liti cal landscape of the early 1890s had been characterized 
by fracture, war had only exacerbated— rather than reconciled— competing 
factions and ideas.
In a moment when the war’s outcome muffl  ed many Cuban voices, then, 
the work that race performed satisfi ed few. Th e in de pen dence movement’s 
commitment to ending racial diff erence and discrimination represented, at 
this point, the strongest critique of the concept itself, but one imperiled by 
changing circumstances; Spanish optimism about a unifi ed Latin race held 
only limited appeal on the island; and assertions of Anglo- Saxon superiority 
hardly held any appeal at all. How those fl uent in the language of Cuban na-
tionalism would, and could, challenge racism aft er Spanish rule depended in 
part on how Cubans assessed the changes and continuities between their Span-
ish imperialist past and the new imperialist presence of the United States. 
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 Aft er experiencing an expansion of po liti cal options leading up to the war, 
Cubans now faced the task of narrowing them down and defi ning national 
integrity anew. And so citizens of an in de pen dent Cuba, constrained by U.S. 
intervention and intent on preserving inclusionary goals of Cuba libre, ulti-
mately rendered loyalty to Spain anachronistic, irrational, and increasingly, 
but not entirely, invisible.
Conclusion
Subject Citizens and the Tragedy of Loyalty
Th ree years aft er winning in de pen dence from Spanish rule, Cubans gathered 
in Havana in 1901 for the island’s fi rst Constitutional Convention. Th e U.S. 
occupation government had sanctioned restricted elections for convention 
delegates one year earlier, and military authorities now anxiously monitored 
the proceedings.1 As debates revolved around universal male suff rage, Wil-
liam George Emmanuel— the Antiguan activist who had led the Unión Afri-
cana in Havana during the 1890s— wrote a fl urry of letters to President William 
McKinley and other U.S. offi  cials that spring. He protested the possible en-
franchisement of Cubans of color on the grounds that “the African natives, 
against their will, [ were] being forced into Cuban Nationality” and that they 
received more rights during slavery, as subjects of the Spanish crown, than 
they  were likely to receive in an in de pen dent Cuba.2 Emmanuel was less con-
cerned with the damaging eff ects of universal male citizenship rights on 
Cuban politics than on Cuban men of color themselves. To the north, ongoing 
African American disfranchisement loomed as a chilling example of what 
postwar national reconciliation could eff ect.3 In the end, Emmanuel’s pleas 
went unanswered, and the Cuban Constitutional Convention extended vot-
ing rights, with a few restrictions, to all Cuban men. With the inauguration 
of the Cuban Republic the following year, a system of representative govern-
ment conferred rights of citizenship without making race a criterion, some-
thing that the architects of Spanish rule had inched toward in the fi nal 
de cades of colonial rule but had never allowed to fl ourish.
On the fi rst day of 1899, U.S. soldiers stood watch as Adolfo Jiménez Cas-
tellanos, Spain’s last captain general, was escorted from his palace to the Bay 
of Havana, where he set sail to complete repatriation eff orts on the island and 
then to return to Spain (see fi gure C.1). As General John Ruller Brooke as-
sumed control of the island, it was clear that Cubans would not enjoy the 
unencumbered sovereignty they had earned in the course of a grueling war. 
So why would Emmanuel, a steadfast advocate for Cubans of color, try to 
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compromise that national vision even further? His skepticism about national 
citizenship, acknowledgment of rights conferred through imperial subject-
hood, and insistence that “African natives” had no instinctive draw to either 
one might seem anachronistic today, when citizenship and suff rage remain the 
locus of so many (but certainly not all) aspirations of demo cratic po liti cal com-
munity. Th is book has provided a genealogy of those ideas as they unfolded in 
practice, in various forms, throughout the fi nal de cades of the Spanish empire 
in Cuba. It explains how arguments like Emmanuel’s drew on a rich history 
of experiences and experiments with reciprocal relationships between Cubans 
of African descent and the Spanish government. Such reciprocities could be 
paternalistic, rewarding, exploitive, aff ective, and, above all, partial. But 
behind the continuity implied by the motto “Ever Faithful” was a dynamic 
pro cess that transformed the way that Cubans came to politics.
Th e ontogeny of two parallel strategies for po liti cal inclusion under colo-
nial rule comes into view through the actions of African- descended Cubans 
and shift s in Spanish colonial policy. Military participation, whether in a mi-
litia or in ser vice during war time, alternately aff orded black and mulatto men 
social status, freedom from slavery, and grounds for claiming citizenship in 
what evolved as Spain’s national empire.4 And as the institutions of the public 
sphere emerged in full force, associational life provided Cubans of color with 
an opportunity to participate and or ga nize through associations, po liti cal 
parties, and newspapers. Th e reach of loyal subjectivity extended into the Cu-
ban Republic, even though Cubans in the new po liti cal and cultural environ-
ment actively forgot what Rodolfo de Lagardère referred to in 1898 as “the 
virtuous history of loyalty.”
Most Cubans disavowed that history aft er 1898. Intent on defending and 
advancing a national project always under threat of U.S. manipulation, Cu-
bans discussed alternatives to nationalism perhaps less than they had before 
in de pen dence. Understanding that pro cess calls for a careful excavation of 
what Steven Feierman has called invisible history: the result of a pro cess by 
which “colonized social forms came to be cut off  from coherence— from the 
meaningful orientation of social action in historically rooted patterns.”5 What 
becomes visible in exploring Cuba’s invisible history is a closer relationship 
between forms of po liti cal personhood constituted under Spanish rule and 
aft er Cuban in de pen dence. As is clear from the history of race and loyalty 
during the nineteenth century, modes of colonial subjectivity and citizenship 
 were not just sequential but simultaneous. Th e same can be said for the Cu-
ban Republic: to the extent that Cuba still endured the vicissitudes of empire 
aft er 1898, most Cubans fi gured as both subjects and citizens.
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At a quick glance, U.S. occupiers seem to have been the fi rst (aft er those 
who fought for in de pen dence) to minimize and demonize the memory of 
Spain in Cuba. William George Emmanuel, was rare in his search for things 
positive about Spanish colonial rule. However, the racial politics of the vision 
of Cuban in de pen dence forged since 1868 should also be remembered in that 
forgetting. Th e overlap of Emanuel’s statements with those of Cubans from 
earlier de cades, such as Lagardère, suggests that the suppression and frag-
mentation of the history of loyalty was not exclusively the product of North 
American intervention. Indeed, the fabric of Cuban nationalism itself worked 
to conceal that narrative.
Concrete shift s in Cuba had occurred throughout the island with the war’s 
denouement, prompting an uneven pro cess of extricating Spanish authority. 
In contrast to the countryside, cities had remained Spanish strongholds for 
much of the war. Ayuntamientos counted numerous but dwindling pro- 
colonial members in their ranks. Th us, as the war ended, colonial offi  cials 
figure C.1 • Captain General Adolfo Jiménez Castellanos being escorted from 
the captain general’s palace to return to Spain, 1 January 1899. Courtesy of 
Houghton Library, Harvard University.
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and local governments awkwardly and begrudgingly cleared the way for a new 
po liti cal order. Th e captain general issued a circular that called on ayunta-
mientos to gather up the Spanish fl ags and royal portraits from civil and mili-
tary institutions so that they could be shipped back to Spain.6 Residents of 
Havana later forced the city’s mayor to ban the display of the Spanish fl ag or 
emblem on any building, including the meeting  houses of  unions, mutual aid 
societies, and veterans’ organizations. As the statue of Isabel II came down 
from its loft y pedestal on Havana’s Paseo del Prado, municipal leaders in 
Santiago de Cuba— on the opposite end of the island— called on ayuntamien-
tos throughout Cuba to contribute funds for a statue of Antonio Maceo, the 
revered insurgent general of African descent.7 Although the victory of Cuba 
libre ushered in a new order, its institutionalization was by no means obvi-
ous, predictable, or guaranteed, especially in the shadow of the North Amer-
ican presence. Liquidating the material culture of Spanish colonialism was a 
clear enough task. Erasing or displacing memories of loyalty to Spanish rule 
would not be so easy.
For journalist and in de pen dence activist Rafael Serra, the harsh experi-
ence of war had obliterated any nostalgia for Spanish rule. Between 1895 and 
1898, Serra routinely publicized the successes of Cubans of color in the in de-
pen dence eff ort and helped to create a pantheon of national martyrs and he-
roes. If the sides  were clearly delineated during the armed confl ict itself, the 
conclusion of the war left  Serra, like many Cubans, frustrated and confused 
about the island’s future as a free and sovereign nation. “Neither Spanish nor 
Yankee” became Serra’s postwar motto. He recognized the uncanny similari-
ties between the rhetoric of Spanish offi  cials who branded the in de pen dence 
movement as “a revolt of blacks,” as he wrote in 1899, commanded by “discon-
tent farmers,” and statements such as one in the New York Herald warning 
that “Cuba Libre signifi es another Black Republic. We do not want some-
thing of that disposition so close. Haiti is already enough.”8
Th e dismaying idea that “two or three rich Americans would be the eco-
nomic own ers of Cuba” accompanied Serra’s worries that U.S. imperial power 
would nullify the in de pen dence movement’s egalitarian promises of citizen-
ship. As early as 1897, he predicted a battle over universal male suff rage— a 
portent of the Constitutional Convention debates of 1901. Infl uential in the 
reconfi guration of Cuban sovereignty, Serra feared, would be African Ameri-
cans from the southern United States. Th e U.S. government might encourage 
the emigration of African Americans “in order to stimulate patriotism, ex-
ploit their loyalty, and set them like an attack dog against everything that 
may not be blind obedience to the arrogant gods of Yankee paganism.” Con-
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fronting limited job opportunities and the ominous threat of lynching, Serra 
allowed that African Americans might also be favorably disposed to seeking 
new lives in Cuba. Th is apprehension might have been well founded. Serra 
concluded that “the diff erence in language, the superiority of education of the 
American black, and many other circumstances will come to impoverish the 
condition of the also miserable Cuban black.”9 Equally appalling for Serra 
was that the military intervention of the United States in the summer of 1898 
diminished the status of the Cuban Liberation Army, which the occupation 
government dissolved aft er the peace negotiations. Cubans of African de-
scent, who occupied prominent positions in the army, stood to lose the most. 
With the reconstitution of the Cuban army, the United States invalidated 
the multiracial leadership of the Liberation Army and insisted on an all- 
white offi  cer corps. With the strongest evidence he could muster, Serra 
combated statements that the “element of color” neither gained from nor 
contributed to the war.
His ambivalence extended to Spanish rule and to Cuban leaders. He ac-
knowledged that even “the government of Spain grasped how much the blacks 
gained by having contributed with their arms and blood to the Ten Years’ 
War. If that was with Spain, must we fall in error to consider Cubans inferior 
in generosity to the cruel Spanish governments?”10 Serra included in his col-
lection of writings from 1907 a report by a commission formed aft er a meet-
ing between Liberal President Tomás Estrada Palma and Generoso Campos 
Marquetti, president of the association of veterans of color. Th e commission 
charged that the artillery corps “decisively” excluded Cubans of African 
descent from its offi  cer ranks. In the Guardia Rural, offi  cers delayed and ig-
nored the hiring and promotion of hombres de color. In police hiring, offi  cers 
harassed black and mulatto applicants with so many unfavorable investiga-
tions that very few of them could become patrolmen or policemen. In the few 
exceptional cases of black or mulatto superiors, the police presented a “wicked 
pretext” for their ultimate exclusion. Serra questioned the fact that for many 
years, even the southern United States had black police offi  cers, and now 
white policemen from the United States had found employment in Cuba.
Th ese exclusions aff ronted one of the greatest achievements of the nation-
alist insurgency. Th e movement’s antiracist ideal, and model for subsequent 
cross- racial politics, found its most visible practice in the diverse composi-
tion of the Liberation Army’s leadership and ranks. Segregating and discrimi-
nating military institutions robbed Cubans of one of their most powerful 
symbols of in de pen dence. Virtually powerless to change the new policies them-
selves, Cubans worked in the 1900s to preserve the memory of that achievement 
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of racial cooperation. Monuments, homages, and banquets commemorated 
black and mulatto veterans, martyrs, and heroes of the war and forced their 
audiences to confront publicly the social signifi cance of the multiracial and 
antiracist elements of Cuban nationalism.11 In addressing this specifi c issue, 
the military loyalties that linked people of African descent to the Spanish 
crown as late as 1898 served little purpose for Cubans in the Republic looking 
to the past for explanation, orientation, or inspiration. For one thing, North 
American occupiers off ered terms of inclusion for Cubans of African descent 
that  were similar to those of Spain: conditional inclusion in public life and 
little chance of offi  cer status in the regular military. Simply put, there was 
little comparative advantage to invoking Spanish military participation over 
the contributions of insurgents who as early as 1868 claimed the title of ciu-
dadano cubano (Cuban citizen).
More important, the racial lines drawn in new military institutions formed 
part of a larger confl ict over representing the nation. Th e image of racial co-
operation was now eclipsed by an alternative depiction of Cuban nationhood 
emphasizing, in Ada Ferrer’s words, the “prominence of educated white lead-
ers, commonalities with American achievements, and the modern, civilized 
status of the would- be nation.” Th is was not a new war of images, but its 
resurgence during U.S. intervention “helped overdetermine the outcome.”12 
Cubans, those of African descent in par tic u lar, had to plan their public inter-
ventions strategically, and the military loyalties of the in de pen dence eff ort 
made a more compelling case for commemorating Cuban citizenship than 
those of Spanish colonial rule. In this environment, every act of remembrance 
signaled a victory in a battle over cubanismo that was tipping in favor of a se-
verely limited vision of racial justice and inclusion.
Th e stakes of this battle  were not lost on Rafael Serra, nor  were its con-
sequences. Writing from New York in 1901, he recognized that conditions for 
most Cubans of color had not dramatically changed from the time of Spanish 
rule. But he explained the continuity between colony and Republic by citing 
the intransigence of nationalist leaders to address racial inequalities. When 
cubanismo existed under Spanish rule, in his view, it
openly opposed itself against the enjoyment of civil rights that the govern-
ment of the monarchy decreed in favor of blacks. But then they told us: 
suff er a little now, because any disagreement between Cubans can ruin the 
redemptive work for which we have come together. Th e black conceded. 
Th e war erupted. Th e blacks had to suff er injustices of emigration and in-
justices in the battlefi eld and  here, like before, they said: suff er a little now, 
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because any disagreement between Cubans can ruin the redemptive work 
for which we have come together. Th e war ended. Spaniards and Cubans 
embraced, [Rafael] Montoro and Martí kissed, and they leave the blacks in 
nearly the same condition as during Spanish rule. But still they say: suff er 
a little now, because what happens  here is because of the Yankees, and any 
disagreement between Cubans can ruin the redemptive work for which we 
have come together, and we now ought to be arm in arm and with a single 
heart, to work so that these Yankee lynchers go and leave us.13
Serra was almost always openly critical of the United States: of lynching, 
disfranchisement, and antimiscegenation laws within its borders, and of its 
presence in Cuba for the many reasons previously discussed. But he was not 
ready to concede that the new imperialist presence exclusively explained 
racism and produced inequalities. In Serra’s view, colonialism— whether 
Spanish or North American— provided Cuban leaders with con ve nient op-
portunities for scapegoating. Th e real problem lay in the inherent inability the 
adherents of Cuban nationalism to address racial problems in a serious way. 
As Louis A. Pérez Jr. has noted, “Th e imperative of nation thus foreclosed the 
invocation of race, presumably by whites and blacks, under the aegis of racial 
equality. ‘Equality’ between the races within racist structures, however, 
promised to institutionalize racism.”14 In their struggle to complete the “re-
demptive work” of cubanismo, Cuban leaders had to strike a balance between 
making claims to sovereignty in the shadow of United States imperialism and 
leveling the inequities that had survived aft er in de pen dence. To Rafael Serra, 
asserting the imperative of nation and attending to racist structures  were 
identical pro cesses, and the inability of those leaders to share that vision and 
act on it led to a polity with diff erential access to citizenship and the contin-
ued subjugation of Cubans of color.
In many respects, the Cuban Republic did reproduce many of the prob-
lems of the Spanish colony. Th e idea of Cuba libre confronted limits as United 
States intervention denied Cubans the national sovereignty, self- determination, 
and in de pen dence they had never fully attained under Spain. Despite shift s in 
the meaning of race and the achievements of the in de pen dence movement, in-
equalities and discrimination still existed. Such social inequities guaranteed 
that many Cubans of African descent would not enjoy the same rewards for 
their labor or the same access to the rights of citizenship as those enjoyed by 
white Cubans.15
In general terms, the colonial legacy in Latin America has made its 
 inhabitants, as Steve Stern has argued, “less rooted in the quest to treat the 
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past as closed and sealed” and instead “free to see it as open, surprising, and 
therefore contestable.”16 In what he calls the “tricks of time,” he shows how 
some Latin Americans have invoked the colonial past to challenge per sis tent 
postcolonial inequalities. Yet, the similarities between the colony and the Re-
public in Cuba did not seem to inspire the inventive responses that Stern high-
lights. Cubans largely sought to forget about the colony and allegiances to the 
former imperial power in the interests of asserting a national identity within 
the context of the new colonial domination by the United States. For Cubans of 
African descent, this meant abandoning a history of loyalty that some now saw 
as contributing to the same continuities they struggled to change.
Very few commentators of African descent, then, thought with the history 
of loyalty, overlooking a narrative with as many layers of counterrevolution in 
the nineteenth century as layers of revolution that Cubans came to celebrate 
in the twentieth century. In that earlier history, strategic ascriptions loyalty 
subjectivity singled out potentially rebellious populations and attempted to 
integrate them as devoted subjects. As a concept of social or ga ni za tion, it 
could connect people— in a colonial polity and through a public sphere— in a 
continuous pro cess of identifi cation and diff erentiation.17 Colonial loyalty be-
came an odd idea in a po liti cal culture in which U.S. imperialism attempted to 
stifl e and distort even the memory of the struggle for in de pen dence. Many 
Cubans of African descent in the Republic sought to make a new history, one 
that might occasionally carefully draw from the colonial past if only to illus-
trate re sis tance to it. Th ey preferred other tricks of time, and worked so that 
the history of loyalty indeed remain “closed and sealed” in order to remember 
a revolutionary past and to imagine a revolutionary future.
Nevertheless, aspects of loyal subjectivity informed struggles for citizen-
ship rights in the Cuban Republic. Cubans of color identifi ed “two principal 
modes of imagining citizenship,” as Alejandra Bronfman notes: claims based 
on military ser vice and those tied to “civic virtue, [which] sought equal sta-
tus through education and participation in associational life.”18 Nor did verti-
cal relationships between po liti cal leaders and race- based associations 
disappear; members of black associations regularly relied on patronage from 
well- placed politicians for resources.19 Even the language used to comprehend 
the presence of the United States clung closely to paternalistic ideas about 
gratitude, even as they delineated anticolonial possibilities.20 Although the 
specifi c history of loyalty to Spanish rule faded from view, the po liti cal sub-
jectivities that it generated conditioned the participation of Cubans of color 
in Republican politics as well as its aff ective structures of power. Whether or 
not activists understood themselves to be performing radically diff erent or 
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similar politics to those of their colonial pre de ces sors, they embodied a pro-
cess of surrogacy in which earlier memories, consciously or not, improvised 
from— as Joseph Roach puts it—“representations by those whom they imag-
ined into existence as their defi nitive opposites.”21
If the story of colonial loyalty ended tragically aft er in de pen dence, 
it helps to remember the ambivalence and unresolved ends implicit in the 
tragic mode.22 Both race- based claims to inclusion in the Spanish empire and 
the race- transcendent citizenship of Cuban in de pen dence emerged out of 
fl awed, incomplete, and uneven pro cesses. “Colonial legacy” might not ade-
quately characterize this ambivalent (tragic) relationship. A more generative 
understanding of the connection between colonial formations to anti- and 
postcolonial aspirations might draw from the work of David Scott, who asks: 
“Does anticolonialism depend upon a certain way of telling the story about 
the past, present, and future? . . .  Or to put it slightly diff erently: Does the po-
liti cal point of anticolonialism depend on constructing colonialism as a par-
tic u lar kind of conceptual and ideological object? Does the moral point of 
anticolonialism depend on constructing colonialism as a par tic u lar kind of 
obstacle to be overcome?”23 One could easily ask the same of antiracism. 
Th ese questions underscore the importance of the colonial past to reimagin-
ing Cuba’s historical struggles against foreign power and racial discrimina-
tion. Prospects for pessimism abound: does it diminish the heroism and moral 
force of antiracism and anticolonialism to retell the story of Spanish rule as 
one of pop u lar support, even as it continued to limit po liti cal  membership— as 
subjects or citizens— through deeply entrenched ideologies of racial diff er-
ence and hierarchy? In many respects, the history of loyalty in the nineteenth 
century foregrounds the uphill battles faced by those who fought for in de-
pen dence and for a race- free nation. Instead of encouraging nostalgia for the 
colonial past, a new vision of Spanish colonialism might identify across the 
imperial- national divide allied but not identical struggles. Recalling Spanish 
po liti cal ideology as both national and imperial, colonial formations within 
the Cuban nation receive their due; national legacies within neo co lo nial 
Cuba open up new ways of thinking about citizenship and subjecthood, and 
the racial presumptions implicit in each.
What makes empire such a per sis tent po liti cal form? Quite oft en, the forces 
of state and capital that give it strength and meaning appear unstoppable, if 
not because of deeply entrenched inequalities that concentrate power in the 
few, then because those forces appear to transcend human agency altogether. 
Th ey chug along, absorbing resources and eclipsing viable alternative visions. 
Yet examples of people at all levels of power mounting challenges to empire 
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are to be found throughout history, quite visibly so in the history of Cuba, the 
African diaspora, and Latin America as a  whole. If the agency of those indi-
viduals has been a motor of anti- imperialism, we must acknowledge and ac-
count for its obverse: the actions of people who have strengthened imperial 
formations through their active consent, willful participation, and benign 
neglect. Th is book is intended as a contribution to the intellectual project of 
making sense of that power. But it is not a celebration of it. Nor should the 
endurance of empire make the past seem unchanging or to make the fi ght to 
broaden the po liti cal imagination futile. Proponents of that view might con-
sider a parallel to the history of racial ideology. Emphasizing the per sis tence 
of race obscures the historically contingent ways that individuals have re-
produced and revised it to adapt to changing worlds.24 Although this eff ect 
may explain why race remains as crucially linked to imperial as to national 
forms of po liti cal community, it should also strike a better balance between 
per sis tence and change. It is little wonder, then, that Cubans in the nine-
teenth  century— as citizens and subjects, slave and free— arrived at diverse 
answers to these same questions. Many, if not most of them, expressed their 
po liti cal ideas through the vocabularies of race and loyalty, keenly aware of 
the possibilities for change that they contained.
Obviously, 1898 did not mark the end of imperialism in Cuba. Nor did the 
replacement of Spanish infl uence by almost six de cades of a weighty United 
States presence simply reproduce or perpetuate imperial practices developed 
over four hundred years— in other words, making empire permanent on the 
island. If the in de pen dence movements to which Rodolfo de Lagardère wist-
fully referred throughout his career did not represent the defi nitive end of 
the Spanish empire— contrary to arguments that they initiated the “modern” 
period in Latin American history— Cuban in de pen dence likewise brought 
ambivalent ends to Spanish rule, not least because of the hierarchies and in-
equalities it sustained left  enduring legacies. But the continuities of racial 
discrimination in Cuba contained within them constantly changing ideologi-
cal frames, with mutating praxes of subordination as well as novel tactics for 
contesting them. Th at the rhetoric of United States domination, quite diff er-
ently from Spanish tradition, routinely disavowed the label of empire, quite 
diff erent from Spanish tradition, attests to the multiplicity of goals, methods, 
and limits of imperial power. Empire, no matter how many challengers and 
supporters it has endured, has— and continues to have— a great many ends.
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